THE  MONITOR 

AND   THE 

NAVY  UNDER  STEAM 


EM.  BENNETT 


/cf/V 


THE  MONITOR 

AND 

THE  NAVY  UNDER  STEAM 

BY 

FRANK   M.    BENNETT 

LIEUTENANT  U.  S.  NAVY 


^Illustration* 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

(Ibe  ffitontfibe  J&nrjs?,  Cambridge 

1900 


COPYRIGHT,    1900,   BY   FRANK   M.    BENNETT 

AND    HOUGHTON,   MIFFLIN   &  CO. 

ALL   RIGHTS   RESERVED 


PEEFACE 

THIS  book  is  written  at  the  request  of  the  pub- 
lishers as  a  history  of  the  origin,  career,  and  in- 
fluence of  the  United  States  ironclad  steamer 
Monitor.  The  subject  is  a  broad  one,  but  is  lim- 
ited herein  by  the  space  proposed  to  only  a  cursory 
treatment.  Many  details  have  by  necessity  been 
left  out,  and  only  such  material  has  been  used  as 
would  serve  best  to  indicate  the  important  stages 
and  events  of  the  progressive  story.  It  is  the 
hope  of  the  author  that  he  has  presented  enough 
to  impress  his  readers  with  the  magnitude  of  the 
changes  in  all  branches  of  human  industry,  and 
particularly  in  naval  methods,  that  have  been 
brought  about  by  the  steam  engine  during  the 
course  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

In  the  gradual  transformation  of  ships  of  war 
from  the  wooden  sailing-ship  to  the  steel  armored 
steam  battleship,  the  Monitor  occupies  a  midway 
station.  More  than  half  a  century  of  steady  pro- 
gress in  the  application  of  steam  power  to  the 
mechanic  arts  was  necessary  to  make  her  possible, 
and  her  success  in  meeting  the  conditions  for 


iv  PREFACE 

which  she  was  built  served  to  fix  a  standard  for 
future  war-vessels,  to  sound  the  death-knell  of  the 
wooden  ship  of  sails,  and  to  herald  to  all  navies 
the  age  of  iron  and  steam.  It  is  fitting,  therefore, 
that  the  history  of  the  Monitor  should  include 
accounts  of  the  causes  that  produced  her  and  the 
effects  that  followed  after.  Without  these,  the 
story  would  be  but  half  told,  though  her  brief 
war  career  was  such  as  to  make  her  one  of  the 
most  famous  ships  the  navy  of  the  United  States 
has  ever  contained,  and  might  fittingly  become 
the  subject  of  a  volume  much  larger  than  this. 
The  Monitor  has  lain  these  many  years  at  the 
bottom  of  the  ocean,  and  the  busy  brain  that 
created  her  has  long  since  ceased  its  labors ;  but 
the  features  peculiar  to  her  have  been  perpetu- 
ated and  amplified  in  all  navies,  and  the  greatest 
battleships  of  the  world  are  impressive  monuments 
in  memory  of  the  great  inventor. 

F.  M.  B. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

ORIGIN  AND  PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

The  Nineteenth  Century  a  Period  of  Remarkable  Progress 
and  Change.  These  Changes  due  to  the  Steam  Engine. 
Complete  Revolution  in  Naval  Armaments  and  Methods. 
Important  Period  marked  by  Ericsson's  Monitor.  Evolu- 
tion of  the  Ironclad.  Beginning  of  Steam  Navigation. 
Early  Experimenters.  Dr.  Papin  and  the  First  Actual 
Steamboat,  1707.  John  Allen,  1729.  Jonathan  Hulls, 
1736.  Rumsey  and  Fitch  in  America.  Miller  and  Sym- 
ington, 1787-1789.  Dundas  and  Symington,  1802.  John 
Stevens,  1802.  Screw  Propeller  patented  before  1800. 
Robert  Fulton  and  the  Clermont,  1807.  Steam  first  used 
in  Navies.  Influence  of  Fulton.  The  Demologos,  the 
First  War-Steamer  ever  built.  Early  American  and  Eng- 
lish Steam  Vessels  of  War.  Disadvantages  of  Side  Wheels. 
John '  Ericsson.  Application  of  the  Screw  Propeller. 
Wider  Field  for  Naval  Operations  made  possible  by  Steam. 
Services  of  Steam  Vessels  in  the  War  with  Mexico.  Influ- 
ence of  Steam  and  Machinery  in  the  Expedition  to  Japan. 
The  First  Atlantic  Cable  laid  by  American  and  English 
War-Steamers.  The  Paraguay  Expedition.  Affair  of  the 
Pei-ho.  Influence  of  Shell-Guns.  The  Question  of  Armor. 
The  Stevens  Circular  Ironclad,  1812.  The  Timby  Revolv- 
ing Fort.  The  Stevens  Battery.  French  Armored  Bat- 
teries of  1854.  Ironclads  in  Action  at  Kinburn,  1855. 
First  French  and  English  Armored  Frigates.  Armored 
Battery  proposed  by  Ericsson  in  1854 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  H 

BUILDING  AND  BATTLE   OF   THE   IRONCLADS 

Beginning  of  Armored  Shipbuilding  in  the  United  States. 
Opinions  of  Board  of  Naval  Officers  regarding  Ironclads. 
Navy  Department  advertises  for  Armored  Ships.  Three 
Plans  accepted.  The  Gunboat  Galena.  The  New  Iron- 
sides. The  Monitor.  Origin  of  the  Name.  Energy  of 
John  Ericsson.  Building  of  the  Monitor.  Failure  on  First 
Trial.  Vessel  in  Commission.  The  Frigate  Merrimac. 
Efforts  to  save  her  from  the  Confederates.  Scuttled  and 
Upper  Works  burned.  Raised  by  the  Confederates. .  Con- 
verted into  an  Armored  Battery.  Race  to  complete  the 
Ironclads  of  North  and  South.  Importance  of  the  Issue. 
Finished  at  the  Same  Time.  Merrimac  attacks  and  de- 
stroys Congress  and  Cumberland.  Minnesota  and  other 
Federal  Ships  participate  in  the  Action.  Completeness  of 
the  Victory  of  the  Merrimac.  Dismay  in  Washington. 
The  Crew  of  the  Monitor.  Perils  of  Her  Voyage  from 
New  York.  Her  Timely  Arrival  in  Hampton  Roads.  Or- 
dered to  defend  the  Minnesota.  Battle  with  the  Merrimac. 
Captain  Worden  disabled.  The  Merrimac  abandons  the 
Fight.  Injuries  of  the  Two  Ships.  The  Monitor  Success- 
ful. Far-reaching  Influences  of  the  Battle.  The  Advent 
of  the  Iron  Age  of  Naval  Construction.  Subsequent  His- 
tory and  Destruction  of  the  Merrimac.  Loss  of  the 
Monitor 69 

CHAPTER  HI 

SOME   NAVAL   EVENTS  OF   THE   CIVIL   WAB 

Sailing- Vessels  used  to  only  a  Limited  Extent  in  the  Civil 
War.  Many  Steamers  added  to  the  Navy.  Importance  of 
Naval  Operations  in  the  Mississippi  River.  Battle  of  the 
Forts  below  New  Orleans.  Loss  of  the  Varuna.  Farragut 
passes  the  Batteries  at  Vicksburg.  Disaster  to  the  Mound 
City.  Encounter  with  the  Ram  Arkansas.  Naval  Battle 
at  Port  Hudson.  Destruction  of  the  Mississippi.  Assem- 


CONTENTS  vii 

bling  of  Monitors  off  Charleston.  Unsuccessful  Attack  on 
the  Charleston  Batteries.  Lack  of  Confidence  in  Monitors. 
Defeat  and  Capture  of  the  Atlanta  by  the  Weehawken. 
Loss  of  the  Weehawken.  Injury  to  Commerce  of  the 
United  States  by  Confederate  Privateers  and  Cruisers. 
Career  of  the  Alabama.  Sinking  of  the  Hatteras.  Duel 
between  the  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama.  Admiral  Farra- 
gut's  Great  Battle  in  Mobile  Bay.  The  Tecumseh  de- 
stroyed by  a  Torpedo.  Capture  of  the  Tennessee.  Results 
of  the  Battle 146 

CHAPTER  IV 

EVOLUTION   OP   THE   BATTLESHIP 

Changes  in  War-ship  Construction  hastened  by  the  Example 
of  the  Monitor.  Revival  of  the  Ram.  Turret  System  of 
mounting  Guns  the  Chief  Legacy  of  the  Monitor.  Many 
Monitors  built  for  the  United  States  Navy.  The  Passaic 
Class.  The  Dictator  and  the  Puritan.  The  Miantonomoh 
Class.  The  Dunderberg.  Influence  of  the  Monitor  in 
Europe.  Captain  Cowper  Coles  and  his  Cupola  Ship.  The 
Rolf  Krake  and  other  Coles  Monitors.  The  Huascar. 
First  Turret  Ships  for  the  British  Navy.  The  Royal  Sov- 
ereign and  the  Prince  Albert.  The  Monarch.  The  Captain. 
The  Devastation  and  the  Thunderer.  The  Inflexible. 
Smaller  English  Monitors.  Broadside  and  Box-Battery 
Ships  versus  Turrets.  Later  English  Battleships.  The  Tur- 
ret Ship  in  France.  The  Italian  Duilio.  Ericsson's  Inven- 
tion adopted  by  the  Nations  of  Northern  Europe.  Russian 
Monitors.  Circular  Ironclads.  Decadence  of  the  United 
States  Navy  after  the  Civil  War.  Miantonomoh  Class  re- 
built The  New  Puritan.  The  Texas  and  the  Maine.  The 
Monterey.  The  First  American  Battleships.  The  Oregon 
and  her  Class.  American  and  English  Battleships  compared. 
Remarkable  Record  of  the  Oregon.  The  Iowa.  Latest 
American  Battleships.  The  Arkansas  Class  of  Monitors. 
The  Modern  Battleship  the  Offspring  of  the  Monitor  and 
Typical  of  the  Iron  Worker's  Progress  during  the  Nine- 
teenth Century 212 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V 

PRINCIPAL  ACTS  OF  THE   NAVY  IN  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

Different  Character  of  Naval  Operations  in  the  Far  East  and 
in  the  West  Indies.  Provocation  for  the  War.  The  Maine 
sent  to  Havana.  Her  Destruction.  Finding  of  the  Naval 
Court  of  Inquiry.  War  Preparations.  The  American 
Asiatic  Squadron.  Battle  in  Manila  Bay.  Its  Results. 
The  North  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron.  Rear  Admiral 
Sampson.  North  Coast  of  Cuba  blockaded.  Affair  at 
Matanzas.  The  Spanish  Cape  Verde  Squadron.  Naval 
Expedition  to  Puerto  Rico.  Battle  at  San  Juan.  First 
Casualties  of  the  War.  Spanish  Squadron  appears  in  the 
West  Indies.  Efforts  to  find  it.  Located  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba.  Blockade  of  Santiago  established.  Sinking  of  the 
Merrimac.  Mine  Defenses  of  Santiago  Harbor.  Bombard- 
ments. Landing  of  the  American  Army.  Naval  Battle  of 
July  Third.  The  Battle  the  Decisive  Point  of  the  War. 
Surrender  of  Santiago.  The  Victorious  Fleet  comes  Home  269 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

JOHN  ERICSSON.  From  hia  Contributions  to  the  Centennial 
Exhibition Frontispiece 

TRIPLE  HULL  BOAT  WITH  PADDLE  WHEELS,  BY  PATRICK 
MILLER,  1787.  From  Woodcraft's  Origin  and  Progress  of 
Steam  Navigation 6 

THE  CLERMONT,  1807.  From  Woodcroft's  Origin  and  Pro- 
gress of  Steam  Navigation 10 

UNITED  STATES  WAR  STEAMER  DEMOLOGOS,  1814.  After 
original  drawings  by  Fulton 12 

GROWTH  OF  MARINE  ENGINES  AND  ORDNANCE  WITHIN 
FIFTY  YEARS 20 

FIRST    FRENCH   AND    ENGLISH   ARMOR -PLATED    STEAM 

FRIGATES 64 

French   Frigate   La  Gloire,    1859.     After  design   in   Sir 

Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy. 
Arrangement  of  Armor  on  H.  M.  S.  Black  Prince.    After 

design  in  Murray's  Ship  Building  in  Iron  and  Wood. 
English    Frigate    Warrior,    1860.     After  design    in    Sir 
Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy. 

UNITED  STATES  IRONCLADS,  1862 76 

Gunboat  Galena.     From  volume  viii.  Official  Records. 
Frigate  New  Ironsides.     After  a  sketch,  1863. 

ERICSSON'S  IRONCLAD  CUPOLA  VESSEL.  Proposed  to  Em- 
peror Napoleon  II.  in  1854.  After  design  in  "  Contribu- 
tions"   82 

THE  MONITOR,  1862.     From  "  Contributions  " 82 

THE  MERRIMAC 96 

United  States  Steam  Frigate,  1855.     After  a  lithograph. 
Confederate  Armored  Steam  Ram,  1862.     From  volume  vii. 
Official  Records. 

THE  MONITOR  AND  MERRIMAC  COMPARED 120 

ACTION  BETWEEN  MONITOR  AND  MERRIMAC.  From  the 
painting  by  William  F.  Halsall,  in  the  Capitol,  Wash- 
ington   130 

U.  S.  S.  HARTFORD.     From  a  photograph 152 


x  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

GROUP  OF  PORTRAITS 170 

Andrew  H.  Foote,  David  D.  Porter,  David  G.  Farragut, 
Franklin  Buchanan,  John  L.  Worden.  From  photographs 
in  the  collection  of  the  Massachusetts  Commandery  of  the 
Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  United  States. 

ACTION    BETWEEN     THE    KEARSARGE   AND   THE   ALABAMA. 

From  the  painting  by  H.  Durand  Brager  in  the  possession 

of  the  Union  League  Club,  New  York,  N.  Y 196 

U.  S.  S.  DUNDERBERG.   After  design  in  Sir  Thomas  Brassey's 

The  British  Navy 220 

EARLY    FOREIGN    TURRET    SHIPS.    After  designs  in  Sir 

Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy 232 

Danish  Ship  Rolf  Krake,  Peruvian  Ship  Huascar,  H.  M.  S. 

Royal  Sovereign. 
ENGLISH  BATTLESHIPS,   1867-1871.    After  designs  in  Sir 

Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy 240 

Devastation,  Captain,  Monarch. 
H.  M.  S.  INFLEXIBLE,   1876.    After  design  in  the  Naval 

Annual.     Edited  by  T.  A.  Brassey 242 

RUSSIAN  CIRCULAR  STEAM  BATTERY  NOVGOROD.    After 

design  in  Sir  Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy      .     .      252 
FRENCH  TURRET  RAM  BOULEDOGUE.    After  design  in  Sir 

Thomas  Brassey's  The  British  Navy 252 

UNITED  STATES  MONITOR  PASSAIC,  1862.    After  design  in 

Ericsson's  "  Contributions  " 256 

UNITED  STATES  MONITOR  PURITAN,  1896.    After  Govern- 
ment drawings 256 

UNITED  STATES  SECOND-CLASS   BATTLESHIPS.    After  de- 
signs in  the  Naval  Annual 258 

Texas,  Maine. 
FIRST-CLASS    BATTLESHIPS.    After  designs  in  the  Naval 

Annual 262 

U.  S.  S.  Oregon,  H.  M.  S.  Centurion. 

U.  S.  S.  OREGON.     From  a  photograph 264 

U.  S.  PROTECTED  CRUISER  OLYMPIA.     From  a  photograph  280 
MANILA  BAY.     Adapted  from  Government  Chart    ....  286 

ADMIRAL  DEWEY.    From  a  photograph 292 

REAR  ADMIRAL  SAMPSON.    From  a  photograph    ....  292 
U.  S.  ARMORED  CRUISER  NEW  YORK.    From  a  photograph  298 
ENTRANCE  OF  SANTIAGO   HARBOR.    After  Sketch  in  Pro- 
ceedings U.  S.  Naval  Institute,  December,  1898    ....  332 


THE  MONITOR 
AND  THE  NAVY  UNDER  STEAM 


CHAPTER  I 

ORIGIN    AND    PROGRESS    OF    STEAM    NAVIGATION 

THE  steam  engine  has  made  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury a  period  of  such  marvelous  advancement  that 
it  is  not  unusual  to  claim  for  it  greater  progress 
than  was  witnessed  by  the  five  or  even  ten  cen- 
turies immediately  preceding  it.  If  we  look  back 
one  hundred  years  and  compare  the  surroundings 
of  life  with  the  conditions  that  we  are  familiar 
with  to-day  it  is  easy  to  realize  that  this  is  true. 
The  eighteenth  century  ended  with  the  world  in 
practically  the  same  condition  as  at  its  beginning, 
and  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, and  the  sixteenth,  and  the  others  that  went 
before.  But  in  what  a  wonderful  world  of  change 
we  are  li ving  now !  At  the  beginning  of  the 
present  century  no  locomotive  had  ever  turned  a 
wheel  upon  a  rail ;  there  were  no  steamboats 
except  here  and  there  a  rude  affair  that  had  not 
successfully  emerged  from  the  experimental  stage  ; 


the  telegraph,  the  telephone,  the  dynamo,  the  elec- 
tric motor  -and  the  electric  light,  and  a  multitude 
of  other  mechanical  appliances,  so  familiar  that 
they  seem  a  natural  and  necessary  part  of  our 
daily  life,  were  absolutely  unknown,  and  for  the 
greater  part  not  even  thought  of  as  within  the 
bounds  of  human  possibility. 

In  all  this  great  transformation  no  change  has 
been  more  complete  and  striking  than  that  of  naval 
armaments.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  for  many  years  afterward,  the  tall 
wooden  sailing  ship-of-the-line  was  regarded  as  the 
invincible  sovereign  of  the  seas  and  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  best  work  that  man  was  believed 
capable  of.  It  had  been  developed  by  several  cen- 
turies of  slow  growth,  in  which  was  much  labor, 
experiment,  experience,  study,  and  patience  ; 
yet  the  grand  result  was  swept  away  in  a  very 
small  part  of  the  time  that  had  been  neces- 
sary to  produce  it,  and  it  was  supplanted  by  a 
fabric  a  hundred  fold  more  formidable,  represent- 
ing in  infinitely  greater  variety  the  product  of 
man's  ingenuity,  and  so  different  m  outward  ap- 
pearance and  internal  economy  that  it  is  difficult 
to  imagine  the  one  filling  the  sphere  of  the  other. 

It  will  be  the  purpose  of  this  volume  to  de- 
scribe this  naval  transformation,  with  special  refer- 
ence to  its  influence  upon  the  history  of  our  own 
country.  Though  young  among  the  nations,  we 
had  the  beginning  of  a  navy  and  the  beginning  of 


THE  MONITOR  AN  EPOCH  MAKER  3 

naval  history  before  the  advent  of  steam,  and  were 
thus  in  a  position  to  accept  and  deal  with  it  under 
the  same  considerations  that  appealed  to  older 
naval  powers.  The  history  of  our  navy  under 
steam  divides  itself  into  two  parts,  rather  sharply 
separated  by  a  peculiar  war-vessel  forced  into  the 
field  of  action  in  advance  of  its  natural  time  by 
the  demands  of  a  great  war  and  destined  suddenly 
to  change  by  its  example  the  naval  armaments  and 
methods  of  all  nations.  The  first  part  deals  with 
the  early  use  of  steam  at  sea  ;  of  its  slow  introduc- 
tion for  naval  purposes ;  of  the  efforts  to  take 
advantage  of  its  aid  without  giving  up  the  out- 
ward appearance  or  established  characteristics  of 
the  conventional  ship  of  war,  and  of  the  extent  to 
which  it  influenced  and  enlarged  naval  tactics  and 
opportunity.  Then  came,  abruptly  and  born  of 
peculiar  conditions,  John  Ericsson's  Monitor,  the 
central  figure  in  a  series  of  events  that  cast  hope- 
less discredit  upon  the  old-established  type  of  war- 
ship, and  was  the  beginning  of  the  new  naval 
history  that  has  iron  and  steel  and  steam  for  its 
agencies. 

The  first  attempts  to  make  practical  use  of  the 
power  of  steam  and  the  earliest  efforts  to  apply 
that  power  to  boat  propulsion  were  the  beginnings 
of  an  evolution  that  ultimately  produced  the  iron- 
clad steamer  and  the  greater  battleship  that 
sprang  from  it.  A  narrative  of  those  early  ex- 
periments belongs  to  the  technical  history  of  the 


4  ORIGIN  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

steam  engine,  and  will  not  be  undertaken  here 
except  to  mention  briefly  the  more  important  steps 
in  the  development,  which  is  necessary  that  we 
may  better  understand  the  connection  of  events 
that  follow. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration,  then,  the  earliest 
attempts  at  steam  navigation,  it  will  answer  for  a 
beginning  to  say  that  the  first  authentic  instance 
of  a  boat  actually  moved  by  steam  power  was  in 
the  year  1707,  when  Dr.  Papin,  the  eminent 
French  scientist,  conducted  a  successful  experi- 
ment at  Marburg,  in  Upper  Hesse,  where  he  was 
a  professor  of  mathematics.  His  efforts  in  the 
direction  of  science  were  so  poorly  appreciated 
that  a  mob  of  boatmen  destroyed  his  boat  and 
evinced  such  hostility  to  its  inventor  that  he  had 
to  leave  the  country  for  personal  safety. 

In  1729  Dr.  John  Allen  in  England  obtained  a 
patent  "  For  the  application  of  certain  powers  to 
give  motion  to  Engines  whereby  a  Ship  may  be 
navigated  in  a  calm,  from  whence  innumerable  ad- 
vantages will  accrue  in  Sayling,  and  be  a  great 
preservation  in  Engagements  at  Sea"  The 
specification  of  this  invention  describes  the  prin- 
ciple of  jet  propulsion,  that  is,  moving  a  boat  by 
the  reaction  of  a  stream  of  water  forced  out  of  the 
stern  by  pumps  in  the  boat.  The  inventor  pro- 
posed various  engines  for  this  duty  and  described 
one  actuated  by  the  explosion  of  gunpowder ;  he 
also  suggested  that  steam  might  be  used  as  the 
forcing  power. 


EARLY  INVENTORS  5 

Jonathan  Hulls,  a  clockmaker  of  Campden,  in 
England,  was  granted  a  patent  in  1736  for  me- 
chanism to  drive  a  boat  by  steam  power.  There 
is  no  record  that  a  trial  was  ever  made  with  an 
actual  boat,  but  the  fact  is  of  importance,  as  it  is 
the  first  record  of  a  patent  of  a  steamboat. 

In  America  James  Rumsey  and  John  Fitch 
were  rival  inventors  and  early  experimenters  with 
steamboats.  Rumsey's  boat,  first  tried  in  Vir- 
ginia in  1784  and  later  in  England,  was  con- 
structed on  the  principle  of  jet  propulsion.  Fitch 
experimented  with  various  propelling  devices  :  an 
endless  chain  running  over  pulleys  on  the  sides  of 
the  boat ;  paddle-wheels ;  long  paddles  operated  in 
a  manner  similar  to  the  motion  of  propelling  a 
canoe,  and  a  rude  form  of  screw  propeller.  Some 
of  his  attempts  were  attended  with  a  fair  measure 
of  success,  but  were  not  carried  beyond  the  stage  of 
experiment  because  of  skepticism  011  the  part  of 
the  public  and  lack  of  funds  to  make  a  commer- 
cial enterprise  of  steam  navigation. 

A  very  important  stage  in  the  development  of 
the  steamboat  is  marked  by  certain  experiments 
under  the  direction  of  Patrick  Miller  in  Scotland 
from  1787  to  1789.  Miller  was  a  gentleman  of 
wealth,  and  first  became  interested  in  the  subject 
by  amusing  himself  with  odd  forms  of  boats  on  a 
lake  on  his  estate.  He  built  several  small  boats, 
or  more  correctly  rafts,  composed  of  two  or  three 
boats  or  hulls  arranged  parallel  to  each  other  and 


6  ORIGIN  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

propelled  by  paddle  wheels  placed  in  the  spaces 
between  them.  Men  were  at  first  employed  to 
turn  these  wheels,  but  it  having  been  suggested 
that  a  steam  engine  might  be  used  for  the  work, 
Miller  engaged  a  Scotch  engineer,  William  Sym- 
ington by  name,  to  make  an  engine  and  fit  it  in 
one  of  the  boats.  A  small  boat  thus  equipped 
was  tried  with  such  success  in  1788  that  a  much 
larger  craft  and  engine  were  built  and  experi- 
mented with  the  next  year  on  the  Forth  and 
Clyde  canal.  A  speed  of  seven  miles  an  hour 
was  realized,  and  the  performance  assured  the 
future  of  steam  afloat ;  but  very  strangely  Mr. 
Miller,  the  patron  of  the  enterprise,  lost  interest 
in  it  about  that  time  and  ordered  the  boat'  dis- 
mantled and  laid  up.  His  experimental  zeal 
turned  to  the  cultivation  of  exotic  grasses,  and  the 
cause  of  steam  received  no  more  aid  from  him. 

The  benefit  of  these  experiments  was  not  lost, 
for  in  1801  Lord  Dundas  employed  the  engineer, 
Symington,  to  apply  the  experience  he  had  gained 
with  Miller  to  the  problem  of  substituting  steam 
power  for  horses  for  towing  purposes  on  the 
Forth  and  Clyde  canal.  In  1802  Symington  com- 
pleted a  tow-boat  named  Charlotte  Dundas  that 
proved  its  fitness  for  the  desired  work  by  towing 
two  barges,  of  seventy  tons  each,  twenty  miles  in 
six  hours  against  a  strong  head  wind.  This  boat 
had  one  paddle  wheel  located  in  a  well-hole  near 
the  stern,  turned  by  a  single-cylinder  engine  very 


Bow  View 


Section 


MILLER'S  TRIPLE-HULL   BOAT,  1787 


THE  SCREW  PROPELLER  7 

similar  in  its  general  form  to  the  simpler  types  of 
steam  engine  now  in  use.  No  practical  use  of  the 
boat  was  ever  made,  as  it  was  feared  the  banks 
of  the  canal  would  be  destroyed  by  the  swash  of 
water  from  the  paddle  wheel. 

Meanwhile,  another  step  toward  practical  steam 
navigation  was  being  made  in  the  United  States. 
John  Stevens,  a  native-born  American  who  had 
taken  a  prominent  part  in  the  War  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  who  owned  a  large  estate  at  Hoboken, 
across  the  Hudson  River  from  New  York  city,  was 
by  instinct  an  engineer,  though  his  education  had 
been  for  the  law.  As  early  as  1791  he  had  taken 
out  a  patent  for  a  multi-tubular  boiler,  and  another 
for  a  method  of  driving  boats  by  jet  propulsion. 
His  mechanical  experiments  continued  until,  in 
1802,  he  navigated  the  river  bordering  his  estate 
with  a  small  boat  fitted  with  a  steam  engine  and 
screw  propeller  much  like  the  present  form  of  that 
instrument.  Brunei,  the  famous  French  engineer, 
then  a  royalist  exile,  was  associated  with  him  in 
some  of  his  experiments. 

This  boat  was  a  mere  skiff  only  twenty-five  feet 
long,  but  is  important  because  it  made  successful 
use  of  the  screw  propeller.  The  idea  of  that  in- 
strument was  then  not  novel,  as  its  principle  of 
operation  was  simply  a  reversal  of  the  principle 
of  a  form  of  windmill  and  waterwheel  that  had 
been  in  use  for  centuries.  In  1752  the  French 
Academy  of  Sciences  had  awarded  a  prize  to  Daniel 


8  ORIGIN  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

Bernoulli!  for  an  essay  on  the  manner  of  impel- 
ling boats  without  wind,  in  which  he  proposed  the 
propeller.  In  1785  Joseph  Bramah  had  obtained 
a  patent  in  England  for  a  mode  of  propelling 
vessels  by  "  a  wheel  with  inclined  Fans  or  Wings, 
similar  to  the  fly  of  a  Smoke-jack,  or  the  ver- 
tical Sails  of  a  Windmill,"  and  patents  for  simi- 
lar inventions  were  granted  in  England  in  1784 
to  William  Lyttleton  and  in  1800  to  Edward 
Shorter.  David  Bushnell,  an  ingenious  Ameri- 
can, had  actually  made  practical  use  of  a  screw 
propeller  during  the  Revolutionary  War  by  apply- 
ing it,  worked  by  hand  power,  to  a  submarine 
torpedo  boat  with  which  he  designed  to  blow  up 
a  50-gun  British  ship.  These  early  instances 
of  the  screw  propeller  are  particularly  referred  to 
because  it  will  save  many  words  when  we  come  to 
a  period  much  later  when  John  Ericsson  and  sev- 
eral other  engineers  were  claiming  and  disputing 
in  the  law  courts  the  invention  of  that  instrument. 
The  name  of  Robert  Fulton  stands  foremost  in 
the  list  of  Americans  who  have  been  distinguished 
in  the  field  of  the  mechanic  arts  during  this 
century.  He  was  a  native  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
in  early  life  took  up  the  profession  of  artist,  in 
which  while  yet  a  youth  he  achieved  reputation  and 
pecuniary  success  by  his  skill  in  miniature  portrait 
painting.  In  1786,  when  twenty-one  years  of 
age,  he  went  to  Europe  to  study  art  with  the  dis- 
tinguished American  painter,  Benjamin  West,  and 


ROBERT  FULTON  9 

remained  abroad  twenty  years  before  returning 
to  his  native  country.  During  this  period  he  de- 
voted much  time  to  mechanical  investigation,  and 
patented  various  machines  for  industrial  purposes, 
gradually  abandoning  his  art  work  and  giving  his 
whole  time  to  engineering,  which  was  his  true  field 
of  labor.  He  became  interested  in  the  problem  of 
steam  navigation,  and  built  one  fairly  successful 
steamer  in  France  in  1803,  which  had  to  be  given 
up  for  lack  of  means.  He  visited  Symington  in 
Scotland ;  and  from  seeing  the  Charlotte  Dundas 
he  became  convinced  that  steam  navigation  was 
practicable,  and  resolved  to  devote  himself  to  it 
until  he  had  proved  it  successful. 

The  United  States  Ambassador  to  France  at 
that  tune  was  Mr.  Robert  Livingston,  who  was 
interested  in  steamboats  from  having  been  asso- 
ciated with  the  experiments  of  John  Stevens  in 
America,  and  who  decided,  with  Fulton's  aid,  to 
attempt  to  introduce  steam  navigation  in  his  native 
country.  As  the  agent  of  Livingston,  Fulton  went 
to  England  in  1804  and  ordered  from  Boulton 
and  Watt  a  large  steam  engine  suitable  for  use  in 
a  boat.  In  1806  he  returned  to  the  United  States, 
and  his  engine  soon  followed  him.  It  is  worth 
mentioning  that  a  special  order  from  the  king 
in  council  had  to  be  obtained  before  this  engine 
could  be  shipped  from  England,  the  exportation  of 
machinery  being  then  prohibited  by  law.  A  hull 
for  the  engine  was  built  in  New  York  and  launched 


10  ORIGIN   OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

early  in  1807.  This  vessel,  named  Clermont  after 
the  home  manor  of  Mr.  Livingston  on  the  Hudson 
River,  was  133  feet  long,  18  feet  wide,  and  9  feet 
depth  of  hold.  In  August  the  machinery  was  all 
fitted  in  place  and  the  boat  ready  for  trial. 

While  being  built  this  steamer  was  ridiculed 
by  the  public  as  "  Fulton's  Folly ;  "  about  half  a 
century  later  the  public  again  made  merry  at  the 
expense  of  an  engineer,  and  enjoyed  newspaper 
tirades  against  "  Ericsson's  Folly."  On  the  7th 
of  August,  1807,  the  Clermont  got  up  steam  and 
got  under  way.  A  large  crowd  watched  the  pro- 
ceeding with  interest,  and  indulged  in  cat-calls 
and  jeers  whenever  Mr.  Fulton  appeared  in  sight. 
Our  modern  public  is  more  accustomed  to  great  in- 
ventions, and  possibly  better  bred,  though  we  may 
easily  imagine  that  a  trial  trip  of  a  flying-machine, 
for  instance,  might  now  be  attended  with  signs  of 
skepticism,  if  not  outspoken  rudeness.  Instead 
of  furnishing  amusement  for  the  crowd,  the  Cler- 
mont swung  into  the  stream  and  steamed  up  the 
river  one  hundred  and  ten  miles  without  stopping, 
until  she  arrived  at  Clermont,  the  home  of  Liv- 
ingston. Twenty  hours  later  she  continued  to 
Albany,  forty  miles  further  up  the  river.  The 
average  speed  for  the  whole  time  under  way  was 
about  five  miles  an  hour.  The  next  day  she  left 
Albany  and  returned  to  New  York  in  thirty  hours 
by  a  continuous  trip. 

The  success  of  this  trip  of  the  Clermont  led  to 


OUR  DEBT  TO  THE  CLERMONT  11 

her  being  advertised  within  a  month  as  a  regular 
packet  to  run  between  New  York  and  Albany. 
The  schedule  time  was  thirty-six  hours  and  the 
fare  was  seven  dollars,  with  lesser  rates  for  inter- 
mediate stopping-places.  Thus  for  the  first  time 
in  history  was  navigation  by  steam  established  on 
a  commercial  basis  and  beyond  experiment.  The 
next  year  the  Clermont  and  two  other  steamboats 
that  had  been  built  during  the  winter  began  regu- 
lar traffic  on  the  rivers  about  New  York  city,  and 
from  them  the  business  extended  within  four 
years  to  the  Delaware  River,  Long  Island  Sound, 
and  even  to  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  tributa- 
ries. In  the  latter  region,  then  a  vast  wilderness 
infested  with  wild  beasts  and  wilder  men,  the 
steamboat  played  a  very  important  part  by  pene- 
trating its  waterways  and  distributing  settlers  who 
conquered  and  civilized  a  great  territory  that  could 
not  have  been  reached  for  many  years  by  any 
other  means. 

To  Fulton,  therefore,  and  to  the  steamboat 
that  sprung  from  his  vigorous  brain,  the  United 
States  owes  a  debt  of  incalculable  magnitude. 
We  cannot  fairly  claim  that  he  invented  the 
steamboat,  because,  as  we  have  seen  in  this  hasty 
review,  that  invention  had  been  growing  slowly 
for  more  than  one  hundred  years  ;  indeed,  it  was 
just  one  hundred  years  from  the  time  that  Dr. 
Papin  operated  a  crude  steamboat  in  Germany  in 
1707  until  Fulton  achieved  success  with  the  Cler- 


12        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

mont  in  1807.  The  steamboat  grew  under  many 
hands  and  many  minds,  and  Fulton  happened  to  be 
the  first  to  put  together  the  best  work  of  his  pre- 
decessors and  make  a  combination  that  succeeded. 
That  he  had  the  judgment  and  mechanical  talent 
to  do  this  is  sufficient  to  keep  his  name  prominent 
for  all  time  in  the  history  of  mechanical  progress. 

As  Robert  Fulton  was  the  first  successfully  to 
apply  steam  to  navigation  for  commercial  purposes, 
so  was  he  the  first  to  apply  it  to  purposes  of  naval 
warfare.  In  1813  he  submitted  to  President 
Madison  plans  for  a  steam  battery  to  be  used 
against  the  ships  of  England,  then  at  war  with  the 
United  States.  His  project  was  favored,  and  in 
March,  1814,  Congress  authorized  the  building  of 
one  or  more  such  batteries  for  the  defense  of  the 
coast.  One  vessel  was  built  in  about  four  months 
at  Brown's  shipyard  on  the  East  River,  in  New 
York  city,  and  received  its  machinery  at  Fulton's 
engine  works,  on  the  North  River.  Mr.  Fulton 
was  the  engineer  in  charge,  or  superintendent,  of 
the  whole  construction.  He  named  his  battery 
Demologos,  —  "  Voice  of  the  People,"  -  —  but  it  was 
afterward  called  Fulton  in  his  honor.  Because 
of  the  appearance  of  the  same  name  in  our  list  of 
ships  at  a  later  period  this  first  war-steamer  is 
known  in  naval  records  as  Fulton  the  First. 

The  conventional  form  of  a  ship  of  war  was  dis- 
carded by  Fulton,  who  proposed  simply  a  huge 
floating  battery  that  could  be  moved  from  place  to 


THE   DEMOLOGOS,  1814 


FULTON'S  WAR- SHIP  13 

place  by  its  own  steam  power.  In  this  conception 
he  was  almost  half  a  century  in  advance  of  the 
time,  as  will  be  seen  as  this  review  progresses. 
His  vessel  was  large  compared  with  the  largest 
war-ships  then  afloat :  the  length  was  156  feet ; 
width,  56  feet ;  depth,  20  feet,  and  measured  ton- 
nage, 2,475  tons.  The  frigate  Constitution  was 
175  feet  in  length,  43  feet  6  inches  beam,  and 
measured  1,576  tons.  The  Victory,  Nelson's  flag- 
ship at  Trafalgar  ten  years  before,  was  226  feet 
6  inches  long  from  figurehead  to  taff rail ;  length 
of  gun  deck,  186  feet ;  extreme  beam,  52  feet, 
and  measured  tonnage,  2,162  tons.  The  hull  of 
the  Fulton  was  double,  as  shown  by  the  drawings, 
which  are  copies  of  the  originals  made  by  Fulton. 
The  combination  of  two  hulls  with  the  paddle 
wheel  revolving  in  the  channel  between  them  may 
perhaps  be  traced  to  Fulton's  visit  to  Scotland  and 
his  observations  there  of  the  experimental  work  of 
Miller  and  Symington,  previously  described.  The 
total  cost  of  the  Fulton  was  $320,000,  or  about 
$17,000  more  than  the  first  cost  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

In  June,  1815,  the  steamer  was  completed  and 
successfully  tried  in  the  harbor  of  New  York. 
On  the  4th  of  July  she  made  a  trip  to  the  ocean 
and  back,  steaming  53  miles  in  8  hours  and  20 
minutes.  In  September,  when  fully  armed  and 
equipped,  she  made  another  trial  trip  to  the  sea, 
averaging  with  and  against  the  tide  5|  miles  per 


14        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

hour.  This  was  more  than  Fulton  had  promised, 
as  his  offer  to  the  government  had  specified  a 
speed  of  3  to  4  miles  an  hour  only. 

Very  deplorably,  Mr.  Fulton  did  not  live  to 
know  the  success  he  had  achieved.  A  sudden  ill- 
ness caused  by  exposure  while  traveling  resulted 
fatally;  his  death,  which  occurred  February  24, 
1815,  being  mourned  as  a  national  calamity.  The 
Coast  and  Harbor  Defense  Association,  having 
direction  of  the  building  of  war -vessels,  referred 
as  follows  to  this  sad  event  when  reporting  the 
completion  of  the  steamer  :  "  Their  exertions  were 
further  retarded  by  the  premature  and  unexpected 
death  of  the  engineer.  The  world  was  deprived 
of  his  invaluable  labors  before  he  had  completed 
his  favorite  undertaking.  They  will  not  inquire, 
wherefore,  in  the  dispensations  of  a  Divine  Provi- 
dence, he  was  not  permitted  to  realize  his  grand 
conception.  His  discoveries,  however,  survive  for 
the  benefit  of  mankind,  and  will  extend  to  unborn 
generations" 

The  war  with  Great  Britain  ceased  a  few  months 
before  the  completion  of  the  Fulton,  and  that  novel 
craft  therefore  missed  a  conclusive  trial  of  her 
worth  by  battle.  But  for  this  lack  it  is  probable 
that  her  name  would  be  famous  in  history  as  a 
victor,  and  as  marking  the  date  of  an  abrupt 
and  complete  change  in  naval  armaments  and  sea 
tactics.  In  the  design  prepared  by  Fulton  were  all 
the  elements  that  are  essential  for  a  battleship  of 


ARMAMENT  OF  THE  DEMOLOGOS          15 

the  present  day,  —  positive  motive  power,  heavy 
battery,  and  impregnable  armor.  The  armor  was 
of  wood,  it  is  true,  but  it  was  heavy  enough  to  resist 
the  fire  of  any  ordnance  then  in  use,  and  that  is 
as  much  as  can  be  hoped  for  now.  At  its  thickest 
part  this  wooden  armor  was  5  feet  through,  dimin- 
ishing below  the  water-line,  as  the  drawings  show. 
Beside  the  main  battery  of  guns,  Fulton  proposed 
to  have  a  submarine  gun  in  each  bow,  to  discharge 
a  100-pound  shot  at  a  depth  of  10  feet  below  the 
surface.  A  furnace  was  supplied  for  heating  shot, 
and  there  were  pumps  for  throwing  water  on  an 
enemy's  deck  to  disable  him  by  wetting  his  ord- 
nance and  powder,  and  dampening  the  ardor  of 
his  men. 

The  original  plan  contemplated  a  mastless 
steamer  or  movable  battery  only,  but  this  was 
altered  greatly  in  building.  Captain  David  Porter, 
just  home  from  his  disastrous  cruise  with  the 
Essex  to  the  South  Pacific,  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  steamer  while  she  was  being 
built.  He  was  a  sailor,  and  a  good  one,  but  his 
nautical  mind  could  not  grasp  the  idea  of  a  ship 
without  sails,  and  he  accordingly  caused  a  heavy 
mast,  rigged  to  carry  lateen-sails,  to  be  stepped  in 
each  hull ;  bowsprits  were  also  set  in  the  ends  of 
the  hulls  to  carry  jibs  or  head  sails.  To  protect 
men  required  on  the  upper  deck  to  handle  these 
spars  and  sails  it  then  became  necessary  to  build 
up  the  sides,  originally  flush  with  the  spar  deck, 


16        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

v 

to  form  bullet-proof  bulwarks,  thus  adding  much 
to  the  weight  of  the  structure.  All  this  top 
hamper  meant  just  so  much  more  weight  for  the 
machinery  to  transport,  and  detracted  from  the 
efficiency  and  character  of  the  battery  without 
adding  at  all  to  its  fighting  qualities. 

Thus,  on  the  first  possible  occasion,  did  steam 
and  sail  power  come  into  conflict,  and  steam  had 
to  take  the  inferior  position.  Had  the  war  en- 
dured and  given  the  Fulton  an  opportunity  to 
attack  the  British  ships  blockading  off  the  port 
of  New  York  all  subsequent  naval  history  must 
have  been  different.  Of  the  result  of  such  an 
encounter  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Independent  of 
wind  and  tide  and  able  to  take  the  sea  when  sail- 
ing-vessels could  not  move  for  lack  of  wind,  the 
steam  battery  was  free  to  select  her  opportunity, 
just  as  the  Merrimac  did  years  afterward,  and  her 
appearance  in  a  squadron  of  sailing-ships  would 
have  caused  more  havoc  with  less  risk  than  marked 
the  raid  of  the  later  armor-clad  battery.  No 
stretch  of  the  imagination  is  needed  to  picture  the 
tranformation  of  navies  that  would  have  followed 
the  destruction  of  a  group  of  frigates  by  a  single 
steamer.  Spars  and  sails,  despite  sentiment,  would 
have  gone  overboard  in  short  order,  and  steam  as 
a  governing  agent  in  naval  warfare  would  have 
been  hailed  as  a  deliverer  and  given  the  recogni- 
tion it  has  since  won,  by  a  struggle  lasting  through 
a  long  series  of  years.  Such  a  change  did  follow 


FATE  OF  THE  DEMOLOGOS  17 

the  performance  of  the  Merrimac,  but  it  was  grad- 
ual rather  than  abrupt.  By  that  time  the  rivalry 
between  steam  and  sails  was  of  long  standing,  had 
engendered  much  professional  enmity,  and  had 
committed  naval  commanders  to  positive  opinions, 
loudly  expressed,  that  were  difficult  and  bitter  to 
retract.  In  the  day  of  the  Demologos  naval  pre- 
judice against  steam  had  not  been  cultivated  and 
there  were  no  obstacles  to  its  adoption  had  it 
proved  its  value  in  battle. 

As  the  first  steam  vessel  of  war  ever  built  by 
any  nation,  the  fate  of  the  Demologos  is  worth 
recording.  With  the  name  Fulton  she  appeared 
in  the  navy  list  for  a  number  of  years  as  the  re- 
ceiving-ship at  the  Brooklyn  navy-yard.  On  the 
4th  of  June,  1829,  her  magazine  blew  up  and  com- 
pletely wrecked  the  vessel,  already  falling  into 
decay.  Twenty-four  people  were  killed  outright, 
and  nineteen  wounded.  The  cause  of  the  explo- 
sion has  never  been  known,  though  there  was  a 
tale  current  at  the  time  that  it  was  the  deliber- 
ate act  of  a  gunner's  mate  who  had  been  flogged 
the  morning  of  the  day  the  catastrophe  occurred. 

The  first  steam  vessel  in  the  British  navy  was 
the  Comet,  built  in  1819.  The  name  was  derived 
from  Bell's  first  commercial  steamer  on  the  Clyde, 
and  it  was  from  representations  of  Mr.  Bell  and 
the  elder  Brunei  that  the  Admiralty  became  aware 
of  the  value  of  steamboats  for  towing  men-of-war. 
The  Comet  was  used  for  that  purpose  and,  accord- 


18        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

ing  to  Murray,  was  still  in  service  in  1863.  She 
was  a  side-wheel  steamer,  115  feet  long  and  21 
feet  beam.  A  year  later  two  similar  steamers, 
slightly  larger,  named  Lightning  and  Meteor, 
were  built.  In  1839  steam  first  appeared  in 
battle,  four  small  British  paddle-wheel  steamers 
taking  part  that  year  in  the  bombardment  of  St. 
Jean  d'Acre.  It  was  reported  that  they  were 
able  quickly  to  take  the  most  advantageous  posi- 
tions and  rendered  great  assistance.  The  first 
steam  vessel  of  real  importance  in  the  British 
navy  appeared  in  1843  when  the  46-gun  frigate 
Penelope  was  cut  in  two,  lengthened,  and  fitted 
with  paddle-wheel  engines.  Several  paddle-wheel 
ships  were  put  under  construction  about  the  same 
time,  of  which  the  Valorous  may  answer  for  the 
type,  as  she  survived  so  long  as  to  be  at  the  great 
Spithead  review  in  1889. 

The  long  interval  between  the  successful  use  of 
steam  for  commercial  purposes  afloat  and  its  adop- 
tion on  a  large  scale  in  the  navy  of  Great  Britain 
is  accounted  for  by  British  naval  writers.  The 
head  of  the  office  charged  with  the  design  and 
building  of  war-ships  in  the  early  days  of  steam 
navigation  was  Captain  (afterward  Rear  Admiral) 
Sir  William  Symonds,  who  had  a  great  reputa- 
tion for  skill  in  handling  ship's  boats  under  sail. 
His  sturdy  opposition  to  the  introduction  of  steam 
eventually  put  his  country  behind  others  in  that 
development  and  led  the  Board  of  Admiralty  to 


SAIL  VERSUS  STEAM  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN     19 

organize  a  committee  of  naval  architects  to  design 
future  ships  for  the  navy.  Sir  William  Symonds 
then  resigned  his  office  as  surveyor,  or  director, 
of  naval  construction  and  was  succeeded  by  Sir 
Baldwin  Walker,  —  "a  naval  officer  distinguished 
for  his  seamanship."  His  distinction  in  this  direc- 
tion was  such  that  the  progress  of  naval  construc- 
tion under  his  control  is  described  as  follows  by  a 
British  historian  :  — 

"  The  naval  members  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
were  men  who  had  long  looked  upon  the  noble 
line-of-battle-ships  of  the  navy  as  not  to  be  sur- 
passed, and  they  could  not  apparently  make  up 
their  minds  to  desecrate  them,  as  they  seemed  to 
consider  it,  by  the  introduction  of  steam  power. 
The  result  of  this  somewhat  romantic  feeling  was, 
that  early  in  Sir  Baldwin  Walker's  administration 
a  number  of  sailing  three-deckers  were  laid  down, 
in  opposition  to  the  expressed  opinion  of  the  lead- 
ing civil  professional  officers  attached  to  the  Ad- 
miralty. Not  one  of  these  vessels,  as  had  been 
predicted,  was  ever  launched  as  a  sailing  vessel. 
They  were  converted  into  screw  ships  by  being 
lengthened  in  midships,  at  the  bows,  and  also  at 
the  sterns.  The  greater  proportion  of  the  other 
sailing  three-deckers  were  also  cut  down  and  con- 
verted into  two-decked  screw  ships,  their  sterns 
only  being  altered." 

This  reluctance  to  allow  space  for  steam  on 
board  ship  is  well  indicated  by  the  accompanying 


20        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

drawings  showing  sections  of  a  ship-of-the-line 
about  the  year  1850  and  a  modern  battleship. 
They  show  not  only  the  development  of  the  marine 
engine,  but  also  put  before  the  eye  the  growth  of 
the  gun  during  the  same  period. 

In  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  also,  steam 
found  no  welcome  in  those  early  years,  but  its 
value  was  so  shown  by  its  general  use  in  river  and 
lake  navigation  that  it  was  forced  upon  the  atten- 
tion of  naval  authorities  more  than  was  the  case 
abroad.  The  performance  of  the  Fulton  in  1815 
had  caused  Congress  the  next  year  to  authorize 
the  construction  of  another  steam  battery,  but  the 
law  long  remained  a  dead  letter.  Direction  of 
naval  affairs  then  was  in  the  hands  of  a  Board 
of  Commissioners  for  the  Navy,  composed  of  three 
naval  captains ;  a  Board  of  Admiralty,  in  fact. 
This  board,  by  the  terms  of  the  law  creating  it, 
was  attached  to  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
and  under  his  superintendence  exercised  "all  the 
ministerial  duties  of  that  office  relative  to  the  pro- 
curement of  naval  stores  and  materials,  and  the 
construction,  armament,  equipment,  and  employ- 
ment of  vessels  of  war,  as  well  as  other  matters 
connected  with  the  naval  establishment  of  the 
United  States."  It  was  claimed  that  this  law 
transferred  to  the  commissioners  the  duties  of  the 
secretary  prescribed  by  the  organic  law  of  1798 
creating  the  Navy  Department,  and,  as  interpreted 
by  a  prominent  officer,  "  required  superintendence 


Section  of  Ship-of-the-Line,  converted  (1850)  into  Screw  Steamer. 


Section  of  Modern  Battleship 

GROWTH   OF   MARINE   ENGINES  AND  ORDNANCE 


THE  SECOND  FULTON  21 

rather  than  execution,  on  the  part  of  the  secretary, 
in  regard  to  the  discharge  of  these  duties,  and  left 
him,  in  effect,  more  of  his  time  to  be  devoted  to 
cabinet  matters,  the  patronage  of  his  department, 
and  to  the  reflection  necessary  to  the  best  exer- 
cise of  his  judgment  and  discretion." 

The  commissioners  were  usually  distinguished 
captains  who  had  won  fame  in  the  last  war  with 
Great  Britain,  and  whose  names  are  honored  in 
American  history.  Like  their  British  contem- 
poraries, however,  their  distinction  was  based  upon 
a  mastery  of  seamanship  as  it  was  then  practiced, 
and  they  regarded  with  displeasure  any  proposal 
to  put  a  power  on  board  ship  that  outclassed  sails 
in  usefulness  and  threatened  to  turn  the  ship  into 
a  machine  and  the  sailor  into  a  machinist.  Con- 
sequently, it  was  nearly  twenty  years  before  the 
law  of  1816  was  heeded,  and  then  it  was  carried 
out  only  by  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  dated  in  June,  1835,  directing  the  board  to 
proceed  at  once  with  the  construction  of  a  steam 
vessel  of  war.  A  marine  engineer  of  established 
reputation,  Mr.  Charles  H.  Haswell,  of  New  York, 
was  employed  as  designer  and  superintendent  of 
construction  of  machinery,  and  the  work  went  for- 
ward slowly  until,  in  1837,  the  vessel  was  com- 
pleted and  put  in  motion  under  her  own  steam. 
The  name  given  to  this  ship  was  Fulton  (the  sec- 
ond). The  length  was  180  feet ;  beam,  35  feet ; 
mean  draft,  10  feet,  6  inches ;  and  the  displacement 


22        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

was  about  1200  tons.  Side  wheels,  operated  by 
engines  on  the  upper  deck,  constituted  the  motive 
power.  A  speed  of  about  twelve  knots  an  hour  was 
realized,  and  her  first  captain,  Matthew  C.  Perry, 
of  Mexican  War  and  Japan  Expedition  fame 
later,  reported :  "  For  harbor  and  coast  defense, 
the  Fulton,  with  slight  alterations,  would  be  per- 
fectly efficient,  and  more  useful  than  any  number 
of  armed  ships  not  propelled  by  steam." 

Two  years  later,  in  1839,  work  was  begun  on 
two  much  larger  side-wheel  steamers,  completed  in 

1842,  and  named  Missouri  and  Mississippi.    They 
were  229  feet  long,  40  feet  beam,  19  feet   draft, 
and  of  about  3200  tons  displacement.     The  Mis- 
souri was   burned  in  Gibraltar  a  year  after  her 
completion  ;  the  Mississippi,  after  a  long  and  very 
eventful  career,  was  destroyed  in  battle  during  the 
American  Civil  War  in  the  river  whose  name  she 
bore.     Contemporary  with  these  war- steamers  was 
the  smaller  side-wheel  steamer  Michigan,  the  first 
iron  vessel  in  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  first  iron  steamer  afloat  on  the  Great  Lakes. 
This  vessel  was  built  in  Pittsburgh,  taken  apart, 
and   the  pieces  carried  overland  to  Erie,  where 
they  were  assembled  and  the  ship  was  launched  in 

1843.  The  Michigan  is  still  in  active  service,  the 
only  representative  of  our  navy  on  the  lakes,  and 
has  her  original  engines  yet  in  use. 

Iron  had  been  used  as  a  material  for  shipbuild- 
ing for  a  number  of  years,  the  first  iron  steamer 


THE  FIRST  IRON  SHIPS  23 

of  which  there  is  any  record  being  the  Caledonia, 
built  at  Dundee,  in  Scotland,  in  1818.  In  1836 
a  large  establishment  for  building  iron  ships  was 
opened  at  Millwall  on  the  Thames,  of  which  con- 
cern the  eminent  marine  engineer,  Mr.  Fairbairn, 
was  the  head.  It  was  early  recognized  that  ves- 
sels with  iron  hulls  had  certain  advantages  over 
those  of  wood,  but  it  was  many  years  before  the 
use  of  iron  for  shipbuilding  became  general. 
This  was  due  chiefly  to  lack  of  knowledge  and 
machinery  for  manufacturing  and  shaping  iron 
of  the  large  sizes  and  forms  required,  but  with 
the  demand  for  such  forms  came  efforts  to 
supply  that  demand.  Thus  was  set  in  motion  an- 
other of  the  various  mechanical  evolutions  that 
contributed  to  make  the  Monitor  and  the  battle- 
ship possible. 

Many  of  the  objections  to  the  use  of  steam  in 
navies  were  purely  sentimental,  built  upon  suspi- 
cion of  innovation  and  the  proverbial  dogmatism 
of  the  professional  seaman.  One  objection,  how- 
ever, had  substantial  foundation  and  was  of  suffi- 
cient gravity  to  make  the  building  of  steamers  for 
war  purposes  a  doubtful  policy.  This  related  to 
the  mode  of  applying  the  engine  power,  which  even 
to  a  landsman  seemed  very  faulty.  The  large 
paddle  wheels  and  important  parts  of  the  engines 
attached  to  them,  including  the  main  shafts,  were 
high  above  water  and  thus  exposed  to  damage  by 
shot  and  shell.  They  occupied  much  space  in  the 


24        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

central  part  of  a  vessel's  broadsides,  and  in  that 
way  much  reduced  the  battery  and  with  it  the 
fighting  force  of  the  ship.  They  also  disturbed 
the  accepted  arrangement  of  masts  and  sails,  and 
were  a  real  obstacle  to  progress  when  steaming 
against  a  head  wind.  The  more  conservative  of 
the  old  school  of  naval  officers  considered  these 
objections  fatal,  and  were  glad  to  rest  upon  the 
assertion  that  steam  was  unsuited  for  naval  pur- 
poses. Younger  seamen,  and  all  engineers,  rec- 
ognized the  military  advantages  that  steam  power 
gave  to  ships  of  war,  and  applied  themselves  to 
the  problem  of  finding  a  better  way  of  exerting 
that  power. 

One  of  the  earliest  efforts  in  this  direction  in 
the  navy  of  the  United  States  was  the  plan  of 
Lieutenant  W.  W.  Hunter,  who  proposed  to  put 
the  paddle-wheels  wholly  under  water.  To  effect 
this,  the  wheels  were  placed  horizontally  in  great 
cylindrical  recesses  in  the  hull  of  the  ship,  the 
paddles  or  "  floats  "  only  projecting  outside  the 
line  of  the  ship  as  they  revolved.  Three  steamers 
of  considerable  size  —  the  Union,  Water  Witch, 
and  Alleghany  —  were  built  and  experimented 
with  between  1842  and  1848,  but  were  not  suc- 
cessful. The  recesses  or  drums  in  which  the 
wheels  revolved  were  made  to  fit  the  wheels  as 
closely  as  possible,  but  were  of  course  full  of 
water  always  being  swept  around  by  the  wheels, 
which  absorbed  much  of  the  power  of  the  engines. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SCREW  25 

In  the  ordinary  arrangement  of  vertical  wheels, 
the  unemployed  parts  of  the  wheels  are  in  the  air, 
where  resistance  is  slight.  The  Hunter  system 
was  condemned  by  a  naval  board  in  1849,  and 
his  ships  were  altered  for  other  methods  of  propul- 
sion. 

Meanwhile,  engineers,  foremost  among  whom 
was  John  Ericsson,  were  developing  the  system  of 
screw  propulsion,  and  had  brought  it  into  success- 
fid  use  in  several  countries  before  the  experiments 
of  Hunter  had  been  given  up.  We  have  already 
seen  that  the  screw  propeller  in  more  than  one 
form  had  been  patented  before  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century,  and  that  Mr.  Stevens  had 
applied  it  to  a  small  steamboat  as  early  as  1802. 
An  Austrian  engineer  named  Ressel  had  applied 
it,  in  1829,  to  a  boat  with  a  six  horse-power  en- 
gine, and  made  six  miles  an  hour  for  a  time.  His 
countrymen  gave  him  a  bronze  monument,  and 
the  credit  of  being  the  first  to  use  the  screw  for 
boat  propulsion.  In  both  England  and  France 
are  other  monuments  ascribing  the  same  credit  to 
natives  of  those  countries.  It  is  idle,  therefore,  to 
weave  into  this  review  any  of  the  controversy  that 
once  raged  so  fiercely,  and  is  not  extinguished  yet, 
as  to  whether  or  not  Ericsson  was  the  inventor  of 
the  screw  propeller.  He  was  the  first  to  lift  it 
above  the  experimental  stage  and  put  it  to  per- 
manent practical  use,  just  as  Fulton  had  made 
the  experimental  steamboat  of  his  time  a  practical 


26        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

success.  Equally  with  Fulton,  and  for  very  sim- 
ilar service,  is  Ericsson  entitled  to  honor  in  the 
history  of  steam  navigation. 

Ericsson's  success  with  screw-propelled  boats 
occurred  in  England  in  1837-38.  Unable  to 
gain  recognitioij  from  the  Admiralty,  he,  in  1839, 
removed  to  the  United  States,  which  country  there- 
after was  his  home.  Under  the  patronage  of  Cap- 
tain R.  F.  Stockton  of  the  United  States  navy,  one 
of  the  few  officers  who  favored  the  use  of  steam  in 
naval  vessels,  Ericsson  in  the  years  1842  and  1843 
superintended  the  building  of  a  sloop-of-war  named 
Princeton,  fitted  with  his  patented  screw  and  with 
peculiar  machinery  of  his  design.  The  Princeton 
was  of  about  1000  tons  displacement,  and  was  the 
first  screw  steam  vessel  of  war  ever  built  in  any 
country.  She  was  also  the  first  war-vessel  in  which 
all  the  machinery  was  below  the  water  line,  out  of 
reach  of  shot,  and  the  first  to  be  supplied  with  fan 
blowers^for  forcing  the  furnace  fires. 

The  Princeton  is  famous  in  American  history  be- 
cause of  a  terrible  tragedy  that  occurred  on  board. 
In  February,  1844,  she  steamed  from  Washington 
for  a  pleasure  trip  down  the  Potomac  River,  having 
on  board  President  Tyler  and  his  Cabinet  and  other 
distinguished  guests  invited  by  Captain  Stockton 
to  witness  the  performance  of  the  vessel  and  her 
machinery.  One  of  the  guns  —  an  enormous  can- 
non of  12 -inches  calibre,  named  Peacemaker,  the 
largest  piece  of  ordnance  then  afloat  —  exploded, 


THE  PRINCETON  27 

injuring  many  people,  among  them  Stockton  him- 
self, and  killing  Abel  P.  Upshur,  Secretary  of 
State ;  Thomas  W.  Gilmer,  Secretary  of  the  Navy ; 
Captain  Beverly  Kennon,  of  the  navy;  Virgil 
Maxey,  of  Maryland;  Colonel  David  Gardiner; 
and  a  colored  servant.  Colonel  Gardiner  was  a 
descendant  of  the  "  lords  of  the  manor  "  of  Gardi- 
ner's Island,  and  his  tragic  death  led  to  an  interest- 
ing romance.  His  body  was  taken  to  the  White 
House,  and  in  the  ensuing  distress  and  sympathy 
President  Tyler  became  so  interested  in  Gardiner's 
beautiful  daughter,  Julia,  that  he  eventually  mar- 
ried her. 

Historically,  however,  the  Princeton  has  a  much 
greater  claim  to  our  interest  because  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  naval  affairs  that  resulted  from  her  example. 
Her  success  as  a  steamer  was  complete,  and  silenced 
the  objections  that  up  to  that  time  had  had  enough 
of  reason  hi  them  almost  to  exclude  steam  from 
navies.  After  the  appearance  of  the  Princeton 
with  her  submerged  machinery  and  propeller  the 
logical  force  of  the  protests  against  steam  was  de- 
stroyed, and  the  reconstruction  of  all  navies  of  any 
importance  became  necessary.  Besides  settling  the 
machinery  dispute,  Ericsson  in  this  same  ship  intro- 
duced another  factor  that  had  much  influence  upon 
the  after  development  of  the  ship  of  war.  He  had 
brought  with  him  from  England  a  huge  wrought- 
iron  gun  of  his  own  design,  with  which  he  experi- 
mented on  iron  targets  and  proved  that  four  and 


28        PROGRESS   OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

a  half  inches  of  armor  could  not  stand  against  the 
gun.  His  gun  was  on  the  Princeton  and  was 
removed  because  the  gun  that  burst  was  a  poor 
imitation  of  it ;  but  he  had  given  naval  men  a  new 
problem.  They  were  required  to  find  protection 
for  ships  against  the  fire  of  such  powerful  guns. 
The  Ericsson  gun  and  the  target  it  perforated 
may  still  be  seen  in  the  small  park  near  the  com- 
mandant's office  in  the  Brooklyn  navy-yard. 

The  success  of  the  Princeton  caused  a  congres- 
sional committee,  in  1846,  to  investigate  the  sub- 
ject of  the  use  of  steam  for  naval  purposes.  The 
report  of  that  committee  dwelt  upon  the  advantages 
of  the  submerged  propeller  and  recommended  that 
thirteen  propeller  steamers  be  built  of  iron  immedi- 
ately. It  takes  time  to  bring  about  radical  changes, 
so  when  authority  was  voted  the  next  year  to  build 
four  war-steamers  a  board  of  prominent  naval  offi- 
cers decided  that  three  of  the  four  should  have  side 
wheels.  The  most  famous  of  these  was  the  Pow- 
hatan.  The  one  screw  steamer  was  named  San 
Jacinto,  and  later  won  a  permanent  place  in  naval 
and  legal  history  by  precipitating  the  affair  of  the 
Trent.  It  was  not  until  1854  that  the  work  of 
rebuilding  the  American  navy  was  seriously  under- 
taken. In  that  year  Congress  ordered  the  build- 
ing of  "  six  first-class  steam  frigates  to  be  provided 
with  screw  propellers."  These  ships  were  com- 
pleted within  two  years,  and  were  the  superiors  of 
any  war- vessels  then  owned  by  any  nation.  The 


STEAM  AS  AN  AUXILIARY  29 

Merrimac,  built  at  Boston,  is  said  to  have  been 
the  most  graceful  of  the  class.  They  were  full 
ship-rigged,  with  auxiliary  steam  power  only,  the 
machinery  being  ridiculously  small  for  the  size  of 
the  ship  in  comparison  with  present  constructions. 
The  late  Rear  Admiral  Edward  Simpson,  in  a 
magazine  article  published  in  1886,  gives  the  fol- 
lowing explanation  regarding  the  inadequate  steam 
power  of  these  ships. 

"  There  were  those  at  that  time  who,  wise  beyond 
their  generation,  recognized  the  full  meaning  of  the 
advent  of  steam,  and  saw  that  it  must  supplant 
sails  altogether  as  a  motive  power  for  ships.  These 
advocated  that  new  constructions  should  be  pro- 
vided with  full  steam  power,  with  sails  as  an  aux- 
iliary ;  but  the  old  pride  in  the  sailing-ship,  with 
her  taut  and  graceful  spars,  could  not  be  made  to 
yield  at  once  to  the  innovation  ;  old  traditions 
pointing  to  the  necessity  of  full  sail  power  could 
not  be  dispelled ;  it  was  considered  a  sufficient  con- 
cession to  admit  steam  on  any  terms,  and  thus  the 
conservative  and  temporizing  course  was  adopted 
of  retaining  full  sail  power,  and  utilizing  steam  as 
an  auxiliary." 

In  1857  five  large  screw  sloops  were  ordered  to 
be  built  at  once.  The  Hartford  became  the  most 
famous  of  these,  and  is  a  good  example  of  the 
class.  The  next  year  Congress  ordered  seven 
more  screw  sloops,  somewhat  smaller,  of  which 
group  the  Mohican  and  Narragansett  were  types. 


30        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

One,  the  Pawnee,  is  worthy  of  mention  as  the  first 
vessel  with  twin  screws  in  our  navy.  Thus,  by  the 
time  the  Civil  War  came  upon  us,  the  navy  was 
fairly  large  for  the  nation  at  that  time,  and  the 
steam  engine  had  become  a  recognized  and  indis- 
pensable, though  not  a  wholly  welcome,  element  in 
naval  armaments.  Its  use,  however,  had  already 
greatly  enlarged  the  scope  and  possibilities  of 
naval  enterprise.  With  its  aid  the  navigator  could 
declare  his  independence  of  winds,  currents,  and 
tides,  and  his  movements  became  invested  with  an 
element  of  certainty  that  had  been  entirely  lacking 
when  he  was  at  the  mercy  of  natural  forces.  A 
steamer  could  put  to  sea  at  the  appointed  time 
regardless  of  the  direction  of  the  wind,  and  pro- 
ceed on  its  voyage  with  a  fair  certainty  of  reach- 
ing its  destination  within  a  given  time ;  it  could 
ascend  swift  and  winding  rivers ;  venture  into 
regions  beset  with  ice  or  treacherous  with  rocks ; 
and,  in  general,  was  capable  of  many  undertakings 
that  were  full  of  peril  or  wholly  forbidden  to  the 
ship  of  sails.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  volume, 
nor  possible  within  its  limits,  to  present  a  con- 
nected history  of  events  with  which  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  has  been  concerned  since  the 
employment  of  steam ;  but  it  is  proper  that  a 
few  of  those  events  be  briefly  touched  upon,  as 
a  means  of  showing  how  naval  operations  were 
gradually  influenced  by  the  new  power  and  event- 
ually came  to  be  entirely  controlled  by  it. 


THE  NAVY  IN  THE   MEXICAN  WAR       31 

The  war  with  Mexico  was  declared  by  Congress 
to  be  in  existence  in  May,  1846,  and  was  formally 
ended  by  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1848.  Mexico  had  no  national  navy,  and 
the  war  therefore  furnished  no  opportunity  for 
battles  at  sea.  Nevertheless,  our  navy  bore  its 
full  share  in  the  conflict,  blockading  and  bombard- 
ing along  the  enemy's  coasts,  and  has  credit  for 
some  of  the  most  decisive  and  lasting  acts  of  the 
war.  Notable  among  these  was  the  seizure  of  the 
Mexican  province  of  California,  embracing  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  present  territory  of  the  United 
States  west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  exceeding 
in  area  the  combined  domains  of  Germany,  France, 
and  Spain.  It  is  known  that  the  English  govern- 
ment was  contemplating  taking  possession  of  Cali- 
fornia as  a  means  of  protecting  the  interests  of 
British  subjects  who  held  a  large  part  of  the 
Mexican  national  debt ;  before  the  war  with  the 
United  States  was  anticipated,  propositions  had 
been  made  to  Mexico  to  permit  the  British  to 
occupy  California  as  a  guarantee  until  the  bonds 
were  paid.  This  was  not  a  remarkable  proposi- 
tion ;  in  fact,  in  much  more  recent  times  we  have 
witnessed  forcible  interference  in  the  affairs  of 
Egypt  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  protect  the 
pockets  of  Englishmen  who  had  large  investments 
in  that  country. 

Mexico  did  not  agree  to  the  proposed  British 
occupation  of  California,  but  the  British  kept  a 


32        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

longing  watch  upon  that  desirable  territory. 
When  relations  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States  were  strained  by  a  dispute  as  to  the  bound- 
ary of  Texas,  and  a  war  seemed  probable,  an  Eng- 
lish naval  squadron  was  assembled  at  Mazatlan  on 
the  west  coast  of  Mexico  with  the  scarcely  con- 
cealed design  of  taking  possession  of  California  in 
the  event  of  the  threatened  war.  A  small  Ameri- 
can squadron  was  also  present  at  the  same  port, 
and  its  commander,  Commodore  John  D.  Sloat, 
by  accidental  good  fortune,  learned  of  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  along  the  Rio  Grande  before 
the  news  became  public  and  reached  the  British 
admiral.  Understanding  the  importance  of  the 
situation,  and  without  instructions,  —  for  naval 
commanders  in  those  days  were  not  controlled  by 
the  telegraph  wire,  —  Commodore  Sloat  instantly 
dispatched  two  of  his  vessels,  the  Cyane  and 
Levant,  names  that  had  before  been  historically 
associated,  to  the  northward,  and  followed  soon 
after  in  his  flagship,  the  Savannah.  A  few  days 
later  the  British  admiral  learned  that  war  had 
begun,  and  he  also  departed  for  the  coast  of  Cali- 
fornia ;  but  he  was  too  late.  The  American  navy 
had  already  taken  possession  of  Monterey,  the  chief 
town  of  Upper  California,  and  of  San  Francisco 
Bay,  the  chief  harbor,  and  that  great  region  has 
ever  since  been  a  part  of  the  American  republic. 
Had  it  become  British  instead  of  American,  the 
history  of  the  United  States  must  have  developed 


THE  SEIZURE  OF  CALIFORNIA  33 

very  differently,  and  quite  beyond  the  reach  of 
present  speculation.  It  is,  indeed,  not  impossible 
that  there  might  be  no  United  States  of  America 
now;  or  had  the  Union  endured  as  a  sovereign 
state,  it  might  be  only  for  a  precarious  existence 
in  the  presence  of  powerful  neighbors,  and  divided 
against  itself  by  an  issue  that  has  been  settled  in 
history  as  it  worked  itself  out  along  the  lines  that 
were  ordained. 

The  vessels  of  Commodore  Sloat  that  thus  won 
an  empire  for  the  United  States  were  sailing-ships, 
and  this  is  the  last  instance  in  our  history  of  an 
event  of  great  national  importance  being  decided 
by  vessels  of  that  kind.  No  great  battle  and  vic- 
tory were  incident  to  the  enterprise,  and  for  that 
reason  it  has  never  been  given  a  prominent  place 
in  history,  though  as  a  decisive  event  it  outranks 
many  battles  on  land  and  sea  that  are  so  celebrated 
in  history  that  every  school-boy  knows  their  details. 

On  the  east,  or  Gulf,  coast  of  Mexico,  a  large 
American  squadron  was  stationed  to  prevent  arms 
and  war  material  being  supplied  the  enemy  by  for- 
eign vessels,  and  to  harass  the  coast  in  all  ways 
consistent  with  the  rules  of  warfare.  This  squad- 
ron was  composed  at  first  mainly  of  sailing-ships, 
but  included  the  Mississippi  and  Princeton,  the 
only  serviceable  war-steamers  of  any  size  that  the 
United  States  then  possessed.  Blockading  under 
sail  on  a  coast  subject  to  sudden  and  violent  storms 
was  difficult,  and  the  steamers,  by  being  able  to 


34        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

maintain  position  regardless  of  weather,  had  no 
difficulty  in  proving  their  superiority  for  war  ser- 
vice. On  one  occasion  the  Mississippi  went  to 
New  Orleans  to  get  intrenching  tools  and  a  battery 
of  field  guns  for  the  army,  and  returned  to  her 
station  just  one  week  after  having  left  it,  which 
quick  trip  amazed  the  old  seamen  in  the  fleet,  and 
almost  persuaded  them  against  their  wishes  that 
there  were  virtues  in  steam  power. 

Captain  Matthew  C.  Perry  has  been  referred  to 
as  the  first  commander  of  the  steamer  Fulton,  and 
as  one  of  the  few  naval  captains  of  the  old  school 
who  appreciated  the  advantages  to  be  gained  from 
steam  power  and  approved  of  its  admission  into 
the  navy.  In  August,  1846,  a  few  months  after 
the  war  began,  he  was  sent  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
to  command  the  Mississippi,  taking  with  him  two 
small  steam  gunboats  that  had  been  bought  and 
hastily  equipped  in  New  York  when  it  became 
known  that  steamers  were  more  useful  than  sail- 
ing-ships for  the  work  required  on  the  Mexican 
coast.  The  gunboats  were  named  Spitfire  and 
Vixen.  Thereafter  the  history  of  naval  opera- 
tions on  the  Gulf  coast  of  Mexico  is  largely  a  his- 
tory of  Commodore  Perry  and  the  steamers  of 
war,  for  it  seems  that  the  commander  of  the  squad- 
ron, Commodore  Conner,  held  faith  in  the  sailing- 
ships  and  allowed  Perry  to  control  the  steamers 
pretty  much  as  he  pleased.  The  steamers,  the 
smaller  ones  particularly,  were  able  to  enter  rivers 


TITLE  AND  RANK  OF  COMMODORE        35 

and  shallow  coast  waters,  and  therefore  had  a 
much  better  opportunity  for  active  service  than 
the  large  sailing-ships  that  required  sea  room  and 
deep  water  for  their  own  safety. 

A  comment  regarding  the  title  of  commodore 
before  used  to  designate  naval  chieftains  will  not 
be  out  of  place.  It  may  be  surprising  to  those 
familiar  with  the  names  of  our  naval  heroes  known 
in  the  school  histories  as  commodores  to  be  told 
that  there  never  was  any  such  rank  in  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  prior  to  the  year  1862.  The 
highest  commissioned  rank  was  that  of  captain, 
corresponding  in  relative  rank  to  colonel  in  the 
army,  and  a  captain  when  in  command  of  a  squad- 
ron had  the  honorary  title,  not  rank,  of  commo- 
dore, and  by  custom  his  flagship  flew  a  broad  pen- 
nant indicative  of  the  rank  of  commodore.  Offi- 
cially, therefore,  the  grand  naval  figures  of  our 
early  history  were  captains,  and  not  commodores 
at  all,  though  we  are  taught  to  know  them  as  com- 
modores, and  as  commodores  they  will  popularly 
remain  through  all  our  history.  In  1862  an  act 
of  Congress  increasing  the  navy  to  meet  war  con- 
ditions created  the  actual  rank  and  legal  title  of 
commodore,  and  we  had  that  grade  for  more  than 
a  third  of  a  century,  being  almost  the  only  nation 
that  did  recognize  it  except  as  a  courtesy  title. 
In  March,  1899,  an  act  of  Congress  reorganized 
the  personnel  of  the  navy  upon  a  basis  of  modern 
conditions,  and  this  act  abolished  the  rank  of  com- 


36        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

modore,  except  for  purposes  of  retirement,  making 
rear  admiral  the  rank  and  title  next  above  captain, 
the  same  as  in  all  the  principal  naval  services. 

In  October,  1846,  Perry  entered  the  Tabasco 
River  with  the  Mississippi  and  Vixen,  having  some 
gun  schooners  in  tow,  and  captured  the  town  of 
Tabasco  after  a  sharp  fight ;  having  no  force  with 
which  to  hold  the  place,  he  had  to  abandon  it,  but 
he  made  useful  additions  to  his  steam  flotilla  by 
capturing  two  small  river  steamers  named  Cham- 
pion and  Petrita.  Toward  the  end  of  the  year  he 
took  the  Mississippi  home  for  some  needed  repairs, 
and  while  he  was  at  the  north  his  familiarity  with 
steam  vessels  was  utilized  by  his  being  put  in  charge 
of  fitting  out  small  vessels  for  service  in  Mexico. 
These  were  the  steam  gunboats  Scorpion  and 
Scourge,  and  some  bomb -ketches  or  mortar -boats 
intended  to  be  towed  into  action  by  the  steamers. 
A  steam  revenue  cutter,  the  Polk,  was  also  trans- 
ferred to  the  navy  for  war  service  about  this  time. 

Perry  returned  with  the  Mississippi  in  March, 
1847,  and  relieved  Commodore  Conner  as  com- 
mander of  the  American  squadron.  His  first  im- 
portant act  was  the  valuable  assistance  rendered 
the  army  of  General  Winfield  Scott  in  capturing 
the  city  of  Vera  Cruz.  The  army  had  begun  the 
siege  of  the  place,  but  found  itself  without  ord- 
nance heavy  enough  to  breach  the  walls  of  the 
city.  The  navy  was  appealed  to  for  heavy  ship's 
guns,  which  Perry  gladly  offered  to  supply,  but  on 


BOMBARDMENT  OF  VERA  CRUZ  37 

condition  that  his  officers  and  men  should  go  with 
them  and  work  them.  Scott,  equally  jealous  for 
his  profession,  at  first  refused  this,  but  realizing 
that  the  success  of  his  undertaking  depended  upon 
the  use  of  heavier  guns,  he  finally  accepted  the 
offer,  and  six  large  guns  were  landed  and  dragged 
through  the  sand  to  the  place  of  use,  from  whence 
their  fire  breached  the  walls  after  only  a  few  days' 
attack.  Several  officers  and  men  of  the  navy 
were  killed  or  wounded  while  operating  this  naval 
battery.  The  earthwork  defenses  for  this  battery 
were  laid  out  by  an  engineer  of  General  Scott's 
staff,  Captain  Robert  E.  Lee,  and  in  the  army 
before  Vera  Cruz  at  that  time  were  a  number  of 
young  officers  gaining  experience  for  a  greater 
war  in  which  the  following  named  became  distin- 
guished: First  Lieutenants  James  Longstreet, 
P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  John  Sedgwick,  and  Earl 
Van  Dorn ;  and  Second  Lieutenants  U.  S.  Grant, 
George  B.  McClellan,  Fitz  John  Porter,  W.  S. 
Hancock,  and  Thomas  J.  (Stonewall)  Jackson. 

The  grim  tragedy  of  the  bombardment  of  Vera 
Cruz  was  relieved  by  a  touch  of  comedy  supplied 
by  Commander  Josiah  Tattnall  and  two  small 
steamers  of  the  fleet.  The  batteries  on  shore  in- 
vesting the  city  suffered  considerable  annoyance 
from  the  guns  of  the  famous  old  stone  castle  of 
San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  built  in  the  harbor  by  the 
Spaniards  at  enormous  cost  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, and  which  had  been  abandoned  by  them  in 


38        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

1825  as  their  last  foothold  in  Mexico.  To  divert 
this  fire,  Perry  ordered  Tattnall  to  approach  and 
open  fire  on  the  castle  with  the  Spitfire  and  Vixen. 
Tattnall,  perhaps  thinking  that  it  was  not  a  simple 
undertaking,  asked  for  specific  orders  as  to  what 
point  he  should  attack,  to  which  "  Ursa  Major," 
as  Perry  was  called  behind  his  back,  replied  not 
too  gently,  "  Where  you  can  do  the  most  execu- 
tion, sir !  "  With  his  temper  disturbed  by  this 
observation,  Tattnall  took  his  two  little  steamers 
within  a  stone's  throw  of  the  castle  and  opened 
furiously  against  its  massive  walls.  The  close 
proximity  probably  saved  the  little  vessels,  for 
they  were  untouched,  while  a  storm  of  cannon 
balls  flew  over  them.  The  spectacle  was  exciting 
to  the  crews  of  the  onlooking  ships,  and  ludicrous 
because  of  its  futility.  Perry,  both  amused  and 
provoked  by  the  exhibition  of  temper  on  the  part 
of  his  subordinate,  made  signal  for  the  steamers 
to  withdraw,  but  Tattnall  failed  to  see  the  signal 
and  kept  his  position  until  a  boat  was  sent  in,  at 
great  risk,  to  call  him  back. 

One  of  the  small  steamers  afforded  a  naval  lieu- 
tenant an  opportunity  for  peculiar  distinction  in 
an  incident  that  attracted  great  attention  at  the 
time,  but  is  now  almost  forgotten.  After  the  fall 
of  Vera  Cruz,  when  Scott's  army  was  being  pre- 
pared for  its  famous  march  to  the  city  of  Mexico, 
it  was  decided  suddenly  to  seize  a  territory  south 
of  Vera  Cruz  in  order  to  supply  the  army  with 


HUNTER'S  CAPTURE  OF  ALVARADO        39 

animals  for  transportation,  which  were  abundant 
in  that  region.  Lieutenant  Charles  G.  Hunter  of 
the  navy,  Commanding  the  steamer  Scourge,  was 
ordered  to  lie  off  the  town  of  Alvarado,  the  sea- 
port of  the  vicinity,  to  watch  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  and  report  them  to  his  superior  officers. 
At  the  same  time  General  Quitman  with  a  con- 
siderable military  expedition  proceeded  inland  to 
surround  the  region.  Observing  that  the  enemy 
did  not  hold  Alvarado  in  force,  Lieutenant  Hunter 
steamed  the  Scourge  up  to  the  town  and  took  pos- 
session of  it,  to  the  great  disapprobation  of  Com- 
modore Perry.  Hunter  was  tried  by  court  martial 
for  exceeding  or  disobeying  his  orders,  and  was  sent 
home  in  disgrace. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  seized  upon 
him  as  a  popular  hero  because  he  had  captured  an 
enemy's  city  with  a  mere  handful  of  sailors,  and 
as  "  Alvarado  Hunter  "  he  was  famous  for  many  a 
day.  Conversely,  Commodore  Perry  received  a 
great  amount  of  abuse  from  a  class  of  newspapers 
that  from  a  superficial  knowledge  of  military 
affairs,  or  no  knowledge  at  all,  assumed  the  obli- 
gation of  reprimanding  army  and  navy  leaders  in 
those  days,  just  as  is  done  to-day  with  even  less 
regard  for  the  truth.  The  real  fact  in  the  Al- 
varado incident  is  that  Hunter  by  exceeding  his 
instructions  defeated  the  object  in  view.  His  act 
gave  the  Mexicans  warning  that  a  descent  upon 
their  vicinity  was  to  be  made,  and  afforded  them 


40        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

time  to  escape  with  their  horses  and  portable  pro- 
perty before  the  army  had  hemmed  them  in. 

In  June,  1847,  Perry,  with  several  of  his  small 
steamers,  after  severe  fighting  recaptured  and  held 
the  town  of  Tabasco  up  the  river  of  the  same 
name.  This  event  is  important  in  naval  history 
as  it  is  the  first  instance  of  a  large  force  of  sailors 
being  regularly  organized  into  a  naval  brigade  for 
prolonged  service  ashore,  which  was  done  under 
the  personal  direction  and  command  of  Commo- 
dore Perry.  This  use  of  seamen  was  made  neces- 
sary by  the  fact  that  the  marines  of  the  fleet  had 
been  collected  into  a  regiment  and  sent  with  Gen- 
eral Scott's  army  on  the  march  to  Mexico.  The 
year  before,  sailors  had  been  used  to  some  extent 
for  guard  and  garrison  duty  at  the  points  seized 
on  the  coast  of  California,  but  credit  for  organiz- 
ing the  first  real  naval  brigade  is  given  to  Perry 
by  naval  historians. 

The  war  was  practically  ended  by  General  Scott's 
entry  into  the  city  of  Mexico  in  September,  1847, 
but  the  navy  continued  blockading  the  coast  until 
the  following  February,  when  the  treaty  of  peace 
was  concluded.  The  principal  lesson  to  the  navy 
from  this  war  was  that  steamers  were  greatly 
superior  to  sailing-ships  for  war  purposes,  and 
naval  prejudice  against  the  adoption  of  steam  was 
to  a  considerable  extent  overcome.  Before  the 
war  was  ended  the  Susquehamia  and  other  large 
war-steamers  before  referred  to  were  put  under  con- 


JAPANESE  EXCLUSIVENESS  41 

struction,  and  not  many  years  later  the  Merrimac 
and  Hartford  classes  of  steam  frigates  and  sloops 
followed.  Thereafter  no  war-vessels  equipped  with 
sails  only  were  projected  for  the  navy  of  the  United 
States. 

From  the  Mexican  war,  Commodore  Perry  pro- 
gressed to  a  victory  of  peace  that  has  given  his 
name  a  more  prominent  place  in  history  than 
would  have  been  assured  by  all  his  deeds  of  war. 
Japan,  the  most  interesting,  and  as  it  has  tran- 
spired the  most  progressive  of  the  nations  of  the 
Far  East,  was  at  that  time  the  most  retired  of 
those  nations  and  maintained  an  attitude  of  ex- 
clusiveness  that  bordered  upon  hostility.  The 
increase  of  commerce  with  China  and  the  develop- 
ment of  whale  fisheries  in  Asiatic  waters  were 
making  it  more  and  more  necessary  that  Japan 
should  become  friendly  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
and  allow  the  use  of  her  ports  as  harbors  of  refuge 
from  storms,  or  as  places  where  vessels  far  from 
home  might  obtain  needed  supplies,  even  if  the 
Japanese  were  not  willing  to  engage  in  general 
commerce.  The  cession  of  California  to  the  United 
States,  though  an  event  apparently  without  bear- 
ing upon  the  destiny  of  Japan,  was  really  of  great 
importance  in  that  regard.  The  discovery  of  gold 
in  California,  almost  immediately  after  it  became 
a  territory  of  the  United  States,  led  to  the  rapid 
settlement  of  that  coast  and  such  a  consequent 
increase  in  commerce  on  the  Pacific  Ocean  that  its 


42         PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

needs  made  themselves  felt  across  the  ocean  and 
on  the  shores  of  China  and  Japan. 

The  only  concession  that  Japan  had  made  to 
the  friendly  overtures  of  Western  nations  was  to 
allow  the  Dutch  to  maintain  a  trading-post  on  a 
little  fan-shaped  island  at  Nagasaki,  the  one  trader 
being  restricted  to  the  island  and  allowed  to  re- 
ceive but  one  ship  a  year,  which  brought  him 
goods  and  the  only  news  of  the  world  that  he  had 
from  one  year  to  another.  To  this  place  Ameri- 
can and  European  sailors,  who  might  be  wrecked 
on  the  Japanese  coast,  and  they  were  many,  were 
taken  and  held  as  close  prisoners  until  they  could 
be  shipped  away  on  the  solitary  Dutch  merchant- 
man. In  1849  Commander  James  Glynn,  in  the 
United  States  brig  Preble,  visited  Nagasaki  to 
obtain  the  release  of  some  shipwrecked  American 
seamen  held  in  duress  there,  and  succeeded  in  his 
mission,  though  not  without  much  difficulty,  as  the 
Japanese  were  not  disposed  to  have  any  dealings 
whatever  with  any  "  outside  barbarian "  but  the 
lonely  Dutch  trader. 

Returning  to  the  United  States  in  1851,  Glynn 
represented  that  the  interests  of  commerce  in  the 
East  were  such  that  it  was  necessary  either  to 
force  or  to  flatter  Japan  into  the  brotherhood  of 
nations,  and  proposed  that  he  be  sent  with  an  im- 
posing naval  force  with  that  object  in  view.  The 
project  met  with  approval,  but  Glynn  himself  did 
not  have  sufficient  rank  to  command  a  squadron 


PERRY'S  MISSION  TO   JAPAN  43 

of  the  size  necessary  to  give  force  and  dignity  to 
the  expedition,  and  the  command  was  eventually 
given  to  Commodore  Perry.  He  selected  his  steam 
favorite,  the  Mississippi,  as  his  flagship,  and  the 
steamers  Alleghany  and  Princeton  were  at  his  re- 
quest also  assigned  to  the  squadron,  but  they  were 
not  made  ready  in  time.  The  Mississippi  in  the 
interval  since  the  Mexican  war  had  made  a  three 
years'  cruise  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  had  added 
to  her  laurels  by  conveying  the  famous  Hungarian 
exile,  Kossuth,  from  Turkey  to  France,  and  by 
bringing  a  number  of  his  fellow-exiles  to  the 
United  States. 

Perry  sailed,  or  more  properly  steamed,  in  the 
Mississippi  from  Norfolk,  in  November,  1852,  pro- 
ceeding on  his  voyage  by  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  for  that  was  nearly  twenty  years  before  the 
Suez  Canal  was  opened.  He  arrived  at  Shanghai 
the  following  May,  and  transferred  his  flag  to  the 
larger  steamer  Susquehanna  that  had  gone  out  to 
the  station  more  than  a  year  before.  The  squadron 
now  consisted  of  the  Susquehanna  and  Mississippi, 
and  the  sailing  ships  of  war,  Plymouth  and  Sara- 
toga. With  these,  Perry  proceeded  to  Japan,  and 
early  in  July  came  to  anchor  in  Yeddo  Bay.  For- 
eign ships  were  no  curiosities  in  those  waters  even 
then,  notwithstanding  the  determination  of  the 
Japanese  to  keep  them  away.  Merchantmen  and 
whalers  often  came  there  seeking  in  vain  to  trade 
with  the  people,  or  driven  in  by  stress  of  weather 


44        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

to  be  refused  a  harbor  of  refuge.  Men-of-war  of 
various  countries  had  been  there  before  seeking 
to  negotiate  treaties,  a  notable  American  attempt 
having  been  that  of  Commodore  Preble  seven  years 
before  in  the  ship-of-the-line  Columbus,  which  had 
met  with  a  positive  refusal.  Sometimes  foreign 
ships  came  to  restore  to  their  country  Japanese 
castaways  picked  up  adrift  at  sea  in  their  junks, 
but  even  these  errands  of  mercy  failed  to  move 
the  authorities  from  their  determination  to  have 
absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  the  outlanders.  The 
increase  from  year  to  year  of  foreign  sails  in  the 
waters  that  surround  Japan  had  been  noted  as  a 
growing  portent  of  coming  evil,  and  in  1850  the 
matter  had  become  so  serious  that  grave  reports 
were  made  to  the  great  dignitaries  of  the  empire 
stating  that  no  less  than  eighty-six  of  the  "  black 
ships  of  the  barbarians "  had  been  seen  within 
the  space  of  a  single  year  from  the  headlands  of 
Matsumae. 

Foreign  ships  therefore  were  not  unfamiliar 
objects  to  the  Japanese,  but  steamships  were  a 
novelty,  as  Perry's  two  frigates  are  believed  to  have 
been  the  first  of  the  kind  to  appear  in  Japanese 
waters.  Their  volumes  of  smoke  and  capability 
of  motion  without  sails  greatly  amazed  the  super- 
stitious peasants,  some  of  whom  settled  the  mys- 
tery satisfactorily  by  agreeing  that  the  foreigners 
must  have  captured  and  enslaved  some  of  the  well- 
known  volcano  demons ;  other  some,  unwilling 


PERRY'S  LANDING  IN  JAPAN  45 

to  believe  the  evidence  of  their  own  senses,  com- 
forted each  other  with  the  happy  assurance  that 
the  uncanny  spectacle  was  only  a  mirage  created 
by  the  breath  of  clams,  and  would  soon  pass  away. 
The  better  class  and  more  intelligent  Japanese 
knew  well  enough  that  the  strange  power  within 
the  unusual  ships  must  be  a  practical  application 
of  some  force  of  which  they  were  ignorant,  and 
being  of  an  investigating  and  mechanical  turn  of 
mind  they  realized  that  it  would  be  to  their  advan- 
tage to  learn  what  it  was.  This  curiosity  had  an 
important  part  in  eventually  deciding  the  authori- 
ties to  make  friends  with  the  intruders,  which  was 
exactly  what  Commodore  Perry  had  expected  when 
he  insisted  upon  the  use  of  steamers  for  his  expe- 
dition. 

After  a  number  of  preliminary  forms  to  show 
the  Japanese  that  the  visitors  had  come  with  a  seri- 
ous purpose  and  could  not  be  turned  away  by  re- 
fusals and  threats,  a  meeting  was  arranged  to  take 
place  on  shore  between  Perry  and  two  native  com- 
missioners of  high  rank  selected  for  that  purpose. 
This  affair  was  studiously  arranged  for  theatrical 
effect  to  impress  the  natives  with  the  grandeur  of 
the  strangers  and  the  importance  of  the  event. 
Many  officers  in  full-dress  uniform  and  about  four 
hundred  armed  men  were  landed,  and  every  cere- 
monial observed  that  would  have  an  effect  upon 
a  people  accustomed  to  an  extravagant  system 
of  official  etiquette.  Knowing  the  uselessness 


46        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

of  haste  in  dealing  with  Asiatics,  Perry  did  not 
engage  in  any  discussion  of  the  object  of  his  visit, 
but  merely  delivered,  with  much  show  of  pomp  and 
solemnity,  a  letter  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States  addressed  to  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  asking 
that  friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries 
be  established  and  explaining  the  advantages  of 
such  relations  to  both  parties.  With  a  promise  to 
return  the  following  year  after  the  matter  had 
been  amply  considered,  the  Americans  closed  the 
interview  and  with  their  ships  returned  to  the  sea 
whence  they  came,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  Jap- 
anese. 

The^steam  frigate  Powhatan  joined  the  squad- 
ron at  Hong  Kong  and  soon  afterward  became  the 
flagship.  Headquarters  were  established  at  Macao, 
a  Portuguese  settlement  near  Hong  Kong,  where 
offices  were  rented  and  facilities  created  for  officers 
and  specialists  with  the  expedition  to  write  reports 
of  what  they  had  observed  and  perfect  their 
sketches  and  drawings.  There  were  a  number  of 
civilians  with  the  expedition,  to  give  it  the  bene- 
fit of  expert  knowledge  in  arts  and  sciences  not 
familiar  to  naval  officers.  Among  these  were  Bay- 
ard Taylor,  the  "  landscape  painter  in  words,"  and 
Messrs.  Heine  and  Brown,  the  water-color  artists 
whose  beautiful  pictures  embellish  Commodore 
Perry's  report.  In  order  to  avoid  the  friction  that 
seems  unavoidable  when  civilians  are  associated 
with  a  military  organization,  these  gentlemen  were 


JAPAN'S  FORBIDDING  ATTITUDE  47 

enlisted  for  the  time  being  as  acting  master's  mates 
and  were  thus  made  amenable  to  naval  law  and 
discipline. 

In  January,  1854,  the  squadron  proceeded  north- 
ward again.  Besides  the  three  steamers  there  were 
several  sailing  ships  of  war  and  store-ships  carry- 
ing coal  and  provisions  for  the  squadron  and  pre- 
sents for  the  Japanese  government.  An  anchorage 
was  reached  in  Yeddo  Bay  February  13,  and  it 
was  then  learned  that  the  Japanese,  so  far  from 
having  decided  to  make  a  treaty,  were  desirous 
only  that  the  strangers  should  stay  away  and  leave 
them  in  peace  and  in  ignorance  of  the  world's 
knowledge.  While  waiting  for  them  to  get  ready 
to  discuss  the  matter  the  Americans  employed 
their  time  by  sounding  and  surveying  the  waters 
and  giving  intelligible  names  to  the  prominent  fea- 
tures of  the  region.  One  name,  Mississippi  Bay, 
thus  bestowed  by  American  naval  officers  and  so 
well  known  to  all  visitors  to  Japan,  will  serve  for 
all  time  to  perpetuate  in  a  far  country  the  name 
of  the  historic  old  steamer  whose  keel  was  the 
first  of  foreign  build  to  disturb  its  waters. 

A  peremptory  demand  to  leave  Japanese  waters 
was  met  by  Perry  moving  his  ships  six  miles 
further  up  the  bay  to  a  place  about  where  the  cos- 
mopolitan city  of  Yokohama  now  stands,  but  which 
was  then  marked  only  by  a  few  fisher  huts.  This 
alarmed  the  authorities  so  thoroughly  that  word 
was  sent  from  Yeddo  forthwith  to  make  some  sort 


48         PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

of  treaty  with  the  Americans  where  they  were  and 
prevent  what  was  called  the  "  national  disgrace " 
of  having  their  ships  appear  in  sight  of  Yeddo. 
March  8  was  selected  as  the  day  for  meeting  on 
shore  in  a  treaty-house  or  pavilion  built  specially 
for  the  purpose  on  the  shore  at  Yokohama.  A 
large  force  of  officers  and  men  under  arms  was 
landed  and  the  same  pomp  and  ceremony  observed 
as  at  the  meeting  of  the  year  before.  After  the 
first  formalities  had  been  properly  attended  to,  a 
detailed  discussion  of  the  situation  was  taken  up 
and  carried  on  from  day  to  day  through  the  entire 
month  of  March. 

While  this  was  going  on,  the  curiosity  and  natu- 
ral mechanical  instincts  of  the  people  were  being 
appealed  to  by  the  exhibition  of  a  great  variety  of 
machinery  and  appliances  that  Perry  had  collected 
and  brought  with  him  with  this  end  in  view,  know- 
ing that  self-interest  would  win  the  Japanese  to  his 
purpose  where  force  and  bluster  would  fail.  A 
circular  railway  track  was  laid  down,  upon  which 
a  small  locomotive  and  cars  were  daily  run,  to  the 
great  wonder  and  interest  of  the  natives  ;  a  tele- 
graph line  was  set  up  and  operated  ;  daguerreotype 
artists  delighted  the  women  and  children,  and  so 
impressed  the  men  that  photography  has  become 
one  of  the  arts  in  which  the  Japanese  have  excelled 
for  many  years.  Machine  tools,  wood-working 
machinery,  steam  engines,  sewing-machines,  print- 
ing-presses, reapers  and  mowers,  clocks,  stoves, 


FIRST  TREATY  WITH  JAPAN  49 

firearms ;  everything,  in  fact,  that  the  broad  field 
of  the  mechanic  arts  had  produced  was  called  into 
use,  and  proved  convincing  arguments  to  even  the 
most  conservative  Japanese  that  they  had  more 
to  gain  and  more  to  learn  by  intercourse  with 
the  outside  world  than  the  preservation  of  their 
national  seclusion  was  worth.  The  factors  that 
decided  Perry's  success  were  his  steamships  and 
the  machinery  he  brought  with  him,  without  which 
he  doubtless  would  have  failed  as  others  had  failed 
before  him. 

A  treaty  was  agreed  to  and  finally  signed  the 
last  day  of  the  month,  March  31,  1854.  It  con- 
ceded little  to  the  Americans,  but  served  as  the 
thin  entering  end  of  the  wedge  for  greater  pri- 
vileges to  follow  afterward.  By  its  terms  the 
Japanese  agreed  to  treat  shipwrecked  mariners 
with  kindness ;  to  allow  vessels  in  distress  to  buy 
fuel,  water,  and  provisions,  and  named  two  ports 
in  Japan  where  foreign  ships  might  resort  for 
repairs  or  shelter  from  storms.  Trade,  except  in 
ship  supplies  that  were  actually  needed,  was  for- 
bidden, as  was  also  permission  to  foreigners  to 
reside  in  Japan.  These  and  other  privileges,  and 
the  opening  to  foreign  trade  of  several  treaty  ports, 
followed  in  due  time  through  the  efforts  of  Eng- 
lish and  other  diplomats.  The  United  States 
through  its  navy  introduced  Japan  to  the  enlight- 
ened nations  of  the  earth  and  enabled  her  to  be- 
come one  of  them  within  one  one-hundredth  part 


50         PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

of  the  time  that  it  had  taken  them  to  arrive  at 
their  degree  of  civilization.  The  advancement  of 
Japan  within  the  past  fifty  years  is  the  most  won- 
derful story  in  all  history. 

Another  victory  of  peace  that  the  advent  of 
steam  power  enabled  the  United  States  to  share 
was  the  laying  of  the  first  Atlantic  cable  in  1858. 
This  great  undertaking  having  been  decided  upon 
by  a  company  of  American  and  English  capital- 
ists, the  large  steam  frigate  Niagara  was  ordered 
to  England  in  the  spring  of  1857  to  assist  in  the 
work.  One  half  the  cable  (about  1250  miles) 
was  stowed  on  board  the  Niagara  and  the  other 
half  on  board  the  British  steam  war-ship  Agamem- 
non. The  two  ships  left  Valencia,  Ireland,  in 
August,  the  Niagara  paying  out  her  cable  as  they 
proceeded,  with  the  arrangement  that  the  Aga- 
memnon would  lay  the  American  portion.  The 
II.  S.  S.  Susquehanna  accompanied  the  expedition 
as  a  convoy  to  render  any  assistance  that  might  be 
needed.  Only  four  days  after  leaving  Ireland  the 
cable  broke  because  of  delays  in  the  paying-out 
machinery,  and  the  enterprise  was  abandoned  for 
that  year,  the  Niagara  returning  to  the  United 
States. 

The  next  year  the  Niagara  returned  to  England, 
and  with  the  Agamemnon  steamed  to  the  middle 
of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  from  whence  each  ship 
started  homeward,  each  paying  out  cable  as  they 
proceeded  and  maintaining  telegraphic  communi- 


THE   ATLANTIC   CABLE  .51 

cation  with  each  other.  A  break  in  the  Agamem- 
non's section  occasioned  a  delay  of  about  a  month, 
but  in  August  both  ends  were  landed,  the  Aga- 
memnon's at  Valencia  and  that  carried  by  the  Nia- 
gara at  Trinity  Bay,  Newfoundland.  This  cable 
was  operated  about  two  weeks  and  transmitted 
four  hundred  messages,  when  it  ceased  working, 
owing  to  defective  insulation.  Capitalists  who 
had  furnished  funds  for  the  undertaking  now  lost 
faith  in  it,  and  but  for  the  energy  and  persever- 
ance of  the  original  projector,  Mr.  Cyrus  W.  Field 
of  New  York,  it  might  have  been  permanently 
abandoned. 

Before  preparations  for  another  attempt  were 
completed  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States 
came,  and  that  of  course  caused  a  suspension  of 
the  enterprise.  Finally,  in  1865,  with  a  larger 
and  better  made  cable  the  work  was  resumed,  and 
met  with  failure  and  bitter  disappointment  by  the 
breaking  and  loss  of  the  cable  after  twelve  hun- 
dred miles  had  been  laid,  proceeding  westward 
from  Ireland.  The  huge  steamship  Great  East- 
ern was  used  in  this  attempt,  and  again  the  next 
year,  when  a  cable  was  successfully  laid  and  tel- 
egraphic communication  that  has  never  been 
broken  established  between  Europe  and  America. 
The  most  remarkable  thing  in  the  whole  story  of 
the  ocean  telegraph  is  that  after  the  Great  East- 
ern had  successfully  laid  the  new  cable  in  1866 
she  went  to  the  middle  of  the  ocean,  located  by 


62        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

accurate  navigation  the  point  where  the  cable  of 
the  year  before  had  parted  and  sank,  and  after 
a  month's  work  actually  succeeded  in  grappling 
the  lost  end  in  two  miles  of  water,  hauled  it  on 
board,  spliced  it  to  another  oable  carried  by  the 
ship,  steamed  to  the  American  coast,  landed  the 
«nd,  and  thus  completed  the  second  telegraphic 
line  under  the  ocean. 

The  value  of  steam  in  naval  operations  was  for- 
cibly shown  in  the  conduct  of  an  expedition  that 
an  unfortunate  collision  compelled  the  United 
States  to  direct  against  a  South  American  repub- 
lic. In  1855  the  United  States  naval  steamer 
Water  Witch,  for  some  time  peaceably  engaged 
in  exploring  the  river  La  Plata  and  its  tributaries, 
was  fired  upon  by  a  Paraguayan  fort  and  pre- 
vented from  continuing  the  work.  A  seaman  on 
duty  at  the  wheel  was  killed,  for  which  outrage 
our  government  demanded  redress  in  the  form  of 
an  apology  for  the  indignity  offered  the  flag,  and 
an  indemnity  for  the  benefit  of  the  family  of  the 
man  who  had  lost  his  life.  Lopez,  the  autocratic 
president  of  Paraguay,  steadily  refused  considera- 
tion of  the  matter  until  finally  diplomatic  en- 
deavors were  exhausted,  and  Congress  in  1858 
authorized  the  President  to  use  force  to  obtain 
satisfaction  from  that  government.  A  naval  expe- 
dition large  enough  to  ensure  a  successful  issue 
was  made  ready,  and  toward  the  end  of  the  year 
was  assembled  in  the  river  near  Montevideo.  In 


AN  AFFAIR  WITH  PARAGUAY  53 

preparing  this  expedition  it  became  necessary,  in 
consequence  of  a  deficiency  in  the  navy  of  light- 
draft  vessels  and  of  the  unfitness  of 'sailing-vessels 
for  river  service,  to  charter  a  number  of  steamers 
to  be  armed  and  equipped  as  war-vessels.  Seven 
such  steamers  were  hired  and  subsequently  pur- 
chased for  retention  in  the  navy,  and  all  rendered 
important  service  in  the  Paraguay  expedition  and 
in  the  civil  war  that  followed  so  soon  after. 

Besides  the  seven  chartered  steamers,  the  ex- 
pedition included  the  steamers  Fulton  and  Water 
Witch  of  the  navy  and  the  famous  little  steam 
revenue  cutter  Harriet  Lane,  or  ten  steamers  in 
all.  There  were  also  some  sailing-frigates  and 
sloops  of  war  and  three  brigs,  making  a  total  of 
nineteen  vessels  of  all  classes,  carrying  about  two 
hundred  guns  and  twenty-five  hundred  men.  The 
steamers  ascended  the  river  about  three  hundred 
miles  to  a  point  above  Rosario,  towing  with  them 
the  brigs,  one  sloop  of  war,  and  two  store-ships, 
the  aggregate  force  thus  moved  inland  being  1740 
men  and  78  guns.  The  commander  of  the  naval 
foi-ce,  Flag  Oflficer  W.  B.  Shubrick,  with  a  special 
commissioner  representing  the  United  States,  then 
proceeded  with  the  Fulton  and  Water  Witch  sev- 
eral hundred  miles  further  up  the  river  to  Asun- 
cion, the  capital  of  Paraguay,  where  they  arrived 
January  30,  1859.  The  presence  of  the  large 
armed  force  down  the  river  was  known,  and  there 
was  no  delay  in  obtaining  the  respectful  hearing 


54         PROGRESS   OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

that  had  for  so  long  been  contemptuously  refused. 
A  satisfactory  apology  was  made  for  firing  on  the 
flag  of  the  United  States ;  an  indemnity  was  paid 
on  the  spot  for  killing  the  American  seaman,  and 
the  special  commissioner  negotiated  a  new  and 
advantageous  commercial  treaty  with  the  Para- 
guayan government.  Paraguay  lies  so  far  inland 
that  without  this  flotilla  of  steamers  to  stem  the 
current  of  the  great  river  it  is  very  doubtful  if 
our  efforts  to  punish  a  flagrant  wrong  could  ever 
have  been  successful. 

In  June,  1859,  a  considerable  number  of  British, 
French,  and  American  war-vessels  gathered  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  River  in  northern  China,  con- 
veying ministers  of  their  respective  governments 
who  were  to  proceed  to  Peking  to  exchange  treaties 
that  had  been  signed  the  year  before.  The  atti- 
tude of  the  Chinese  was  hostile  to  the  French  and 
English  because  of  a  war  of  the  previous  year,  and 
less  so  in  degree  only  toward  the  Americans.  The 
latter  were  represented  by  Flag  Officer  (Captain) 
Josiah  Tattnall,  whose  flagship  was  the  Powhatan. 
Honorable  John  E.  Ward  was  the  American  min- 
ister. Because  of  the  shoalness  of  the  river,  the 
foreigners  were  provided  with  a  number  of  light- 
draft  gunboats  and  dispatch-vessels  to  take  the  ex- 
pedition forward  after  the  heavy  war- vessels  would 
be  compelled  to  anchor  off  the  river  entrance. 
The  Americans,  having  no  suitable  small  vessel  of 
war,  had  chartered  a  small  English  steamer,  the 


CAPTAIN  TATTNALL  IN  CHINA  55 

Toey-wan,  which  was  not  armed,  as  it  was  intended 
only  to  take  the  American  minister  and  his  suite 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Pei-ho  to  Peking. 

The  Chinese  desired  to  delay  or  prevent  alto- 
gether the  exchange  of  the  treaties,  and  it  was 
found  that  they  had  rebuilt  and  armed  the  forts  at 
the  mouth  of  the  river  that  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish had  demolished  the  year  before,  and  had  also 
planted  several  barriers  of  stakes  across  the  river. 
They  refused  to  remove  the  barriers  and  gave  notice 
to  the  English  admiral  that  they  would  oppose  with 
force  any  attempt  to  pass  them  and  ascend  the 
river.  Tattnall  in  the  Toey-wan,  with  Mr.  Ward 
on  board,  steamed  up  to  the  barriers,  hoping  that 
the  threat  would  not  apply  to  Americans ;  but  on 
sending  an  officer  on  shore  with  interpreters  it  was 
learned  that  no  one  would  be  allowed  to  pass  with- 
out attack.  The  Toey-wan  grounded  while  on  this 
mission  and  was  in  great  danger  for  a  time,  but 
floated  at  high  water.  Rear  Admiral  Hope,  the 
British  commander-in-chief,  sent  a  gunboat  to 
attempt  to  tow  the  Toey-wan  off,  and  also  offered 
Tattnall  the  use  of  another  gunboat  for  himself 
and  the  minister,  with  the  very  unusual  privilege 
of  hoisting  the  American  flag  on  it. 

The  next  day,  June  25,  the  gunboat  flotilla,  com- 
posed of  one  French  and  twelve  English  vessels, 
attempted  to  force  the  barriers,  and  at  once  became 
engaged  in  a  desperate  combat  with  seven  forts  at 
close  range  on  both  sides  of  the  river.  Several  of 


56        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

the  frail  improvised  gunboats  were  soon  sunk  or 
disabled;  their  loss  of  men  was  frightful,  and 
within  fifteen  minutes  after  the  battle  began  it 
was  evident,  as  Tattnall  reported  later,  that  they 
had  no  hope  of  success.  Three  vessels  used  as  the 
British  admiral's  flagship  were  put  out  of  action  in 
succession,  and  he,  after  being  seriously  wounded, 
transferred  his  flag  to  a  fourth  before  the  day  was 
done.  The  French  commander-in-chief  was  also 
wounded.  The  Toey-wan  remained  for  a  time 
neutral,  lying  below  the  engagement,  but  Tattnall 
grew  impatient  of  inaction,  and  finally  with  the 
laconic  excuse  that  has  ever  since  been  famous,  — 
"  Blood  is  thicker  than  water,"  —  he  got  under  way 
and  towed  a  number  of  barges  containing  a  reserve 
of  several  hundred  men  up  to  the  scene  of  action 
against  a  tide  that  they  could  not  stem  unaided. 
After  nightfall  these  men  and  others  landed  and 
attempted  to  take  the  forts  by  assault,  but  were  re- 
pulsed with  heavy  loss.  The  day's  work  cost  about 
four  hundred  and  fifty  men  killed  and  wounded, 
only  twelve  of  whom  were  French. 

After  towing  the  English  reserves  into  action, 
Tattnall  with  his  flag  lieutenant,  Trenchard,  went 
to  the  Cormorant,  then  hotly  engaged  and  flying 
the  admiral's  flag,  to  pay  a  visit  of  sympathy  to 
Admiral  Hope,  of  whose  injury  he  had  just  learned. 
When  within  a  few  feet  of  the  Cormorant  a  round 
shot  struck  the  American  boat,  killed  the  coxswain, 
wounded  the  flag  lieutenant,  and  so  injured  the 


A  VIOLATION  OF  NEUTRALITY  57 

boat  that  it  barely  gave  its  occupants  time  to  board 
the  Cormorant  before  it  sank.  While  the  officers 
were  paying  their  respects  to  the  wounded  admiral, 
the  American  seamen  of  the  boat's  crew-  quietly 
edged  forward  and  were  soon  busily  fighting  the 
British  bow  gun,  the  crew  of  which  had  become 
inadequate  from  casualties.  Tattnall  reproved  the 
men  for  this  conduct  as  a  violation  of  neutrality, 
and  the  sailor-like  answer,  —  "Beg  pardon,  sir,  but 
seein'  them  so  short-handed  we  just  thought  we  'd 
give  them  a  lift  for  fellowship's  sake,"  is  quite  as 
worthy  of  preservation  as  Tattnall' s  "  Blood  is 
thicker  than  water."  Tattnall  himself  was  subse- 
quently assailed  by  anti-administration  and  anti- 
British  newspapers  at  home  for  improperly  depart- 
ing from  a  position  of  strict  neutrality ;  but  the 
great  mass  of  the  American  people  upheld  him,  and 
he  was  thanked,  through  the  State  Department,  by 
the  British  government.  The  history  of  our  navy 
is  none  the  worse  for  his  act  and  his  epigram. 

During  these  years  just  reviewed,  while  steam 
was  gaining  its  footing  in  all  navies  as  well  as  in 
our  own,  the  growth  of  the  gun  had  forced  the 
question  of  finding  something  better  than  wooden 
walls  to  resist  its  attack.  This  matter  was  not  im- 
portant in  the  great  naval  wars  of  the  Napoleonic 
period,  and  the  first  advocates  of  iron  armor  for 
ships  met  with  no  encouragement.  In  those  days 
the  gun  was  a  rude  cast-iron  affair,  throwing  at  low 
velocity  a  solid  shot  not  much  larger,  for  most  of 


58         PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

the  guns  in  use,  than  a  big  apple.  Except  at  close 
quarters,  the  tough  and  thick  oaken  sides  of  ships 
of  war  could  stop  these  cannon  balls,  and  even  if 
one  did  penetrate,  it  was  only  a  single  missile  that 
might  or  might  not  hit  a  man.  Splinters  from 
the  passage  of  a  shot  through  a  wooden  side  were 
guarded  against  by  nettings  made  for  that  special 
purpose  of  small  tough  ropes.  The  seaman  of  the 
period  therefore  had  small  need  for  better  protec- 
tion ;  indeed,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have 
thought  it  cowardly  to  put  iron  plates  between 
himself  and  his  enemy,  for  the  age  of  the  "  wooden 
walls  "  was  also  the  age  of  chivalry  on  the  sea. 

A  great  change  came  with  the  introduction, 
about  the  year  1825,  of  guns  for  firing  explosive 
shells  directly  at  an  object  instead  of  in  an  over- 
head curve  from  mortars.  The  gun  for  this  pur- 
pose was  the  invention  of  Colonel  Paixhans  of  the 
French  army,  who  had  been  a  soldier  of  Napoleon, 
and  from  him  shell-guns  were  known  for  many 
years  as  Paixhans  guns.  The  destructive  effects 
of  such  shells  bursting  on  the  crowded  decks  of  a 
wooden  ship  were  obvious,  but  it  was  not  until  the 
beginning  of  the  Crimean  war  that  the  full  terror 
of  the  invention  was  shown  by  use.  In  November, 
1853,  at  Sinope,  a  Russian  squadron  of  six  sailing- 
ships  and  three  steamers  assailed  a  Turkish  squad- 
ron of  nine  sailing-ships  and  two  steamers,  lying 
at  anchor  and  off  their  guard.  The  Russians  had 
shell-guns  and  the  Turks  had  not.  It  was  a  test 


THE  INTRODUCTION  OF  IRONCLADS   59 

to  destruction  of  shell  against  shot.  Exploding 
shells  set  the  Turkish  ships  on  fire  time  after  time, 
and  in  a  very  short  engagement  their  fleet  was 
practically  destroyed.  One  steamer  escaped,  but 
all  the  other  Turkish  ships  were  captured  or  sunk, 
and  their  loss  of  life  was  frightful.  The  Russian 
loss  was  comparatively  small.  After  the  lesson  of 
Sinope  the  nations  of  Europe  began  experimenting 
with  iron-armored  vessels,  and  the  era  of  the  iron- 
clad may  be  considered  as  dating  from  that  event. 
Long  before  Sinope,  however,  many  inventions 
and  suggestions  relative  to  armoring  ships  of  war 
had  been  put  forward,  and  in  the  United  States 
there  was  one  notable  instance  of  an  ironclad  in 
actual  course  of  construction.  As  early  as  1812 
Colonel  John  Stevens,  whose  experiments  with 
steamboats  have  been  described,  had  prepared 
plans  for  a  peculiar  armored  ship  of  war.  He 
proposed  a  circular  vessel,  heavily  armed  and 
armored,  shaped  something  like  a  saucer,  to  be 
moored  by  a  swivel  in  the  channel  to  be  defended, 
and  fitted  with  submerged  screw  propellers  so 
placed  as  to  revolve  the  vessel  rapidly  about  its 
mooring.  The  guns  were  to  be  fired  as  they  came 
into  line  with  the  hostile  object  and  reloaded  be- 
fore coming  round  again.  No  craft  like  this  was 
ever  built.  In  1841,  Mr.  Theodore  R.  Timby,  of 
New  York,  submitted  to  the  War  Department 
plans  for  a  revolving  iron  battery,  and  in  1843  he 
filed  a  caveat  in  the  United  States  Patent  Office 


60        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

for  "  a  metallic  revolving  fort  to  be  used  on  land 
or  water,  and  to  be  revolved  by  propelling  engines 
located  within  the  same,  and  acting  upon  suitable 
machinery."  In  this  patent  specification,  and  in 
the  project  of  Stevens,  it  is  easy  to  see  some  fore- 
shadowing of  the  Monitor.  Circular  ironclads  not 
unlike  Stevens's  design  have  been  built  since  for 
the  navy  of  Russia. 

In  1841  also,  Colonel  Paixhans  advised  the 
use  of  iron  plates  on  the  sides  of  ships  as  a  protec- 
tion against  his  shells,  but  the  French  government 
rejected  his  plans.  The  same  year  the  sons  of 
Colonel  Stevens  proposed  to  the  Navy  Department 
to  build  an  ironclad  vessel  of  high  speed,  with 
screw  propellers  and  all  machinery  below  the 
water  line.  This  proposal  was  accepted,  and  an 
act  of  Congress,  approved  April  14,  1842,  author- 
ized the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  contract  for 
"the  construction  of  a  war-steamer,  shot  and 
shell  proof,  to  be  built  principally  of  iron,  upon 
the  plan  of  the  said  Stevens."  The  armor  of 
this  vessel  was  to  be  41  inches  thick,  which  was 
believed  by  the  Stevens  brothers,  from  experiments 
of  their  own,  to  be  sufficient  to  resist  the  fire  of 
any  gun  known.  Rather  curiously,  work  on  this 
vessel  was  retarded  by  John  Ericsson,  whose  ex- 
periments with  his  big  wrought-iron  gun  proved 
that  the  armor  of  the  Stevens  battery  was  insuffi- 
cient. Work  on  it  languished  until  1854,  when 
the  builders  proceeded  in  earnest  with  a  much 


FRENCH  FLOATING  BATTERIES  61 

larger  battery  that  was  to  be  plated  with  6|  inches 
of  iron  ;  this  in  turn  was  never  finished,  for  causes 
not  necessary  to  describe  in  this  short  review. 

These  are  a  few  only  of  many  early  attempts  to 
deal  with  the  armor  question,  but  they  are  suffi- 
cient to  indicate  the  causes  that  made  the  problem 
important  and  to  outline  the  steps  that  led  to  the 
demand  for  armored  ships  of  war.  The  victory 
of  the  shell  at  Sinope  was  so  complete  that  armor 
for  ships  was  thereafter  a  necessity  admitted  by 
all.  The  French  took  the  lead,  and  in  1854 
began  building  several  armored  floating  batteries, 
which,  though  large,  may  hardly  be  called  ships, 
but  were  rather  mere  barges  for  transporting 
small  forts.  They  were  164  feet  long,  42 £  feet 
beam,  8  feet  draft,  and  1400  tons  displacement. 
Auxiliary  steam  power  applied  through  the  screw 
was  provided.  The  hulls  were  of  timber,  with 
4  inches  of  iron  armor,  and  each  carried  18 
50-pounder  smooth-bore  guns.  They  were  fitted 
with  masts  and  sails,  for  a  mastless  steamer  was 
then  a  monstrosity  that  seamen  could  not  under- 
stand and  would  not  tolerate.  When  it  was  found 
that  the  batteries  could  not  sail,  the  masts  were 
replaced  with  light  poles  that  could  be  unshipped 
in  action,  thus  retaining  at  least  a  semblance  of 
what  was  regarded  as  "  ship-shape." 

As  soon  as  completed,  three  of  these  batteries, 
named  Devastation,  Tonnante,  and  Lave,  were 
sent  out  to  the  East  under  convoy  of  real  ships. 


62          PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

On  October  17,  1855,  they  had  their  battle  trial 
by  engaging  the  Russian  forts  at  Kinburn.  The 
allied  French  and  British  fleet  at  this  attack  num- 
bered eighty  vessels  of  all  classes  from  ships-of-the- 
line  to  mortar-boats.  The  three  armored  batteries 
were  put  in  an  inner  line  of  attack  only  800  yards 
from  the  works,  and  in  the  event  proved  to  be  the 
decisive  factors  of  the  battle,  so  employing  the 
Russian  fire  that  not  a  man  was  killed  on  any  of 
the  great  wooden  ships  present.  At  such  short 
range  the  projectiles  from  the  iron  batteries  were 
very  destructive  to  the  Russian  works,  the  com- 
mander of  which  surrendered  after  three  hours' 
fighting,  29  of  his  62  guns  being  then  dismounted. 
The  Devastation  was  struck  75  times ;  the  others 
about  60  times  each.  Their  armor  was  not 
pierced,  the  results  of  the  hits  they  sustained  be- 
ing dents  only  about  1-|-  inches  deep.  They  had 
2  men  killed  and  25  wounded,  these  casualties 
being  the  results  of  shot  and  splinters  coming  in 
at  the  very  large  gun-ports.  These,  as  said  before, 
were  the  only  losses  in  the  allied  fleet.  The  Rus- 
sians lost  45  killed  and  130  wounded. 

While  these  batteries  were  building,  the  Eng- 
lish had  undertaken  a  number  of  similar  ones  from 
plans  furnished  them  by  the  French.  Eight  were 
built,  but  they  were  not  finished  in  time  to  take 
any  part  in  the  war.  The  British  and  French 
officers  at  Kinburn  were  astonished  at  the  invulner- 
ability of  the  ironclads,  and  the  great  importance 


FRENCH  AND  ENGLISH  IRONCLADS        63 

of  armor  for  ships  of  war  was  finally  admitted. 
The  emperor  of  the  French  called  to  his  aid  a  dis- 
tinguished naval  architect,  M.  Dupuy  de  Lome, 
and  immediately  began  a  complete  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  French  navy.  They  accepted  the  new 
aspect  of  naval  affairs,  and  began  the  methodical 
creation  of  an  ironclad  navy,  adhering  as  closely 
as  changed  conditions  allowed  to  the  various 
classes  of  ships  that  had  been  essential  in  the  old 
navy  of  wood  and  canvas.  The  English,  bound 
by  stronger  ties  of  sentiment  to  their  tall  frigates 
and  ships-of-the-line,  were  loath  to  give  them  up, 
and  did  not  follow  the  lead  of  the  French  until 
1858,  when  the  Admiralty  reluctantly  authorized 
the  building  of  their  first  armored  sea-going  ship 
—  the  Warrior.  Other  armor-clads  followed,  but 
English  conservatism  had  the  result  that  for  one 
short  period,  about  the  year  1861,  their  heredi- 
tary rival,  France,  actually  outclassed  them  on  the 
sea. 

These  early  armored  ships  differed  but  slightly 
in  appearance  from  the  ships  of  former  years,  re- 
taining as  they  did  masts  and  spars  for  full  ship 
rigs.  The  first  French  ship,  La  Gloire,  was  of 
wood,  plated  with  iron  from  stem  to  stern,  and 
was  built  on  the  model  of  an  old  screw  ship-of-the- 
line,  named  Napoleon.  The  Warrior  and  the 
iron-cased  frigates  that  followed  her  were  built  of 
iron  with  4^  inches  of  iron  armor  on  a  wood  back- 
ing 18  inches  thick.  The  example  of  France  and 


64        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

England  was  followed  by  other  European  nations, 
BO  that  by  1861  Spain,  Italy,  Austria,  and  Den- 
mark all  had  ironclads  afloat  or  building. 

The  construction  of  these  ships  by  rival  nations, 
and  the  problem  of  piercing  their  armor  that  was 
naturally  much  discussed,  resulted  in  the  intro- 
duction of  the  rifled  gun  as  yet  another  factor  to 
assist  in  deciding  the  characteristics  of  the  war- 
ship of  the  future.  The  rifle  appeared  first  as  a 
small  shoulder-piece,  or  musket,  used  by  infantry, 
from  which  it  grew  by  degrees  to  the  small  field- 
gun  and  then  to  heavy  cannon,  fit  for  siege  and 
naval  uses.  The  first  instance  of  its  use  on  board 
ship  is  by  the  French  in  the  Crimean  war.  It 
proved  so  much  superior  to  smooth-bore  guns,  es- 
pecially in  trials  against  armor  plates,  that  by  the 
year  1859  France  had  adopted  it  as  the  standard 
for  heavy  artillery.  Thus  France  contributed  to 
naval  and  military  science  the  first  shell-guns,  the 
first  armored  ship,  and  the  first  rifled  cannon.  We 
have  already  seen  that  but  for  official  stubbornness 
or  jealousy  France  might  also  have  had  the  honor 
of  giving  the  first  practical  steamboat  to  the 
world. 

A  few  weeks  after  the  French  government  had 
begun  the  iron-plated  batteries  that  proved  their 
worth  at  Kinburn,  John  Ericsson  submitted  to 
that  government  plans  for  an  ironclad  that  in  all 
essentials  was  the  Monitor.  The  order  directing 
the  building  of  the  batteries  was  dated  September 


La  Gloire,  1859 


Armor  Section 
H.  M.  S.  Black  Prince 
(Sister  Ship  of  Warrior) 


H.  M.  S.  Warrior.  1860 

FIRST   FRENCH  AND   ENGLISH  ARMORED  FRIGATES 


ERICSSON'S  PROPOSAL  TO  FRANCE        65 

5,  1854  ;  Ericsson's  proposal  was  sent  September 
26,  1854,  through  the  Swedish  consul  at  New 
York.  These  dates  are  important,  because  it  is 
often  loosely  asserted  and  generally  believed  that 
the  French  batteries  were  the  outcome  of  Erics- 
son's plans,  though  there  was  hardly  a  point  of 
resemblance  between  the  two  designs.  A  short 
extract  from  the  document  sent  with  the  plans  to 
the  emperor  of  the  French  gives  Ericsson's  own 
description  of  his  vessel  and  its  proposed  armar 
ment :  — 

"  The  vessel  to  be  composed  entirely  of  iron. 
The  midship  section  is  triangular,  with  a  broad, 
hollow  keel,  loaded  with  about  200  tons  of  cast- 
iron  blocks  to  balance  the  heavy  upper  works. 
The  ends  of  the  vessel  are  moderately  sharp.  The 
deck,  made  of  plate  iron,  is  curved  both  longitu- 
dinally and  transversely,  the  curvature  being  5 
feet ;  it  is  made  to  project  8  feet  over  the  rudder 
and  propeller.  The  entire  deck  is  covered  with  a 
lining  of  sheet  iron  3  inches  thick,  with  an  open- 
ing in  the  centre  16  feet  diameter.  Over  this 
opening  is  placed  a  semi-globular  turret  of  plate 
iron  6  inches  thick  revolving  on  a  vertical  column 
by  means  of  steam  power  and  appropriate  gear- 
work.  The  vessel  is  propelled  by  a  powerful 
steam  engine  and  screw  propeller.  Air  for  the 
combustion  in  the  boilers  and  for  ventilation 
within  the  vessel  is  supplied  by  a  large  self-acting 
centrifugal  blower,  the  fresh  air  being  drawn  in 


66         PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

through  numerous  small  holes  in  the  turret.  The 
products  of  combustion  in  the  boilers  and  the  im- 
pure air  from  the  vessel  are  forced  out  through 
conductors  leading  to  a  cluster  of  small  holes  in 
the  deck  and  turret.  Surrounding  objects  are 
viewed  through  small  perforations  at  appropriate 
places.  Reflecting  telescopes,  capable  of  being 
protruded  or  withdrawn  at  pleasure,  also  afford  a 
distinct  view  of  surrounding  objects.  The  rud- 
derstock  passes  through  a  water-tight  stuffing-box, 
so  as  to  admit  of  the  helm  being  worked  within 
the  vessel.  Shot  striking  the  deck  are  deflected, 
whilst  shell  exploding  on  it  will  prove  harmless. 

"  Tube  for  projecting  the  shells  to  be  made  of 
cast  iron  or  brass,  20  inches  bore,  2  inches  thick, 
and  10  feet  long.  It  is  open  at  one  end,  the 
other  end  being  closed  by  a  door  moving  on 
hinges  provided  with  a  cross-bar  and  set-screw,  in 
order  to  be  quickly  opened  and  afterwards  firmly 
secured.  The  shell  is  inserted  through  this  door, 
and  projected  by  the  direct  action  of  steam  ad- 
mitted from  the  boiler  of  the  vessel  through  a 
large  opening  at  the  breech.  The  induction  valve 
is  made  with  a  double  face  of  large  areas,  and 
moved  by  mechanism  of  instantaneous  action,  sus- 
ceptible of  accurate  regulation  in  regard  to  open- 
ing. One  tube  of  the  above  description  is  placed 
on  a  level  on  the  platform  of  the  revolving 
turret." 

The  drawing,  it  will  be  noticed,  shows  an  ordi- 


ERICSSON'S  PROPOSAL  TO  FRANCE         67 

nary  cannon  in  the  turret  instead  of  the  breech- 
loading  steam  gun  described  in  the  letter.  For-' 
tunately,  perhaps,  for  the  United  States,  the 
emperor  of  the  French  was  not  seriously  im- 
pressed with  this  project,  and  it  was  permitted 
to  remain  on  paper  for  several  years.  A  note, 
written  by  a  subordinate,  was  sent  to  Ericsson 
acknowledging  the  receipt  of  his  plans,  and  there 
the  matter  dropped.  The  formal  note  began  by 
saying,  "  The  Emperor  himself  has  examined  with 
the  greatest  care  the  new  system  of  naval  attack 
that  you  have  submitted  to  him,"  and  this  was  all 
the  reward  Ericsson  had  for  his  trouble.  His 
letter  of  explanation  includes,  in  addition  to  what 
has  been  quoted,  a  description  of  two  other  steam 
guns,  or  tubes,  to  be  placed  low  in  the  vessel  for 
projecting  shells  (torpedoes)  under  water.  The 
shell  or  torpedo  is  described  as  16  inches  in 
diameter  and  carried  on  the  end  of  a  cylinder 
of  wood  of  the  same  diameter  and  10  feet  long. 
This  "hydrostatic  javelin,"  as  Ericsson  called  it, 
was  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  direction  and 
flotation  in  the  water. 

We  have  now  skimmed  over  briefly  and  imper- 
fectly the  history  of  many  inventions  relating  to 
peace  and  war  that  combined  to  make  the  Mon- 
itor possible.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  any 
of  these  had  yet  reached  perfection.  The  oldest 
of  all  —  the  steam  engine  —  was  still  a  crude 
machine  compared  with  its  present  state,  and  its 


68        PROGRESS  OF  STEAM  NAVIGATION 

right  upon  the  sea  was  yet  hotly  disputed.  In 
1861  the  greater  part  of  the  commerce  of  the 
world  was  carried  in  sailing-vessels,  and  in  navies 
many  distinguished  officers  wagged  their  heads 
wisely  at  the  sight  of  steam  ships  of  war  and  pre- 
dicted that  they  could  never  withstand  the  shock 
and  fire  of  battle.  Others  thought  that  the  thin 
armor  being  applied  to  a  few  ships  must  certainly 
sink  them  in  heavy  weather,  and,  with  few  excep- 
tions, all  agreed  that  the  inventor  and  engineer 
had  brought  evil  days  upon  a  formerly  fair  pro- 
fession. A  war  would  surely  disprove  the  false 
claims  of  all  these  impudent  innovations,  and  then 
the  good  old  days  might  come  again.  The  lesson 
of  Hampton  Roads  was  still  in  the  future. 

Great  changes  in  all  things  were  impending. 
Naval  armaments  were  to  be  transformed  so 
rapidly  that  they  woidd  be  hardly  recognizable, 
and  in  a  much  wider  field  all  the  conditions  of 
life  and  the  surroundings  of  society  were  to  be 
upset  and  made  more  complicated,  and  at  the 
same  time  easier  for  those  capable  of  appreciating 
and  using  the  arts  placed  within  easy  reach.  The 
time  had  come  when  the  mechanic  could  begin  to 
harmonize  the  laws  of  the  scientist  and  the  dreams 
of  the  inventor,  and  out  of  the  union  to  evolve  the 
multitude  of  mechanisms  that  have  given  us  an 
entirely  new  world,  and  so  changed  our  environ- 
ment and  the  conveniences  of  life  that  we  wonder 
how  our  ancestors  managed  to  exist  at  all. 


CHAPTER  II 

BUILDING   AND    BATTLE    OF   THE   IRONCLADS 

WE  have  now  seen  that  by  the  year  1860  naval 
mechanisms  and  processes  of  manufacture  had  been 
so  developed  that  ironclad  steamships  could  be 
built.  All  that  was  lacking  in  the  United  States 
to  prevent  their  building  was  a  demand  for  such 
ships,  and  that  demand  was  soon  made  by  the  out- 
break of  the  Civil  War.  As  at  a  later  period, 
Congress  had  permitted  but  little  advance  in  naval 
material,  resting  passive  while  foreign  nations  ex- 
perimented with  guns,  armor,  and  machinery,  and 
were  slowly  changing  their  ideas  of  war-ships.  Our 
naval  experts,  however,  were  watching  the  results 
of  foreign  experiments,  and  stood  ready  to  apply 
the  knowledge  so  gained  when  the  need  came. 
It  is  unfortunate  that  our  first  use  of  armored 
ships  should  have  been  against  ourselves,  but  in 
the  march  of  national  history  it  seems  to  have  been 
necessary  that  such  should  be  the  case.  Instead 
of  the  mechanical  genius  of  the  whole  country 
being  devoted  to  constructions  in  advance  of  the 
time  for  the  discomfiture  of  a  foreign  foe,  the 
inventive  talents  of  two  sections  were  arrayed  in 


70    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

hostile  competition.  The  result  was  the  creation 
of  two  types  of  armored  steamers  different  from 
each  other  and  from  constructions  abroad,  but 
each  possessing  features  that  have  been  lasting 
and  that  have  been  repeated  and  improved  in  all 
subsequent  naval  shipbuilding. 

Descriptions  of  the  originals  of  these  two  types 
and  a  narrative  of  the  causes  and  incidents  joined 
in  their  building  are  essential  to  this  history.  In 
taking  them  up,  the  story  of  the  inception  and 
building  of  the  ship  ,of  the  North  —  the  Monitor  — 
will  be  told  first,  as  it  is  logically  joined  to  what 
was  said  in  the  latter  part  of  the  preceding  chapter 
about  plans  for  an  armored  ship  sent  by  John 
Ericsson  to  the  French  emperor.  It  does  not 
follow  from  this  arrangement  of  subjects  that  the 
beginning  of  the  Monitor  was  the  incentive  that 
caused  the  building  of  the  ironclad  of  the  South ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  may  appear  as  the  two  accounts 
are  developed  that  the  reverse  was  the  case. 

The  first  move  toward  providing  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  with  an  armored  vessel  for  use 
in  suppressing  the  rebellion  was  a  joint  resolution 
of  Congress,  approved  June  24,  1861,  directing 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  appoint  a  board  of 
officers  to  examine  the  Stevens  battery  and  report 
upon  the  expediency  of  completing  it;  the  report 
was  not  made  until  near  the  end  of  that  year,  and 
advised  against  the  completion  of  the  vessel,  which 
put  an  end  to  that  project  so  far  as  the  government 


A  NAVAL  BOARD  OF  INVESTIGATION      71 

was  concerned.  Under  date  of  July  4,  1861,  Mr. 
Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  reported  to 
Congress  the  condition  of  the  navy  at  that  time 
when  it  was  confronted  with  a  great  war;  he 
referred  to  the  progress  abroad  in  armored  ship- 
building, and  asked  that  a  board  be  authorized  to 
investigate  the  subject  and  recommend  some  policy 
for  the  United  States  to  assume  toward  it.  The 
secretary  did  not  commit  himself  in  favor  of  iron- 
clads, but  guardedly  said  that  in  case  the  report 
of  the  board  should  be  favorable  to  them  it  must 
devolve  upon  Congress  to  decide  whether  or  not 
the  navy  should  be  provided  with  them. 

Congress  authorized  the  appointment  of  the 
board  asked  for,  by  an  act  that  was  approved 
August  3,  1861,  and  the  board  made  its  report 
September  16,  1861.  It  referred  briefly  to  the 
construction  of  ironclad  war-steamers  by  foreign 
powers,  and  reviewed  at  some  length  the  theories 
and  opinions  regarding  armor  held  by  naval  and 
scientific  experts.  With  this  were  many  original 
opinions,  though  the  report  was  prefaced  with  an 
explanation  that  the  members  of  the  board  had 
no  experience  and  but  scanty  knowledge  of  this 
branch  of  naval  architecture.  The  members  were 
three  officers  of  the  navy  of  high  rank,  —  two  cap- 
tains and  one  commander,  —  all  eminent  in  their 
calling  and  probably  as  well  informed  as  any  naval 
officers  of  that  time.  Their  report  is  therefore  of 
great  interest,  not  only  because  of  its  importance 


72    BUILDING  AND   BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

historically,  but  because  of  the  insight  it  gives  of 
the  beliefs  of  progressive  naval  men  of  that  day. 
So  completely  have  many  of  these  seemingly  well- 
founded  opinions  been  upset  by  experience  within 
the  short  space  of  only  a  third  of  a  century  that 
the  quotation  of  a  few  will  be  instructive ;  from 
them  we  may  learn  that  in  this  era  of  growth  and 
mechanical  progress  it  is  not  safe  to  declare  any- 
thing impossible. 

"  For  coast  and  harbor  defense  they  (ironclad 
ships)  are,  undoubtedly,  formidable  adjuncts  to 
fortifications  on  land.  As  cruising  vessels,  how- 
ever, we  are  skeptical  as  to  their  advantage  and 
ultimate  adoption." 

"  The  enormous  load  of  iron,  as  so  much  addi- 
tional weight  to  the  vessel ;  the  great  breadth  of 
beam  necessary  to  give  her  stability ;  the  short 
supply  of  coal  she  will  be  able  to  stow  in  her  bunk- 
ers ;  the  greater  power  required  to  propel  her ; 
and  the  largely  increased  cost  of  construction,  are 
objections  to  this  class  of  vessels  as  cruisers,  which 
we  believe  it  is  difficult  to  overcome." 

"  From  what  we  know  of  the  comparative  advan- 
tages and  disadvantages  of  ships  constructed  of 
wood  over  those  of  iron,  we  are  clearly  of  opinion 
that  no  ironclad  vessel  of  equal  displacement  can 
be  made  to  obtain  the  same  speed  as  one  not  thus 
encumbered,  because  her  form  would  be  better 
adapted  to  speed.  Her  form  and  dimensions,  the 
unyielding  nature  of  the  shield,  detract  materially 


CONSERVATIVE  OPINIONS  73 

in  a  heavy  sea  from  the  life,  buoyancy,  and  spring 
which  a  ship  built  of  wood  possesses." 

"  Wooden  ships  may  be  said  to  be  but  coffins 
for  their  crews  when  brought  in  conflict  with  iron- 
clad vessels ;  but  the  speed  of  the  former,  we  take 
for  granted,  being  greater  than  that  of  the  latter, 
they  can  readily  choose  their  position  and  keep  out 
of  harm's  way  entirely." 

"  As  yet  we  know  of  nothing  superior  to  the  large 
and  heavy  spherical  shot  in  its  destructive  effects 
on  vessels,  whether  plated  or  not." 

"  It  is  assumed  that  4^-inch  plates  are  the  heavi- 
est armor  a  sea-going  vessel  can  safely  carry." 

Besides  investigating  the  armor  question,  this 
board  was  directed  to  examine  and  report  upon 
plans  for  armored  vessels  that  might  be  submitted 
to  it,  such  plans  having  been  advertised  for  by  the 
Navy  Department.  This  was  a  fine  opportunity 
for  inventors  and  patriots,  genuine  and  otherwise, 
to  rush  to  the  aid  of  their  country,  and  the  chance 
was  not  neglected.  Plans  were  offered  for  almost 
every  imaginable  form  of  war-vessel  different  from 
those  then  in  use,  and  of  every  variety  in  size ; 
some  specified  as  much  as  15,000  tons  displace- 
ment, and  one  offered  alleged  formidable  qualities 
on  a  displacement  of  only  90  tons ;  the  estimates 
of  cost  were  equally  dispersed,  ranging  all  the 
way  from  $32,000  to  $1,500,000.  Some  were 
submitted  by  engineers  and  shipbuilders  of  ability 
and  reputation,  while  others  were  the  illusions  of 


74    BUILDING  AND   BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

impracticable  speculators.  The  board  in  its  report 
described  seventeen  of  these  projects  and  recom- 
mended that  three  be  accepted. 

The  act  of  Congress  that  created  the  board 
also  provided  that,  should  its  report  be  favorable, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  should  cause  one  or 
more  ironclad  vessels  to  be  constructed,  a  sum  of 
$1, 500, 000  being  appropriated  for  this  use.  Con- 
tracts were  accordingly  made  immediately  with 
the  three  successful  competitors  :  these  were  Bush- 
nell  &  Co.,  New  Haven,  Conn. ;  Merrick  &  Sons, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. ;  and  J.  Ericsson,  New  York. 
The  first-named  firm  undertook  the  construction 
of  an  armored  gunboat  that  was  named  Galena, 
the  designs  for  it  having  been  prepared  by  Mr. 
S.  H.  Pook,  afterward  a  constructor  in  the  navy. 
The  contract  price  was  $235,250,  and  the  vessel 
was  built  at  Mystic  Bridge,  Conn.  The  Galena 
was  not  unlike  an  ordinary  small  war-steamer 
in  appearance  except  that  the  upper  part  of  her 
sides  was  rounded  inward,  or  "tumbled  home" 
as  a  sailor  would  say,  at  an  angle  of  about  forty- 
five  degrees.  She  had  one  four-bladed  screw  pro- 
peller twelve  feet  in  diameter,  driven  by  engines 
of  Ericsson's  vibrating  lever  type,  that  will  be 
more  fully  described  further  along ;  there  were 
two  horizontal  tubular  boilers  with  three  furnaces 
in  each,  provided  with  blower  engines  for  fan 
blast. 

A  battery  of  six  large  guns  was  mounted  on  a 


THE  GALENA  75 

gun-deck,  protected  by  armor  about  four  inches 
thick,  on  what  was  described  as  the  "rail  and 
plate  principle,"  laid  on  over  the  wooden  sides  of 
the  vessel.  As  soon  as  the  Galena  was  completed 
she  was  sent  to  active  service,  and  in  her  first  en- 
gagement proved  that  her  armor  was  insufficient. 
The  morning  of  May  15,  1862,  in  company  with 
the  Monitor  and  some  gunboats,  she  attacked  a 
battery  on  Drewry's  Bluff  in  the  James  River, 
about  eight  miles  below  Richmond,  the  battery 
being  about  two  hundred  feet  above  the  water. 
The  Galena,  at  anchor  with  her  broadside  sprung 
toward  the  battery,  made  a  fine  target  for  the 
plunging  shot  from  the  bluff,  which  struck  her 
sloping  side  armor  almost  at  right  angles.  The 
iron  armor  was  penetrated  thirteen  tunes,  several 
shots  coming  clear  through  and  doing  much  dam- 
age, while  others  stuck  in  the  wooden  side  after 
passing  through  the  iron.  The  upper  deck  was 
badly  torn  and  broken  through  in  places  ;  and  all 
along  the  exposed  side,  planks,  knees,  beams,  and 
bulkheads  were  splintered  and  started  out  of  place. 
Thirteen  men  were  killed  and  eleven  wounded. 
In  spite  of  this  terrible  ordeal,  her  commander, 
the  gallant  old  John  Rodgers,  kept  his  ship  in 
action  for  three  hours  and  did  not  withdraw  until 
his  ammunition  was  almost  spent.  In  his  report 
of  the  battle  he  grimly  remarked,  "We  demon- 
strated that  she  is  not  shot-proof." 

Though   not    a   success   as  an  armor-clad,  the 


76    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

Galena  was  kept  in  active  service  as  a  gunboat 
throughout  the  war,  and,  lashed  alongside  the  evil- 
starred  Oneida,  participated  in  Farragut's  great 
victory  in  Mobile  Bay.  In  the  decade  following 
the  Civil  War,  economy  was  so  rampant  that  Con- 
gress allowed  the  navy  barely  enough  money  to 
keep  its  old  ships  in  repair  and  refused  any  ship- 
building efforts.  To  prevent  the  utter  disappear- 
ance of  our  fleet,  it  was  necessary  to  construe  the 
word  "  repairs  "  in  a  somewhat  elastic  manner,  and 
thus  some  new  ships  were  built  around  old  names. 
In  this  way  the  Galena  was  "repaired"  about 
1872  by  the  building  of  an  entirely  new  wooden 
sloop-of-war  of  the  same  name,  the  old  ship  quietly 
disappearing  as  the  new  one  grew. 

The  contract  with  Merrick  &  Sons  of  Philadel- 
phia gave  the  navy  the  New  Ironsides,  the  finest 
example  of  a  battleship  afloat  at  the  time  of  her 
completion.  Generally  described,  she  was  a  large 
steam  frigate  of  wood,  with  the  main  battery  pro- 
tected by  an  iron  casement  or  citadel ;  this  was  of 
long  and  wide  iron  plates  four  inches  thick,  cover- 
ing the  sides  of  the  ship  for  the  length  of  the 
battery  and  crossing  the  gun-deck  at  each  end, 
thus  making  a  complete  iron  fort  around  the 
guns.  The  ship  was  232  feet  long,  about  58  feet 
beam,  and  of  4120  tons  displacement;  the  battery 
consisted  of  sixteen  11-inch  Dahlgren  guns,  two 
200-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  and  four  24-pounder 
howitzers.  The  contractors  built  the  machinery 


The  Galena 


The  New  Ironsides 

UNITED  STATES   IRONCLADS,  1862 


THE  NEW  IRONSIDES  77 

at  their  own  works,  but,  not  being  shipbuilders, 
obtained  the  oak  hull  from  the  famous  Cramp  ship- 
yard. Sails  were  still  thought  indispensable,  and 
the  New  Ironsides  was  fully  rigged  as  a  bark 
when  first  fitted  out,  but  when  sent  to  war,  the 
masts  were  taken  out  and  replaced  with  light 
clothes-poles,  giving  her  an  appearance  much  h'ke 
a  modern  fighting-ship. 

The  New  Ironsides  was  completed  late  in  1862, 
and  was  sent  at  once  to  become  the  principal  ship 
in  the  fleet  of  ironclads  that  for  more  than  two 
years  invested  the  city  and  harbor  of  Charleston, 
S.  C.  It  is  said  that  she  was  in  action  more  days 
than  any  other  vessel  of  our  navy  during  the  Civil 
War,  and  was  struck  by  projectiles  more  than 
any  ship  that  floated  afterward  in  any  war,  but  in 
all  this  she  suffered  very  little  damage.  In  one 
engagement  with  batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island  she 
was  hit  seventy  times  within  three  hours,  and  on 
another  occasion  was  struck  and  somewhat  injured 
by  a  torpedo.  In  one  period  of  fifty-four  days 
during  the  summer  of  1863  she  has  a  record  of 
having  fired  four  thousand  four  hundred  and 
thirty-nine  11-inch  projectiles.  After  the  war,  in 
December,  1866,  she  was  destroyed  by  fire  acci- 
dentally at  the  Philadelphia  navy-yard. 

After  these  brief  but  necessary  accounts  of  the 
two  vessels  that  were  associated  in  their  origin 
with  the  Monitor,  we  will  proceed  with  the  story 
of  that  epoch-making  craft.  It  appears  from  the 


78    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

records  that  Ericsson  did  not  at  first  submit  any 
plans  of  his  vessel  to  the  armor-board  in  Washing- 
ton, his  former  dealings  with  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment not  having  been  pleasant  or  encouraging. 
After  Mr.  Bushnell  had  been  promised  a  contract 
to  build  the  Galena,  he  went  to  New  York  to  con- 
sult with  Ericsson  about  the  details  of  the  work 
he  was  about  to  undertake ;  during  the  interview 
Ericsson  exhibited  a  model  showing  the  principles 
of  the  vessel  he  had  proposed  to  the  French  seven 
years  before.  Mr.  Bushnell  was  so  impressed 
with  the  merits  shown  by  the  model  that  he  in- 
sisted on  bringing  it  to  the  attention  of  the  armor 
board,  which  he  was  able  to  do  through  personal 
acquaintance  with  Secretary  Welles,  though  the 
time  allowed  for  the  presentation  of  inventions 
had  nearly  elapsed.  The  project  was  rejected  at 
first  sight,  but  after  a  masterly  description  by 
Ericsson  himself,  induced  to  visit  Washington  for 
that  purpose,  and  a  belief  in  it  expressed  by  Mr. 
Welles,  the  board  gave  its  approval,  and  Ericsson 
was  told  to  proceed  at  once  with  the  construction ; 
this  he  did  with  such  energy  that  in  the  few  days 
that  elapsed  before  the  formal  contract  was  pre- 
pared he  had  material  for  his  vessel  going  through 
the  rolling-mill. 

The  contract,  dated  October  4,  1861,  required 
Ericsson  and  his  sureties  to  build  an  ironclad 
shot-proof  steam  battery,  of  iron  and  wood  com- 
bined, of  dimensions  stated  in  general  terms  in 


THE  CONTRACT  FOR  THE  MONITOR       79 

the  document.  A  sea  speed  of  eight  knots  per 
hour  for  twelve  consecutive  hours  was  specified. 
The  contract  price  was  $275,000,  to  be  paid 
in  five  installments  of  $50,000  each  and  one  of 
$25,000,  payments  to  be  made  as  often  as  the 
superintendent  of  construction  should  report  that 
the  progress  of  work  warranted.  A  reservation 
of  25  per  cent,  was  withheld  from  each  payment, 
to  be  retained  until  after  the  satisfactory  trial  of 
the  vessel,  not  less  than  ninety  days  after  she 
should  be  ready  for  sea.  The  superintendent  of 
construction  on  the  part  of  the  government  was 
Chief  Engineer  Alban  C.  Stimers  of  the  navy. 
The  capitalists  who  became  Ericsson's  sureties  and 
joined  with  him  in  making  the  contract  were 
Messrs.  C.  S.  Bushnell.  John  A.  Griswold,  and 
John  F.  Winslow. 

One  clause  of  the  contract  provided  that  if  the 
vessel  failed  to  make  the  specified  speed,  or  should 
be  wanting  in  other  respects,  the  contractors 
should  refund  the  full  amount  that  had  been  paid 
them.  This  provision  is  probably  the  foundation 
of  the  widespread  fiction  that  Ericsson  and  his 
sureties  paid  for  the  building  of  the  Monitor  out 
of  their  own  pockets.  Nothing  is  wider  of  the 
truth  :  every  payment  was  made  as  the  work  pro- 
gressed, according  to  contract,  before  the  vessel 
left  New  York,  and  the  twenty-five  per  cent,  reser- 
vation was  paid  within  a  week  after  the  famous 
fight  in  Hampton  Roads.  Another  requirement 


80    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

of  the  contract  shows  how  reluctant  the  naval 
experts  of  that  time  were  to  admit  steam  on  board 
war-ships  except  as  an  adjunct.  It  required  the 
contractors  to  "  furnish  masts,  spars,  sails,  and 
rigging  of  sufficient  dimensions  to  drive  the  vessel 
at  the  rate  of  six  knots  per  hour  in  a  fair  breeze 
of  wind."  Ericsson's  ideas  of  stability  as  applied 
to  light-draft  vessels  did  not  accord  with  this 
requirement,  and  he  did  not  observe  it ;  nor  does 
it  appear  that  any  attempt  was  made  to  enforce  it, 
for  the  Monitor  was  without  mast,  spar,  or  sail. 
Not  many  years  later,  the  top  hamper  of  masts  and 
sails  on  a  low-freeboard  turret  ship  gave  the  Brit- 
ish navy  the  tragedy  of  the  Captain. 

The  name  of  the  battery  was  given  by  Ericsson 
himself,  as  shown  by  the  following  letter  written 
by  him  in  January,  1862,  to  the  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Gustavus  Vasa  Fox :  — 

"  SIR,  —  In  accordance  with  your  request,  I  now 
submit  for  your  approbation  a  name  for  the  float- 
ing battery  at  Greenpoint.  The  impregnable  and 
aggressive  character  of  this  structure  will  admon- 
ish the  leaders  of  the  Southern  Rebellion  that  the 
batteries  on  the  banks  of  their  rivers  will  no 
longer  present  barriers  to  the  entrance  of  the 
Union  forces.  The  ironclad  intruder  will  thus 
prove  a  severe  monitor  to  those  leaders.  But 
there  are  other  leaders  who  will  also  be  startled 
and  admonished  by  the  booming  of  the  guns  from 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  MONITOR         81 

the  impregnable  iron  turret.  '  Downing  Street ' 
will  hardly  view  with  indifference  this  last  '  Yan- 
kee notion,'  this  monitor.  To  the  Lords  of  the 
Admiralty  the  new  craft  will  be  a  monitor,  sug- 
gesting doubts  as  to  the  propriety  of  completing 
those  four  steel-clad  ships  at  three  and  a  half  mil- 
lions apiece.  On  these  and  many  similar  grounds, 
I  propose  to  name  the  new  battery  Monitor." 

To  hasten  the  work  to  the  utmost,  it  was  par- 
celed out  to  many  contractors.  The  hull  (of  iron) 
was  built  by  Thomas  F.  Rowland  at  the  Conti- 
nental Iron  Works,  Greenpoint,  N.  Y.,  and  the 
main  engines  and  auxiliary  machinery  by  Dela- 
mater  &  Co.,  of  New  York,  while  the  turret  came 
from  the  Novelty  Iron  Works,  also  of  New  York. 
The  turret  was  built  up  of  eight  layers  of  one-inch 
iron  plates  bolted  together.  Many  lesser  estab- 
lishments contributed  to  the  great  work  by  sub- 
contracts for  forgings,  bolts,  rivets,  and  other 
material.  The  amount  of  work  done  by  Ericsson 
himself  is  almost  incredible.  He  had  practically 
nothing  but  his  rude  model  to  start  with,  and  as 
there  were  no  precedents  for  the  vessel,  nothing 
could  be  made  until  he  supplied  the  plans.  It  all 
seems  to  have  existed  in  his  brain,  needing  only 
to  be  put  upon  paper  to  become  intelligible  to 
other  people ;  and  to  his  task  he  devoted  himself 
with  tireless  energy.  Hull,  machinery,  turret, 
gun-mounts,  and  details  of  all  descriptions  grew 


82    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE   OF  IRONCLADS 

from  his  designs,  sketches  of  parts  and  pieces  of 
machinery,  as  he  wished  them  made,  going  from 
his  drawing-table  almost  like  sheets  from  a  print- 
ing-press ;  these  were  usually  rough  pencil  sketches 
that  had  to  be  perfected  by  his  assistants,  though 
in  cases  of  great  urgency  his  sketches  had  to  go 
direct  to  the  shops  for  the  workmen  to  decipher  as 
best  they  could. 

Such  speed  was  made  with  the  work  that  the 
ship  was  launched  January  30,  1862,  with  her 
main  engines  installed  on  board.  This  was  one 
hundred  and  one  working  days  from  the  date  of  the 
contract.  The  dimensions  of  the  vessel  as  built 
followed  closely  the  figures  named  in  the  contract. 
The  extreme  length  was  172  feet ;  extreme  beam, 
41  feet  6  inches ;  depth  of  hold,  11  feet  4  inches ; 
mean  draft,  10  feet  6  inches ;  inside  diameter  of 
turret,  20  feet ;  height  of  turret,  9  feet ;  displace- 
ment, 987  tons.  The  iron  hull  was  124  feet  long, 
18  feet  wide  at  the  bottom,  and  34  feet  wide  at 
the  top  where  it  joined  to  the  armor  raft  or  upper 
body;  the  latter  was  a. sort  of  wooden  raft  on  top 
of  the  iron  hull.  It  is  difficult  to  explain  this 
arrangement,  which  was  described  by  Ericsson  as 
a  fort  on  a  raft,  and  bore  no  resemblance  to  any 
known  form  of  seagoing  ship.  The  drawings  of 
the  Monitor  accompanying  this  chapter  give  good 
general  impressions  of  the  relative  positions  and 
dimensions  of  the  under  and  upper  bodies. 

A  provision  of  the  great  engineer's  will  required 


Transverse  Section 


Transverse  Section 

IRON-CLAD  CUPOLA  VESSEL,  1854.    (See  page  &i) 
THE   MONITOR,  1862 


ERICSSON'S  DRAWINGS  83 

that  all  his  papers,  drawings,  journals,  and  records 
of  every  kind  relating  to  his  professional  career, 
should  be  destroyed ;  this  wish  was  carried  out 
too  well,  and  thus  much  of  interest  to  history  was 
lost.  Some  of  the  original  drawings  of  the  Moni- 
tor, though  unfortunately  a  very  incomplete  set, 
were  saved  from  the  general  destruction  by  Pro- 
fessor C.  W.  MacCord,  of  Stevens  Institute,  who 
had  been  chief  draftsman  in  Ericsson's  office  at 
the  time  the  vessel  was  built. 

The  top  of  the  turret  was  made  of  bars  of  com- 
mercial railway  iron,  with  two  small  openings  left 
for  escape  hatches.  The  turret  was  large  enough 
to  permit  of  loading  the  guns  at  the  muzzle  when 
run  inside,  during  which  operation  the  gunports 
were  screened  by  huge  iron  pendulums,  swung 
across  them.  The  pilot-house  was  built  of  heavy 
iron  billets  almost  a  foot  square,  with  the  corners 
dovetailed  together  like  the  timbers  of  a  log  cabin ; 
it  was  located  on  deck,  well  forward,  and  was  found 
in  battle  to  be  in  the  way  of  firing  the  guns  as  well 
as  out  of  communication  with  the  turret,  a  speaking- 
tube  or  voice-pipe  for  this  purpose  being  found 
unreliable  in  the  noise  and  confusion  of  battle. 

Ericsson's  favorite  form  of  steam  engine  was 
that  described  as  the  vibrating-lever  type,  by 
which  a  rocking  or  oscillating  motion  was  changed 
to  rotation  by  means  of  connecting  rods.  His  first 
application  of  this  was  the  rather  remarkable  half- 
cylinder  engine  of  the  Princeton.  The  Monitor 


84    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

had  a  double  trunk  engine  with  cylinder  not  dif- 
ferent from  ordinary  engine  practice,  but  with 
power  transmitted  by  means  of  rocking  arms  as 
before.  The  cylinder,  or  cylinders,  for  there  were 
really  two  though  only  one  casting,  were  36  inches 
in  diameter  and  27  inches  stroke  of  piston.  There 
were  two  return-tube  "  box "  boilers,  placed  side 
by  side  forward  of  the  engines,  each  containing 
two  furnaces  joined  to  the  back  combustion-cham- 
bers by  large  oval  flues.  The  height  of  the  boilers 
from  water-bottoms  to  top  of  shell  was  9  feet ;  from 
which  it  will  be  seen  that  they  occupied  almost  all 
the  vertical  space  between  the  bottom  of  the  ship 
and  the  deck.  Each  boiler  discharged  its  smoke 
through  a  short  uptake  to  a  grated  hole  in  the 
deck,  there  being  no  smokepipes.  The  object  in 
this  was  to  keep  the  deck  free  from  obstructions 
to  firing  the  guns.  The  reason  for  the  gratings 
was  to  keep  missiles  and  debris  from  falling  below. 
Sheet  iron  coamings,  or  trunks,  about  five  feet  high 
were  provided  to  be  bolted  about  these  holes  at  sea 
to  act  as  smokepipes  and  to  keep  water  out,  but 
they  were  to  be  unshipped  and  stowed  away  when 
the  ship  engaged  in  battle,  leaving  the  deck  clear 
except  for  the  pilot-house.  These  movable  trunks 
were  unsatisfactory,  and  in  all  subsequent  moni- 
tors smokepipes  were  provided. 

There  were  no  ventilators  or  deck-openings  by 
which  air  could  reach  the  furnaces,  so  a  mild  sys- 
tem of  forced  draft  had  to  be  resorted  to.  This 


THE   MONITOR'S  FIRST  TRIAL  TRIP       85 

was  supplied  by  two  steam  engines  driving  by 
belts  two  large  fans  that  drew  air  from  grated 
openings  in  the  deck,  similar  to  the  smoke-holes 
and  like  them  provided  with  the  portable  trunks, 
and  discharged  it  into  the  engine-room  and  fire- 
room. 

About  three  weeks  after  the  launching,  the  Mon- 
itor had  a  trial  trip  that  was  such  a  dismal  failure 
that  she  had  to  be  towed  home.  Almost  every- 
thing went  wrong,  though  this  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  when  we  remember  how  rapidly  the 
structure  had  been  put  together,  and  that  it  was 
composed  of  many  parts  from  different  workshops 
without  opportunity  of  trying  them  together  while 
they  were  being  finished.  The  main  engines  fur- 
nished inadequate  power  for  driving  the  vessel, 
because  the  valves  were  set  wrong.  Both  gun-car- 
riages were  disabled  by  firing  the  guns  when  the 
friction  gear  by  which  the  recoil  was  to  be  taken 
up  was  not  screwed  up,  and  there  were  many 
minor  defects  discovered.  The  most  serious  fault 
was  the  inability  of  the  steering-gear  to  control 
the  vessel.  The  rudder,  of  the  balanced  type, 
was  over-balanced ;  that  is,  the  area  forward  of 
the  axis  was  too  great  in  proportion  to  that  abaft 
it.  The  consequence  was  that  when  the  rudder 
was  put  over  either  way,  the  over-large  forward 
section  offered  so  much  resistance  to  being  thrown 
back  that  the  mechanical  connection  between  the 
steering-wheel  and  the  tiller  was  unequal  to  the 


86    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

work.  It  was  seriously  proposed  by  the  naval 
officials  to  put  the  ship  in  dock  and  fit  her  with 
a  new  rudder  as  a  remedy  for  this  defect,  which 
would  have  required  a  month's  time  and,  as  events 
proved,  have  changed  the  history  of  the  Monitor. 
Ericsson,  probably  angered  by  the  knowledge  that 
he  had  made  a  mistake  in  designing  the  rudder, 
is  said  to  have  been  much  enraged  when  this 
proposition  was  made  known  to  him,  and  fiercely 
prohibited  its  being  carried  out.  He  said  that  he 
could  remedy  the  defect  in  three  days,  and  actually 
did  so,  though  his  method  was  only  a  makeshift. 
It  consisted  in  interposing  a  pulley  in  each  lead 
of  the  wire  rope  between  the  tiller  and  the  drum 
of  the  steering-wheel,  thus  doubling  the  power  of 
the  wheel,  though  of  course  it  had  to  be  turned 
twice  as  much  in  order  to  obtain  the  same  angle 
of  helm. 

These  defects  were  remedied  within  two  weeks, 
and  on  March  4th  a  final  and  successful  trial  trip 
was  run,  the  guns  were  satisfactorily  tried,  and  a 
favorable  report  was  made  by  a  board  of  naval 
officers.  She  had  been  under  way  once  before  this, 
after  the  first  trial,  to  test  the  improvised  steering 
arrangement,  and  had  been  regularly  put  in  com- 
mission as  a  ship  of  the  navy ;  this  was  done  on 
February  25,  Lieutenant  John  L.  Worden  being 
assigned  to  her  command. 

Having  now  brought  the  Monitor  up  to  readi- 
ness for  the  field  of  action,  we  will  undertake  the 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  MERRIMAC      87 

history  of  her  famous  antagonist,  the  Merrimac. 
In  this  case,  there  is  lack  of  reliable  material  to 
work  with,  though  much  has  been  written  on  the 
subject.  The  original  orders  relating  to  her  con- 
struction and  the  plans  from  which  she  was  built 
are  supposed  to  have  been  destroyed,  together  with 
much  else  of  historical  value,  when  the  public 
offices  in  Richmond  were  burned  shortly  before  the 
surrender  of  General  Lee.  Copies  of  some  of  the 
documents  relating  to  her  have  been  preserved  by 
individuals,  and,  with  recollections  of  persons  con- 
cerned with  her  career,  have  appeared  from  tune 
to  time  in  historical  works,  in  magazines,  and  in 
newspaper  articles.  From  such  sources  of  infor- 
mation, though  admittedly  not  the  best,  as  accurate 
an  account  of  her  creation  will  be  prepared  as  the 
comparison  of  many  conflicting  statements  will 
permit.  This  will  follow  in  some  detail,  justified 
by  the  great  influence  exerted  by  the  vessel  upon 
naval  construction  and  methods  of  warfare.  In- 
deed, it  may  not  be  too  much  to  assert  that  it  was 
her  example  rather  than  that  of  the  Monitor  that 
drew  the  parting  line  between  the  old  navies  of 
wood  and  canvas  and  the  new  navies  of  steel  and 
steam. 

The  Merrimac  class  of  large  sailing-frigates 
with  auxiliary  steam  power  has  already  been  re- 
ferred to.  In  the  spring  of  1861,  when  the  long 
impending  storm  of  civil  war  burst  upon  the 
nation,  the  Merrimac  was  lying  at  the  navy-yard 


88    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

in  Norfolk,  Virginia,  within  what  was  soon  to  be- 
come the  enemy's  country.  She  had  made  a  cruise 
as  flagship  of  the  United  States  squadron  in  the 
Pacific,  and,  returning  home  in  1860,  had  been 
sent  to  a  navy-yard  for  the  customary  overhauling 
after  such  service  and  for  the  remedying  of  certain 
inherent  defects  in  her  machinery.  Several  sailing 
ships  of  war  were  at  the  same  navy-yard,  the  most 
interesting  of  these  being  the  sloop-of-war  Cum- 
berland, in  commission  with  a  crew  on  board,  and 
just  returned  from  the  usual  winter  cruise  in  the 
West  Indies. 

When  it  became  evident  that  war  between  the 
North  and  South  could  not  be  prevented,  the 
authorities  in  Washington  made  an  effort  to  take 
the  Merrimac  away  from  Norfolk  and  thus  pre- 
vent her  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  those  who 
would  become  enemies.  To  this  end  the  com- 
mandant of  the  navy-yard  was  ordered  to  prepare 
the  ship  with  all  dispatch  for  removal  to  Phila- 
delphia, the  engineer  -  in  -  chief  of  the  navy,  Mr. 
Isherwood,  being  sent  to  Norfolk  to  expedite  the 
work.  He  carried  with  him  a  peremptory  order 
from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  the  command- 
ant to  render  him  every  assistance  and  have  his 
suggestions  promptly  carried  into  effect.  It  had 
been  reported  by  officials  of  the  navy-yard  that  it 
would  require  a  month  to  put  the  machinery  of 
the  ship  together  and  get  it  in  working  order. 
Nearly  all  the  officers  attached  to  the  navy-yard 


THE  MERRIMAC   AT  NORFOLK  89 

were  Southerners  and  in  sympathy  with  the  brew- 
ing rebellion  :  so  it  is  probable  that  this  report  was 
intended  to  deceive  the  commandant  and  discour- 
age the  project  of  removing  the  ship.  Mr.  Isher- 
wood,  with  the  assistance  of  the  chief  engineer  of 
the  station,  who  was  a  Northern  man,  succeeded 
in  getting  everything  done  and  the  vessel  ready  to 
move  with  her  own  steam  within  three  days.  This 
remarkable  task  was  accomplished  by  employing  a 
great  number  of  mechanics  and  working  them 
night  and  day,  arranged  in  three  watches  or  work- 
ing gangs.  It  was  a  noteworthy  example  of  how 
obstacles,  seemingly  unsurmountable,  may  be  over- 
come by  zeal  and  knowledge  united  for  system- 
atic exertion. 

Steam  was  raised  in  the  boilers  and  the  engines 
were  put  in  operation  as  the  ship  lay  moored  to  the 
dock.  It  was  then  reported  to  the  commandant 
that  the  ship  was  ready  to  proceed,  but  that  officer 
hesitated  about  giving  the  order  for  her  to  go.  He 
was  old,  and  seemed  unable  to  meet  the  responsibili- 
ties and  perplexities  that  gathered  so  thickly  about 
him,  and  it  appears  that  he  had  been  so  completely 
deceived  by  his  subordinates  that  he  really  did 
not  understand  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  His 
personal  courage  and  loyalty  have  never  been  ques- 
tioned, though  the  results  of  his  vacillation  were 
far-reaching  and  disastrous.  Beside  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  actual  situation,  he  was  hampered  with 
orders  from  Washington  not  to  do  anything  that 


90    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

might  appear  hostile  to  the  people  of  Virginia,  a 
hope  having  been  cherished  until  the  last  moment 
that  Virginia,  if  not  needlessly  provoked,  might 
remain  in  the  Union  that  her  soldiers  and  states- 
men of  other  years  had  done  so  much  to  create. 
The  removal  of  the  Merrimac  from  Norfolk  would 
have  appeared  a  hostile  act  when  the  people  were 
openly  counting  on  her  for  their  prospective  navy ; 
so  in  her  regard  the  commandant  had  directly  con- 
tradictory orders. 

The  Merrimac  was  ready  for  sea,  with  steam 
up,  the  18th  of  April.  The  State  Convention  of 
Virginia  had  passed  its  Ordinance  of  Secession 
the  day  before,  so  there  was  no  longer  any  reason 
for  observing  a  pacific  attitude  for  fear  of  provok- 
ing disloyal  sentiments  into  open  rebellion;  the 
rebellion  was  already  declared.  Though  urged 
during  the  day  of  the  18th  to  allow  the  departure 
of  the  frigate,  the  commandant  persisted  in  with- 
holding his  permission,  and  toward  evening  gave 
the  order  to  stop  her  engines  and  haul  the  fires, 
saying  that  he  had  decided  to  retain  the  vessel  and 
defend  the  yard.  This  decision  cost  the  United 
States  the  Merrimac  immediately,  and  the  far 
greater  loss  about  a  year  later  that  resulted  from 
her  raid  into  Hampton  Roads. 

Following  closely  upon  the  events  described, 
came  an  order  to  destroy  public  property  and 
abandon  the  navy-yard.  The  steam  sloop-of-war 
Pawnee  with  marines  and  soldiers  on  board  was 


ABANDONMENT  OF  THE  NORFOLK  YARD  91 

sent  to  aid  in  the  work  of  destruction,  arriving  at 
the  yard  the  evening  of  April  20.  Several  ves- 
sels had  already  been  scuttled  and  had  sunk  or 
were  sinking.  A  petty  officer  and  gang  of  men 
from  the  Cumberland  opened  the  sea  valves  of  the 
Merrimac  and  caused  her  to  sink  to  the  bottom, 
submerging  the  machinery  but  leaving  the  rigging 
and  upper  part  of  the  hull  out  of  water.  Work- 
shops, ship-houses,  and  ships  were  set  on  fire  and 
ordnance  material  was  damaged  as  much  as  the 
limited  time  and  confusion  permitted.  Many  fine 
uninjured  cannon  subsequently  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Confederates.  Some  hours  after  she  sank, 
the  upper  works  of  the  Merrimac  caught  fire  from 
the  burning  ship-houses  and  burned  down  to  the 
water's  edge.  Toward  morning  the  Pawnee  took 
the  Cumberland  in  tow  and  departed,  leaving  the 
burning  yard  to  the  enemy,  who  at  once  took  pos- 
session, put  out  many  fires,  saved  the  granite  dry- 
dock  from  being  blown  up,  and  thus  gained  an 
important  naval  base. 

The  Merrimac  and  some  other  vessels  were  soon 
raised  because  they  were  obstructions  to  naviga- 
tion, and  not  with  the  first  intention  of  fitting 
them  for  active  service.  The  sailing-ships  Ger- 
mantown  and  Plymouth  had  no  machinery  to  be 
injured  by  submersion  and  could  be  made  service- 
able at  no  great  cost ;  they  were  not  made  use 
of,  however,  probably  because  it  was  realized  that 
the  day  of  the  sailing  ship  of  war  was  over.  The 


92    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

appearance  of  the  Merrimac  when  once  more  afloat, 
burnt  down  to  the  berth-deck  and  consequently 
lying  low  in  the  water,  suggested  at  once  the  idea 
of  converting  her  into  a  ram  or  floating  battery ; 
and  several  persons  have  left  to  their  posterity 
traditions  to  the  effect  that  they  were  the  first  to 
propose  that  adaptation. 

Under  date  of  May  8,  1861,  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Mallory,  wrote  to  the 
chairman  of  the  Confederate  naval  committee, 
urging  the  construction  of  an  ironclad,  in  these 
words  :  - 

"  I  regard  the  possession  of  an  iron-armored 
ship  as  a  matter  of  the  first  necessity.  Such  a 
vessel  at  this  time  could  traverse  the  entire  coast 
of  the  United  States,  prevent  all  blockade,  and 
encounter,'  with  a  fair  prospect  of  success,  their 
entire  navy.  If,  to  cope  with  them  upon  the  sea, 
we  follow  their  example,  and  build  wooden  ships, 
we  shall  have  to  construct  several  at  one  time,  for 
one  or  two  ships  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  their 
comparatively  numerous  frigates.  But  inequality 
of  numbers  may  be  compensated  by  invulnerabil- 
ity, and  thus  not  only  does  economy,  but  naval 
success,  dictate  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of 
fighting  with  iron  against  wood  without  regard  to 
first  cost." 

This  was  probably  before  the  Merrimac  had 
been  raised  and  before  any  one  had  proposed  con- 
verting her  into  an  ironclad ;  at  least  this  seems 


STEPHEN  RUSSELL  MALLORY  93 

so  from  the  fact  that  Mr.  Mallory  did  not  refer  to 
her,  and  in  a  later  paragraph  of  his  letter,  not 
quoted,  speaks  of  building  an  entirely  new  structure. 
It  was  also  two  months  before  Secretary  Welles 
made  his  halting  suggestion  to  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  on  the  same  subject.  Mr.  Mal- 
lory was  well  informed  in  naval  matters  ;  he  had 
been  chairman  of  the  committee  on  naval  affairs 
in  the  United  States  Senate  for  several  years,  and 
had  been  distinguished  for  his  interest  in  the  navy 
and  for  his  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the  changes 
that  steam  and  mechanical  agencies  were  forcing  in 
naval  methods.  His  initiative  regarding  armored 
ships  was  therefore  based  upon  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  importance  of  the  question  than 
was  generally  entertained  at  that  time,  and  may 
fairly  be  taken  as  the  first  step  in  the  train  of 
events  that  compelled  a  revolution  in  war-ship 
design  and  changed  the  tactics  of  naval  warfare. 
Those  changes  would  have  followed  in  due  course 
of  time  from  the  beginnings  that  had  been  made 
in  Europe,  but  the  example  and  performance  of 
the  Monitor  and  Merrimac  in  America  so  hastened 
the  development  that  it  was  abrupt  instead  of 
gradual. 

In  June  Mr.  Mallory  appointed  a  board  to  de- 
cide upon  a  plan  for  converting  the  Merrimac  into 
an  ironclad  battery.  The  board  consisted  of 
Lieutenant  John  M.  Brooke,  inventor  of  the 
Brooke  rifled  gun ;  Engineer-in-chief  William  P. 


94    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

Williamson,  and  Chief  Constructor  John  L.  Por- 
ter, all  of  the  Confederate  navy,  and  all  formerly 
officers  of  long  service  in  the  navy  of  the  United 
States.  Each  has  been  given  credit  for  the  plan 
that  was  adopted,  though  there  is  no  positive  evi- 
dence that  it  was  altogether  original  with  any  one 
of  them.  Brooke  obtained  a  patent  from  the  Con- 
federate government  for  the  "  invention,"  and  he 
was  at  first  given  the  greater  credit  in  newspaper 
report  and  public  opinion ;  even  Mr.  Jefferson 
Davis,  in  "  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederacy," 
credited  Mr.  Brooke  with  being  the  projector  of 
the  Merrimac,  but,  being  afterward  convinced  that 
he  was  mistaken,  made  a  correction  in  a  second 
book,  —  "A  Short  History  of  the  Confederate 
States."  Brooke  himself  in  testifying  before  a 
Confederate  congressional  committee  said  that 
Mr.  Williamson  first  proposed  it,  and  he  himself 
was  opposed  to  it,  but  finally  agreed  to  the  report. 
The  order  directing  the  work  to  be  undertaken  does 
not  refer  to  Brooke  at  all. 

NAVY  DEPABTMENT,  RICHMOND,  VA. 
July  11,  1861. 

FLAG  OFFICER  F.  FORREST  :  You  will  pro- 
ceed with  all  practicable  dispatch  to  make  the 
changes  in  the  Merrimac,  and  to  build,  equip,  and 
fit  her  in  all  respects,  according  to  the  designs  and 
plans  of  the  constructor  and  engineer,  Messrs. 
Porter  and  Williamson.  As  time  is  of  the  utmost 


DESIGNERS  OF  THE  MERRIMAC  95 

importance  in  this  matter,  you  will  see  that  the 
work  progresses  without  delay  to  completion. 

S.  R.  MALLORY, 
Secretary  Confederate  States  Navy. 

Descendants  of  Chief  Engineer  Williamson 
claim  that  he  had  made  plans  of  an  armored  ship 
at  least  ten  years  before  1861  and  that  the  Merri- 
mac  was  almost  a  reproduction  of  those  plans. 
Interest  in  the  Stevens  battery  of  course  di- 
rected the  minds  of  naval  men  to  the  possibilities 
of  armor,  and  it  is  quite  likely  that  every  studious 
officer  speculated  with  pencil  and  paper  as  to  its 
application.  The  arrangement  of  armor  on  the 
Merrimac  was  so  simple  that  it  must  have  been 
thought  of  by  many,  just  as  a  plan  to  sink  another 
Merrimac  in  another  war  a  generation  later  was 
claimed  as  original  by  several  scores  of  persons. 
Constructor  Porter's  claim  to  the  invention  ante- 
dates Williamson's  by  several  years.  He  had 
assisted  Lieutenant  Hunter  in  supervising  the 
building  of  the  Alleghany  in  Pittsburgh  during 
the  '40s,  and  had  been  concerned  with  that  officer 
in  devising  a  plan  for  a  shield  or  protective  deck  for 
war-vessels.  Porter  was  familiar  with  this  plan,  — 
had  probably  made  the  drawing,  in  fact,  —  and  the 
burned-down  condition  of  the  Merrimac  must  have 
reminded  him  of  it  at  once.  He  had  a  model  of 
the  Pittsburgh  armor-clad  that  he  took  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Brooke  board,  though  his  idea 


96    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE   OF  IRONCLADS 

seems  first  to  have  been  to  propose  an  entirely  new 
vessel  from  it.  Difficulty  in  building  machinery 
within  the  Confederacy  suggested  using  that  in 
the  Merrimac,  from  which  it  was  an  easy  step  to 
think  of  using  it  where  it  was  and  adapting  the 
shield  to  the  hull  of  that  vessel.  Each  member 
of  the  board  undoubtedly  exerted  some  influence 
upon  the  final  form  of  the  ship. 

All  the  charred  debris  of  the  upper  works  was 
cut  down  and  removed  to  the  level  of  the  berth- 
deck,  which  became  the  main  deck  of  the  structure 
and  was  intended  to  be  at  about  the  water  line 
when  the  vessel  should  be  armed  and  equipped  for 
service.  A  large  cast-iron  spur  or  ram  was  secured 
to  the  bow  about  two  feet  below  the  water  line 
and  projecting  eighteen  inches  beyond  the  cut- 
water. A  citadel  or  casemate  with  rounded  ends 
was  erected  on  the  main  deck,  occupying  its  full 
width  and  extending  one  hundred  and  seventy 
feet  fore  and  aft.  This  was  made  of  timbers  six- 
teen inches  square,  sided  close  together  and  ex-, 
tending  up  at  an  angle  of  about  thirty-two  degrees ; 
the  lower  ends  of  these  timbers  extended  several 
feet  below  the  waterways,  but  were  at  first  ar- 
mored on  only  about  two  feet  of  their  extension. 
The  vertical  height  of  this  citadel  was  seven  feet, 
the  upper  ends  of  the  timbers  being  joined  to  other 
timbers  of  the  same  dimensions  that  formed  the 
rim  of  a  large  long  hatch ;  this  hatch  was  covered 
with  gratings  and  thus  served  as  an  upper  or 
promenade  deck. 


United  States  Frigate  Merrimac.    (See  page  59) 


Confederate  Ram  Mtrrimac,  1862 

THE   MERRIMAC 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  MERRIMAC     97 

The  timber  sides  were  sheathed  with  six-inch 
oak  planks,  over  which  was  placed  four  inches  of 
iron  armor.  The  armor  consisted  in  some  places 
of  plates  two  inches  thick  and  in  others  of  plates 
one  inch  thick,  but  in  all  cases  disposed  so  as  to 
make  a  total  thickness  of  four  inches.  There 
was  no  railway  iron  used  on  the  vessel,  though 
such  is  the  general  belief,  which  originated  in  all 
likelihood  from  the  fact  that  dearth  of  material 
compelled  the  makers  of  the  armor  to  roll  bars 
from  railway  rails.  Some  specimens  of  these  bars 
remain  to  this  day  at  the  Norfolk  navy-yard,  and 
are  of  about  the  width  and  thickness  that  would 
result  from  rolling  railway  iron.  The  armor  was 
secured  by  large  bolts  passing  through  it  and  the 
wood  backing.  The  battery  mounted  inside  the 
citadel  consisted  of  a  7-inch  Brooke  rifle  pivoted 
in  each  of  the  rounded  ends,  and  four  guns  in 
broadside  on  each  side  ;  six  of  the  latter  were 
9-inch  Dahlgren  guns  and  two  were  32-pounder 
Brooke  rifles. 

The  dimensions  of  material  used  in  building  the 
citadel  were  furnished  the  author  by  Mr.  F.  Ash- 
ton  Ramsay  of  Baltimore,  and  are  believed  to  be 
correct,  though  differing  in  some  respects  from  the 
usually  printed  descriptions.  Mr.  Ramsay  was 
chief  engineer  of  the  Merrimac  during  her  active 
career  in  the  Confederate  navy,  and  was  in  charge 
of  the  refitting  of  her  machinery  during  the  whole 
time  that  the  ship  was  being  remodeled  ;  his  oppor- 


98    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

tunities  for  observation  were  therefore  excellent 
and  entitle  Ms  statements  to  all  credit. 

Accidental  circumstances,  as  we  have  seen,  and 
poverty  in  manufacturing  resources  decided  the 
characteristics  of  the  Merrimac.  Her  distinguish- 
ing features,  however,  were  not  novel,  her  type  being 
practically  that  established  by  the  floating  batteries 
of  the  Crimean  War,  and  not  a  new  invention  by 
any  means.  The  ram  with  which  she  was  fitted, 
though  unusual  at  that  time,  was  simply  a  revival 
of  a  former  sea-weapon  so  old  that  it  had  figured 
prominently  in  the  wars  of  Rome  and  Carthage 
before  the  Christian  era.  The  same  causes  that 
determined  the  character  of  the  Merrimac,  the  lack 
of  iron  manufactures  particularly,  operated  to  fix 
her  type  as  that  of  all  armored  vessels  built  by  the 
Confederate  States  within  their  own  boundaries. 
Of  these  there  were  a  number  from  first  to  last, 
some  built  entirely  as  new  structures,  like  the 
famous  Albemarle,  and  others  improvised  from 
vessels  originally  intended  for  other  uses,  as  the 
Atlanta  and  Manassas. 

Ironclads  bearing  a  general  resemblance  to  the 
Merrimac  appeared  under  the  United  States  flag 
also  in  the  year  1861,  but  whether  they  were  in- 
spired by  the  French  batteries  of  1855  or  were 
imitations  of  the  Merrimac  it  is  difficult  to  say. 
They  were  the  property  of  the  War  Department 
and  were  built  by  the  distinguished  engineer  James 
B.  Eads  for  use  in  connection  with  army  opera- 


EADS'S  RIVER  GUNBOATS  99 

tions  along  the  Mississippi  River.  Seven  such 
steam  batteries  were  built  during  the  latter  part 
of  the  year,  and  did  much  important  service  on 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries.  They  were 
175  feet  long,  50  feet  wide,  and  were  propelled  by 
a  huge  paddle-wheel  placed  near  the  stern.  The 
casemate,  like  that  of  the  Merriinac,  was  made  of 
thick  timbers  with  iron  plating ;  this  casemate 
enclosed  the  battery,  the  paddle  wheel,  and  upper 
parts  of  engines  and  boilers.  Besides  these  seven 
batteries,  the  War  Department  provided  two 
others,  much  larger,  by  buying  the  river-steamers 
Essex  and  Benton  and  converting  them  on  the 
plan  of  the  other  gunboats.  All  were  transferred 
to  the  Navy  Department  in  July,  1862. 

The  struggle  between  the  armored  ships  of 
North  and  South  began  long  before  their  actual 
meeting.  The  South,  as  has  been  described,  took 
the  lead  in  building  sufficiently  early  to  have 
gained  control  of  the  situation  had  mechanical 
possibilities  been  equal.  As  it  was,  the  lateness 
of  beginning  at  the  North  was  exactly  offset  by 
better  facilities  for  hastening  the  work  when  once 
undertaken,  and  the  two  ships  were  ready  for 
battle  at  almost  the  same  hour.  The  North  did 
not  lack  establishments  capable  of  producing  all 
the  varieties  of  iron  material  needed,  and  there  was 
no  lack  of  mechanics  skilled  in  shaping  and  fitting 
that  material  for  its  manifold  uses.  At  the  South 
there  was  great  dearth  of  manufacturing  industries 


100    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

and  consequently  few  mechanics,  the  latter  even 
being  mostly  importations  from  the  North  not 
in  sympathy  with  the  rebellion.  The  South  had 
to  learn  by  bitter  experience  what  some  nations 
already  knew  and  others  have  learned  since,  — 
that  the  hammer  of  the  artisan  is  a  truer  symbol 
of  national  power  than  the  coronet  of  the  patrician. 

The  advantage  that  an  ironclad  would  give  the 
Confederacy  was  not  overstated  by  Secretary  Mai- 
lory  when  he  asked  his  Congress  for  authority  to 
build  one.  It  amounted  hi  effect  to  the  command 
of  the  sea,  an  advantage  so  great  under  the  mili- 
tary situation  then  existing  that  it  might  have  de- 
cided the  success  of  the  Southern  cause.  This  was 
fully  understood  at  the  time  both  North  and  South, 
and  was  proved  with  fatal  completeness  on  the  day 
of  battle,  when  the  Merrimac  met  the  best  exam- 
ples of  the  old  navy  and  easily  overcame  them. 
The  race  to  finish  the  ironclads  was  thus  for  high 
stakes,  —  the  integrity  of  the  American  Union  on 
one  side  hazarded  against  the  life  of  a  new  and 
ambitious  nation  on  the  other. 

Then,  as  now,  the  American  demand  for  all  the 
news,  and  the  commercial  rivalry  of  newspaper 
management  to  supply  that  demand,  kept  each 
side  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  other.  From 
letters  written  by  Ericsson  and  to  him  while  the 
Monitor  was  building  it  appears  that  there  was  great 
fear  that  the  armored  ship  of  the  enemy  would 
take  the  sea  first,  and  there  were  many  predictions 


THE  APPROACHING  CONTEST  101 

of  disaster  at  the  North  when  it  was  reported, 
about  the  end  of  January,  that  the  Merrimac  was 
ready.  Her  readiness  was  only  to  the  extent  that 
she  had  been  floated  out  of  dock  and  had  ye$  to 
be  equipped  for  sea,  a  condition  that  was  matched 
by  that  of  the  Monitor,  just  launched  and  also 
undergoing  equipment.  Superior  mechanical  re- 
sources had  already  overcome  the  diif erence  in  time 
at  the  beginning  of  the  race.  At  this  period  the 
people  of  the  South  had  the  greater  confidence  in 
the  issue ;  though  the  North  was  eager  to  see  the 
Monitor  completed,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  people 
pinned  very  little  faith  to  that  vessel.  This  is 
shown  by  a  great  amount  of  adverse  newspaper 
criticism  at  the  time,  the  complete  novelty  of  Erics- 
son's vessel  seeming  to  exclude  it  in  public  opin- 
ion from  the  field  of  action  peculiar  to  ships  of  war. 
The  Merrimac  at  least  had  the  virtue  of  being 
built  from  a  real  ship  that  had  made  long  voyages 
and  still  possessed  many  of  the  accepted  features 
of  a  man-of-war. 

The  name  of  the  Merrimac  was  changed  to  Vir- 
ginia, but  that  name  has  seldom  been  used  except 
by  Southern  writers.  The  alliterative  union  of 
the  older  name  with  that  of  the  Monitor  caught 
public  fancy  and  fixed  it  in  history  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  Virginia.  The  Monitor,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  commissioned  as  a  ship  of  war  on  the  25th 
of  February,  1862.  Though  not  a  remarkable 
coincidence,  it  is  nevertheless  interesting  that 


102    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

orders  to  a  Confederate  officer  to  command  the 
Merrimac  were  issued  the  day  before,  February  24. 
These  orders,  addressed  to  Flag  Officer  Franklin 
Buqhanan  and  signed  by  Secretary  Mallory,  show 
so  thoroughly  the  high  hopes  centred  in  the  future 
of  the  Merrimac  that  they  must  be  repeated  as  they 
were  written :  — 

"  You  are  hereby  detached  from  the  Office  of 
'  Orders  and  Detail,'  and  will  proceed  to  Norfolk 
and  report  to  F.  Officer  Forrest  for  the  command 
of  the  naval  defenses  of  James  River. 

"You  will  hoist  your  flag  on  the  Virginia,  or 
any  other  vessel  of  your  squadron,  which  will  for 
the  present  embrace  the  Virginia,  Patrick  Henry, 
Jamestown,  Teaser,  Raleigh,  and  Beaufort. 

"  The  Virginia  is  a  novelty  in  naval  construc- 
tion, is  untried,  and  her  powers  unknown,  and  the 
department  will  not  give  specific  orders  as  to  her 
attack  upon  the  enemy.  Her  powers  as  a  ram  are 
regarded  as  very  formidable,  and  it  is  hoped  you 
may  be  able  to  test  them. 

"  Like  the  bayonet  charge  of  infantry,  this  mode 
of  attack,  while  the  most  destructive,  will  commend 
itself  to  you  in  the  present  scarcity  of  ammunition. 
It  is  one  also  that  may  be  rendered  destructive  at 
night  against  the  enemy  at  anchor. 

"  Even  without  guns  the  ship  would  be  for- 
midable as  a  ram. 

"  Could  you  pass  Old  Point  and  make  a  dashing 
cruise  on  the  Potomac  as  far  as  Washington,  its 


MALLORY'S  ORDERS  TO  BUCHANAN     103 

effect  upon  the  public  mind  would  be  important  to 
the  cause. 

"  The  condition  of  our  country  and  the  painful 
reverses  we  have  just  suffered  demand  our  utmost 
exertions,  and  convinced  as  I  am  that  the  oppor- 
tunity and  the  means  for  striking  a  decided  blow 
for  our  navy  are  now  for  the  first  time  presented, 
I  congratulate  you  upon  it  and  know  that  your 
judgment  and  gallantry  will  meet  all  just  expecta- 
tions. 

"  Action  —  prompt  and  successful  action  —  now 
would  be  of  serious  importance  to  our  cause." 

On  the  7th  of  March  the  following  order,'  even 
more  hopeful  of  the  powers  of  the  Merrimac,  was 
sent  to  Captain  Buchanan  :  — 

"  I  submit  for  your  consideration  the  attack  of 
New  York  by  the  Virginia.  Can  the  Virginia 
steam  to  New  York  and  attack  and  burn  the  city  ? 
She  can,  I  doubt  not,  pass  Old  Point  safely,  and 
in  good  weather  and  a  smooth  sea  she  could  doubt- 
less go  to  New  York.  Once  in  the  bay  she  could 
shell  and  burn  the  city  and  the  shipping.  Such 
an  event  would  eclipse  all  the  glories  of  all  the 
combats  of  the  sea,  would  place  every  man  in  it 
preeminently  high,  and  would  strike  a  blow  from 
which  the  enemy  could  never  recover.  Peace 
would  inevitably  follow.  Bankers  would  with- 
draw their  capital  from  the  city,  the  Brooklyn 
navy-yard  and  its  magazines  and  all  the  lower 
part  of  the  city  would  be  destroyed,  and  such  an 


104    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

event,  by  a  single  ship,  would  do  more  to  achieve 
an  immediate  independence  than  would  the  re- 
sults of  many  campaigns. 

"  Can  the  ship  go  there  ?  Please  give  me  your 
views." 

The  next  day,  March  8,  the  Merrimac  got 
under  way  from  the  navy -yard  and  began  the 
career  that  had  been  predicted  for  her.  She  was 
far  from  complete  in  many  respects,  but  time 
was  too  valuable  for  the  cause  she  represented  to 
permit  of  more  delay.  Workmen  were  busy  on 
board  until  the  very  moment  of  her  departure. 
The  guns  had  not  been  fired,  the  main  engines  were 
unreliable,  and  the  steering-gear  was  insufficient. 
There  had  not  been  time  to  station  and  drill  the 
crew,  which  was  not  composed  of  seamen,  but  was 
made  up  chiefly  of  volunteers  from  the  army 
forces  in  the  vicinity.  The  South  was  poor  in 
sailors  as  well  as  in  mechanics,  but  in  the  case 
of  the  Merrimac  the  lack  of  experienced  seamen 
was  not  the  source  of  weakness  that  it  is  usually 
represented  to  have  been.  An  engine  and  boiler 
room  personnel  accustomed  to  ship  conditions  was 
of  importance,  but  there  was  so  little  of  the  old- 
fashioned  ship  about  the  modified  Merrimac  that 
she  furnished  little  in  the  peculiar  line  of  work  of 
the  old-fashioned  sailor.  Soldiers,  especially  if 
they  were  artillerymen,  were  doubtless  as  good 
as  sailors  in  the  use  and  care  of  the  battery  and 
in  keeping  the  living  quarters  clean,  which  was 


CREW  OF  THE  MERRIMAC  105 

about  all  that  sailors  could  have  found  to  do,  and 
is  the  same  work  that  soldiers  do  in  garrison. 
Had  the  ship  ever  gone  to  sea,  a  number  of 
sailors  would  of  course  have  been  essential  for 
her  management.  Several  officers  and  some  of 
the  men  had  seen  service  in  the  old  navy,  but  the* 
general  character  of  the  crew  was  as  indicated. 
Under  these  conditions,  the  officers  of  experience 
on  board  could  not  share  the  popular  enthusiasm 
as  to  the  invincibility  and  probable  achievements 
of  the  ship,  and  must  have  felt  their  mission  more 
desperate  than  it  looked  to  the  admiring  populace. 
It  is  even  said  that  officers  and  men  received 
communion  before  going  out,  but  this,  like  many 
other  picturesque  tales  of  other  great  events,  is 
probably  a  fiction  based,  maybe,  upon  the  actions 
of  a  few. 

With  the  Merrimac  as  she  came  out  were  two 
small  improvised  gunboats  of  one  gun  each,  the 
Beaufort  and  the  Raleigh.  Lying  some  miles 
up  the  river  above  Newport  News  were  three 
other  gunboats  of  the  James  River  squadron,  the 
Patrick  Henry,  the  Jamestown,  and  the  Teaser. 
They  immediately  came  down  the  river,  passed 
the  formidable  Federal  batteries  at  Newport  News, 
and  joined  in  the  battle  that  ensued.  The  Patrick 
Henry  is  generally  referred  to  as  the  Yorktown, 
having  under  that  name  been  one  of  the  finest 
and  best-known  steamers  of  the  Old  Dominion 
Company  plying  between  New  York  and  Vir- 


106    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

ginian  seaports ;  she  was  rated  as  of  1400  tons 
burden,  and  had  been  converted  into  a  war-vessel 
of  considerable  force  by  the  Confederates,  who 
installed  on  her  a  battery  of  ten  medium  32- 
pounder  guns  in  broadside,  one  10-inch  shell-gun 
"in  pivot  forward  and  one  8-inch  pivot  gun  aft. 
It  is  a  fact  worth  mentioning  that  this  vessel  was 
supplied  with  partial  armor  protection.  One-inch 
iron  plates,  all  the  ship  could  bear,  were  put  on 
abreast  the  boilers,  extending  a  short  distance 
below  the  water  line  and  a  few  feet  forward  of 
and  abaft  the  engine  and  boiler  space.  V-shaped 
shields  of  the  same  thickness  were  also  put  on 
the  spar-deck  forward  of  and  abaft  the  engines 
as  protections  for  the  walking-beam  and  connec- 
tions of  the  side-wheel  machinery.  The  James- 
town was  a  sister  ship  of  the  Yorktown,  taken 
from  the  same  steamship  company,  but  in  the 
official  records  is  reported  as  mounting  only  two 
guns.  She  was  re-named  Thomas  Jefferson,  but 
her  better  known  merchant-ship  name  stuck  to 
her.  The  Teaser  was  simply  a  river  tugboat 
which  carried  but  a  single  gun. 

These  steamers  are  mentioned  particularly  to 
dispel  an  idea,  somewhat  prevalent,  that  the  battle 
of  that  day  was  wholly  an  issue  to  destruction 
between  the  old  and  the  new,  —  wooden  sailing- 
ships  against  an  iron  steamer.  It  was  really  a 
battle  between  squadrons,  several  Union  vessels 
large  and  small  having  hastened  to  the  aid  of  the 


THE  OPPOSING  SQUADRONS  107 

sailing-ships  and  influenced  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent the  operations  of  the  day.  The  small  Con- 
federate vessels  had  a  part  in  the  conflict  of 
much  more  consequence  than  their  character  war- 
ranted: by  moving  about  in  dispersed  positions 
they  diverted  attention  to  themselves,  prevented 
a  concentration  of  fire  upon  the  Merrimac,  and 
inflicted  considerable  damage  upon  their  enemies 
with  their  few  guns. 

The  Union  force  in  and  about  Hampton  Roads 
that  day  was  large  in  ships  and  guns,  if  not  in 
real  effectiveness.  Altogether  there  were  present 
about  twenty  ships  of  war,  so  called,  mounting 
nearly  three  hundred  guns.  Some  were  merely 
tugboats  with  one  small  gun ;  others  were  indif- 
ferent merchant- vessels,  both  sail  and  steam,  with 
a  few  guns  each,  and  one  was  the  old  frigate 
Brandywine,  of  fifty  guns,  dismantled  and  de- 
graded to  the  status  of  a  store-ship.  The  most 
formidable  of  the  Union  ships  were  the  big  screw 
frigates  Roanoke  and  Minnesota  of  forty  guns 
each,  sister  ships  of  the  original  Merrimac.  The 
Roanoke  was  flagship  and  was  also  practically  a 
sailing-ship,  her  main  shaft  having  been  broken 
several  months  before.  The  fact  that  this  great 
ship  was  kept  on  active  war  service  in  that  crip- 
pled condition  is  a  perfect  illustration  of  the 
belief  of  the  time  that  sails  were  all-sufficient  and 
steam  of  no  consequence.  A  broken  topsail  yard 
would  have  sent  the  ship  promptly  to  a  navy-yard 


108    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

for  a  new  one.  About  five  miles  beyond  Old 
Point,  out  toward  Lynnhaven  Bay,  was  the  sail- 
ing-frigate St.  Lawrence,  50  guns,  at  anchor, 
arrived  only  two  days  before  from  New  York. 
Several  miles  inside  Old  Point,  off  the  Federal 
batteries  at  Newport  News,  the  sailing-frigate 
Congress  of  50  guns,  and  the  sloop-of-war  Cumber- 
land, 24  guns,  had  been  lying  for  several  months. 

"  Their  ostensible  duty,"  as  remarked  by  Pro- 
fessor Soley  in  "  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers," 
"  was  to  blockade  the  James  River ;  but  it  is  not 
very  clear  how  a  sailing-vessel  at  anchor  could  be 
of  any  use  for  this  purpose.  Most  of  the  old 
sailing-vessels  of  the  navy  had  by  this  time  been 
relegated  to  their  proper  place  as  school-ships, 
store-ships,  and  receiving-ships,  or  had  been  sent 
to  foreign  stations  where  their  only  duty  was  to 
display  the  flag.  Nothing  shows  more  clearly  the 
persistence  of  old  traditions  than  the  presence  of 
these  helpless  vessels  in  so  dangerous  a  neighbor- 
hood. Although  the  ships  themselves  were  of  no 
value  for  modern  warfare,  their  armament  could 
ill  be  spared ;  and  they  carried  between  them  over 
eight  hundred  officers  and  men,  whose  lives  were 
exposed  to  fruitless  sacrifice." 

In  addition  to  the  forces  afloat,  each  side  had 
shore-batteries  so  located  as  to  participate  in  the 
engagement  and  to  some  extent  contribute  to  its 
features.  The  Union  batteries  at  Newport  News 
commanded  the  mouth  of  James  River,  and  were 


WORK  OF  THE  SHORE  BATTERIES       109 

within  close  range  of  the  Merrimac  when  she 
attacked  the  two  sailing-ships.  The  Confederate 
batteries  were  at  Sewell's  Point,  more  remote  from 
the  place  of  hostilities,  but  were  able  to  annoy  the 
ships  working  up  from  Hampton  Roads,  firing 
upon  each  one  in  turn,  and  doing  each  one  some 
injury. 

From  information  exchanged  between  the  lines 
by  spies  and  enterprising  newspapers  it  was  known 
that  a  visit  from  the  Merrimac  was  probable,  but 
her  actual  appearance  caught  the  two  sailing-ships 
somewhat  unexpectedly :  their  lower  booms  were 
rigged  out  with  boats  lying  at  them ;  wash-clothes 
were  triced  up  in  the  rigging  to  dry,  and  each  ship 
was  without  its  captain.  Commander  Radford  of 
the  Cumberland  was  on  board  the  Roanoke  at 
Hampton  Roads  as  a  member  of  a  court  of  inquiry, 
and  Commander  William  Smith  of  the  Congress 
had  been  officially  detached  the  day  before ;  he  was 
still  on  board,  however,  and  rendered  service  in  the 
battle  under  the  command  of  the  executive  officer, 
Lieutenant  Joseph  B.  Smith.  The  latter  was 
killed  during  the  fight  and  the  command  devolved 
upon  the  next  in  rank,  Lieutenant  Pendergrast. 
The  Cumberland  was  fought  by  her  executive 
officer,  Lieutenant  George  U.  Morris. 

About  1  P.  M.  the  Merrimac  was  sighted  coming 
out  of  the  Elizabeth  River,  and  the  two  sailing- 
ships  at  once  prepared  for  battle,  the  course  of  the 
enemy  being  directed  toward  them  after  reaching 


110    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

Sewell's  Point.  When  distant  nearly  one  mile, 
the  Merrimac  opened  the  engagement  by  firing  her 
bow  gun  at  the  Cumberland,  and  the  battle  soon 
became  general.  The  fire  from  a  great  number  of 
guns  of  the  two  ships  and  from  shore  was  concen- 
trated upon  the  Merrimac,  but  from  her  sloping 
armor,  made  slippery  by  slushing  with  grease,  the 
shot  glanced  off  and  did  her  no  serious  injury. 
Steaming  slowly  past  the  Congress,  she  turned 
toward  the  Cumberland  and  rammed  that  vessel 
under  the  starboard  fore  chains,  breaking  a  large 
hole  in  her  below  water.  Some  of  the  reports  say 
that  she  rammed  the  Cumberland  twice,  but  this 
is  doubtful.  The  shock  of  collision  tore  the  cast- 
iron  beak,  or  ram,  off  the  bow  of  the  Merrimac 
and  thus  greatly  impaired  her  offensive  qualities. 
She  was  also  somewhat  injured  by  the  Cumberland 
putting  one  or  two  sheEs  into  her  forward  gun- 
port  as  she  approached  to  ram,  that,  according  to  a 
statement  made  in  a  magazine  article  by  one  of 
the  crew,  killed  two  and  wounded  five  men. 

In  spite  of  her  fatal  injury,  the  Cumberland 
continued  to  fight  her  guns  as  long  as  they  were 
above  water  and  gave  as  notable  an  example  of 
heroism  in  disaster  as  is  known  to  the  annals  of 
any  navy.  Though  sinking  slowly  and  suffering 
much  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  her  commander, 
Lieutenant  Morris,  scornfully  refused  to  surrender, 
saying,  "  I  will  sink  alongside  first ;  "  this  he  did 
about  forty  minutes  after  the  ship  was  rammed, 


THE  SINKING  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND    111 

the  Cumberland  going  down  gloriously  with  the 
American  flag  flying  at  the  peak  and  her  guns  still 
firing.  This  was  about  3.30  p.  M.  Many  of  her 
people,  including  the  wounded,  were  carried  down 
with  the  ship,  and  many  others  escaped  by  swim- 
ming to  the  shore.  Of  a  total  crew  of  376  officers 
and  men  when  the  action  began,  121  were  reported 
as  killed,  wounded,  or  missing. 

While  the  Cumberland  was  sinking,  consider- 
able of  the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  diverted  from  her 
by  the  Congress  and  shore  batteries.  Owing  to 
shoal  water  and  the  great  draft  of  the  Merrimac 
she  was  obliged  to  enter  the  James  River  a  short 
distance  above  the  batteries  to  wind  or  turn  her- 
self around  in  order  to  return  to  attack  the  Con- 
gress ;  this  exposed  her  twice  to  the  concentrated 
fire  of  the  shore  batteries,  which,  as  reported  by 
Captain  Buchanan,  did  some  damage  and  compelled 
him  to  direct  much  of  his  gun  fire  at  the  batteries 
in  return.  About  the  time  that  the  Cumberland 
sank,  the  three  steamers  previously  mentioned  as 
being  up  the  river  came  out  at  fidl  speed  past  the 
batteries  to  join  the  Merrimac.  They  passed  closer 
to  shore  than  was  expected,  with  the  result  that 
much  of  the  cannon  fire  directed  at  them  passed 
over  and  beyond.  The  Patrick  Henry,  however, 
was  temporarily  disabled  by  a  shot  striking  a  boiler 
or  steam  pipe,  filling  the  engine  and  fire  rooms  with 
steam,  driving  every  one  on  deck,  and  causing  the 
engine  to  stop.  Four  firemen  were  scalded  to 


112    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

death  and  others  wounded.  The  Jamestown  towed 
her  out  of  action  until  the  engineers  made  connec- 
tions to  steam  with  the  uninjured  boiler,  when  she 
returned  and  joined  in  battle. 

The  Merrimac  and  her  satellites  now  attacked 
the  Congress,  which  vessel,  though  annoyed  by  the 
Beaufort  and  the  Raleigh,  had  got  under  way  in 
the  interval  with  sails  and  with  assistance  from  the 
tug  gunboat  Zouave,  and  had  run  ashore  as  near  the 
batteries  as  her  draft  permitted.  From  a  position 
close  astern,  the  Merrimac  fired  into  her  with 
deadly  effect,  the  small  steamers  also  attacking  and 
doing  great  harm;  under  this  combined  attack, 
which  could  be  replied  to  by  only  a  few  guns,  the 
Congress  was  obliged  to  haul  down  her  flag  and 
hoist  a  white  flag  as  a  token  of  surrender.  This 
was  between  4  and  4.30  P.  M.,  the  official  reports 
of  the  event  varying  to  this  extent. 

The  Beaufort  and  the  Raleigh  were  at  once  sent 
alongside  to  receive  the  surrender  and  take  off 
prisoners,  but  they  were  driven  off  with  loss  by 
artillery  and  small-arm  fire  from  shore ;  a  lieuten- 
ant and  a  midshipman  of  the  Raleigh  were  killed 
at  this  time,  and  it  is  said  that  several  casualties 
resulted  on  board  the  Congress  from  the  shore  fire. 
It  was  thought  by  both  Union  and  Confederate 
officers  afloat  at  the  time  that  the  firing  was  by 
green  volunteers  who  did  not  understand  the  situa- 
tion nor  the  meaning  of  the  white  flag,  but  the 
report  of  the  officer  in  command  ashore  states  that 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  CONGRESS        113 

the  firing  was  by  his  order,  to  prevent  the  Confed- 
erates from  taking  possession  of  their  prize.  A 
second  attempt  to  board  the  Congress  was  made 
by  the  flag  lieutenant  of  the  Merrimac  in  a  small 
boat,  covered  by  the  Teaser,  but  this  was  also 
repulsed  by  the  fire  from  shore,  the  lieutenant 
and  several  of  his  men  being  wounded. 

The  Merrimac  then,  according  to  the  report  of 
Captain  Buchanan,  set  the  Congress  on  fire  with 
hot  shot  and  incendiary  shell.  The  officer  left  in 
command  of  the  Congress  by  the  death  of  Lieuten- 
ant Smith  states  in  his  official  report  that  the  ship 
was  on  fire  in  several  places  before  he  surrendered. 
The  driving  away  of  the  enemy  gave  the  opportu- 
nity to  man  the  boats  and  send  the  wounded  ashore ; 
many  of  her  crew  escaped  to  the  shore  by  boats 
or  by  swimming,  and  some  were  drowned  in  the 
attempt.  The  only  prisoners  taken  off  the  Con- 
gress were  about  twenty-five  men  who  got  on  board 
the  Raleigh  when  she  was  alongside.  Accounts 
differ  as  to  whether  these  were  wounded  men  moved 
first  out  of  the  prize,  or  were  men  who  voluntarily 
jumped  on  board  the  Raleigh  to  escape  from  the 
firing  of  their  friends  on  shore.  The  Congress  had 
at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement  434  officers 
and  men  on  board,  and  her  total  loss  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  was  136,  or  about  one  third 
of  the  entire  crew.  Included  in  the  whole  number 
on  board  as  just  stated  were  two  officers  and  eighty- 
seven  men  of  Company  D,  Ninety-Ninth  New  York 


114    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

Volunteer  Infantry,  put  on  board  two  months 
before  to  make  up  deficiencies  in  the  crew.  This 
company  had  its  full  share  of  casualties,  nine  men 
being  killed  and  fifteen  wounded,  while  seven 
were  reported  missing.  The  Congress  burned 
furiously  until  after  midnight,  her  destruction 
being  completed  by  the  explosion  of  her  magazine 
about  half  an  hour  after  midnight. 

Captain  Buchanan  of  the  Merrimac  was  dis- 
abled by  a  Minie  ball  from  shore  about  the  time 
that  the  Congress  surrendered,  and  the  command 
devolved  upon  the  executive  officer.  As  Captain 
Buchanan  was  the  foremost  figure  produced  by 
the  Confederate  States  navy  it  is  proper  to  refer 
briefly  to  his  career.  Franklin  Buchanan  was 
born  in  Baltimore  in  1800  and  was  appointed  a 
midshipman  in  the  navy  from  Pennsylvania  in 
1815  ;  he  became  a  lieutenant  in  1825  ;  a  master- 
commandant  in  1841,  and  a  captain  in  1855.  He 
was  largely  instrumental  in  founding  the  U.  S. 
Naval  Academy  at  Annapolis,  and  was  its  first 
superintendent,  from  1845  to  1847.  His  services 
in  the  war  with  Mexico  and  in  the  famous  expedi- 
tion of  Commodore  Perry  to  Japan  were  conspic- 
uous. At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  he  was 
commandant  of  the  navy-yard  at  Washington,  and 
resigned  his  commission  from  the  United  States 
navy.  Later  in  that  year,  when  he  found  that  his 
native  state,  Maryland,  did  not  secede  he  tried  to 
recall  the  resignation,  but  was  refused ;  he  then 


FRANKLIN  BUCHANAN'S  CAREER         115 

entered  the  navy  of  the  Confederate  States.  The 
office  of  admiral  of  that  navy  was  created  for  him 
in  recognition  of  his  services  on  the  Merrimac, 
and  with  that  rank  he  afterward  commanded  the 
Confederate  squadron  in  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay, 
where  he  was  again  wounded,  and  defeated  by 
Admiral  Farragut.  His  standing  in  the  old  navy 
was  such  that  had  he  remained  with  it  he  might 
have  become  its  most  distinguished  officer.  After 
the  war  he  was  for  several  years  president  of  the 
Maryland  Agricultural  College  ;  his  death  occurred 
in  1874. 

Other  considerations  than  the  attack  from  shore 
and  the  wounding  of  her  captain  called  the  Merri- 
mac away  from  the  stranded  Congress.  While 
the  fight  off  Newport  News  was  in  progress  there 
was  great  activity  in  the  shipping  at  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, and  the  war-vessels  there  got  under  way  to 
join  in  the  combat,  with  all  haste.  The  Minnesota, 
under  her  own  steam,  arrived  within  about  a  mile 
of  the  scene  and  went  hard  aground  just  as  the 
Cumberland  was  sinking.  After  attacking  the 
Congress,  as  described,  the  Merrimac  and  two 
of  the  gunboats  withdrew  their  attention  to  the 
Minnesota,  but  the  ironclad  could  not  approach 
within  a  mile  of  her  because  of  shoal  water,  and 
could  not  inflict  much  damage  with  her  guns  at 
that  distance.  The  two  gunboats,  however,  took 
positions  off  the  port  bow  and  stern  of  the  Min- 
nesota and  did  her  considerable  injury,  besides 


116    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

killing  and  wounding  nineteen  men.  They  were 
finally  driven  off,  but  the  Merrimac  continued  the 
battle  at  long  range  until  7  P.  M.,  when  darkness 
and  the  falling  of  the  tide  compelled  her  to  with- 
draw to  an  anchorage  between  Sewell's  Point  and 
Craney  Island. 

Meanwhile  the  Roanoke  and  the  St.  Lawrence 
had  obtained  aid  from  steam  tugs  and  proceeded 
slowly  up  to  the  scene  of  battle.  The  Roanoke, 
towed  by  the  Young  America  and  the  Dragon, 
grounded  when  still  too  far  distant  to  join  in  the 
action ;  she  was  soon  afloat  again  and,  seeing  the 
uselessness  of  trying  to  get  nearer,  returned  to  Ft. 
Monroe,  after  dispatching  her  tugs  to  the  aid  of 
the  Minnesota.  Her  only  part  in  the  battle  was 
the  exchange  of  shots  with  the  batteries  at  Sewell's 
Point,  which  attacked  her  both  going  and  return- 
ing. The  St.  Lawrence,  towed  by  the  armed  screw 
steamer  Cambridge,  was  more  fortunate  in  getting 
near  the  enemy,  but  she  also  grounded  near  the 
Minnesota,  where  she  arrived  about  6  p.  M.  She 
at  once  engaged  the  Merrimac  by  firing  broadsides 
at  her,  and  received  a  severe  gun  fire  in  return. 
Her  principal  injury  was  from  a  large  rifled  shell 
that  wrecked  the  after  part  of  her  wardroom  but 
did  not  explode ;  she  had  no  casualties.  When 
the  Merrimac  ceased  the  combat,  the  St.  Lawrence 
was  floated  by  the  Young  America  and  towed  back 
to  Old  Point.  The  Cambridge  participated  in  the 
engagement,  as  did  also  another  auxiliary  gunboat, 


THE  MERRIMAC'S  ACCOMPLISHMENT     117 

the  Whitehall.  The  latter  was  a  small  New  York 
ferry-boat,  mounting  four  guns  only,  and  had  no 
business  in  such  company;  she  was  struck  by  a 
shell  from  the  Merrimac  that  killed  one  officer 
(an  assistant  engineer)  and  two  men  and  wounded 
another  man. 

When  the  battle  ended,  the  Merrimac  and  her 
consorts  had  won  a  remarkable  victory  against 
great  numerical  odds,  and  were  hi  complete  control 
of  the  situation.  The  results  of  the  attack  were 
nearly  300  men  placed  hors  de  combat  on  the  Fed- 
eral ships  ;  two  large  sailing  ships  of  war,  until  that 
day  thought  formidable,  totally  destroyed ;  the  Min- 
nesota badly  damaged  and  in  great  peril;  other 
ships  suffering  from  lesser  injuries ;  and  a  wide- 
spread alarm  which  not  only  prevailed  among  the 
ships  in  the  vicinity  but  extended  to  the  national 
capital  and  to  the  chief  seaboard  cities  of  the 
Union.  In  accomplishing  all  this,  the  Merrimac 
had  lost  two  men  killed  and  eight  wounded ;  the 
muzzles  of  two  of  her  guns  had  been  shot  off ;  her 
ram  was  lost,  the  prow  twisted,  and  the  armor 
somewhat  damaged ;  the  anchors,  boats,  and  flag- 
staffs  were  shot  away,  and  the  smokepipe  was  rid- 
dled. The  injury  to  the  smokepipe  was  a  serious 
one,  as  it  much  impaired  her  ability  to  steam,  which 
was  bad  originally.  The  injuries  sustained  by  the 
Patrick  Henry  and  the  Raleigh  have  already  been 
mentioned. 

News  of  the  disaster  caused  wild  dismay  in  the 


118    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

governmental  departments  in  Washington,  which 
city  was  a  natural  objective  point  of  the  enemy, 
and  some  of  the  projects  for  defense,  and  even 
flight,  proposed  by  high  officials  would  seem  ludi- 
crous now  if  we  could  not  analyze  the  real  gravity 
of  the  situation.  A  great  army  was  at  that  tune 
being  massed  in  Virginia  for  a  campaign  that,  it 
was  hoped,  would  quell  the  rebellion ;  and  the  real 
importance  of  the  Merrimac's  achievement  is  shown, 
better  than  by  any  other  evidence,  by  the  way  it  im- 
pressed the  officer  commanding  that  army.  Tele- 
graphing the  next  day,  General  McClellan  said: 
"  The  performances  of  the  Merrimac  place  a  new 
aspect  upon  everything.  I  may  very  probably 
change  my  whole  plan  of  campaign  just  on  the 
eve  of  execution." 

This  day's  battle  gives  the  real  date  of  the  di- 
viding line  between  the  old  and  the  new  in  naval 
constructions.  It  revolutionized  the  navies  of  the 
world,  and  showed  that  the  dominion  of  the  seas 
by  means  of  wooden  sailing-ships  had  come  to  an 
abrupt  ending.  The  event  of  the  next  day  has 
generally  been  given  the  greater  importance  in 
this  regard,  but  it  was  not  needed  to  demonstrate 
the  triumph  of  iron  and  the  overthrow  of  the  long- 
famed  wooden  walls.  It  served  only  to  drive  the 
lesson  deeper  home,  beyond  contradiction,  to  set 
all  maritime  powers  to  immediately  reconstructing 
their  navies,  and  to  condemn  as  useless  the  great 
fighting  fabrics  that  for  so  long  had  been  regarded 


THE  MONITOR  SETS  SAIL  119 

as  the  absolute  war-lords  of  the  ocean.  It  ushered 
in  the  full  dawn  of  the  day  of  iron  and  steel,  of 
engines  and  engineers,  in  naval  affairs,  and  started 
the  stately  old  three-decker  on  her  last  long  voyage 
to  the  "  Islands  of  the  Blest." 

We  must  now  return  to  the  Monitor  and  bring 
her  to  the  scene  of  action.  Her  final  and  satis- 
factory trial  trip  took  place  March  4.  Two  days 
later,  hurried  by  frequent  orders  from  Washing- 
ton, she  put  to  sea,  bound  for  Hampton  Roads, 
convoyed  by  the  gunboats  Sachem  and  Currituck, 
and  in  tow  of  the  steamer  Seth  Lowe,  though  she 
used  her  own  engines  also.  Two  hours  after  her 
departure  a  telegraphic  order  arrived  for  her  to 
proceed  direct  to  Washington,  and  this  order  was 
repeated  to  Captain  Marsden,  the  senior  officer  at 
Hampton  Roads.  In  this  incident  historians  have 
found  an  interesting  parallel  to  the  case  of  the 
frigate  Constitution,  that  boldly  went  to  sea  just 
before  a  change  of  orders  came,  and  won  such  a 
victory  from  the  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world 
that  new  heart  was  given  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  our  right  to  the  freedom  of 
the  ocean  was  established. 

The  officers  and  men  of  the  Monitor  volunteered 
for  that  service  instead  of  being  arbitrarily  ordered, 
as  would  have  been  the  case  in  assignment  to  any 
other  naval  vessel.  This  was  because  of  the  com- 
plete novelty  of  the  ship  and  distrust  of  her  sea- 
going qualities,  expressed  so  openly  by  seamen  and 


120    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

landsmen  that  the  venture  seemed  as  desperate  as 
service  in  a  submarine  boat  would  be  considered 
now.  The  officers  were  Lieutenant  John  L.  Wor- 
den,  in  command ;  Lieutenant  S.  Dana  Greene ; 
Acting  Masters  John  J.  N.  Webber,  and  Louis  N. 
Stodder ;  Assistant  Surgeon  D.  C.  Logue ;  Assis- 
tant Paymaster  W.  F.  Keeler;  First  Assistant 
Engineer  Isaac  Newton,  acting  as  chief  engineer ; 
Second  Assistant  Engineer  A.  B.  Campbell ; 
Third  Assistant  Engineers  R.  W.  Hands  and 
M.  F.  Sundstrum;  and  Mr.  Daniel  Toffey,  cap- 
tain's clerk. 

Chief  Engineer  Alban  C.  Stimers,  previously 
mentioned  as  the  superintendent  of  construction 
of  the  ship,  went  to  sea  in  her  by  authority  of 
the  Navy  Department,  to  give  the  officers  and 
men  the  benefit  of  his  knowledge,  and  to  observe 
the  behavior  of  the  vessel  and  machinery.  He 
had  seen  every  detail  of  the  ship  built  and  put 
together,  and  he  had  personally  operated  every 
machine  on  board,  gaining  in  this  way  experience 
that  was  invaluable,  and  enabled  him  to  contribute 
more  to  the  successful  performance  of  the  vessel 
than  was  possible  for  any  other  person  on  board. 
This  is  truthfully  said  without  disparagement  of 
Lieutenant  Worden,  who,  as  commander,  directed 
all  general  operations  and  controlled  the  fate  of 
his  command,  but  who  could  not  compel  obedience 
from  refractory  machinery  that  he  did  not  under- 
stand, even  if  his  success  or  failure  depended  upon 


'liiiMllllllllllllllll BIIIIIIIIHIIII|l|ll|IIHIIIimib- 


THE   MONITOR   AND   THE   MERRIMAC 

Comparison  of  Size  and  Armor  Sections 


THE  PERSONNEL  OF  THE  MONITOR     121 

that  machinery.  In  view  of  the  national  impor- 
tance of  the  issue  at  stake,  it  is  difficult  to  ima- 
gine greater  responsibility  put  upon  the  skill  and 
technical  knowledge  of  one  man  than  in  this  case 
rested  upon  Chief  Engineer  Stimers. 

The  crew,  comprising  forty-five  men  of  various 
ratings,  was  made  up  of  the  usual  classes  of  man- 
of-war's-men,  selected  from  a  large  number  that 
had  volunteered  for  the  supposedly  forlorn  hope ; 
they  came  from  the  receiving-ship  North  Carolina 
and  the  sailing-frigate  Sabine,  the  least  number 
possible  to  operate  and  fight  the  ship  properly 
being  taken.  Separated  into  classes,  five  officers 
and  twenty-one  men  were  of  the  line,  or  seaman, 
branch ;  five  officers  and  seventeen  men  belonged 
to  the  engineer  branch ;  the  remainder  —  three 
officers  and  seven  men  —  were  surgeon,  paymaster, 
clerk,  storekeepers,  cooks,  and  stewards,  not  di- 
rectly concerned  with  the  working  of  the  ship, 
but  necessary  in  the  general  organization. 

After  twenty-four  hours  of  uneventful  progress 
in  fair  weather,  the  wind  and  sea  rose,  and  the 
condition  of  the  Monitor  soon  became  perilous. 
Such  quantities  of  water  came  in  through  the 
hawse-pipes  and  around  the  base  of  the  turret  that 
the  pumps  provided  for  keeping  the  vessel  free 
were  unequal  to  the  task,  and  danger  from  foun- 
dering threatened.  Ericsson  claimed  afterward 
in  his  usual  vigorous  way  that  but  for  ignorance, 
the  amount  of  water  that  came  in  around  the 


122    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

turret  would  have  been  inconsiderable  and  easily 
handled  by  the  pumps.  The  base  of  the  turret 
rested  heavily  upon  a  bronze  ring  let  into  the 
deck,  leaving  scarcely  any  crack  through  which 
water  could  force  its  way.  Before  the  vessel  left 
the  navy-yard,  however,  some  "  expert,"  familiar 
with  the  manifold  uses  of  rope  on  shipboard,  had 
had  the  turret  wedged  partly  up  and  caulked  the 
wide  crack  thus  opened  with  rope  gaskets.  When 
seas  began  to  beat  violently  against  the  turret, 
these  gaskets  were  washed  out,  leaving  a  wide 
annular  opening  sixty-three  feet  in  circumference, 
through  which  water  poured  in  cascades  into  the 
ship. 

Further  trouble  came  from  the  trunks  provided 
for  smoke-exits  and  blower-supply  pipes :  these  were 
so  low  that  the  waves  frequently  broke  clear  over 
them,  choking  the  blowers  with  water  and  impair- 
ing the  fires  in  the  boilers.  The  belts  of  the 
blowers  got  wet  from  this  cause,  and  slipped  so 
that  fresh  air  for  the  furnaces  could  not  be  sup- 
plied, and  the  engine  and  fire  rooms  became  filled 
with  noxious  gases  from  the  coal  fires.  In  their 
efforts  to  get  the  blowers  in  operation,  some  of  the 
engineers  and  firemen  were  overcome  by  the  gas 
and  were  carried  to  the  top  of  the  turret,  presum- 
ably dead,  but  they  revived  after  a  time  in  the 
fresh  air.  Without  the  blower  supply  of  air  the 
fires  and  steam  became  so  low  that  the  pumps 
stopped  altogether ;  and  in  the  full  expectation  of 


A  PERILOUS  VOYAGE  123 

foundering,  the  Monitor  was  towed  in  toward  the 
shore.  After  several  hours  of  peril,  smoother  water 
was  reached,  the  machinery  started  again,  water 
pumped  out,  and  the  voyage  resumed.  It  was  then 
evening  of  March  7.  Fair  progress  was  made  for 
a  time,  but  soon  after  midnight  more  danger  and 
trouble  came,  as  expressively  described  by  Lieu- 
tenant Greene  in  a  letter  written  home  soon  after- 
ward. 

"We  were  just  passing  a  shoal,  and  the  sea 
suddenly  became  rough  and  right  ahead.  It  came 
up  with  tremendous  force  through  our  anchor-well 
and  forced  the  air  through  our  hawse-pipe  where 
the  chain  comes,  and  then  the  water  would  rush 
through  in  a  perfect  stream,  clear  to  our  berth 
deck,  over  the  wardroom  table.  The  noise  resem- 
bled the  death  groans  of  twenty  men,  and  was  the 
most  dismal,  awful  sound  I  have  ever  heard.  Of 
course  the  captain  and  myself  were  on  our  feet  in 
a  moment,  and  endeavored  to  stop  the  hawse-pipe. 
We  succeeded  partially,  but  now  the  water  began 
to  come  down  our  blowers  again,  and  we  feared 
the  same  accident  that  happened  in  the  afternoon. 
We  tried  to  hail  the  tugboat,  but  the  wind  being 
dead  ahead  they  could  not  hear  us,  and  we  had  no 
way  of  signaling  them,  as  the  steam  whistle  which 
father  had  recommended  had  not  been  put  in. 

"  We  began  to  think  the  Monitor  would  never 
see  daylight.  We  watched  carefully  every  drop 
of  water  that  went  down  the  blowers,  and  sent 


124    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

continually  to  ask  the  fireman  how  they  were 
going.  His  only  answer  was  '  Slowly,'  but  could 
not  be  kept  going  much  longer  unless  the  water 
could  be  kept  from  coming  down.  The  sea  was 
washing  completely  over  the  decks,  and  it  was 
dangerous  for  a  man  to  go  on  them,  so  we  could 
do  nothing  to  the  blowers.  In  the  midst  of  all 
this  our  wheel-ropes  jumped  off  the  steering-wheel 
(owing  to  the  pitching  of  the  ship),  and  became 
jammed.  She  now  began  to  sheer  about  at  an 
awful  rate,  and  we  thought  our  hawser  would  cer- 
tainly part.  Fortunately  it  was  new,  and  held  on 
well.  In  the  course  of  half  an  hour  we  freed  our 
wheel-ropes,  and  now  the  blowers  were  the  only 
difficulty.  About  three  o'clock  Saturday  A.  M. 
the  sea  became  a  little  smoother,  though  still 
rough,  and  going  down  our  blowers  somewhat." 

The  next  morning  (March  8)  the  sea  was 
smoother  and  the  weary  voyage  progressed  slowly, 
but  free  from  serious  danger.  About  4  p.  M.  the 
Monitor  entered  in  at  the  Capes  of  Chesapeake, 
and  there  heard  from  afar  the  guns  of  the  conflict 
then  raging  at  Newport  News.  An  hour  or  two 
later  definite  information  of  the  great  disaster 
that  had  befallen  the  United  States  navy  was 
obtained  from  an  out-going  pilot-boat.  About  9 
p.  M.  the  Monitor  arrived  in  Hampton  Roads  and 
Lieutenant  Worden  reported  in  person  to  Captain 
Marsden  on  board  the  Roanoke. 

In  view  of  the  events  of  the  day  there  was  no 


PREPARATION  FOR  BATTLE       .      125 

doubt  as  to  what  was  the  duty  of  the  Monitor ; 
the  order  for  her  to  go  on  to  Washington  was  of 
course  disregarded,  and  she  was  directed  to  go  to 
the  Minnesota  to  defend  that  ship  if  possible  from 
the  attack  that  would  surely  be  made  in  the  morn- 
ing. A  number  of  Chesapeake  pilots  refused  to 
take  the  Monitor  to  Newport  News,  giving  the 
absurd  excuse  that  they  did  not  know  the  chan- 
nel. This  embarrassment  was  relieved  by  Acting 
Master  Samuel  Howard  of  the  navy,  attached  to 
the  armed  bark  Amanda,  who  fortunately  was 
familiar  with  those  waters  and  had  faith  enough 
in  the  Monitor  to  risk  his  fate  in  her  voluntarily. 
In  the  battle  of  the  ensuing  day  he  was  with 
Worden  in  the  pilot-house.  Not  long  after  mid- 
night the  Monitor  anchored  close  to  the  Minne- 
sota, and  her  wearied  crew  at  once  began  prepar- 
ing the  vessel  for  the  fight  that  must  come  with 
the  morning.  The  sounds  of  heavy  hammering 
that  came  from  her  in  the  dark  hours  before 
dawn,  as  the  adjustments  for  battle  progressed, 
gave  forcible  notice  that  the  engineer  had  at  last 
come  upon  the  stage  of  naval  warfare. 

There  is  an  end  of  all  things,  and  morning 
finally  relieved  the  dreadful  suspense  of  the  night. 
It  was  Sunday,  which  by  a  series  of  great  events 
has  come  to  be  the  battle-day  of  the  navy  of  the 
United  States.  Besides  the  struggle  in  Hampton 
Roads  with  which  we  are  now  concerned,  other 
notable  Sunday  triumphs  of  our  navy  that  come 


126    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

to  mind  are  the  bloody  victory  of  the  frigate 
United  States  over  the  Macedonian  ;  the  sinking 
of  the  Alabama  by  the  Kearsarge ;  the  remarkable 
victory  of  Admiral  Dewey  in  Manila  Bay;  and 
Admiral  Sampson's  great  sea-fight  —  the  greatest 
in  results  since  Trafalgar  —  in  the  deep  blue 
waters  off  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

The  Merrimac  got  under  way  shortly  before  8 
A.  M.  and  steamed  down  below  Sewell's  Point  far 
enough  to  enable  her  to  turn  into  the  channel  by 
which  the  Minnesota  had  proceeded  to  Newport 
News.  The  wound  of  Captain  Buchanan  had 
proved  so  serious  that  he  had  been  sent  ashore  to 
the  hospital,  leaving  the  executive  officer,  Lieu- 
tenant Catesby  ap  R.  Jones,  in  command,  as  he 
had  been  during  the  latter  part  of  the  day  before. 
Turning  down  the  main  ship-channel,  the  Merri- 
mac slowly  approached  the  Minnesota,  the  Con- 
federate gunboats  meanwhile  stationing  themselves 
in  the  vicinity  of  Sewell's  Point,  ready  to  contrib- 
ute whatever  they  could  to  their  cause. 

When  the  Minnesota  and  Merrimac  were  about 
a  mile  apart,  firing  began  between  them,  and  the 
Monitor,  in  obedience  to  signal  from  the  former, 
at  once  steamed  out  between  the  two  and  engaged 
the  Merrimac.  There  is  some  doubt,  after  a  com- 
parison of  the  official  reports,  whether  the  Confeder- 
ates knew  beforehand  that  they  were  to  encounter 
the  Ericsson  battery,  but  they  probably  did.  It 
is  certain  that  they  saw  her  early  in  the  morning, 


THE  MONITOR  ENGAGES  THE  MERRIMAC    127 

and  the  well-informed  must  have  recognized  her 
from  the  descriptions  that  newspapers  had  fur- 
nished friend  and  foe  alike.  In  some  of  the  Con- 
federate reports  it  is  stated  that  they  supposed  the 
strange-looking  object  to  be  a  water-tank  sent  to 
supply  the  Minnesota,  or  a  floating  magazine  bring- 
ing her  ammunition.  Lieutenant  Jones,  however, 
says  that  at  daylight  he  saw  the  Minnesota  was 
still  aground,  and  that  there  was  an  iron  battery 
lying  near  her. 

All  doubt  about  the  stranger  was  dispelled  by 
the  heavy  impact  of  her  11-inch  solid  shot  against 
the  casemate  of  the  Merrimac,  starting  it  inward, 
knocking  men  off  their  feet  by  the  shock,  and 
leaving  them  stunned,  and  bleeding  at  the  nose, 
mouth,  and  ears.  The  first  shot  fired  at  the 
Monitor  missed  her,  and  the  enemy  realized  that 
they  did  not  have  the  big  hull  of  a  frigate  for  a 
target.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  all  the  details 
of  a  combat  that  is  so  historic  and  so  well  known. 
Speed  is  a  word  hardly  applicable  to  either  com- 
batant, but  the  great  advantage  of  quicker  move- 
ment was  with  the  Monitor.  The  Merrimac, 
whose  steaming  power  was  much  impaired  by  the 
damage  to  the  smoke-pipe  inflicted  in  the  action 
of  the  day  before,  was  also  much  hampered  by  her 
deep  draft  in  a  contracted  channel,  and  had  to  be 
very  slow  and  careful  in  her  movements.  She 
was,  in  fact,  aground  once,  early  in  the  action, 
and  remained  so  for  fifteen  minutes.  Her  pilots 


128    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

also  are  reported  as  having  been  remarkably  cau- 
tious and  not  at  all  anxious  to  get  the  ship  at  close 
quarters  with  a  formidable  enemy. 

The  Monitor's  projectiles  knocked  off  the  armor 
bars  freely  from  the  casemate  of  the  Merrimac  and 
broke  the  wooden  timbers  underneath,  but  none 
actually  penetrated.  Many  smaller  shot  from  the 
Minnesota  also  struck  her,  but  they  glanced  off 
the  sloping  armor  as  harmlessly  as  they  had  done 
the  day  before.  The  only  solid  shot  the  Merrimac 
had  were  of  large  windage,  intended  to  be  fired 
hot ;  so  she  was  compelled  to  use  shells  only,  with 
which  she  had  been  supplied  when  it  was  supposed 
she  would  encounter  nothing  but  wooden  ships. 
These  shells  had  small  effect  on  the  Monitor  be- 
yond making  dents  in  the  turret  and  decks,  and 
their  impact  did  not  derange  the  turret-turning 
mechanism,  as  had  been  greatly  feared.  An  at- 
tempt to  ram  the  Monitor  was  eluded  by  the  supe- 
rior agility  of  that  vessel,  a  glancing  blow  only 
being  struck  that  did  no  injury  to  her,  but  did 
damage  the  Merrimac  by  starting  a  leak  in  her 
already  weakened  stem.  On  board  the  Monitor, 
the  location  of  the  pilot-house  on  deck  forward 
was  found  to  be  a  great  disadvantage,  as  it  pre- 
vented firing  the  guns  ahead  and  separated  the 
handling  and  fighting  intelligences  of  the  ship. 
In  subsequent  monitors  both  these  objections  were 
overcome  by  the  simple  device  of  putting  the  pilot- 
house on  top  of  the  turret. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  IRONCLADS   129 

The  Merrimac  fired  often  at  the  Minnesota  and 
did  considerable  damage  to  that  ship,  but  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Monitor  so  occupied  her  attention  that 
the  otherwise  certain  destruction  of  the  stranded 
frigate  was  prevented.  One  shell  entered  the 
chief  engineer's  room  on  the  Minnesota,  tore  sev- 
eral rooms  into  one,  and  in  bursting  exploded  two 
charges  of  powder  that  set  the  ship  on  fire.  An- 
other shell  exploded  the  boiler  of  the  tugboat 
Dragon,  lying  alongside  the  Minnesota  trying  to 
get  her  afloat,  seriously  wounding  three  men,  and 
completely  destroying  the  inside  of  the  wheel. 
The  Confederates  very  properly  claimed  this  dam- 
age to  the  Dragon  as  one  of  the  results  of  the 
Merrimac's  raid,  but  they  were  in  error  in  claim- 
ing the  destruction  of  the  Whitehall,  also  along- 
side the  Minnesota  at  the  time.  The  Whitehall 
had  been  in  the  battle  of  the  day  before  and  had 
lost  some  men,  as  before  mentioned,  but  had  not 
suffered  any  material  damage  from  the  enemy.  On 
the  morning  of  March  10,  at  least  twelve  hours 
after  the  Merrimac  had  returned  to  Norfolk,  the 
Whitehall  accidentally  took  fire  while  lying  at 
the  wharf  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  was  completely 
destroyed.  She  had  on  board  a  quantity  of  equip- 
ment and  gun-gear  taken  from  the  Minnesota 
when  it  was  feared  that  vessel  would  have  to  be 
abandoned,  and  this  also  was  burned. 

The  battle  continued  without  advantage  to 
either  combatant.  At  one  time  the  Monitor  had 


130    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

to  draw  out  of  action  to  hoist  shot  into  her  turret, 
which  it  appears  could  not  be  done  while  the  tur- 
ret was  in  use.  This  cessation  of  hostilities,  which 
lasted  only  fifteen  minutes,  greatly  encouraged 
the  Confederates,  who  thought  their  enemy  dis- 
abled, and  caused  gloom  and  despair  on  board  the 
Minnesota  under  the  same  supposition.  About 
this  time  the  Minnesota  was  virtually  abandoned ; 
part  of  the  crew  was  sent  on  shore  and  the  remain- 
der, except  the  few  who  were  to  apply  the  torch 
to  her,  were  in  boats  alongside  ready  to  leave. 
The  quick  resumption  of  the  fight  by  the  Monitor 
dispelled  the  illusions  on  both  sides  and  eventually 
saved  the  Minnesota,  for  the  work  of  destroying 
her  was  stayed,  and  soon  after  converted  into  a 
successful  effort  to  float  and  save  her. 

About  11.30  A.  M.,  when  the  ironclads  were  not 
more  than  fifty  yards  apart,  Lieutenant  Worden 
was  disabled,  while  looking  through  a  peephole  in 
the  pilot-house,  by  a  shell  striking  and  exploding 
right  in  front  of  his  eyes.  He  was  temporarily 
blinded  and  his  face  badly  burned  and  cut  by  fly- 
ing bits  of  powder  and  iron.  The  helmsman  was 
also  stunned  for  a  few  minutes  by  the  concussion, 
and  in  that  short  time  the  Monitor,  with  no  one 
hi  control  to  steer  or  signal  the  engine-room,  ran 
off  aimlessly  away  from  the  fight.  Very  soon, 
however,  Greene  learned  of  the  casualty  in  the 
pilot-house,  and  leaving  Stimers  in  charge  of  the 
turret,  took  command  of  the  ship  and  began  firing 


THE  MERRIMAC  RETIRES  131 

again  at  the  enemy.  Then  to  the  surprise  of  all, 
the  Merrimac  gave  up  the  fight  and  steamed  away 
for  Norfolk.  Her  commander  reported  after- 
ward that  he  believed  the  Monitor  disabled,  and 
he  was  very  desirous  of  crossing  the  Elizabeth 
River  bar  before  ebb-tide.  The  well  established 
fact  that  the  Monitor  resumed  firing  after  the 
few  minutes  of  silence  incident  to  the  wounding  of 
Worden  is  conclusive  proof  that  she  gave  no  sign 
of  being  disabled.  She  did  not  follow  the  retiring 
enemy,  because  her  duty  was  limited  by  specific 
order  to  defending  the  Minnesota.  Pursuit  was 
almost  out  of  the  question  also,  because  of  the 
unfortunate  location  of  the  pilot-house  preventing 
the  firing  of  her  guns  ahead.  Lieutenant  Jones 
was  harshly  criticised  by  some  officers  and  others 
in  Confederate  official  circles  for  taking  his  ship 
out  of  action,  but  the  reasons  given  by  himself 
and  his  officers  are  satisfactory  from  an  historical 
point  of  view.  Briefly,  they  are,  that  the  Merri- 
mac was  leaking  badly  from  the  effects  of  ramming, 
that  her  officers  and  men  were  worn  out  by  two 
days  and  a  night  of  continuous  intense  labor,  that 
the  Minnesota  was  inaccessible  because  of  shoal 
water,  that  they  feared  if  the  ship  touched  bottom 
again  the  leak  would  open  to  a  fatal  degree,  and 
that  the  pilots  declared  it  impossible  to  get  over 
the  bar  until  the  next  day  unless  they  went  at  the 
moment. 

The  Monitor  was  struck  twenty-one  times  in  the 


132    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

action,  and  fired  forty-one  11-inch  solid  shot.  The 
most  severe  blow  she  received  was  from  the  shell 
that  disabled  Worden,  this  having  broken  one  of 
the  big  iron  "  logs  "  of  which  the  pilot-house  was 
built,  entirely  through,  and  forced  the  fractured 
ends  inward  an  inch  and  a  half,  besides  displacing 
the  loose  iron  cover  of  the  pilot-house.  The  deep- 
est indentation  in  her  turret  was  two  inches,  and 
the  deepest  score  in  the  deck  was  only  one-half 
inch.  Two  men  in  the  turret  were  temporarily 
disabled  by  being  in  touch  with  the  iron  wall  when 
it  was  struck ;  these  two  and  Worden  were  the 
only  persons  injured  on  board.  The  Merrimac 
had  about  forty  men  prostrated  by  concussion,  but 
their  injuries  were  mostly  of  a  temporary  nature. 
In  the  official  report  of  Lieutenant  Jones,  the  loss 
of  the  Merrimac  in  the  two  days'  fight  is  given  as 
two  men  killed  and  nineteen  wounded ;  as  he  had 
reported  on  the  evening  of  March  8  that  he  had 
lost  two  men  killed  and  eight  wounded  in  the  fight- 
ing of  that  day,  it  follows  that  eleven  of  his  men 
were  sufficiently  injured  in  the  combat  with  the 
Monitor  to  figure  in  the  list  of  casualties.  Of 
nearly  one  hundred  shot-marks  on  the  armor  of 
the  Merrimac,  twenty  were  identified  as  having 
been  made  by  the  11-inch  guns  of  the  Monitor. 
The  greatest  injury  to  the  Merrimac  was  the  leak 
caused  by  ramming  first  the  Cumberland,  and 
afterwards  the  Monitor ;  that  this  was  very  serious 
is  established  by  the  fact  that  the  ship  was  put  in 


THE  MONITOR'S  VICTORY  133 

dry  dock  that  same  afternoon,  as  soon  as  she  arrived 
at  Norfolk. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  since  that  event- 
ful day  in  dispute  as  to  which  of  the  ironclads  was 
the  victor,  though  the  official  reports  from  both 
sides  leave  no  room  for  doubt.  Had  the  battle 
been  simply  a  trial  of  strength  between  them,  had 
they  come  out  from  their  respective  lines,  like 
David  and  Goliath  of  old,  to  submit  the  issue  to 
the  test  of  personal  combat,  the  result  —  if  result 
it  may  be  called  —  must  be  decided  as  a  draw. 
Neither  was  disabled,  and  neither  vanquished  the 
other.  The  real  issue,  however,  was  much  broader 
than  the  mere  question  of  endurance  of  the  two 
armored  ships.  The  task  of  the  day  chosen  by 
the  Merrimac  was  to  destroy  the  Minnesota,  to 
clear  Hampton  Roads  of  hostile  ships,  and  to  open 
a  free  seaway  for  herself  for  wider  operations. 
The  task  of  the  Monitor  was  to  prevent  the  execu- 
tion of  this  design,  which  she  did  with  complete 
success  by  checking  the  enemy  at  the  very  first 
stage  of  his  programme.  Baffled  in  the  attack 
upon  the  Minnesota,  the  Merrimac  abandoned  the 
field  and  left  her  enemy  in  possession ;  instead  of 
destroying  the  Federal  ships,  she  did  not  destroy 
anything,  and  at  the  end  of  the  day  was  not 
even  in  their  presence.  The  duty  assigned  to  the 
Monitor  was  to  protect  the  wooden  ships,  and  she 
protected  them  ;  when  night  fell,  she  was  still  on 
guard  over  them,  grim,  ugly,  and  ready  to  fight. 


134    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

The  only  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  facts 
is  that  the  Monitor  won  a  decided  victory  over  the 
Merrimac. 

The  success  of  the  Monitor  completely  changed 
the  aspect  of  the  opening  military  campaign,  and 
raised  the  North  from  the  depths  of  apprehension 
to  a  pinnacle  of  hope  and  celebration.  No  single 
event  of  the  Civil  War,  as  has  been  often  said, 
so  excited  popular  enthusiasm,  and  the  Monitor 
furnished  for  a  long  time  material  for  public 
discussion  and  applause.  The  officers  —  Wordeu, 
Greene,  and  Stimers,  particularly  —  found  them- 
selves suddenly  popular  heroes,  and  in  all  this 
adulation  it  is  pleasant  to  know  that  the  real 
author  of  all  the  success,  John  Ericsson,  was  not 
overlooked.  He  who  had  been  looked  at  with 
suspicion  as  an  "  inventive  crank  "  was  now  over- 
whelmed with  honors,  and  recognized  as  a  national 
benefactor,  and  the  foremost  engineer  of  his 
time. 

The  story  of  the  battle  created  a  profound  sen- 
sation abroad,  and  established  a  respect  for  the 
naval  power  of  the  United  States  that  was  much 
needed  just  at  that  time.  European  nations  whose 
commercial  interests  were  suffering  because  of  the 
war  in  America  were  constrained  to  check  their 
almost  openly  avowed  intentions  of  meddling  with 
our  affairs,  because  it  suddenly  appeared  that  an 
element  of  danger,  until  then  unsuspected,  would 
attend  such  interference.  This  discovery  was  well 


IMPORTANT  RESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE    135 

expressed  by  the  "  London  Times,"  which  said 
editorially :  "  Whereas  we  had  available  for  imme- 
diate purposes  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  first- 
class  war-ships,  we  have  now  two,  these  two  being 
the  Warrior  and  her  sister  Ironside.  There  is  not 
now  a  ship  in  the  English  navy,  apart  from  these 
two,  that  it  would  not  be  madness  to  trust  to  an 
engagement  with  that  little  Monitor." 

It  is  doubtful  if  any  naval  conflict  in  the  history 
of  the  world  ever  attracted  such  widespread  atten- 
tion as  did  the  battle  between  the  Monitor  and 
Merrimac,  because  the  peculiar  character  and 
results  of  the  struggle  forced  new  and  vital  pro- 
blems upon  all  naval  powers.  The  essential  lesson 
of  the  whole  affair  was  demonstrated  by  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Merrimac  in  her  first  day's  work: 
these  proved  beyond  all  discussion  that  the  sailless 
armored  steamer  must  supplant  the  wooden  sail- 
ing-ship ;  the  next  day  showed  that  the  armored 
steamer  could  be  met  and  checked  by  its  own  kind. 
The  revolution  in  naval  architecture  that  has  pro- 
duced the  great  battleships  of  the  present  day 
began  at  once  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

It  will  be  appropriate  before  concluding  this 
chapter  to  review  the  short  and  tragic  histories 
of  the  two  ironclads  after  their  famous  encounter. 
The  Merrimac,  while  in  the  dry  dock  at  Norfolk 
after  the  battle,  was  repaired  as  much  as  great 
haste  allowed.  Her  damaged  armor  plates  were 
replaced,  and  the  armor  was  extended  deeper  below 


136    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

the  water-line ;  a  new  ram,  or  spur,  was  fitted 
to  the  bow,  and  port-shutters  were  provided  for 
some  of  the  gun-ports.  This  work  was  pushed 
night  and  day,  and  was  hastened  by  almost  hourly 
telegrams  from  Richmond  urging  expedition  and 
threatening  punishment  to  any  official  lacking  in 
energy  or  ability.  It  is  even  said  that  women  and 
children  aided  in  the  work  by  holding  torches 
and  lanterns  for  mechanics  to  work  by  at  night. 
April  4  the  ship  was  floated  out  of  dock,  though 
not  fully  completed,  and  an  aggressive  policy  against 
the  enemy  at  once  decided  upon.  Captain  Josiah 
Tattnall,  of  "  Blood  is  thicker  than  water  "  fame, 
was  appointed  to  the  command  in  place  of  Buch- 
anan, whose  wound  had  proved  very  troublesome, 
and  much  was  expected. 

On  the  morning  of  April  11,  the  Merrimac,  with 
the  Jamestown  and  some  of  the  other  improvised 
gunboats,  steamed  down  into  Hampton  Roads  with 
the  intention  of  offering  battle  to  the  large  force 
of  Federal  war-vessels  and  transports  lying  there, 
and  more  particularly  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
the  Monitor.  With  this  object  in  view,  a  plan 
had  been  decided  upon  to  board  her  with  a  party 
of  men  equipped  for  particular  service ;  some  were 
provided  with  heavy  hammers  and  iron  wedges  to 
disable  the  turret  by  driving  the  wedges  into  the 
crack  between  the  bottom  of  the  turret  and  the 
deck ;  others  were  armed  with  combustibles  to  throw 
down  the  smoke-holes  and  blower-openings,  and 


AN  INCOMPREHENSIBLE  PROCEEDING    137 

another  party  was  detailed  to  throw  a  wet  sail  over 
the  pilot-house  and  thus  make  steering  impossible 
by  cutting  off  the  range  of  vision  of  the  helms- 
man. She  passed  below  Sewell's  Point,  and,  in 
the  afternoon,  fired  a  few  shots  at  impossibly  long 
range  at  the  Monitor,  lying  at  anchor  near  Fortress 
Monroe.  Return  firing  at  equally  futile  range  was 
indulged  in  by  the  Naugatuck  and  Octorara,  but 
effort  seems  to  have  been  lacking  to  close  in  and 
engage  the  Confederate  squadron  seriously.  In 
the  face  of  the  Federal  force,  the  Jamestown  and 
Raleigh  crossed  Hampton  Bar  and  captured  two 
American  brigs  and  a  schooner,  empty  and  lying 
at  anchor,  and  towed  them  away  as  prizes  without 
molestation. 

This  day's  proceeding  is  quite  incomprehensible 
to  any  one  familiar  with  the  dash  and  intrepidity 
that  all  our  history  shows  to  be  attributes  of  officers 
of  the  United  States  Navy.  A  plan  had  been 
agreed  upon  to  attack  the  Merrimac  whenever  she 
should  appear  and  attempt  her  destruction  by 
running  her  down  or  over-riding  her  with  large 
merchant-steamers  that  had  been  chartered  and 
specially  prepared  for  that  purpose.  The  Monitor 
was  present,  at  anchor  it  is  true,  but  with  steam 
up  and  ready  to  fight  if  ordered,  and  the  Nauga- 
tuck was  also  an  ironclad  supposed  to  possess  for- 
midable characteristics ;  she  was  a  small  steamer 
that  had  been  fitted  out  by  the  Stevens  brothers 
of  Hoboken,  to  demonstrate  the  features  of  their 


138    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

armored  battery  that  they  were  trying  to  dispose 
of  to  the  government.  The  flag  officer  in  com- 
mand at  Hampton  Roads,  Captain  L.  M.  Golds- 
borough,  in  reporting  the  affair,  mentioned  the 
capture  of  the  three  small  merchant-vessels  as 
the  only  important  incident,  and  said  that  had  the 
Merrimac  engaged  the  Monitor,  "  which  she  might 
have  done,"  to  use  his  own  words,  he  was  prepared 
with  several  vessels  to  run  her  down.  Altogether, 
the  affair  is  difficult  to  understand. 

Again,  on  May  8,  the  Merrimac  appeared  for  a 
short  time  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Federal  ships. 
On  that  date  the  Monitor,  Dacotah,  Susquehanna, 
Seminole,  and  Naugatuck  shelled  the  Confederate 
batteries  at  Sewell's  Point,  to  test  their  strength 
and  to  ascertain  the  possibility  of  landing  troops 
in  that  vicinity.  The  Merrimac  came  out  at 
once,  but  nothing  happened.  The  reports  are  con- 
flicting :  Captain  Tattnall  says  that  the  Federals 
retired  before  his  approach,  and  Captain  Golds- 
borough  says  that  the  Merrimac  "  did  not  engage 
the  Monitor,  nor  did  she  place  herself  where  she 
could  have  been  assailed  by  one  of  our  ram  vessels 
to  any  advantage,  or  where  there  was  any  prospect 
whatever  of  our  getting  at  her."  The  commander 
of  the  British  man-of-war  Rinaldo,  present  at  the 
time,  perhaps  not  a  wholly  unprejudiced  observer, 
reported  to  his  government  that  110  attempt  was 
made  to  molest  the  Merrimac,  except  a  few  shots 
fired  at  her  from  the  Rip  Raps  (the  fort  in  the 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  MERRIMAC       139 

channel  at  Old  Point),  and  that  she  drove  the  Fed- 
eral ships  away. 

The  military  situation  was  then  critical  for  the 
Confederates  in  that  vicinity,  and  two  days  later, 
May  10,  the  city  of  Norfolk  was  abandoned  to 
the  Union  forces.  An  attempt  was  made  to  save 
the  Merrimac  by  taking  her  up  the  James  River, 
but  she  was  found  to  draw  too  much  water,  and 
Tattnall  in  his  extremity  had  to  run  her  on  shore 
near  Craney  Island  and  destroy  her  by  fire  to  pre- 
vent her  falling  into  the  hands  of  his  enemy ;  the 
fire  reached  her  magazine,  and  she  blew  up  early 
in  the  morning  of  May  11.  The  Southern  public 
had  counted  on  so  much  from  the  Merrimac  and 
had  such  an  exaggerated  idea  of  her  powers  that 
this  loss  occasioned  a  fierce  outburst  of  grief  and 
for  a  time  threatened  mob  violence  to  the  govern- 
ment offices  in  Richmond.  To  gratify  popular 
clamor,  Captain  Tattnall  was  tried  by  court-mar- 
tial, but  was  honorably  acquitted,  as  it  was  shown 
that  his  action  was  the  result  of  dire  necessity  and 
the  only  step  possible  to  prevent  his  ship  from 
capture  and  use  by  the  Federals.  His  argument 
in  defense  is  a  long  and  peculiarly  interesting 
document,  couched  in  the  stately  forensic  phrase 
of  a  by-gone  day,  still  in  use  to  some  extent  at 
the  South.  It  reviews  with  minuteness  of  detail 
all  his  actions  and  his  controlling  surroundings 
while  in  command  of  the  Merrimac,  and  concludes 
with  a  paragraph  that  is  worthy  of  repetition  to  a 


140    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

younger  generation,  for  its  application  is  general 
and  pertinent  at  any  time  when  men  in  high  mili- 
tary position  are  judged  by  the  public  only  upon 
the  standard  of  success,  without  regard  to  un- 
known obstacles :  — 

"  Thus  perished  the  Virginia,  and  with  her 
many  high-flown  hopes  of  naval  supremacy  and 
success.  That  denunciation,  loud  and  deep, 
should  follow  in  the  wake  of  such  an  event,  might 
be  expected  from  the  excited  mass  who,  on  occa- 
sions of  vast  public  exigency,  make  their  wishes 
the  measure  of  their  expectations,  and  recognize 
in  public  men  no  criterion  of  merit  but  perfect 
success.  But  he  who  worthily  aspires  to  a  part  in 
great  and  serious  affairs  must  be  unawed  by  the 
clamor,  looking  to  the  right-judging  few  for  pre- 
sent support,  and  patiently  waiting  for  the  calmer 
time  when  reflection  shall  assume  a  general  sway, 
and  by  the  judgment  of  all,  full  justice,  though 
tardy,  will  be  done  to  his  character,  motives,  and 
conduct." 

Immediately  following  the  surrender  of  Norfolk, 
the  Monitor,  as  one  of  a  squadron  of  small  vessels 
under  the  command  of  Captain  John  Kodgers  in 
the  Galena,  proceeded  up  the  James  River  to 
within  about  eight  miles  of  Richmond.  She  par- 
ticipated in  the  fight  there  May  15,  at  Drewry's 
Bluff,  on  which  occasion  the  Galena  was  so  roughly 
handled,  as  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
and  was  struck  three  times  by  the  enemy's  pro- 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  MONITOR  141 

jectiles ;  the  damage  was  of  no  consequence,  and 
no  one  on  the  Monitor  was  injured.  Thereafter, 
until  late  in  September,  she  was  an  active  member 
of  the  James  River  squadron,  and  had  many 
brushes  with  the  shore  batteries  of  the  enemy  at 
various  points  along  the  river  banks.  In  Septem- 
ber she  went  to  the  navy-yard  at  Washington  for 
repairs  to  fit  her  for  a  sea  voyage  and  for  further 
service. 

When  again  ready  for  service,  the  Monitor,  in 
company  with  a  newly  built  monitor  of  improved 
type,  the  Passaic,  left  Hampton  Roads  the  after- 
noon of  December  29,  1862,  as  the  initial  move 
in  a  plan  for  investing  with  ironclad  vessels  the 
harbor  and  city  of  Charleston.  Both  monitors 
were  under  their  own  steam,  but  were  in  tow  as 
well,  the  Monitor  by  the  Rhode  Island  and  the 
Passaic  by  the  State  of  Georgia.  A  rough  sea 
was  encountered  in  the  vicinity  of  Cape  Hatteras, 
and  the  Monitor  began  leaking  and  taking  in 
water  about  the  turret  and  through  the  hawse- 
pipes  to  such  an  extent  that  the  pumps  could  not 
discharge  it.  It  being  evident  that  the  vessel 
must  founder,  signals  of  distress  were  made,  and 
the  work  of  transferring  the  crew  to  the  Rhode 
Island  undertaken.  Before  all  were  taken  off, 
the  Monitor  sank.  This  occurred  shortly  after 
midnight  in  the  morning  of  December  31,  1862, 
at  a  point  about  twenty  miles  south-southwest  of 
Cape  Hatteras.  With  the  Monitor  perished  two 


142    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

ensigns,  two  assistant  engineers,  and  twelve  enlisted 
men. 

Commander  Bankhead,  her  captain,  stated  in 
his  report  of  the  disaster  that  the  Monitor  must 
have  sprung  a  leak  somewhere  in  the  forward  part, 
where  the  hull  joined  on  to  the  armor,  and  that 
it  was  caused  by  the  heavy  shocks  received  as  she 
came  down  upon  the  sea.  A  glance  at  the  draw- 
ings showing  the  structural  features  of  the  ship 
will  show  that  this  belief  was  probably  correct. 
The  shrinking  of  timbers  in  the  upper  body,  a 
result  of  the  long  hot  summer's  work  in  James 
River,  may  have  been  a  cause  of  leakage  also. 
The  Monitor,  in  spite  of  her  brief  career,  achieved 
one  of  the  most  conspicuous  positions  in  all  re- 
corded naval  annals.  For  this  reason,  it  is  proper 
in  concluding  her  history  to  give  with  exactness 
the  particulars  attending  her  destruction.  These 
cannot,  perhaps,  be  presented  in  better  detail  than 
appears  in  the  official  report  by  which  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  North  Atlantic  Blockading 
Station  informed  the  Navy  Department  of  the  dis- 
aster :  — 

"  Commander  J.  P.  Bankhead,  commanding 
the  Monitor,  reports  to  me  that  he  left  the  Roads 
Monday  29th  ultimo,  at  2.30  P.  M.,  with  light 
southwest  wind,  clear,  pleasant  weather,  and  every 
prospect  of  its  continuing  so.  At  6  P.  M.  he 
passed  Cape  Henry;  water  smooth,  and  every- 
thing working  well.  The  same  good  weather  con- 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  MONITOR  143 

tinued  during  the  night  and  until  5  A.  M.  on  Tues- 
day, the  30th,  when  the  Monitor  felt  a  swell  from 
the  southward  and  a  slight  increase  of  wind  from 
southwest,  the  sea  breaking  over  the  pilot-house 
and  striking  the  base  of  the  tower  ;  speed  about 
five  knots.  Until  6  P.  M.  the  weather  was  varia- 
ble, with  occasional  squalls  of  wind  and  rain,  with 
less  swell  in  the  afternoon.  Bilge-pumps  were 
amply  sufficient  to  keep  her  free.  At  7  P.  M.  the 
wind  hauled  more  to  the  southward,  increased  and 
caused  sea  to  rise,  the  computed  position  being 
fifteen  miles  south  of  Cape  Hatteras.  At  this 
time  the  Monitor  was  yawing  and  towing  badly, 
the  vessel  working  and  making  more  water  ;  the 
Worthington  pumps  were  set  to  work,  and  the 
centrifugal  pumps  got  ready.  At  8  P.  M.  the  sea 
was  rising  rapidly  (the  Monitor  plunging  heav- 
ily), completely  submerging  pilot-house,  and  at 
times  entering  the  turret  and  blower  pipes. 
When  she  rose  to  the  swell,  the  flat  under  surface 
of  the  projecting  armor  would  come  down  with 
great  force,  causing  considerable  shock  to  the  ves- 
sel. Stopping  the  Rhode  Island,  which  was  tow- 
ing her,  did  not  make  the  Monitor  ride  easier  or 
cause  her  to  make  less  water,  as  she  would  then 
fall  off  and  roll  heavily  in  the  trough  of  the  sea. 
The  centrifugal  pump  was  at  length  started,  the 
others  failing  to  keep  the  water  down.  With  all 
pumps  working  well,  the  water  continued  rising, 
and  at  10  p.  M.,  after  a  fair  trial  of  the  pumps, 


144    BUILDING  AND  BATTLE  OF  IRONCLADS 

and  the  water  still  gaining  rapidly,  Commander 
Bankhead  made  signal  of  distress,  cut  the  hawser, 
steamed  close  to  and  under  the  lee  of  the  Rhode 
Island,  received  two  boats  from  her,  and  ordered 
the  crew  of  the  Monitor  to  leave  her,  —  a  danger- 
ous operation,  as  the  sea  was  breaking  heavily  over 
the  deck.  The  two  vessels  touched,  and,  owing 
to  the  sharp  bow  and  sides  of  the  Monitor,  the 
Rhode  Island  was  endangered,  and  she  steamed 
ahead  a  little.  At  11.30  p.  M.  the  water  was 
gaining  rapidly,  though  all  the  pumps  were  in  full 
play,  the  engine  working  slowly  and  the  sea  break- 
ing badly  over  the  vessel,  making  it  dangerous  to 
leave  the  turret.  At  this  time,  several  men  were 
supposed  to  have  been  washed  overboard.  The 
engine  and  pumps  soon  ceased  to  work,  the  water 
having  put  the  fires  out.  While  waiting  for  re- 
turn of  boats,  bailing  was  resorted  to.  As  the 
Monitor  was  now  laboring  in  the  trough  of  the 
sea,  Commander  Bankhead  let  go  the  anchor 
which  brought  her  head  to  sea.  The  vessel  filling 
rapidly,  Commander  Bankhead  ordered  the  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  men,  then  left  on  board,  to  leave 
in  the  boats  then  approaching  cautiously,  as  the 
sea  was  breaking  violently  over  the  Monitor's  sub- 
merged deck.  In  this  perilous  position,  Com- 
mander Bankhead  held  a  boat's  painter  until  as 
many  men  could  get  in  as  the  boat  could  carry. 
Some  men  left  in  the  turret,  terrified  by  the  peril, 
declined  to  come  down,  and  are  supposed  to  have 


THE  LOSS  OF  THE  MONITOR  145 

perished.  Commander  Bankhead  did  not  leave 
his  vessel  so  long  as  he  could  do  anything  towards 
saving  his  crew,  in  which  efforts  he  was  ably  as- 
sisted by  Commander  Trenchard,  the  officers,  and 
crew  of  the  Rhode  Island." 


CHAPTER  III 

SOME   NAVAL   EVENTS    OF   THE   CIVIL   WAR 

THE  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  furnishes 
the  first  instance  in  history  of  prolonged  and  ex- 
tensive naval  operations  carried  on  with  steam  ves- 
sels only.  The  instances  of  the  use  of  sailing-ships 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  war  are  few,  are  without 
important  results,  and  are  confined  to  the  events 
of  the  first  year,  so  the  statement  that  steam  was 
the  only  motive  power  of  the  navy  during  that  war 
is  practically  accurate.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  there  were  but  thirteen  sailing-vessels  of  the 
navy  in  commission  for  service,  and  only  four  of 
these  were  attached  to  the  North  Atlantic,  or  home, 
squadron :  the  others  were  in  the  East  Indies,  in 
the  Pacific,  on  the  Brazil  station,  or  enduring  the 
monotony  and  exile  of  the  west  coast  of  Africa, 
where,  in  cooperation  with  British  ships  of  war, 
they  were  cruising  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing 
the  slave  trade. 

As  they  came  home,  some  were  assigned  to 
cruising  or  blockading  duty  off  the  coast  of  the 
Southern  States,  but  they  were  admittedly  so  infe- 
rior to  steamers  for  that  service  that  as  fast  as  the 


WORK  OF  THE  SAILING-SHIPS  147 

latter  could  be  obtained  by  purchase  or  construc- 
tion the  sailing-ships  were  withdrawn,  and  assigned 
to  less  active  and  dangerous  duty.  A  few  of  them 
participated  in  actual  hostilities  in  the  early  days 
of  the  war,  as  the  Cumberland,  for  instance,  which 
was  in  squadron  with  a  number  of  steamers  that 
attacked  and  captured  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet 
in  August,  1861,  and  the  sloop-of-war  Vandalia 
that,  in  tow  of  a  steamer,  used  her  battery  to  good 
effect  on  the  forts  at  the  entrance  to  Port  Royal 
in  the  naval  battle  of  November  7  in  the  same  year. 
During  that  first  year  of  the  war  also  the  brig 
Perry,  acting  singly,  captured  a  Confederate  pri- 
vateer, the  Savannah,  and  the  sailing-frigate  St. 
Lawrence  attacked  and  sank  another  privateer 
named  Petrel.  The  most  important  encounter  in 
which  sailing-ships  were  engaged,  in  which  the 
Congress  and  Cumberland  were  destroyed  and  the 
St.  Lawrence  injured,  has  already  been  described. 
That  was  the  farewell  appearance  in  battle  in  our 
navy  of  that  historical  and  picturesque  type  of  war- 
ship, the  disappearance  of  which  is  still  mourned 
by  some  who  believe  that  much  of  the  romance  of 
warfare  on  the  water  took  flight  with  them. 

The  large  steam  frigates  and  sloops-of-war  built 
a  few  years  previously  constituted  the  backbone  of 
the  navy  during  the  years  of  the  Civil  War.  They 
were  fully  armed  and  equipped  ships  of  war  that 
had  been  in  service  long  enough  to  have  their  de- 
fects discovered  and  remedied,  and  as  flagships  of 


squadrons,  or  senior  officers'  ships  in  special  expe- 
ditions, were  the  standards  about  which  the  newer 
naval  force  of  armed  merchant  craft  or  hastily- 
built  war-steamers  rallied.  The  latter  were  of 
many  kinds,  as  the  peculiar  exigencies  of  the  war 
demanded  :  many  were  monitors,  or  imitations  of 
monitors,  inspired  by  the  event  of  Hampton  Roads ; 
curious  forms  of  ironclads  were  found  best  suited 
to  the  conditions  of  service  on  the  Mississippi 
River  and  other  inland  waters  ;  there  were  a  great 
number  of  small  gunboats  for  blockading  and  gen- 
eral service,  called  "  ninety-day "  gunboats  from 
the  rapidity  with  which  they  were  built  and  the 
circumstance  that  a  number  of  them  were  actually 
in  action  within  little  more  than  three  months  after 
their  keels  were  laid.  The  ascent  of  hostile  rivers 
too  narrow  to  permit  of  a  vessel  turning  around 
led  to  the  creation  of  a  peculiar  class  of  gun-ves- 
sels known  as  "  double-enders,"  from  the  fact  that 
the  bows  and  sterns  were  exactly  alike,  with  a 
rudder  at  each  end,  and  paddle  wheels  centrally 
located  with  reference  to  the  length ;  though  en- 
croaching upon  the  battery  space,  the  side  wheels 
were  necessary  that  the  vessels  might  be  of  very 
light  draft  for  river  service.  Altogether  there 
were  built  forty-seven  of  these  double-enders,  and 
much  useful  work  was  had  from  them ;  but  one, 
—  the  Monocacy,  —  now  employed  for  more  than 
thirty  years  in  the  waters  of  China  and  Japan, 
survives  of  all  this  class. 


THE  STEAM  SLOOPS-OF-WAR  149 

There  were  also  a  number  of  large  steam  sloops- 
of-war  built  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  and  com- 
pleted early  enough  to  take  a  prominent  part  in  it. 
They  were  not  much  smaller  than  the  Hartford, 
and  as  they  were  built  of  seasoned  timber  on  hand 
before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  they  lasted  for 
many  years ;  and  eventually,  as  the  navy  was  neg- 
lected and  allowed  to  go  to  ruin  after  the  war,  they 
came  to  be  the  principal  vessels  in  it.  The  names 
of  some  of  the  best  known  of  these  were  Juniata, 
Oneida,  Kearsarge,  Tuscarora,  Canandaigua,  Lack- 
awanna,  Monongahela,  Ticonderoga,  and  Shenan- 
doah.  These  and  many  other  sonorous  and  dis- 
tinctively American  names  have  now  practically 
disappeared  from  our  navy,  which  is  greatly  to  be 
regretted,  as  they  proclaimed  the  nationality  of  the 
vessels  bearing  them  and  served  to  make  known 
throughout  the  world  and  perpetuate  the  beautiful 
and  euphonious  words  that  the  vanished  tribes  of 
American  aborigines  bestowed  upon  their  hills  and 
forests,  rivers  and  lakes. 

Besides  the  various  classes  of  war-vessels  added 
to  the  navy  to  meet  the  emergency,  almost  every 
steam  vessel  owned  in  the  United  States  that  was 
at  all  suitable  was  bought,  armed,  and  sent  out 
to  do  its  best  as  a  man-of-war.  Some  of  these  were 
fairly  large  ocean-going  steamers ;  others  were 
freight-carriers,  harbor  and  river  tugs,  and  even 
ferry-boats,  all  ill-adapted  to  the  uses  required,  but 
the  best  that  coidd  be  done,  and  the  best  that  can 


150    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

be  expected  in  our  country,  where  the  solemn  and 
imperative  obligation  of  preparing  for  war  in  time 
of  peace  is  so  habitually  disregarded.  All  were 
steamers,  however,  and  the  long  war  in  which  they 
participated  was,  as  before  observed,  essentially  a 
steam  war  in  its  naval  features. 

There  is  a  preconceived  notion  on  the  part  of 
the  public  that  naval  engagements  should  be  con- 
fined to  the  open  sea  and  deep  water.  Because  of 
this  mistaken  belief,  some  of  the  most  important 
naval  operations  of  the  Civil  War  have  never  at- 
tracted the  interest  they  deserved,  as  they  took  place 
in  shallow  coast  waters,  or  in  rivers  remote  from 
the  sea.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  services 
of  the  navy  on  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  tribu- 
taries, where  the  location  was  such  in  reference  to 
the  States  forming  the  western  section  of  the  Con- 
federacy that  naval  success  influenced  in  large  de- 
gree the  conduct  of  the  war.  The  capture  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  in  February,  1862,  brought 
General  Grant  into  prominence  and  furnished  the 
hastily-built  river  gunboats  their  first  opportunity 
for  active  service.  In  the  case  of  Fort  Henry,  the 
land  force  was  delayed  by  bad  roads,  and  the  sur- 
render was  actually  made  to  the  gunboats,  under 
Captain  A.  H.  Foote  of  the  navy,  after  a  bombard- 
ment of  an  hour,  before  the  arrival  of  the  troops. 
This  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  naval  victory,  however, 
as  the  river  gunboats  at  that  time,  though  com- 
manded by  officers  of  the  navy,  were  under  the 


FARRAGUT'S  FLEET  151 

control  of  the  army  and  operated  as  a  part  of  it. 
This  anomaly  was  removed  in  July  of  the  same 
year  by  an  act  of  Congress  transferring  the  river 
flotilla  to  the  navy. 

A  naval  enterprise  on  a  much  greater  scale, 
having  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  for  its 
object,  was  already  in  process  of  formation  at  the 
time  of  Grant's  victories  at  Henry  and  Donelson. 
The  Hartford,  with  Captain  David  G.  Farragut  on 
board  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  fleet,  arrived 
off  the  mouth  of  the  river  the  twentieth  day  of 
February,  and  other  vessels  continued  to  arrive, 
until  by  the  middle  of  April  a  formidable  and  ade- 
quate force  had  assembled.  There  were  four  of 
the  big  sloops  of  the  Hartford  class  and  one  of  the 
similar  new  sloops,  the  Oneida ;  the  old  Mississippi 
was  there,  and  also  the  Iroquois  and  the  Harriet 
Lane,  of  dates  anterior  to  the  war ;  there  were  ten 
of  the  ninety-day  gunboats,  one  double-ender,  and 
a  number  of  armed  merchant-steamers,  besides 
a  flotilla  of  twenty  mortar-schooners,  the  latter 
under  the  immediate  charge  of  Commander  David 
D.  Porter.  Six  of  the  steamers  were  attached  to 
the  mortar  fleet  to  shift  the  schooners  into  position 
and  to  protect  them  from  attacks  that  they  could 
not  resist  with  their  peculiar  ordnance.  The  fleet 
under  Farragut's  own  command  consisted  when  all 
preparations  were  complete  of  seventeen  ships,  all 
regularly  built  vessels  of  war  except  the  Varuna, 
which  was  a  fairly  large  armed  merchant-steamer. 


152    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

The  first  point  to  be  attacked  was  a  bend  in  the 
river  some  miles  below  New  Orleans,  where  two 
formidable  earthwork  batteries  called  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip  were  located  on  opposite  banks  so  ad- 
vantageously that  the  upper  one  had  a  clear  fire 
down  the  river  past  the  other  in  the  elbow  of  the 
bend.  By  this  arrangement  a  ship  or  ships  pass- 
ing up  and  engaging  the  first  fort  broadside  on 
would  have  the  fire  from  the  other  full  in  the  face. 
The  river  was  further  defended  a  short  distance 
below  the  forts  by  a  barrier  of  log  rafts  and 
schooners  at  anchor,  supporting  heavy  chain  cables 
extending  from  bank  to  bank  clear  across  the  river. 
Above  the  barrier  and  the  forts  was  a  Confederate 
flotilla  of  twelve  vessels  made  up  chiefly  of  river 
steamers  and  tugs,  armed,  and  in  some  cases  lightly 
armored  with  iron  plates.  This  naval  force  was 
much  inferior  to  Farragut's  fleet  of  genuine  war- 
vessels,  but  from  its  position  was  capable  of  inflict- 
ing damage  and  possible  defeat  upon  the  Federal 
ships  should  they  come  up  straggling  and  injured 
from  their  encounter  with  the  forts. 

Porter's  mortar-schooners  were  moved  up  the 
river  to  within  about  three  thousand  yards  of  the 
lower  fort,  Jackson,  and  almost  perfectly  hidden 
by  dressing  the  masts  with  bushes  and  foliage,  the 
vessels  lying  close  to  the  bank  with  a  background 
of  forest.  Beginning  on  April  18,  they  maintained 
an  almost  constant  bombardment  for  about  a  week 
on  Ft.  Jackson,  inflicting  considerable  damage 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI      153 

and  receiving  some  in  return,  one  of  the  mortar- 
schooners  being  sunk  at  her  anchors  by  a  shell 
dropping  clean  through  her.  In  order  to  divert 
this  annoying  fire  away  from  the  mortar-boats,  two 
or  three  of  the  war-vessels  were  each  day  advanced 
into  the  zone  of  fire  and  effected  the  object  by 
firing  at  the  fort  and  attracting  its  cannon-balls  in 
return.  One  of  these  decoy  ships,  the  Oneida,  then 
just  from  the  shipyard  where  she  was  built,  received 
some  ugly  hits  and  had  a  number  of  men  wounded 
the  first  time  she  went  into  action,  and  this  was 
the  beginning  of  a  series  of  misfortunes  that  fol- 
lowed throughout  her  career  and  ended  only  when 
she  went  to  the  bottom  in  a  distant  sea,  carrying 
the  greater  part  of  her  crew  with  her. 

Meanwhile,  down  the  river,  Farragut  was  strip- 
ping his  ships  for  battle.  All  unnecessary  spars, 
boats,  sails,  and  rigging  were  put  on  shore  at  Pilot 
Town,  and  five  of  the  gunboats  even  hoisted  out 
their  lower  masts.  Steam  was  to  be  trusted  en- 
tirely. Many  expedients  were  adopted  to  protect 
the  ships  and  make  the  attempt  to  run  by  the  forts 
successful  if  possible.  One  of  these  was  to  suspend 
the  heavy  chain  cables  up  and  down  on  the  sides  of 
the  ships,  making  an  apron  or  screen  of  mail  in  the 
line  of  engines  and  boilers  for  their  protection ; 
another  was  to  change  the  trim  of  the  ships  by 
transferring  weights  forward  until  they  were  deeper 
in  the  water  there  by  about  a  foot  than  at  the  stern. 
The  object  in  this  was  to  keep  the  ships  headed 


154    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

toward  the  objective  up  the  river  by  not  allowing 
the  current  to  swing  their  bows  down  stream  should 
they  touch  bottom,  as  would  have  occurred  had  they 
grounded  when  in  the  usual  trim  with  the  greatest 
draft  of  water  at  the  stern.  Yet  another  expedi- 
ent was  to  daub  the  hulls  of  the  ships  with  the 
yellowish  clay  of  the  river,  making  them  the  same 
color  as  the  muddy  water  and  therefore  less  dis- 
tinctly visible  as  targets  to  shoot  at.  So  many 
unusual  steps  were  taken  to  ensure  protection  and 
success  that  Farragut  thought  it  proper  to  refer  to 
them  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  which  he  did  as 
follows :  — 

"  Every  vessel  was  as  well  prepared  as  the  inge- 
nuity of  her  commander  and  officers  could  suggest, 
both  for  the  preservation  of  life  and  of  the  vessel, 
and,  perhaps,  there  is  not  on  record  such  a  display 
of  ingenuity  as  has  been  evinced  in  this  little 
squadron.  The  first  was  by  the  engineer  of  the 
Richmond,  Mr.  Moore,  by  suggesting  that  the  sheet 
cables  be  stopped  up  and  down  on  the  sides  in  the 
line  of  the  engines,  which  was  immediately  adopted 
by  all  the  vessels.  Then  each  commander  made 
his  own  arrangements  for  stopping  the  shot  from 
penetrating  the  boilers  or  machinery  that  might 
come  in  forward  or  abaft,  by  hammocks,  coal,  bags 
of  ashes,  bags  of  sand,  clothes-bags,  and  in  fact, 
every  device  imaginable.  The  bulwarks  were  lined 
with  hammocks  by  some,  with  splinter-nettings  made 
of  ropes  by  others.  Some  rubbed  their  vessels 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI     155 

over  with  mud,  to  make  their  ships  less  visible, 
and  some  whitewashed  their  decks,  to  make  things 
more  visible  by  night  during  the  fight,  all  of  which 
you  will  find  mentioned  in  the  reports  of  the  com- 
manders. In  the  afternoon  I  visited  each  ship,  in 
order  to  know  positively  that  each  commander 
understood  my  orders  for  the  attack,  and  to  see 
that  all  was  in  readiness." 

A  gap  was  made  in  the  chain  barrier  during 
the  night  of  April  20,  by  Lieutenant  Caldwell,  in 
the  gunboat  Itasca  ;  he  gallantly  boarded  one  of  the 
schooners  supporting  the  chain  and  cast  adrift  the 
ends  of  the  chain  that  were  fortunately  found  bitted 
on  board.  The  fleet  was  formed  in  three  divisions 
for  the  attack,  and  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  24th  the  signal  —  two  blood-red  lights  at 
the  peak  of  the  Hartford — was  made  for  the  move- 
ment to  begin.  There  was  a  short  delay  in  getting 
under  way,  occasioned  by  difficulty  in  managing  the 
anchors  in  the  swift  current,  but  the  first  division 
soon  moved  up  through  the  opening  in  the  line  of 
obstructions  and  became  furiously  engaged  with 
the  forts.  This  division  consisted  of  eight  vessels 
led  by  Captain  Theodorus  Bailey  in  the  gunboat 
Cayuga,  and  had  orders  to  keep  close  to  the  left, 
or  east,  bank  of  the  river  and  give  its  principal 
attention  to  Fort  St.  Philip.  The  Pensacola  and 
the  Mississippi  were  the  largest  vessels  in  this 
division,  the  others  being  the  Oneida,  four  ninety- 
day  gunboats,  and  the  converted  steamer  Varuna. 


156    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

These  ships  steamed  up  into  action,  closely  follow- 
ing behind  each  other  in  the  formation  then  known 
as  "  line  ahead,"  but  now  called  "  column." 

Shortly  after  the  first  division  had  passed 
through  the  gap  in  the  barrier,  the  second  divi- 
sion, consisting  only  of  the  Hartford,  the  Brooklyn, 
and  the  Richmond,  commanded  by  Farragut  in  per- 
son, moved  up,  and  this  was  followed  by  the  third 
division,  led  by  Fleet  Captain  Bell  in  the  gunboat 
Sciota.  This  last  division  was  composed  of  five 
ninety-day  gunboats  and  the  sloop-of-war  Iroquois, 
and  was  roughly  received,  coming  up  to  the  forts 
as  it  did  after  the  distracting  fire  from  the  larger 
ships  had  passed  on.  Three  of  its  gunboats  — 
the  Itasca,  the  Kennebec,  and  the  Winona  —  were 
disabled  or  so  injured  that  they  failed  to  get  past 
at  all,  dropping  down  stream  out  of  action  and  re- 
joining the  fleet  some  days  later.  When  the  fleet 
was  moving  up,  the  mortar-boats  and  steamers 
convoying  them  opened  a  heavy  cannonade  against 
the  works  of  the  enemy,  adding  their  din  and 
destruction  to  the  already  unearthly  scene.  The 
river,  despite  the  obscurity  of  night  and  the  dense 
masses  of  smoke  that  rolled  over  it,  was  lighted 
up  with  fire-rafts  and  burning  wreckage  in  addi- 
tion to  the  incessant  flashes  from  the  great  num- 
ber of  guns  and  bursting  shells,  while  the  noise 
from  the  latter  joined  with  the  shouts  of  command 
and  the  screams  of  the  wounded  to  increase  the 
weirdness  and  terror  of  the  hour.  In  his  report 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI      157 

Farragut  said :  "  Such  a  fire,  I  imagine,  the  world 
has  rarely  seen." 

Within  a  little  more  than  an  hour  after  the  first 
Federal  vessel  had  passed  through  the  obstructions 
the  entire  fleet,  with  the  exception  of  the  three 
gunboats  that  had  been  put  out  of  action,  had 
arrived  above  the  forts  and  appeared  among  the 
ships  of  the  enemy.  The  Cayuga  and  the  Varuna 
arrived  first  and  fared  badly  until  other  ships 
came  up  to  their  support.  The  Varuna  was 
rammed  twice  and  had  to  be  run  ashore  to  pre- 
vent her  sinking  in  mid-stream,  her  loss  being 
complete,  as  she  sank  on  the  river  bank.  The 
Cayuga  had  no  less  than  forty-two  hits,  but  she 
bravely  kept  on  fighting  and  received  individually 
the  surrender  of  three  of  the  Confederate  vessels. 
In  the  enemy's  squadron  was  an  iron-plated  ram 
named  Manassas,  obtained  by  rebuilding  a  large 
ocean  tug,  and  this  ugly  craft  rammed  both  the 
Richmond  and  the  Mississippi  at  different  stages 
of  the  combat.  Fortunately  both  blows  were 
glancing  and  not  fatal  though  very  damaging,  and 
the  Richmond  owed  her  escape,  according  to  her 
captain's  report,  to  the  chain  mail  that  she  wore. 
The  Mississippi  later  in  the  fight  attacked  the 
Manassas  and  drove  her  ashore,  where  she  was 
scuttled  and  abandoned  by  her  crew.  Later,  as 
her  stern  settled  with  the  weight  of  inflowing 
water,  her  bow  floated  clear  of  the  bank,  and  she 
drifted  down  stream  into  Porter's  flotilla,  where 


158    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

she  caused  considerable  excitement  before  her 
harmless  condition  was  discovered. 

Eleven  Confederate  steamers  were  destroyed 
during  this  fierce  morning  fight,  while  the  Varuna 
was  the  only  vessel  lost  to  Farragut.  The  total 
Federal  casualties  of  the  battle,  as  reported  by 
the  fleet  surgeon,  amounted  to  thirty-seven  men 
killed  and  one  hundred  and  forty-seven  wounded, 
which  makes  this  one  of  the  most  bloody  naval 
engagements  of  the  war.  Two  officers,  both  mid- 
shipmen, were  killed,  and  eleven  wounded.  After 
a  day  spent  at  anchor  to  allow  the  crews  the  rest 
that  was  absolutely  necessary  after  such  a  night, 
the  ships  proceeded  up  the  river,  silenced  the 
Chalmette  batteries  without  loss,  and  at  noon  of 
April  25  took  possession  of  the  city  of  New 
Orleans,  which  they  held  until  May  first,  when 
General  B.  F.  Butler  arrived  with  troops  and 
assumed  military  control.  Farragut  and  his  fleet 
then  went  on  up  the  river  to  encounter  and  over- 
come other  obstacles.  Commander  Porter  with 
the  mortar  flotilla  continued  the  bombardment  of 
the  lower  forts  until  April  28,  when  they  surren- 
dered to  him. 

In  its  passage  up  the  river  the  fleet  met  with  no 
serious  resistance  until  it  arrived  at  Vicksburg,  in 
Mississippi,  where  numerous  batteries  were  located 
on  the  bluffs  two  or  three  hundred  feet  above 
and  overlooking  the  river.  To  aid  in  the  passage 
of  this  place,  Porter's  mortar-boats,  sixteen  in 


FARRAGUT  PASSES  VICKSBURG          159 

number,  were  towed  up  from  New  Orleans,  arriving 
before  Vicksburg  June  20.  At  four  o'clock  in 
the  morning  of  June  28,  the  mortars  opened  fire 
on  the  enemy's  batteries,  which  was  at  once  re- 
turned, and  the  fleet  got  under  way  to  attempt  to 
run  past.  The  ships  then  with  Farragut  were  the 
Hartford  (flagship),  the  Richmond,  the  Brooklyn, 
the  Iroquois,  the  Oneida,  and  six  of  the  ninety- 
day  gunboats;  these  were  formed  in  two  lines,  or 
double  column,  and  steamed  throughout  the  action 
at  low  speed  in  order  to  give  full  effect  to  their  guns 
on  the  batteries  above.  Six  steamers  of  Porter's 
flotilla  also  joined  in  the  battle,  which  made  the 
attacking  force  consist  of  seventeen  steamers  under 
way  and  the  sixteen  mortar-boats  at  anchor. 

Farragut's  ships  were  hit  repeatedly  and  some 
were  considerably  injured,  but  all  except  the 
Brooklyn  and  two  small  gunboats  that  followed 
her  movements  got  past  the  batteries  and  into  the 
upper  reach  of  the  river  beyond.  The  Brooklyn 
dropped  down  the  river  out  of  range  after  having 
been  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire  for  some  time, 
and  her  example  was  followed  by  the  ninety-day 
gunboats  Kennebec  and  Katahdin.  Farragut 
expressed  his  dissatisfaction  at  this  conduct,  and  in 
his  official  report  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
none  of  the  delinquent  vessels  had  any  casualties. 
On  board  the  other  ships  fifteen  men  were  killed 
and  thirty  wounded,  among  the  latter  Farragut  him- 
self, who  figured  on  the  surgeon's  report  as  having 


160    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

suffered  from  contusions.  The  Oneida  was  again 
roughly  used,  having  a  number  of  casualties,  and 
having  her  steam  drum  hit  by  an  eight-inch  solid 
shot  that  eventually  came  to  rest  in  the  fire-room. 
The  most  serious  injury  to  any  of  the  vessels  was 
to  the  Clifton,  one  of  Porter's  steamers,  which  was 
completely  disabled  by  having  a  boiler  pierced  by 
a  solid  shot,  seven  men  being  scalded  to  death, 
while  another  who  jumped  overboard  to  escape  the 
steam  was  drowned. 

There  was  nothing  to  be  gained  by  attacking 
these  batteries,  located  as  they  were  so  high  that 
they  could  not  be  much  damaged  by  gun  fire  from 
the  river  below,  and  could  not  be  kept  silent  except 
when  actually  subject  to  a  heavy  fire.  Farragut 
reported :  "  I  passed  up  the  river  this  morning, 
but  to  no  purpose  ;  the  enemy  leave  their  guns  for 
the  moment,  but  return  to  them  as  soon  as  we  have 
passed,  and  rake  us."  The  following  extracts 
from  his  reports  indicate  that  he  had  been  ordered 
to  try  to  run  the  batteries  to  see  if  it  could  be  done, 
without  having  any  object  in  view  higher  up  the 
river. 

"  In  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  department 
and  the  command  of  the  President,  I  proceeded 
back  to  Vicksburg  with  the  Brooklyn,  Richmond, 
and  Hartford,  with  the  determination  to  carry  out 
my  instructions  to  the  best  of  my  ability." 

"  The  department  will  perceive  from  this  (my) 
report  that  the  forts  can  be  passed,  and  we  have 


COMMANDER  PORTER'S  COMMENT         161 

done  it,  and  can  do  it  again  as  often  as  may  be 
required  of  us.  It  will  not,  however,  be  an  easy 
matter  for  us  to  do  more  than  silence  the  batteries 
for  a  time,  as  long  as  the  enemy  has  a  large  force 
behind  the  hills  to  prevent  our  landing  and  hold- 
ing the  place." 

Commander  Porter's  comment  as  to  the  impos- 
sibility of  a  naval  force  capturing  the  batteries 
as  they  were  located  is  interesting  :  — 

"  All  the  steamers  took  good  positions,  and  their 
commanders  did  their  duty  properly.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  a  combined  attack  of  army  and  navy 
had  not  been  made,  by  which  something  more  sub- 
stantial might  have  been  accomplished.  Such  an 
attack,  I  think,  would  have  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  the  city.  Ships  and  mortar-vessels  can  keep 
full  possession  of  the  river,  and  places  near  the 
water's  edge,  but  they  cannot  crawl  up  hills  three 
hundred  feet  high,  and  it  is  that  part  of  Vicksburg 
which  must  be  taken  by  the  army.  If  it  was  in- 
tended merely  to  pass  the  batteries  at  Vicksburg 
and  make  a  junction  with  the  fleet  of  Flag  Officer 
Davis,  the  navy  did  it  most  gallantly  and  fearlessly. 
It  was  as  handsome  a  thing  as  has  been  done  dur- 
ing the  war ;  for  the  batteries  to  be  passed  extended 
full  three  miles,  with  a  three-knot  current  against 
ships  that  could  not  make  eight  knots  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances." 

In  the  same  month  (June,  1862)  a  disaster 
similar  to  that  of  the  Clifton  but  much  more  serious 


162    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

befell  one  of  the  ironclads  of  the  Mississippi  flo- 
tilla, still  under  the  direction  of  the  army.  An 
expedition  consisting  of  the  Mound  City  and  three 
other  gunboats  was  sent  up  the  White  River  in 
Arkansas  to  convoy  troop-steamers  and  look  for 
some  armed  vessels  of  the  Confederates  that  were 
known  to  be  in  that  river.  At  St.  Charles  it  was 
found  that  the  enemy  had  sunk  his  steamers  in  an 
attempt  to  block  the  river  and  had  taken  the  guns 
from  them  to  arm  two  batteries  on  shore.  An 
Indiana  regiment  landed  from  the  transports  and 
captured  the  second  battery  by  a  gallant  charge 
after  the  first  had  been  silenced  by  the  gunboats, 
but  the  victory  was  dearly  paid  for  in  the  dreadful 
catastrophe  that  occurred  on  board  the  Mound 
City  during  the  progress  of  the  engagement. 

A  shot  penetrated  her  casemate  a  little  above 
and  forward  of  the  gun-port,  killed  three  men  in 
its  flight,  and  exploded  the  steam  drum,  which  was 
above  water  and  dangerously  exposed,  as  was  the 
case  in  a  majority  of  the  vessels  hastily  improvised 
or  modified  for  war  uses.  The  casemate,  in  which 
the  greater  part  of  the  crew  was  stationed  at 
the  guns,  was  instantly  filled  with  steam,  which 
scalded  nearly  eighty  men  to  death  outright  and 
drove  others  overboard  through  the  gun-ports, 
where  many  were  drowned  or  shot  while  strug- 
gling in  the  water.  Of  a  crew  of  one  hundred 
and  seventy-five  officers  and  men,  only  twenty-five 
were  unhurt,  and  the  number  who  lost  their  lives, 


CAPTAIN  JOSEPH  FRY  AT  ST.  CHARLES    163 

including  those  who  were  drowned,  and  those  who 
died  subsequently  of  their  injuries,  was  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-five.  Commander  Kilty  of  the 
Mound  City,  who  was  in  command  of  the  flotilla, 
was  so  badly  scalded  that  his  left  arm  had  to  be 
amputated. 

The  Confederate  commander  of  the  steamers 
that  had  been  sunk  and  of  the  batteries  formed 
from  their  guns  was  Captain  Joseph  Fry,  who  had 
been  a  midshipman  and  lieutenant  in  the  regular 
navy  of  the  United  States  for  a  number  of  years 
before  the  war.  He  was  wounded  and  taken  pris- 
oner, and  while  in  the  Federal  hospital  at  Memphis 
narrowly  escaped  assassination  at  the  hands  of 
Union  sailors  who  believed  him  guilty  of  having 
ordered  his  men  to  fire  upon  the  unfortunates  of 
the  Mound  City  while  they  were  helpless  in  the 
water.  That  many  of  them  were  shot  while  in 
the  water  was  a  matter  of  fact  reported  by  officers 
who  were  present  and  admitted  by  the  Confeder- 
ates, who  had  fired  grape  and  canister  at  the  port- 
holes of  the  St.  Louis,  near  by  and  trying  to 
rescue  the  struggling  swimmers.  Fry  himself 
denied  having  given  such  an  inhuman  command, 
though  he  stated  that  he  did  order  his  riflemen  to 
fire  at  some  armed  boats  that  he  thought  intended 
to  land  and  cut  off  his  retreat,  but  which  in  reality 
had  been  sent  from  the  Union  gunboats  to  pick 
up  the  men  in  the  water.  Whether  Fry  was  per- 
sonally accountable  for  the  firing  or  not,  his  own 


164    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

ending  was  equally  tragic,  and  he  was  the  victim 
of  an  even  worse  instance  of  ferocious  barbarism. 
While  in  command  of  an  American  merchant- 
vessel,  the  Virginius,  in  1873,  he  was  captured  by 
a  Spanish  gunboat  near  Jamaica,  hastily  and  un- 
fairly tried  by  court  martial  at  Santiago  de  Cuba 
on  charges  of  aiding  a  Cuban  insurrection,  and, 
with  fifty-two  of  his  crew  and  passengers,  was  sum- 
marily shot. 

Farragut's  ships  repassed  the  Vicksburg  bat- 
teries in  the  evening  of  the  15th  of  July,  the 
movement  being  caused  by  the  unexpected  appear- 
ance of  the  Confederate  ram  Arkansas  instead  of 
by  any  particular  object  in  wishing  to  get  below 
Vicksburg.  The  Arkansas  was  an  armored  case- 
mate ram  with  sloping  sides  not  unlike  the  Merri- 
mac,  and  was  held  in  such  awe  by  the  general 
community  that  her  destruction  was  very  much 
desired.  She  was  believed  to  be  somewhere  up 
the  Yazoo  River,  at  the  union  of  which  with  the 
Mississippi  Farragut's  ships  were  lying.  Accord- 
ingly, an  expedition  composed  of  light  gunboats 
of  the  river  flotilla  was  sent  up  to  attack  her, 
which  expedition  reappeared  in  haste  the  next 
morning  to  the  surprise  of  every  one,  with  the  ram 
in  hot  pursuit ;  they  had  caught  a  Tartar.  As 
Farragut  had  not  imagined  that  the  Arkansas 
would  ever  venture  near  a  formidable  fleet  of  gen- 
uine war-ships,  the  ships  were  without  steam  and 
unable  to  move,  being  therefore  restricted  to  firing 


THE  CONFEDERATE  RAM  ARKANSAS  165 

into  the  ram  and  receiving  her  fire  in  return  as 
she  slowly  passed  close  by  them. 

In  spite  of  the  furious  cannonading  she  was 
subjected  to,  the  Arkansas  was  not  disabled, 
though  considerably  injured,  and  passed  on  until 
she  gained  the  shelter  of  the  Vicksburg  batteries. 
Disappointed  and  mortified,  Farragut  ordered  his 
ships  to  make  ready  to  attack  her,  and  late  in  the 
afternoon  they  got  under  way  and  proceeded 
towards  Vicksburg  for  that  purpose.  Delays  due 
to  handling  such  large  ships  in  a  swift  river  so 
kept  them  back  that  it  was  dark  by  the  time  they 
arrived  opposite  the  town.  The  Arkansas  could 
not  be  seen,  and  her  position  could  only  be  guessed 
by  the  flashes  of  guns,  that  of  course  were  indis- 
tinguishable from  the  fire  of  riflemen  and  field 
batteries  along  the  banks.  The  ships  therefore 
did  all  the  damage  they  could  in  the  dark  and 
dropped  on  down  to  an  anchorage  below  Vicksburg. 
The  exchange  of  shots  in  the  morning  and  the 
more  serious  affair  of  the  evening  cost  Farragut 
six  men  killed  and  sixteen  wounded,  three  of  the 
killed  and  six  of  the  wounded  being  on  his  flag- 
ship, the  Hartford.  The  ram  was  soon  repaired, 
and  she  sustained  her  reputation  as  the  terror  of 
the  river  until  August  6,  when  she  was  destroyed 
a  few  miles  above  Baton  Rouge  by  the  river  iron- 
clad Essex,  Commander  William  D.  Porter,  as- 
sisted by  two  small  wooden  gunboats.  Porter  was 
a  brother  of  the  more  famous  David  D.  Porter, 


166    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

and  son  of  the  Captain  David  Porter  who  had 
commanded  the  frigate  Essex  when  she  was  cap- 
tured by  the  Phrebe  and  Cherub  during  the  second 
war  with  England.  The  Arkansas  had  come  down 
to  assist  in  an  attack  upon  Baton  Rouge,  held  by 
the  Federals,  and  became  disabled  through  the 
breaking  down  of  her  engines  before  arrival.  Her 
people  have  always  asserted  that  they  set  fire  to  her 
and  abandoned  her  when  they  saw  the  approach 
of  the  Federal  vessels,  but  Porter  claimed  that 
the  fire  was  the  result  of  shells  from  the  Essex 
after  considerable  firing.  At  all  events,  she 
burned  for  a  time  and  was  then  totally  destroyed 
by  the  explosion  of  her  magazine. 

A  famous  battle  in  the  Mississippi  River  oc- 
curred early  in  1863,  when  Farragut  attempted  to 
pass  Port  Hudson,  which  place  had  been  supplied 
with  formidable  batteries  since  the  passage  up  and 
down  the  river  of  the  ships  the  year  before.  Be- 
side the  Hartford,  Farragut  had  the  screw  ships 
Richmond  and  Monongahela,  the  old  side-wheel 
steamer  Mississippi,  and  three  small  gunboats.  In 
this  attack  the  expedient  was  adopted  of  lashing  a 
gunboat  to  each  of  the  large  ships  on  the  side  that 
would  be  away  from  the  batteries  and  therefore 
unengaged ;  the  object  in  this  was  to  have  motive 
power  at  hand  to  carry  the  heavy  ships  on  past  the 
batteries  should  their  own  machinery  become  dis- 
abled by  the  terrific  fire  that  it  was  known  they 
must  sustain.  The  side  wheels  of  the  Mississippi 


NAVAL  BATTLE  AT  PORT  HUDSON       167 

did  not  permit  of  this  arrangement ;  and  she  had 
to  go  in  without  assistance,  —  to  her  doom,  as 
the  event  proved. 

About  midnight  of  March  13-14  the  ships  moved 
up  to  the  attack,  and  were  at  once  brought  under 
a  heavy  fire,  being  plainly  seen  by  the  light  of 
bonfires  and  buildings  burning  on  shore  for  that 
purpose.  The  Essex  and  some  mortar-boats  of 
Porter's  fleet  assisted  in  the  battle,  as  they  had 
done  the  year  before  at  the  forts  below  New  Or- 
leans, and  at  Vicksburg.  Farragut  in  the  Hart- 
ford, with  the  Albatross  lashed  alongside,  ran  the 
batteries  successfully  and  gained  the  desired  posi- 
tion in  the  river  above,  but  all  the  others  failed. 
The  Monongahela  grounded  on  a  bar  directly  in 
front  of  the  principal  battery,  and  despite  the 
utmost  endeavors  of  her  consort,  the  Kineo,  and  of 
her  own  engineers  to  work  her  off,  she  remained  a 
stationary  target  for  half  an  hour,  and  was  badly 
cut  up ;  six  of  her  crew  were  killed,  and  twenty- 
one  wounded.  When  eventually  gotten  afloat  the 
engines  were  unfit  for  immediate  use,  as  violent 
running  backward  with  increased  steam  pressure 
to  back  the  ship  off  had  heated  and  cut  the  crank- 
pins.  The  Kineo  was  unable  to  carry  her  up 
against  the  strong  current  and  she  had  to  drop 
down  the  river  and  give  up  the  attempt. 

The  Richmond,  with  the  Genesee  alongside,  was 
disabled  by  a  shot  that  carried  away  both  safety- 
valves,  letting  the  steam  out  of  her  boilers  and 


168    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

rendering  her  entirely  helpless ;  the  Genesee 
proved  unable  to  stem  the  current  with  such  a 
heavy  load,  and  both  ships  had  to  drop  down  out 
of  action.  The  Richmond  had  three  men  killed 
and  twelve  wounded,  and  the  Genesee  had  three 
wounded. 

The  Mississippi,  last  in  line,  grounded  in  an 
unfortunate  position  where  she  was  exposed  to  the 
cross-fire  of  three  batteries,  which  she  endured  for 
thirty-five  minutes  before  it  was  admitted  that  the 
efforts  to  get  her  afloat  could  not  avail.  Her 
engineers  took  the  desperate  risk  of  doubling 
the  safe  working  pressure  of  the  boilers,  and  the 
engines  were  backed  with  all  their  power,  but 
without  starting  her,  until  finally,  when  the  enemy 
had  the  range  perfectly  and  many  of  her  crew  were 
killed  or  wounded,  the  order  was  given  to  set  her 
on  fire  and  abandon  ship,  which  was  done.  Over 
two  hundred  of  her  people  escaped  to  the  west 
bank,  where  the  enemy  were  in  small  numbers, 
and  were  subsequently  rescued,  with  the  exception 
of  a  few  who  straggled  into  the  country  and  were 
taken  prisoners.  Altogether,  she  lost  sixty-four 
men  in  killed  and  wounded. 

After  burning  for  a  time  and  making  a  grand 
spectacle  with  her  masts  and  spars  all  outlined  in 
fire  against  the  dark  sky,  she  floated  free  from  the 
bank  and  drifted  down  with  the  current  toward 
the  ships  below,  her  guns  discharging  as  they 
became  overheated.  These,  fortunately,  had  been 


DEWEY  AT  PORT  HUDSON  169 

trained  at  high  elevation  upon  the  batteries  on  the 
bluffs ;  so  the  shots  went  over  the  friendly  ships, 
and  were  not  the  source  of  danger  they  might  have 
been.  After  floating  down  past  the  other  ships 
into  the  darkness  below,  a  mass  of  fire  from  stem 
to  stern,  from  waterline  to  truck,  there  was  sud- 
denly a  tremendous  explosion,  the  masts  shot  high 
in  air  like  javelins  hurled  by  a  giant  arm,  an  erup- 
tion of  flame  for  a  moment  lit  up  the  whole  sur- 
rounding world,  and  amid  the  sullen  thunder  of 
her  exploded  magazine  the  Mississippi  vanished 
from  the  earth  in  the  river  whose  name  she  had 
borne  so  worthily  and  so  long. 

In  the  outset  of  his  report  of  this  engagement 
Farragut  referred  to  it  as  a  "  disaster  to  my  fleet," 
and  said  that  he  could  only  plead  his  zeal  and  the 
chances  of  war  as  reasons  for  the  misfortune  that 
had  come  upon  him,  adding  that  he  had  acted  to 
the  best  of  his  judgment  and  was  alone  answerable 
for  the  imperfections  of  that  judgment.  From 
the  official  report  of  the  captain  of  the  Mississippi 
the  comment,  "  I  consider  that  I  should  be  neglect- 
ing a  most  important  duty  should  I  omit  to  men- 
tion the  coolness  of  my  executive  officer,  Mr. 
Dewey,"  is  of  peculiar  interest  at  this  time  when 
the  same  "  Mr.  Dewey "  has  become  our  great 
admiral  and  is  more  widely  famous  than  any 
American  naval  officer  since  Farragut  himself. 

These  events  in  the  Mississippi  River  are  only 
a  few  of  the  more  important  of  a  great  series 


170    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

that  marked  the  industry  of  naval  officers  in  that 
peculiar  field  of  war.  Though  peculiar  and  not 
in  accordance  with  preconceived  notions  of  naval 
employment,  the  river  region  was  wide  in  possibili- 
ties, and  besides  affording  Farragut  the  foundation 
for  his  fame  it  established  professional  reputations 
for  a  number  of  other  officers,  less  than  his  only 
in  degree.  Admiral  David  D.  Porter,  Commo- 
dore Foote,  Rear  Admirals  George  Brown,  R.  W. 
Meade,  and  John  G.  Walker,  are  a  few  only  of 
the  many  distinguished  names  of  the  navy  that 
first  came  into  notice  through  deeds  performed  in 
uncouth  steamers,  utterly  unlike  the  typical  ship 
of  war,  in  the  midst  of  swamps  and  forests,  instead 
of  upon  the  open  sea,  where  the  naval  officer  is 
supposed  to  find  his  opportunity  and  his  fame. 

We  will  now  leave  the  inland  rivers  and  glance 
at  some  naval  events  that  were  taking  place  on 
the  Atlantic  coast.  After  the  battle  in  Hampton 
Roads  the  public  went  "  monitor  mad,"  and  under 
its  insistence  the  Navy  Department  began  the  im- 
mediate construction  of  a  numerous  monitor  fleet, 
as  will  be  described  in  another  chapter  devoted  to 
the  spread  of  the  monitor  idea  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  battleship.  Charleston,  South  Caro- 
lina, was  one  of  the  most  important  cities  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  in  the  early  years  of  the  war  was 
its  chief  seaport ;  this  was  possible  because  of  its 
excellent  defenses —  Fort  Sumter  in  the  harbor 
and  various  earthwork  batteries  at  the  harbor 


ANDREW  H.  FOOTE  DAVID  D.   PORTEU 

DAVID  G.  FARRAGUT 
FRANKLIN   BUCHANAN  JOHN   L.   WORDEN 


PLAN  FOR  ATTACK  ON  CHARLESTON    171 

entrance,  and  also  the  bar  outside  that  greatly 
increased  the  arc  of  approach  to  be  watched. 
Blockading  vessels  could  not  close  in  their  circuit 
to  the  inside  of  the  bar  without  coming  within  the 
range  of  hostile  guns,  and  as  their  numbers  were 
few  they  were  so  dispersed  on  the  outer  line  that 
it  was  comparatively  easy  for  vessels  to  run  by 
them  either  to  enter  or  to  escape  from  the  port. 

It  was  early  believed  that  the  monitors  could 
withstand  the  fire  of  the  fortifications  and  lie 
within  the  bar,  from  which  position  they  could 
completely  interdict  all  commerce ;  and  as  rapidly 
as  they  could  be  made  ready  for  sea  a  project  of 
assembling  them  off  Charleston  was  put  into 
operation.  The  capture  of  the  city  was  also  con- 
templated, though  from  its  position  far  from  the 
scene  of  active  operations  on  land  it  was  of  little 
consequence  in  a  military  or  strategic  point  of 
view.  It  was,  however,  regarded  at  the  North 
as  the  original  seat  of  the  rebellion  and  of  dis- 
union, and  as  such  its  chastisement  by  attack  and 
seizure  was  much  desired,  even  if  the  occupation 
of  the  city  offered  no  real  military  advantage. 
The  first  of  the  new  monitors  to  be  completed 
was  the  Passaic,  which  was  started  south  at  the 
end  of  December,  1862,  in  the  same  expedition 
with  the  Monitor,  and  narrowly  escaped  the  fate 
of  that  vessel  in  the  gale  that  caused  her  loss. 
Other  monitors  arrived  one  after  another  off 
Charleston,  but  owing  to  various  delays  a  sum- 


172    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

cient   force  to    attack  the  fortifications  was   not 
collected  until  early  in  April,  1863. 

Before  this,  some  of  the  monitors  had  been  put 
to  some  hostile  service  in  the  vicinity,  principally 
to  get  the  men  accustomed  to  handling  the  turrets 
and  guns  in  action.  About  the  end  of  January 
the  Montauk,  commanded  by  Captain  Worden  of 
the  original  Monitor,  made  two  attacks  upon  Fort 
McAllister  in  the  Ogeechee  River,  in  which  she 
received  nearly  sixty  hits  without  suffering  any 
material  damage  and  without  having  any  of  her 
people  injured.  On  the  28th  of  February  she  again 
attacked  the  fort,  accompanied  by  three  gunboats 
and  destroyed  with  her  shells  a  Confederate  priva- 
teer named  Nashville,  lying  about  twelve  hundred 
yards  up  the  river,  where  it  had  been  for  eight 
months  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  escape  to 
sea.  In  this  action  the  Montauk  was  hit  only 
five  times  and  the  gunboats  not  at  all ;  a  torpedo 
exploded  under  the  Montauk  when  she  was  pro- 
ceeding out  of  the  river,  and  did  her  considerable 
injury,  but  not  enough  to  disable  her.  On  the 
3d  of  March  the  Passaic,  the  Patapsco,  and  the 
Nahant  attacked  the  same  fort  to  test  their  gun 
mechanism,  and  came  out  uninjured  except  for 
dents  in  their  turrets  and  side  armor,  after  an 
engagement  of  eight  hours.  Many  bolts  in  the 
gun-mounts  broke  under  the  strain  of  prolonged 
firing,  and  the  discovery  and  repair  of  this  weak- 
ness well  repaid  the  risks  run. 


THE  NEW  IRONSIDES  173 

On  the  7th  of  April  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  fleet  in  those  waters,  Rear  Admiral  S.  F. 
DuPont,  made  an  unsuccessful  attack  upon  the 
fortifications  in  Charleston  harbor,  using  the  iron- 
clads only.  Beside  his  flagship,  the  New  Ironsides, 
he  had  the  monitors  Catskill,  Moiitauk,  Nahant, 
Nantucket,  Passaic,  Patapsco,  and  Weehawken, 
and  a  nondescript  ironclad,  the  Keokuk.  The 
latter  was  one  of  the  crop  of  inventions  that  sprang 
up  after  the  successful  performance  of  the  Monitor, 
and  was  proved  useless  when  put  to  the  test  of 
war.  The  New  Ironsides,  owing  to  her  great 
draft  and  the  difficulty  of  steering  her  in  narrow 
places,  did  not  approach  the  enemy's  guns  nearer 
than  one  thousand  yards,  but  all  the  smaller  iron- 
clads fought  at  about  one  half  that  distance.  The 
New  Ironsides  fired  but  eight  shots,  each  from  a 
different  gun,  and  the  only  important  injury  she 
sustained  was  the  loss  of  one  port-shutter,  though 
she  was  hit  sixty-five  times.  She  was  anchored 
for  about  an  hour  exactly  over  an  observation 
mine  containing  two  thousand  pounds  of  gun- 
powder, while  the  operator,  concealed  on  shore,  was 
making  frantic  but  futile  efforts  to  explode  it. 
The  failure  of  this  mine  to  explode  has  never  been 
fully  explained,  but  it  saved  the  New  Ironsides 
from  what  must  have  been  complete  destruction. 
It  has  been  claimed  that  the  wires  leading  to  the 
mine  were  cut  by  Union  sympathizers,  but  the 
difficulty  of  doing  any  such  thing  in  an  enemy's 


174    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

country  without  detection  renders  this  very  im- 
probable. The  Confederate  theory  that  the  wires 
were  cut  by  an  ignorant  teamster  driving  a  heavy 
wagon  through  the  sand  in  which  they  were  buried 
is  probably  correct. 

The  monitors  at  close  range  were  exposed  to  a 
furious  fire  from  Sumter  and  Fort  Moultrie,  and 
from  the  batteries  on  Morris  Island  and  Sullivan's 
Island,  but  in  spite  of  the  many  hits  they  received 
none  was  actually  disabled.  The  Keokuk  fared 
differently  :  her  armor  was  easily  pierced  by  the 
enemy's  projectiles,  and  after  she  had  fired  but 
three  shots  she  had  to  withdraw  from  the  battle 
to  save  herself  from  destruction.  Within  a  space 
of  thirty  minutes  she  was  hit  ninety  times  and  was 
pierced  at  or  near  the  water  line  nineteen  tunes, 
which  caused  her  loss  by  sinking  the  next  morning 
when  the  sea  became  rough  enough  to  wash  into 
the  shot-holes.  Fifteen  of  her  crew  were  wounded, 
some  seriously.  On  board  the  Nahant,  a  quarter- 
master was  killed  in  the  pilot-house  by  flying 
debris  caused  by  the  impact  of  shot  outside,  and 
Commander  Downes  and  five  others  were  injured 
in  the  pilot-house  or  turret  from  the  same  cause. 
These,  and  those  mentioned  as  having  occurred  on 
the  Keokuk,  were  the  only  Federal  casualties  of 
the  day.  The  monitors  were  in  action  only  about 
an  hour,  when  by  signal  from  the  flagship  they 
were  withdrawn  and  anchored  out  of  range  of  the 
forts,  with  the  intention,  as  the  admiral  stated,  of 


THE  MONITORS  BEFORE  CHARLESTON    175 

renewing  the  attack  in  the  morning.  After  seeing 
the  captains,  however,  DuPont  decided  not  to 
attack  again,  reporting  that  in  his  judgment  "  it 
would  have  converted  a  failure  into  a  disaster." 
He  also  reported  :  — 

"  No  ship  had  been  exposed  to  the  severest  fire 
of  the  enemy  over  forty  (40)  minutes,  and  yet  in 
that  brief  period,  as  the  department  will  perceive 
by  the  detailed  reports  of  the  commanding  officers, 
five  of  the  iron-clads  were  wholly  or  partially  dis- 
abled ;  disabled,  too  (as  the  obstructions  could 
not  be  passed),  in  that  which  was  most  essential  to 
our  success,  —  I  mean  in  their  armament,  or  power 
of  inflicting  injury  by  their  guns." 

And  again :  — 

"  I  had  hoped  that  the  endurance  of  the  iron- 
clads would  have  enabled  them  to  have  so  borne 
any  weight  of  fire  to  which  they  might  have  been 
exposed  ;  but  when  I  found  that  so  large  a  portion 
of  them  were  wholly  or  one-half  disabled,  by  less 
than  an  hour's  engagement,  before  attempting  to 
remove  (overcome)  the  obstructions,  or  testing  the 
power  of  the  torpedoes,  I  was  convinced  that  per- 
sistence in  the  attack  would  only  result  in  the  loss 
of  the  greater  portion  of  the  iron-clad  fleet,  and 
in  leaving  many  of  them  inside  the  harbor,  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy." 

The  actual  injuries,  as  shown  by  the  detailed 
reports  of  the  commanding  officers,  failed  to  sus- 
tain this  sweeping  condemnation  of  the  monitors. 


176    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

Four  of  them,  as  stated  in  DuPont's  own  report, 
continued  to  use  their  guns  throughout  the  action ; 
the  Patapsco  lost  the  use  of  one  of  hers  through 
the  breaking  of  a  part  of  the  gun-carriage,  due  to 
firing  the  gun  and  not  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy ; 
and  the  damage  was  not  serious,  as  it  was  re- 
paired within  two  hours.  The  Passaic  had  one  gun 
disabled  for  several  hours,  by  its  slides  being  de- 
formed by  the  impact  of  two  heavy  shots  in  quick 
succession  on  the  outside  of  the  turret.  The  Nan- 
tucket  also  had  one  gun  put  out  of  action  by  its 
port-shutter  being  jammed  by  several  shots  strik- 
ing near  the  port  and  bending  in  the  plates.  On 
nearly  all  the  monitors  there  was  some  trouble 
from  the  turrets  getting  jammed  by  bolt-heads  be- 
ing broken  off  inside  by  concussion  and  dropping 
into  the  crack  between  the  deck-plate  and  the  base 
of  the  turret,  or  by  the  base  of  the  turret  becom- 
ing distorted  by  the  blows  of  shells  against  it.  In 
later  monitors  this  danger  was  provided  against  by 
a  base  ring  or  glacis  plate  being  fitted  around  the 
base  of  the  turret.  Flying  bolts  and  bolt-heads 
were  a  source  of  considerable  danger,  but  the  cas- 
ualties from  them  were  limited  to  those  already 
mentioned. 

Chief  Engineer  A.  C.  Stimers,  whose  important 
services  in  connection  with  the  Monitor  have 
already  been  described,  had  been  the  general  in- 
spector for  the  Navy  Department  of  the  building 
of  all  these  monitors,  and  was  more  f  amiliar  with 


THE  MONITORS  BEFORE  CHARLESTON    177 

their  features  than  any  other  officer  of  the  navy. 
Prior  to  the  attack  on  the  Charleston  fortifica- 
tions, he  had  been  sent  there  with  a  large  force  of 
machinists  and  shipsmiths,  to  be  on  hand  to  repair 
any  damages  they  might  sustain  in  the  intended 
attack,  and  was  present  at  the  time  of  the  battle. 
He  examined  all  the  monitors  the  next  day,  and 
made  a  report  very  much  at  variance  with  Admiral 
DuPont's  conclusions  as  to  the  injuries  received 
and  fitness  for  further  service  of  the  vessels,  as 
appears  from  the  following  extracts  :  — 

"  I  was,  however,  agreeably  disappointed  to  find, 
upon  my  inspection  of  the  monitor  vessels  the  next 
morning,  that  there  were  no  clear  passages  through 
the  decks,  and  no  penetrations  through  the  sides 
of  the  vessels,  or  the  pilot-houses.  The  blunt- 
headed  shots  had  proven  much  less  effective  than 
round  shot,  not  only  in  confining  their  injury  to 
the  indentation,  made  more  distinctly  than  is  the 
case  with  round  shot,  but  the  indentations  them- 
selves were  less  than  those  made  by  the  spherical 
balls.  On  the  other  hand,  I  found  casualties  had 
occurred  which  occasioned  loss  of  life  in  one  in- 
stance, and  disabled  guns  in  others,  through  faults 
of  design  which  only  such  experience  could  point 
out,  and  which,  I  think,  can  be  entirely  removed 
in  the  new  vessels  now  building." 

"  In  consideration  of  the  vast  importance  to  our 
country  that  that  stronghold  of  rebellion  should 
be  reduced,  I  take  the  liberty  to  express  to  the 


178    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

department  my  firm  opinion  that  the  obstructions 
can  be  readily  passed  with  the  means  already  pro- 
vided, and  our  entire  fleet  of  ironclads  pass  up 
successfully  to  the  wharves  of  Charleston,  and  that 
the  monitor  vessels  still  retain  sufficient  enduring 
powers  to  enable  them  to  pass  all  the  forts  and 
batteries  which  may  reasonably  be  expected." 

As  Stimers,  from  his  experience,  was  regarded 
as  an  authority  in  all  that  concerned  monitors,  his 
opinions  in  this  instance  had  more  weight  with  the 
Navy  Department  than  the  views  of  the  admiral 
and  captains,  whose  experience  was  short  with  that 
class  of  vessels,  and  who  were  suspected  of  profes- 
sional prejudice  against  a  form  of  vessel  so  novel, 
and  so  unlike  the  ships  of  war  with  which  they 
had  always  been  familiar.  The  Navy  Department 
and  the  President  were  bitterly  disappointed  by 
the  result  of  the  attack  on  the  Charleston  forts 
and  the  failure  to  renew  it,  and  began  a  corre- 
spondence with  DuPont  that  excited  his  resent- 
ment, and  resulted,  a  short  time  afterward,  in  his 
being  detached  from  his  command  and  deprived  of 
further  participation  in  the  war.  He  undoubtedly 
was  opposed  to  such  radical  changes  in  naval 
methods  as  the  introduction  of  the  monitors  en- 
tailed, but  the  time  was  too  serious  for  the  cher- 
ishing of  old  naval  traditions,  and  he  had  to  go 
to  the  wall.  Ericsson's  biographer  says  of  him, 
"  There  was  no  more  accomplished  officer  in  our 
naval  service  than  Admiral  DuPont,  no  man  of 


DAHLGREN  SUCCEEDS  DUPONT          179 

nobler  personality ;  but  he  was  the  very  incarna- 
tion of  naval  exclusiveness  and  prejudice  against 
innovation,  and  the  introduction  of  the  monitors 
into  our  navy  gave  a  shock  to  his  sensibilities  from 
which  they  never  recovered.  It  may  be  that  he 
was  expected  to  accomplish  with  them  more  than 
was  possible  in  his  attack  upon  Charleston,  but 
he  was  disposed  to  exaggerate  their  deficiencies 
and  to  criticise  them  in  a  spirit  of  unfriendliness 
that  arrayed  against  him  the  active  hostility  of 
their  champions." 

Rear  Admiral  John  A.  Dahlgren  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  the  squadron  early  in  July,  and 
began,  in  conjunction  with  the  army,  a  determined 
and  prolonged  struggle  for  possession  of  Charles- 
ton harbor.  Fort  Wagner,  on  Morris  Island,  was 
captured  in  September,  but  Sumter  held  out, 
though  reduced  to  an  almost  shapeless  mass  of 
ruins  by  the  end  of  the  year.  The  monitors  main- 
tained themselves  inside  the  bar,  and  the  princi- 
pal object  in  view  —  that  of  completely  stopping 
the  commerce  of  Charleston  —  was  accomplished. 
They  were  engaged  almost  daily,  for  months,  with 
the  batteries,  and  proved  their  great  value  for 
harbor  and  coast  service,  to  which  sphere  of  opera- 
tions they  were  limited  in  the  projects  of  their 
designer.  During  all  this  time,  but  one  serious 
casualty  occurred  on  board  a  monitor.  The  Cats- 
kill,  while  engaged  with  Fort  Wagner,  was  struck 
by  a  shot  at  the  top  of  the  pilot-house,  which 


180    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

broke  the  inner  lining,  and  killed  with  flying 
debris  Commander  George  W.  Rodgers  and  Pay- 
master Woodbury,  besides  wounding  two  men  who 
were  in  the  pilot-house  with  them.  These  two 
officers,  and  the  quartermaster  who  was  killed  on 
the  Nahant,  are  the  only  persons  who  were  killed 
on  board  the  monitors  by  cannon  fire  during  the 
whole  course  of  the  war. 

Though  the  monitors  did  not  engage  the  Charles- 
ton forts  again  while  DuPont  was  in  command, 
an  event  took  place  shortly  before  he  was  relieved 
that  did  much  to  restore  public  confidence  in  the 
monitor  type.  The  Confederates  in  1861  had  pur- 
chased a  large  English  blockade-runner  named 
Fingal,  an  iron  vessel,  and  had  converted  her 
into  an  armored  ram  on  a  plan  similar  to  the  one 
followed  in  the  case  of  the  Merrimac.  For  lack 
of  iron  armor  or  appliances  for  making  it,  they 
used  an  enormous  quantity  of  wooden  timbers  for 
an  armor  belt  along  the  water  line,  disposed  as 
shown  by  the  cross-section  of  the  vessel.  Thin 
iron  plating  was  used  on  the  roof,  or  sloping  sides 
of  the  casemate.  The  battery  consisted  of  four 
Brooke  rifles,  two  of  them  pivoted  for  bow  and 
stern  as  well  as  broadside  fire,  and  a  spar  was 
fitted  over  the  bow  for  carrying  and  operating  a 
torpedo.  The  vessel,  renamed  Atlanta,  was  ready 
for  sea  in  1863  and  crossed  over  by  back  channels 
from  Savannah,  where  she  had  been  rebuilt,  into 
Wassaw  Sound  south  of  that  city. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  RAM  ATLANTA   181 

Learning  of  her  presence  there,  DuPont  sent 
the  monitors  Weehawken  and  Nahant,  Captain 
John  Rodgers  of  the  former  in  command  of  the 
expedition,  to  intercept  her.  Early  in  the  morning 
of  June  17  the  Atlanta  came  down  to  give  battle, 
so  confident  that  it  is  said  she  was  accompanied 
by  boats  loaded  with  gay  parties  to  witness  her 
victory.  The  Nahant,  having  no  pilot,  had  to  fol- 
low in  the  wake  of  the  Weehawken,  and  though 
close  to  her  did  not  have  an  opportunity  to  fire  a 
shot,  so  short  and  decisive  was  the  conflict.  At 
4.55  A.  M.  the  Atlanta  began  firing  without  effect, 
but  the  Weehawken  withheld  her  fire  for  twenty 
minutes  until  in  close  range,  when  Rodgers  began 
using  his  guns  with  deliberate  precision.  In  fifteen 
minutes  the  Atlanta,  aground  and  badly  damaged, 
hauled  down  her  flag  and  surrendered.  Only  five 
shots  were  fired  by  the  Weehawken,  one  of  which 
missed.  The  first  one  broke  through  the  armor 
and  wood  backing  on  the  casemate,  strewed  the 
gun-deck  with  splinters,  and  disabled  about  forty 
men ;  another  struck  the  top  of  the  pilot-house  and 
stunned  both  pilots  and  the  man  at  the  wheel, 
which  accounts  for  the  vessel  going  aground.  Cap- 
tain Rodgers  stated  that  "the  first  shot  took 
away  her  desire  to  fight,  and  the  second  destroyed 
her  ability  to  do  so."  The  other  two  shots  that 
struck  did  no  serious  damage.  The  Weehawken 
was  not  hit,  nor  was  the  Nahant.  Prisoners 
stated  that  the  Atlanta  was  the  most  formidable 


182     NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

vessel  they  had  yet  completed,  and  that  they  fully 
expected  a  victory  over  both  the  Weehawken  and 
Nahaiit.  The  prize,  which  was  found  fully 
equipped  for  sea,  was  backed  off  into  deep  water 
with  her  own  engines  by  the  chief  engineer  of  the 
Weehawken  and  steamed  to  Port  Royal  without 
escort,  where  she  was  refitted  and  became  a  vessel 
of  the  United  States  navy.  She  was  appraised, 
with  her  ordnance  and  equipment,  at  a  little  more 
than  $350,000. 

After  such  a  remarkable  victory  it  is  unfortu- 
nate to  have  to  chronicle  the  loss  of  the  Weehaw- 
ken. About  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  of  Sunday, 
December  6  of  the  same  year,  she  sank  suddenly 
while  at  anchor  off  Morris  Island.  The  cause,  as 
determined  by  a  court  of  inquiry,  was  that  her  trim 
had  been  altered  by  putting  a  great  quantity  of 
ammunition  into  storerooms  forward,  where  it  did 
not  belong,  and  leaving  the  forward  hatch  open 
when  water  was  washing  over  the  deck.  Ordina- 
rily all  water  that  got  below  ran  aft  and  was  thrown 
out  by  the  pumps  in  the  engine-room,  but  with 
the  trim  changed  so  the  vessel  was  "  down  by  the 
head ; "  this  did  not  occur  until  a  great  quantity  of 
water  had  accumulated  forward,  bringing  the  bow 
down  more  and  more  and  allowing  greater  quanti- 
ties of  water  to  get  below.  Desperate  attempts 
were  then  made  to  relieve  her,  but  it  was  too  late ; 
her  limit  of  buoyancy,  which  was  only  125  tons, 
was  reached  before  the  pumps  began  gaining  on 


DESTRUCTION  OF  COMMERCE  183 

the  water,  and  though  the  greater  part  of  her 
interior  was  still  empty  she  went  down.  Four  offi- 
cers, all  engineers,  and  twenty-six  enlisted  men 
perished  in  her,  the  whole  watch  on  duty  in  the 
engine  and  fire  rooms  being  lost. 

The  greatest  injury  done  the  United  States  by 
the  Confederate  navy  during  the  war  was  that 
wrought  upon  her  commerce.  From  the  very 
beginning  of  the  war  commerce-destroying  was 
resorted  to  by  the  South,  and  soon  assumed  such 
proportions  that  a  considerable  number  of  Federal 
vessels  had  to  be  diverted  from  regular  naval  en- 
terprise and  devoted  to  efforts  for  its  suppression. 
At  first  small  vessels,  steamers,  or  even  fast-sailing 
schooners,  were  commissioned  as  privateers,  and, 
by  reason  of  their  size,  confined  themselves  rather 
closely  to  the  coast,  where  by  issuing  suddenly 
from  some  river  or  inlet  they  could  fall  upon  un- 
suspecting passing  coasters  and  seize  them.  Hat- 
teras  Inlet,  until  its  capture  by  the  Federals,  was 
a  favorite  hiding-place,  and  the  adjacent  coast  was 
the  scene  of  a  majority  of  these  exploits.  Prizes 
taken  in  this  way,  though  considerable  in  numbers, 
were  generally  small  coast-wise  vessels  of  little  or 
no  use  to  the  captors  and  of  petty  value.  This 
peculiar  industry  ceased  within  a  few  months  from 
lack  of  victims,  as  the  coasting  trade  was  sus- 
pended by  the  existence  of  war,  and  vessels  going 
to  or  coming  from  more  distant  ports  in  the  South 
began  giving  the  coast  a  wide  berth  when  the 
dansrer  became  known. 


184    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

The  over-sea  commerce  of  the  United  States 
offered  a  wider  and  more  profitable  field  for  this 
species  of  enterprise,  but  a  more  difficult  one 
because  of  lack  of  suitable  vessels  with  which  to 
exploit  it.  A  few  privateers,  or  sea-going  war- 
vessels,  were  improvised  from  merchant-steamers, 
and  two  or  three  were  built  expressly  for  the  pur- 
pose, but  from  first  to  last  not  more  than  eight  or 
nine  such  vessels  appeared  upon  the  high  seas. 
Small  as  was  then-  number,  however,  the  result  of 
their  depredations  was  to  practically  annihilate 
American  commerce,  and  it  has  never  yet  been 
revived.  Only  two  hundred  and  sixty-one  vessels, 
all  told  and  of  all  classes,  were  taken  by  the  Con- 
federate cruisers  and  privateers,  which  is  an  in- 
significant number  compared  with  the  total  of 
American  shipping  at  that  time,  but  the  example 
and  danger  led  to  the  laying  up  or  sale  of  great 
numbers  of  ships,  and  deterred  neutrals  from  pat- 
ronizing American  ships  as  carriers. 

The  year  before  the  war  began,  two  thirds  of 
the  commerce  of  the  port  of  New  York  was  carried 
in  American  ships;  three  years  later  the. portion 
was  only  one  fourth.  During  the  four  years  of 
the  war  over  seven  hundred  American  ships  are 
recorded  as  having  been  transferred  to  the  British 
flag  alone,  and  many  others  went  to  other  neutrals. 
"  Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished "  is  a 
prominent  clause  hi  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  concluded 
by  the  principal  nations  of  Europe  at  the  close  of 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  ALABAMA       185 

the  Crimean  war.  An  invitation  was  extended  to 
the  United  States  to  subscribe  to  this  part  of  the 
treaty,  but  we  declined,  probably  because  in  former 
wars  with  a  European  power  our  privateers  had 
been  prominent  instruments  of  injury  to  the  enemy, 
and  we  expected  to  use  them  to  equal  advantage 
again.  When  the  Civil  War  began  and  with  it  the 
destruction  of  our  commerce,  we  expressed  a  will- 
ingness to  subscribe  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  but  it 
was  too  late ;  the  offer  was  declined.  Thus  in  a 
way  did  we  fall  into  a  pit  of  our  own  digging,  and 
the  resulting  injury  was  great  and  seemingly  is 
irreparable. 

As  this  chapter  is  devoted  to  outlines  of  some  of 
the  chief  naval  events  of  the  Civil  War,  it  is  proper 
that  a  sketch  of  the  career  of  the  most  destruc- 
tive of  the  Confederate  cruisers  be  presented, 
though  the  deeds  of  a  commerce-destroyer  may 
not  be  particularly  attractive.  The  results,  as 
just  mentioned,  were  certainly  important  and  of 
more  lasting  influence  than  any  of  the  naval 
battles  of  the  war.  The  Alabama,  or  290  as  she 
was  first  called,  because  that  was  the  number 
she  was  designated  by  while  building  in  the  yards 
of  Messrs.  Laird  at  Birkenhead,  was  constructed 
expressly  for  the  Confederate  government,  and  in 
open  violation  of  the  rules  of  war  regarding  the 
obligations  of  neutrals.  Her  principal  dimensions 
and  armament  will  be  given  later.  She  was  a 
screw  steamer  with  propeller  arranged  to  discon- 


186    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE  CIVIL  WAK 

nect  and  hoist  clear  of  the  water  when  sailing,  and 
was  bark-rigged  with  notably  tall  masts  and  wide 
spread  of  sail ;  so  remarkable  in  fact  in  this  respect 
that  her  peculiarity  was  known  all  over  the  world 
in  a  wonderfully  short  time,  and  American  skip- 
pers in  all  seas  soon  came  to  recognize  an  unusu- 
ally high  mast  on  the  sky-line  as  a  harbinger  of 
evil.  Her  speed  under  steam  was  about  twelve 
knots,  and  under  sail  usually  about  ten  ;  neither 
rate  remarkable  for  that  period,  when  speed  had 
not  become  the  all-important  factor  in  ocean  com- 
merce, but  rather  better  than  the  average  sail  or 
steam  speed  of  the  day. 

Her  intended  career  was  sufficiently  well  known 
while  she  was  building  to  cause  the  American 
Minister  to  Great  Britain  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  authorities  to  her,  and  orders  were  sent  to 
Liverpool  to  prevent  her  sailing  without  a  satisfac- 
tory destination  being  given.  Those  were  not  the 
days  of  so-called  "  Anglo-Saxon  "  goodfellowship, 
and  just  at  that  time  blood  was  not  thicker  than 
water ;  accordingly,  the  Alabama  sailed  away  on 
an  alleged  trial  trip  without  question  and  without 
any  guard  on  board,  and,  according  to  expectation, 
never  came  back.  The  neglect  of  the  local  author- 
ities was  in  the  end  expensive,  as  England  had  to 
pay,  by  judgment  of  the  Geneva  Tribunal,  for  all 
the  damage  done  American  shipping.  Once  clear 
of  Liverpool  docks  the  Alabama  steamed  around 
north  of  Ireland  and  then  southerly  direct  to  the 


THE  CREW  OF  THE  ALABAMA  187 

Azores,  where  a  steamer  with  guns,  ammunition, 
and  the  usual  equipment  of  an  armed  cruiser,  met 
her,  and  a  few  days  later  another  steamer  came 
with  officers  and  crew.  The  captain  was  Raphael 
Semmes,  who  had  been  a  commander  in  the  navy 
of  the  United  States  before  the  war,  and  more 
recently  had  been  in  command  of  a  Confederate 
cruiser  named  Sumter,  engaged  in  preying  upon 
American  commerce.  The  officers  with  few  excep- 
tions were  natives  of  the  Southern  States,  and  some 
of  them  had  learned  their  profession  in  the  navy  of 
the  United  States  before  the  war.  The  crew  was 
made  up  of  the  rougher  and  more  adventurous 
element  of  the  human  flotsam  and  jetsam  that  is 
abundant  on  the  water  streets  of  seaport  cities  in 
all  countries,  and  was  largely  British,  fey  which 
is  meant  English  and  Irish  and  Scotch;  there 
were  sea-rovers  of  other  breeds,  equally  without 
country,  and  it  is  even  said  some  were  "  Yankees." 
There  were  some  trained  gunners  from  the  British 
navy,  whose  presence  is  admitted  by  English 
writers  but  not  explained.  Outside  the  territorial 
waters  of  the  Azores  (Portuguese),  the  guns,  mu- 
nitions of  war,  and  crew  were  taken  on  board,  the 
Confederate  flag  was  hoisted,  and  the  vessel  pro- 
claimed by  Semmes  the  Alabama,  in  commission 
as  a  cruiser  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America. 
This  was  late  in  August,  1862. 

Within  three  weeks  the  Alabama  captured  ten 
American  whalers  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Azores, 


188    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

that  being  a  favorite  whaling-ground  at  the  time, 
and  the  American  skippers  were  in  complete  igno- 
rance that  any  vessels  of  the  enemy  were  abroad. 
In  every  case  the  prize  was  burned  as  of  no  use  to 
the  captor,  and  the  earnings  of  months  or  even 
years  of  the  hardest  toil  and  exposure  by  their 
crews  were  destroyed  before  their  eyes.  This 
wanton  destruction  of  private  property  of  course 
had  not  the  slightest  effect  upon  the  government 
of  the  United  States  in  its  prosecution  of  the  war, 
and  was  not  war.  Could  the  prizes  have  been  sold 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Confederacy,  or  made  any 
use  of,  the  case  would  have  been  different,  though 
in  any  case  warfare  against  unarmed  and  peaceful 
citizens  is  not  a  lofty  employment.  In  October, 
Semmes  -ran  across  the  Atlantic  and  intercepted 
no  less  than  twelve  outward-bound  American  ships 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland,  that 
being  the  time  of  year  and  the  route  for  ships  tak- 
ing the  season's  wheat  crop  to  European  markets. 
Thence  the  Alabama  proceeded  southward  to  the 
West  Indies,  taking  but  one  prize  on  the  way,  and 
put  into  Martinique  for  coal.  At  that  port  she 
was  discovered  and  blockaded  by  the  San  Jacinto, 
but  escaped  to  sea  when  she  was  ready  without  any 
apparent  difficulty. 

More  coal  was  taken  at  a  port  in  Venezuela,  and 
then  the  Alabama  appeared  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Hayti  on  the  sea  route  of  vessels  going  to  and 
from  Central  and  South  America.  There  she 


THE  ALABAMA  AND  THE  HATTERAS  189 

captured  the  Ariel  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Steamship 
Company,  the  only  steamer  that  was  taken  by  her 
during  her  whole  career.  The  Ariel  was  of  better 
speed,  but  was  lured  into  close  range  by  suppos- 
ing the  stranger  to  be  an  American  man-of-war ; 
she  had  on  board  about  five  hundred  passengers, 
mostly  women  and  children,  and  a  detachment  of 
United  States  marines  returning  from  the  Pacific 
station.  This  great  number  of  prisoners  required 
the  preservation  of  the  prize  for  their  conveyance  ; 
the  marines  were  paroled  as  prisoners  of  war  and 
the  Ariel  was  released  on  a  bond  for  $216,000 
to  be  paid  when  the  Confederate  States  should 
become  an  independent  nation,  a  bond  which  has 
not  yet  become  redeemable ;  the  cash  on  board  the 
Ariel,  about  $9000,  was  taken. 

Semmes  then  proceeded  into  the  Gulf  of  Mex- 
ico and  appeared  in  sight  of  some  Federal  block- 
ading ships  off  the  port  of  Galveston  about  noon 
of  January  11,  1863.  Not  imagining  that  the 
stranger  could  be  anything  worse  than  a  blockade- 
runner,  the  weakest  ship  present  was  sent  out  to 
investigate.  This  was  the  Hatteras,  a  frail  paddle- 
wheel  steamer  with  overhead  walking-beam,  that 
had  formerly  been  a  river  boat  on  the  Delaware 
and  was  now  lightly  armed  for  war  purposes,  and 
wholly  unfit  for  an  encounter  with  a  regularly 
built  vessel  of  war.  The  Alabama  made  feint  of 
running  away  until  nearly  dark,  and  when  twenty 
miles  or  more  away  from  the  line  of  blockaders, 


190    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

she  allowed  the  Hatteras  to  approach ;  the  com- 
mander of  that  vessel  became  suspicious  when  he 
found  himself  in  the  novel  situation  of  gaining  on 
a  steamer  with  his  feeble  engines  and  boilers,  but 
he  was  without  support  and  there  was  nothing  for 
it  but  to  go  on  and  investigate  the  stranger.  Ap- 
proaching within  hail  he  asked  the  name  of  the 
ship,  and  was  informed  that  it  was  "  Her  Britannic 
Majesty's  ship  Vixen."  The  Hatteras  lowered  a 
boat  to  board  her,  and  as  it  shoved  off,  the  two 
ships  lying  close  together,  the  stranger  announced, 
"  This  is  the  Confederate  steamer  Alabama,"  at 
the  same  time  firing  a  broadside  at  point-blank 
range. 

Knowing  his  inferiority  in  battery,  Commander 
Blake  of  the  Hatteras  endeavored  to  close  in  and 
board,  but  the  walking-beam  of  his  engine  was 
shot  away  and  the  steam  cylinder  also  struck  and 
broken  immediately,  either  wound  being  sufficient 
to  disable  the  ship  entirely.  Shells  striking  near 
the  water  line  tore  whole  sheets  of  iron  off  the 
hull,  and  the  vessel  filled  as  rapidly  as  a  perforated 
tin  pan.  In  this  fatal  situation  the  Hatteras  was 
obliged  to  surrender  after  an  engagement  of  only 
fifteen  minutes,  and  sank  so  soon  afterward  that 
the  victors  barely  had  time  to  rescue  their  prison- 
ers. The  casualties  were  remarkably  few  con- 
sidering the  character  of  the  combat :  the  Hat- 
teras had  two  men,  both  firemen,  killed,  and  five 
wounded ;  one  man  only  was  wounded  on  the  Ala- 


THE  HATTERAS  PRISONERS  191 

bama.  The  crew  of  the  boat  that  had  been  low- 
ered from  the  Hatteras  escaped  and  made  its  way 
back  to  Galveston.  Some  of  the  ships  came  out 
from  the  shore,  attracted  by  the  firing,  but  found 
nothing,  as  the  Alabama  was  already  far  away 
with  her  prisoners,  whom  she  carried  to  Kings- 
ton, in  Jamaica,  and  put  ashore  in  a  pitiful  con- 
dition without  money  or  adequate  clothing,  as 
they  had  lost  everything  in  the  Hatteras.  Not- 
withstanding their  condition,  their  reception  by 
the  British  residents  of  Kingston  was  such  as  to 
compel  Commander  Blake  thus  to  refer  to  it  in 
his  official  report :  "  Landed  on  an  unfriendly 
shore,  in  a  state  of  abject  destitution,  that  should 
have  commanded  the  sympathy  of  avowed  enemies, 
we  felt  keenly  the  unkind  criticisms  of  those  who 
profess  to  have  no  dislike  for  our  government  or 
its  people." 

From  Kingston,  Semmes  stood  out  into  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  as  he  knew  that  the  West  Indies 
would  be  dangerous  cruising-ground  for  him  after 
the  affair  of  the  Hatteras.  Near  the  centre  of 
the  ocean,  at  the  place  known  to  sailors  as  the 
"  cross-roads,"  because  the  trade-routes  to  and 
from  South  America  and  around  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  "from  both  Europe  and  North  America 
meet  there,  he  made  five  prizes.  He  then  stood 
south  along  the  route  from  South  America,  and 
took  twenty-four  American  vessels  within  a  short 
time,  all  of  which,  with  but  one  exception,  were 


192    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

destroyed;  the  exception  was  the  Conrad,  which 
Semmes  commissioned  a  Conf ederafe  cruiser  under 
the  name  of  Tuscaloosa,  and  sent  forth  on  the 
same  mission  as  himself.  She  made  two  prizes, 
but  upon  her  arrival  at  Cape  Town  was  held  by 
the  British  authorities,  who  could  not  overlook  the 
wholly  irregular  manner  in  which  she  was  supposed 
to  have  acquired  nationality. 

After  lingering  for  two  months  on  the  coast  of 
Brazil,  the  Alabama  crossed  the  South  Atlantic  to 
Cape  Town,  where  some  repairs  were  made,  and 
whence  she  soon  took  her  way  across  the  Indian 
Ocean  for  the  Straits  of  Sunda,  where  the  sailing- 
routes  to  the  Far  East  converge.  There  the  hunt- 
ing-ground was  good,  but  after  taking  only  two 
ships  Semmes  became  alarmed  at  the  rumored 
proximity  of  the  United  States  sloop-of-war  Wyo- 
ming, and  moved  on,  going  across  the  Bay  of  Ben- 
gal and  northern  Indian  Ocean  until  he  reached 
the  east  coast  of  Africa  far  north  of  Madagascar. 
Cruising  on  down  the  African  coast  without  find- 
ing an  American  ship,  though  they  had  once  been 
numerous  there,  the  Alabama  returned  to  Cape 
Town,  thence  across  to  Brazil,  and  then  north  by 
way  of  the  cross-roads  to  Europe,  arriving  at  Cher- 
bourg, in  France,  June  11,  1864.  She  had  been 
cruising  now  nearly  two  years,  and  in  that  time 
had  made  sixty-eight  prizes,  only  two  of  which 
were  taken  on  the  return  from  the  furthest  point 
she  had  reached,  as  by  that  time  the  alarm  had 


ALABAMA   AND  KEARSARGE  193 

gone  forth,  and  the  merchant  shipping  of  the 
United  States  had  been  largely  withdrawn  from 
the  seas.  Of  her  sixty-eight  prizes,  fifty-three 
had  been  burned  at  sea  by  the  captor.  Compared 
with  the  great  reaches  of  ocean  she  had  traversed, 
the  Alabama  was  now  back  practically  to  her 
starting-point,  and  it  was  destined  that  her  cruising 
should  end  here. 

The  news  of  her  arrival  at  Cherbourg  traveled 
fast,  and  the  next  morning  reached  Captain  Wins- 
low  of  the  United  States  sloop-of-war  Kearsarge, 
lying  at  Flushing  on  an  island  off  the  coast  of 
the  Netherlands.  Two  days  later  the  Kearsarge 
arrived  off  Cherbourg,  but  did  not  go  inside  the 
three-mile  limit  of  territorial  waters,  to  avoid  the 
detention  that  the  twenty-four-hours  rule  would 
have  made  her  liable  to.  This,  it  may  be  ex- 
plained, is  an  international  agreement,  obligatory 
upon  neutrals,  to  prevent  vessels  that  are  hostile 
to  each  other  from  leaving  the  same  port  within 
twenty-four  hours  of  each  other.  As  belligerents 
may  not  remain  in  a  neutral  port  longer  than 
necessary  to  effect  absolutely  essential  repairs  or  to 
take  sufficient  coal  and  provisions  to  carry  them 
home,  it  would  be  possible,  without  the  twenty- 
four-hour  rule,  for  a  powerful  vessel  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  enforced  departure  of  a  weaker  one 
by  following  her  closely  to  sea  and  destroying  her. 
So  the  Kearsarge  lay  off  in  free  waters  waiting 
for  her  enemy  to  come  out.  Semmes  had  nothing 


194    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

to  gain  in  fighting  her,  as  his  vocation  was  the 
destruction  of  merchantmen,  in  the  successful  pur- 
suit of  which  he  had  gained  a  reputation  that 
admitted  no  fear  of  rivalry.  However,  his  feelings 
were  very  bitter  toward  the  North  and  the  service 
that  he  had  formerly  belonged  to,  and  as  he  had 
great  confidence  in  his  ship  and  his  crew,  he  sent 
a  message  to  Winslow  requesting  him  not  to  leave 
the  vicinity,  and  assuring  him  that  the  Alabama 
would  come  out  as  soon  as  she  could  take  coal  and 
complete  some  repairs. 

The  two  ships  were  as  nearly  equal  in  size  and 
as  evenly  matched  in  armament  and  crews  as 
could  be  wished  for  the  principals  in  a  sea  duel, 
their  chief  features  being  as  follows  :  — 

Kearsarge.  Alabama. 

Length  over  all      ....    214  ft.    3  in.  220  ft. 

Length  on  water-line  .     .     .     198  ft.    6  in.  210  ft. 

Beam 33  ft.  10  in.  32  ft. 

Depth  of  hold 16  ft.  17  ft. 

Tonnage 1031  1150 

Total  crew  on  the  day  of  battle         163  149 

The  Kearsarge  carried  two  11-inch  smooth- 
bore shell-guns  and  one  30-pounder  rifle  pivoted 
to  fire  on  either  broadside,  and  four  32-pounders, 
two  on  each  broadside ;  she  could  therefore  fight 
five  guns  on  either  side,  and  she  did  so  in  the 
engagement,  her  starboard  battery  only  being  en- 
gaged. The  battery  of  the  Alabama  consisted  of 
one  7-inch  Blakely  rifle,  one  8-inch  shell-gun, 


MORALE  OF  THE  TWO  CREWS  195 

six  32-pounders,  and  one  9-pounder,  so  mounted 
that  she  could  fight  seven  guns  in  broadside, 
which  she  did.  Though  using  five  guns  to  the 
Alabama's  seven,  the  Kearsarge  could  throw  the 
greater  weight  of  metal  at  a  broadside,  or  ex- 
actly 366  pounds  to  the  Alabama's  305.  These 
figures  seem  almost  ridiculous  to-day,  when  there 
are  large  numbers  of  guns  afloat  on  the  battle- 
ships of  the  United  States  navy  that  throw  single 
projectiles  weighing  three  or  four  times  as  much 
as  one  of  these  broadsides. 

Though  the  two  ships  were  so  nearly  alike  on 
paper,  there  was  one  great  difference  between 
them  in  favor  of  the  Kearsarge,  and  that  was  in 
the  morale  and  character  of  their  crews.  That  of 
the  Alabama,  as  has  been  noted,  was  made  up 
of  adventurers  from  many  lands,  without  interest 
in  the  flag  under  which  they  served,  except  for  the 
destructive  career  it  afforded  them,  and  probably 
without  knowledge  of  the  reasons  for  its  existence. 
Very  few  of  them  had  ever  set  foot  in  the  Con- 
federacy, and  they  cared  as  little  for  its  defense  as 
they  knew  of  its  history.  With  but  eleven  excep- 
tions, the  crew  of  the  Kearsarge  was  composed  of 
native-born  citizens  of  the  United  States,  the  most 
of  them  being  seamen  and  mechanics  from  the 
coast  and  machine-shops  of  New  England.  They 
had  been  organized  as  a  fighting  unit  under  the 
perfecting  influence  of  constant  drills  and  system- 
atized discipline  on  board  the  Kearsarge  for  more 


196    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

than  two  years,  and  they  were  animated  by  devo- 
tion to  a  great  cause  that  they  understood,  and 
were  ready  to  fight  for,  or  if  need  be  to  die  for. 
The  event  furnished  one  more  instance  of  the 
many  that  are  prominent  in  naval  affairs  through 
all  the  ages  to  support  the  trite  maxim  that  men 
rather  than  ships  win  battles. 

On  Sunday  morning,  June  19,  1864,  five  days 
after  the  Kearsarge  had  appeared  off  Cherbourg, 
the  Alabama  came  out  to  give  her  battle.  The 
Kearsarge  at  first  steamed  further  out  to  sea  to 
make  sure  that  the  fight  should  not  work  its  way 
into  neutral  waters  and  be  interfered  with  by  the 
French  naval  force  present.  When  about  seven 
miles  off  shore  she  turned  and  headed  for  her  ad- 
versary, the  Alabama  beginning  the  fight  by  firing 
an  ineffectual  broadside  when  the  ships  were  a 
mile  distant  from  each  other.  The  Kearsarge  did 
not  reply  until  the  distance  had  decreased  to  about 
nine  hundred  yards,  when  she  began  firing  shell 
slowly  and  with  careful  aim.  The  firing  of  the 
Alabama  at  all  times  was  rapid  and  wild,  showing 
lack  of  drill. 

The  Kearsarge  endeavored  to  steam  between 
the  Alabama  and  the  shore  to  prevent  the  fight 
from  taking  place  on  parallel  lines  leading  toward 
the  three-mile  limit,  and  the  Alabama,  to  prevent 
being  raked  by  the  change  in  position  that  this 
involved,  kept  sheering  so  that  her  broadside  was 
always  presented  to  her  foe.  Thus  it  came  about 


DUEL  OF  REARS ARGE  AND  ALABAMA  197 

that  the  two  ships  continued  to  steam  around  a 
circle,  about  diametrically  opposite  each  other, 
always  headed  in  opposite  directions,  and  with 
their  starboard  batteries  engaged.  A  current  set- 
ting to  the  westward  at  the  rate  of  three  miles  an 
hour  prevented  this  from  being  a  fixed  circle,  and 
drew  it  out  into  a  sort  of  spiral  in  which  each  ship, 
steaming  at  full  speed,  made  seven  complete  turns. 
Though  not  supposed  to  be  the  better  steamer, 
the  slightly  superior  speed  of  the  Kearsarge  en- 
abled her  to  force  these  tactics  and  prevent  the 
enemy  from  approaching  the  neutral  shore.  Ex- 
traordinarily high  steam  pressure  was  carried,  and 
the  engines  performed  better  than  they  had  at  any 
time  during  her  commission,  which  speaks  highly 
of  the  skill  and  training  of  her  engineer  force. 
The  "  man  at  the  furnace  door,"  therefore,  con- 
tributed an  element  of  victory  as  important  as 
that  furnished  by  the  more  celebrated  "  man  be- 
hind the  gun." 

The  difference  in  gunnery  of  the  two  ships  soon 
showed  results,  as  well  as  the  difference  in  speed ; 
the  rapidly  discharged  guns  of  the  Alabama  sel- 
dom hit  their  target,  while  the  carefully-aimed 
shots  from  the  Kearsarge  reached  home  with  tell- 
ing frequency.  The  Alabama  fired  three  hundred 
and  seventy  times,  but  hit  the  Kearsarge  only 
twenty-eight  times,  doing  her  no  serious  harm  and 
injuring  but  three  of  her  people ;  one  of  the 
wounded  men  subsequently  died.  The  Kearsarge 


198    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

fired  only  one  hundred  and  seventy-three  shots 
and  must  have  made  a  good  proportion  of  hits, 
as  the  Alabama  sank,  carrying  the  proof  of  her 
enemy's  marksmanship  with  her.  From  survivors 
it  was  learned  that  the  Federal  fire  had  been  very 
destructive,  disabling  many  men,  blocking  the 
engines  with  coal  and  wreckage  from  the  explosion 
of  a  shell  in  a  coal-bunker,  and  making  so  many 
holes  near  the  water  line  that  it  was  impossible  to 
keep  the  ship  afloat.  An  hour  after  the  engage- 
ment began,  the  Alabama  set  her  head  sails  and 
endeavored  to  reach  the  three-mile  limit  with  their 
aid,  but  as  the  water  was  reaching  and  extinguish- 
ing her  furnace  fires  she  was  practically  helpless, 
and  the  effort  was  futile.  The  Kearsarge  steamed 
across  her  bow  into  a  raking  position,  where  a  few 
shots  brought  down  her  flag  and  led  to  the  sub- 
stitution of  a  white  one  in  token  of  surrender. 
Two  minutes  later  the  Kearsarge  fired  into  her  a 
few  times  more  because  she  had  resumed  firing. 
Twenty  minutes  after  the  surrender  the  Alabama 
sank  by  the  stern,  her  bow  rising  high  in  air  as 
she  went  down. 

The  wounded  had  been  put  out  of  the  ship  in  a 
boat  before  she  sank,  and  the  others  now  took  to 
the  water,  where  the  greater  part  of  them  were 
rescued  by  the  British  yacht  Deerhound,  a  French 
pilot-boat,  and  two  boats  sent  from  the  Kearsarge. 
Semmes  himself  was  picked  up  by  the  Deerhound, 
and  with  forty  or  more  of  his  crew  was  landed  in 


CAPTAIN  SEMMES  IN  DEFEAT  199 

England,  where  they  were  received  with  great 
enthusiasm  and  marked  approbation.  Owing  to 
desertions  and  changes  in  the  crew  while  in  Cher- 
bourg and  the  dispersion  after  the  fight,  the  fate 
of  the  Alabama's  men  has  never  been  exactly 
known,  but  as  reported  by  the  English  newspapers 
immediately  after  the  fight  was  as  follows  :  — 

Killed 11 

Drowned 3 

Wounded 26 

Taken  by  the  Kearsarge 54 

Picked  up  by  French  pilot-boat    ...  10 

Taken  to  England  by  the  Deerhound     .  41  to  47 

After  his  defeat  Captain  Semmes  spoke  bitterly 
of  the  conduct  of  his  enemy  in  several  regards :  for 
firing  into  him  after  the  surrender,  claiming  that 
he  had  not  fired  after  displaying  the  white  flag ; 
for  tardiness  in  sending  boats  to  the  rescue  of  the 
men  in  the  water,  and  especially  for  the  "  Yankee 
trick "  of  protecting  the  machinery  of  the  Kear- 
sarge by  stopping  the  chain  cables  on  the  sides  of 
the  ship  just  as  had  been  done  by  Farragut  two 
years  before.  The  conduct  of  the  Deerhound  was 
much  criticised  for  taking  the  men  of  the  Alabama 
to  a  friendly  port  where  they  escaped  being  prison- 
ers of  war,  but  she  was  asked  by  Captain  Wins- 
low  to  aid  in  the  rescue  and  did  not  violate  any 
rule  of  neutrality  by  carrying  the  survivors  to  a 
place  of  safety.  Bitter  as  were  the  reproaches 


200    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

aimed  by  Semmes  at  his  victorious  foe,  they  were 
more  than  matched  by  the  opinions  of  himself 
expressed  by  the  Federal  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
which  as  a  fine  example  of  official  invective  is 
worth  repeating :  — 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  July  12, 1864. 

SIB  :  —  Your  despatch  of  the  21st  ultimo  (No. 
21)  is  received,  stating  your  efforts  to  save  the 
lives  of  the  survivors  of  the  Alabama,  after  the 
battle  of  the  19th  of  June,  and  after  the  formal 
surrender  and  destruction  of  that  vessel.  Your 
efforts  in  the  cause  of  humanity  in  striving  to 
rescue  these  men,  most  of  them  aliens,  who  have, 
under  their  ignoble  leader  —  himself  a  deserter 
from  our  service  and  a  traitor  to  our  flag  —  been 
for  two  years  making  piratical  war  on  unarmed 
merchantmen,  are  rightly  appreciated. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  confidence  and 
generous  sympathy  which  you  exercised,  and  which 
would  actuate  all  honorable  minds  under  similar 
circumstances,  should  have  been  so  requited  and 
abused  by  the  persons  on  board  the  Deerhound,  an 
English  vessel  of  the  royal  yacht  squadron. 

That  the  wretched  commander  of  the  sunken 
corsair  should  have  resorted  to  any  dishonorable 
means  to  escape  after  his  surrender ;  that  he  should 
have  thrown  overboard  the  sword  that  was  no 
longer  his;  that  before  encountering  an  armed 
antagonist  the  mercenary  rover  should  have  removed 


LETTER  OF  SECRETARY  WELLES    201 

the  chronometers,  and  other  plunder  stolen  from 
peaceful  commerce,  are  not  matters  of  surprise,  for 
each  act  is  characteristic  of  one  who  has  been  false 
to  his  country  and  flag.  You  could  not  have  ex- 
pected, however,  that  gentlemen,  or  those  claiming 
to  be  gentlemen,  would,  on  such  an  occasion,  act  in 
bad  faith,  and  that  having  been  called  upon  or  per- 
mitted to  assist  in  rescuing  persons  or  property 
which  had  been  surrendered  to  you,  would  run 
away  with  either.  It  is  now  evident  that  your 
confidence  in  the  Deerhound,  and  the  persons  con- 
nected with  her,  was  misplaced. 

The  department  commends  your  efforts  to  save 
the  lives  of  drowning  men,  although  they  had  been 
engaged  in  robbing  and  destroying  the  property  of 
those  who  had  never  injured  them.  In  paroling 
the  prisoners,  however,  you  committed  a  grave 
error. 

The  Alabama  was  an  English-built  vessel, 
armed  and  manned  by  Englishmen;  has  never 
had  any  other  than  an  English  register ;  has  never 
sailed  under  any  recognized  national  flag  since  she 
left  the  shores  of  England ;  has  never  visited  any 
port  in  North  America,  and  her  career  of  devasta- 
tion, since  she  went  forth  from  England,  is  one 
that  does  not  entitle  those  of  her  crew  who  were 
captured  to  be  paroled.  This  department  expressly 
disavows  that  act.  Extreme  caution  must  be  exer- 
cised so  that  we  in  no  way  change  the  character 
of  this  English-built  and  English-manned,  if  not 


202    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

English-owned  vessel,  or  relieve  those  who  may  be 
implicated  in  sending  forth  this  robber  upon  the 
seas  from  any  responsibility  to  which  they  may 
be  liable  for  the  outrages  she  has  committed. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Captain  JOHN  A.  WINSLOW,  U.  S.  N., 
Com'dg  United  States  Steamer  Kearsarge,  Cherbourg,  France. 

The  most  sanguinary  and  important  naval  battle 
of  the  Civil  War  was  the  famous  engagement  hi 
Mobile  Bay  on  the  morning  of  August  5,  1864. 
The  situation  here  was  similar  to  that  at  the  forts 
below  New  Orleans  in  that  the  ships  had  to  pass 
through  a  narrow  channel  by  a  formidable  fort  on 
shore,  and  was  even  more  difficult  by  reason  of  the 
presence  of  a  powerful  ironclad,  the  Tennessee, 
above  the  fort,  and  an  obstructing  line  of  torpedoes 
in  front  of  it  across  the  channel.  Admiral  Farra- 
gut  was  still  hi  command  of  the  fleet,  and  still  flew 
his  flag  from  the  already  famous  Hartford.  The 
fleet  present  consisted  of  a  number  of  the  large 
sloops-of-war,  several  gunboats  of  different  classes, 
and  four  monitors ;  the  latter  had  been  sent  at  Far- 
ragut's  urgent  request  to  give  him  proper  vessels 
with  which  to  assail  the  forts  and  the  Tennessee. 
Two  of  them,  the  Chickasaw  and  Winnebago,  were 
double-turreted  "turtle-backed"  craft  of  the  Eads 
type  from  the  Mississippi  River,  and  the  others, 
the  Tecumseh  and  Manhattan,  were  single-turreted 
Ericsson  monitors. 


LINE  OF  BATTLE  IN  MOBILE  BAY        203 

In  the  order  of  battle  it  was  directed  that  the 
monitors  should  lead  the  column  of  wooden  ships 
and  receive  the  first  attack  from  the  fort,  as  they 
would  not  suffer  from  it  as  much  as  the  others,  and 
could  begin  to  get  it  in  check  with  their  gun  fire. 
Superfluous  boats,  spars,  etc.,  were  taken  out  of 
the  ships  and  anchored  off  shore  or  left  at  Pensa- 
cola,  some  of  the  big  ships  even  dispensing  with 
their  lower  yards  and  topmasts.  The  expedient 
adopted  without  success  at  Port  Hudson,  of  lashing 
a  small  vessel  to  the  unengaged  side  of  a  large  one, 
was  again  resorted  to,  the  object  being  the  same, 
to  have  power  present  to  carry  the  large  ships  out 
of  the  fire  of  the  fort  should  their  machinery  be- 
come disabled.  There  were  seven  pairs  thus  made, 
as  follows,  the  name  of  the  larger  or  fighting  ship 
first  in  each  pair,  and  the  pairs  given  in  the  order 
in  which  they  went  into  the  fight :  Brooklyn  and 
Octorara;  Hartford  and  Metacomet;  Richmond 
and  Port  Royal ;  Lackawanna  and  Seminole ;  Mo- 
nongahela  and  Kennebec ;  Ossipee  and  Itasca  ; 
Oneida  and  Galena.  The  monitors,  in  the  order 
Tecumseh,  Manhattan,  Winnebago,  and  Chickasaw, 
formed  a  line  ahead  by  themselves  on  the  starboard 
bow  of  the  leading  ships  and  closer  in  to  the  land. 

All  preparations  having  been  made  the  day  and 
night  before,  the  crews  had  breakfast  at  an  early 
hour,  and  at  5.30  A.  M.,  August  5,  the  signal  was 
made  to  get  under  way,  the  pairs  of  ships,  already 
lashed  together,  advancing  with  low  steam  toward 


204    NAVAL  EVENTS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

the  scene  of  battle.  Farragut  chose  a  position  for 
observation  in  the  port  main  rigging  of  the  Hart- 
ford, and  as  the  smoke  interfered  with  his  vision, 
he  mounted  higher  and  higher  up  the  ratlines 
until  he  arrived  at  the  futtock  shrouds  just  below 
the  main-top.  Captain  Drayton,  fearing  that  his 
chief  might  lose  his  footing  by  some  shock  to  the 
mast,  sent  the  signal  quartermaster,  Knowles,  up 
the  rigging  to  make  his  position  more  secure. 
When  the  incident  became  magnified  and  its 
details,  as  always  happens  in  such  cases,  became 
a  matter  of  dispute,  Knowles  was  called  upon  for 
his  story  of  exactly  what  was  done.  He  said :  "  I 
went  up  with  a  piece  of  lead-line  and  made  it  fast 
to  one  of  the  forward  shrouds,  and  then  took  it 
round  the  admiral  to  the  after  shroud,  making 
it  fast  there.  The  admiral  said,  '  Never  mind, 
I  am  all  right ; '  but  I  went  ahead  and  obeyed 
orders,  for  I  feared  he  would  fall  overboard  if  any- 
thing should  carry  away  or  he  should  be  struck." 
This  appears  to  be  the  whole  sum  and  substance 
of  the  story  of  Farragut  being  "  lashed  "  to  the 
rigging.  He  remained  in  the  position  described 
until  the  ships  had  passed  above  the  forts. 

By  6.30  A.  M.  the  line  was  well  up  toward  the 
fort,  and  about  6.45  the  Tecumseh  fired  each  of 
her  two  guns  once  at  the  fort ;  she  then  loaded 
with  steel  bolts  and  the  heaviest  charges  of  powder 
allowed,  to  be  in  readiness  for  the  Tennessee, 
and  consequently  did  not  participate  in  the  firing 


THE  SINKING  OF  THE  TECUMSEH         205 

that  soon  began.  A  few  minutes  after  seven  (the 
reports  varying  somewhat),  the  fort  opened  on  the 
leading  ships,  and  its  fire  was  at  once  returned  by 
the  "  bow  chasers  "  of  the  Brooklyn.  These  were 
two  100-pounder  Parrott  guns  mounted  on  her 
forecastle,  and  it  was  due  to  her  having  them  and 
an  ingenious  device  for  picking  up  torpedoes  that 
Farragut  had  been  influenced  against  his  wish  to 
let  her  take  the  lead  instead  of  the  Hartford. 
The  action  soon  became  general,  and  then  furious, 
as  the  fleet  drew  nearer  to  the  fort.  Fort  Morgan 
contained  thirty-five  large  guns,  fourteen  of  which 
were  rifles,  and  there  was  in  addition  an  exterior 
earthwork,  called  the  Water  Battery,  which 
mounted  twenty-nine  others,  four  of  which  were 
10-inch  shell-guns.  The  Tennessee  and  three 
gunboats  had  drawn  out  from  behind  the  fort 
ahead  and  were  adding  their  fire,  directly  in  front 
of  the  advancing  ships. 

By  half  past  seven  several  of  the  ships  were 
abreast  of  the  fort,  and  by  their  tremendous  fire, 
made  more  deadly  by  the  use  of  grape,  had  almost 
silenced  the  enemy's  guns.  At  this  juncture  the 
Tecumseh,  then  about  three  hundred  yards  ahead 
and  on  the  starboard  bow  of  the  Brooklyn,  was 
observed  to  lurch  suddenly  and  then  go  down 
almost  instantly.  She  had  run  upon  a  torpedo,  the 
explosion  of  which  communicated  a  severe  shock 
through  the  water  to  the  adjacent  ships  and,  from 
the  suddenness  with  which  she  sank,  probably  tore 


206    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  ClVlL  WAR 

the  bottom  out  of  the  Tecumseh.  Her  bow  was 
seen  to  settle  in  the  water,  the  stern  rose  in  air 
with  the  screw  racing  violently,  and  before  the 
startled  onlookers  could  fully  realize  what  had 
happened  she  literally  dived  out  of  sight.  Of  a 
crew  of  112  officers  and  men,  only  three  officers 
and  seventeen  men  were  saved,  the  most  of  these 
having  escaped  through  the  gun-ports  in  the 
turret,  and  been  picked  up  by  a  boat  sent  from 
the  Metacomet.  With  the  exception  of  one  coal- 
heaver,  the  entire  engine-room  force  of  six  officers 
and  thirty-seven  men  perished.  In  the  moment 
of  the  Tecumseh's  destruction  occurred  a  simple 
act  of  sublime  heroism  that  is  often  told,  but  can- 
not be  too  often  repeated.  Her  commander,  Tunis 
A.  Craven,  and  the  pilot  met  at  the  little  hatch- 
way in  the  floor  of  the  pilot-house  that  opened 
into  the  turret,  and  through  which  but  one  man 
could  pass  at  a  time.  Craven  stepped  aside,  say- 
ing, "  After  you,  pilot,"  and  the  pilot  saved  his 
life  by  gaining  the  turret  and  plunging  out  of  a 
gun-port  as  the  vessel  dropped  under  water ;  but 
Craven  went  down  with  his  ship.  Short  and 
simple  tragedies  like  this  have  elevated  the  profes- 
sion of  arms  in  all  ages  by  ennobling  the  heroes 
who  have  been  their  victims. 

The  orders  to  the  Tecumseh  were  to  pass  inside 
a  red  buoy  that  was  known  to  mark  the  termina- 
tion of  the  row  of  torpedoes,  but  instead  of  so 
doing  she  passed  outside  it  and  ran  upon  a  torpedo 


FARRAGUT  ENTERS  MOBILE  BAY        207 

as  described.  Farragut  held  himself  somewhat  to 
blame,  as  he  believed  the  catastrophe  would  have 
been  averted  had  he  instead  of  yielding  to  his 
captains  insisted  upon  leading  the  line  in  the  Hart- 
ford. Some  notes  of  the  battle  written  by  him 
contain  the  following :  "  Allowing  the  Brooklyn  to 
go  ahead  was  a  great  error.  It  lost  not  only  the 
Tecumseh,  but  many  valuable  lives,  by  keeping 
us  under  the  fire  of  the  forts  for  thirty  minutes ; 
whereas,  had  I  led,  as  I  intended  to  do,  I  would 
have  gone  inside  the  buoys,  and  all  would  have 
followed  me." 

Some  confusion  at  the  head  of  the  line  had  al- 
ready occurred  because  of  the  Brooklyn  faltering, 
backing  her  engines,  and  drifting  down  across  the 
channel  close  upon  the  Hartford.  It  is  said  she 
mistook  a  line  of  empty  shell-boxes  floating  down 
from  the  Confederate  vessels  above  for  buoys 
marking  torpedoes,  and  it  is  certain  that  she  sig- 
naled "torpedoes"  when  asked  by  the  flagship 
what  the  matter  was.  Then  the  resolution  and 
commanding  genius  of  Farragut's  character  came 
to  the  front,  as,  undaunted,  he  shouted  above  the 
uproar  of  battle  the  famous  order,  "  Damn  the 
torpedoes !  Go  ahead !  "  at  the  same  time  order- 
ing full  speed  for  his  own  ship.  The  Hartford 
steamed  rapidly  past  the  Brooklyn  and  took  her 
place  at  the  head  of  the  column,  the  other  ships 
closely  following  their  commander-in-chief,  who 
without  further  delay  led  them  into  Mobile  Bay. 


208    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

The  fire  of  the  larger  ships  kept  that  of  the  fort 
in  check  while  they  were  passing,  but  the  last  in 
line,  the  evil-starred  Oneida,  fared  badly,  as  the 
men  in  the  fort  had  returned  to  their  guns  by  the 
time  she  came  up.  It  was  probably  a  mistake  to 
put  a  small  ship  at  the  end  of  the  line,  as  she  could 
not  protect  herself  with  her  battery  so  effectually 
as  the  larger  ships  could  and  did.  She,  like  the 
others,  had  the  improvised  chain  armor  hanging 
on  the  exposed  (starboard)  side,  but  this  was 
pierced  by  a  rifled  shell  that  entered  and  exploded 
one  of  her  boilers,  killing  outright  or  severely 
scalding  all  the  firemen  and  coalheavers  of  the 
watch  below.  The  motive  power  of  the  ship  was 
disabled  by  this  accident ;  but  in  a  short  time  the 
exploded  boiler  was  cut  off  from  the  other,  and, 
assisted  by  the  Galena,  she  passed  on,  her  gun 
fire  not  having  been  interrupted  by  this  disaster 
nor  by  others  caused  by  shells  cutting  the  wheel- 
ropes  and  starting  a  fire  near  the  forward  maga- 
zine. 

When  the  leading  ships  got  past  the  fort  they 
were  attacked  by  the  Tennessee,  which  made  a 
futile  effort  to  ram  the  Hartford,  and  then  ex- 
changed shots  with  most  of  the  other  vessels  as 
they  came  up  and  passed  her.  The  most  damage 
done  at  this  stage  of  the  fight  was  to  the  luckless 
Oneida,  coming  up  partially  disabled  just  in  time 
to  receive  a  raking  broadside  from  the  Tennessee 
that  destroyed  boats  and  rigging,  dismounted  a 


THE  TENNESSEE  IN  ACTION  209 

gun,  crippled  the  mainmast,  and  wounded  several 
of  her  people,  among  them  Commander  Mullany, 
who  lost  an  arm.  The  fire  from  the  Confederate 
gunboats  in  front  of  the  ships  had  been  so  annoy- 
ing that  Farragut,  as  soon  as  he  was  past  the  fort, 
ordered  some  of  his  small  gunboats  to  east  off  from 
their  consorts  and  attack  them.  The  Metacomet, 
leaving  the  Hartford,  pursued  and  captured  one 
of  them,  the  Selma,  and  the  two  others  —  Morgan 
and  Gaines  —  were  chased  ashore  near  the  fort, 
where  the  Gaines  was  burned,  the  Morgan  event- 
ually escaping  to  Mobile. 

The  ships  proceeded  about  four  miles  up  the 
bay  and  anchored  to  clear  away  the  wreckage  on 
their  decks,  but  very  soon  the  Tennessee  was  seen 
following  them,  alone  and  bent  on  having  another 
fight.  She  made  a  desperate  stand  against  the 
whole  Federal  fleet,  and  fought  them  for  an  hour 
before  she  was  literally  worried  into  a  surrender. 
Her  low  speed  prevented  the  use  of  her  most  dan- 
gerous weapon  —  the  ram  —  against  much  faster 
vessels,  and  made  her  the  subject  for  successful 
attack  in  the  same  way  by  vessels  not  fitted  for 
ramming.  Her  greatest  injuries  came  from  the 
heavy  projectiles  of  the  three  remaining  monitors 
that  hung  close  upon  her  like  bull-dogs  around  a 
bear.  Of  the  ramming  efforts  Farragut  wrote  in 
his  report,  "In  this  engagement  the  Tennessee 
ran  at  our  entire  line  of  fourteen  vessels,  and  yet 
never  succeeded  in  striking  one,  but,  on  the  con- 


210    NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


trary,  she  was  herself  struck  in  succession  by  the 
Monongahela,  the  Lackawanna,  the  Hartford,  and 
the  Ossipee.  All  the  injuries  she  inflicted  were 
with  her  guns.  As  a  ram  she  did  us  no  harm 
whatever." 

The  casualties  of  the  Federal  ships  in  this  his- 
toric morning  battle  were  considerable,  and  were 
greater  than  in  any  other  naval  engagement  of  the 
Civil  War.  Tabulated  by  ships  they  were  as  fol- 
lows :  — 


Killed. 

Hartford 25 

Brooklyn 11 


Lackawanna  . 
Oneida      .     . 
Monongahela 
Metacomet    . 
Ossipee     .     . 
Richmond 
Galena      .     . 
Octorara  .     . 
Kennebec 
Tecumseh 


4 
8 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
92 


Wounded. 

28 
43 
35 
30 

6 

2 

7 

2 

1 
10 

6 

0 


Totals 144 


170 


On  the  Tennessee,  the  Confederate  admiral, 
Franklin  Buchanan,  lost  a  leg;  two  men  were 
killed  and  eight  wounded.  The  Selma  in  her 
fight  with  the  Metacomet  had  eight  men  killed 
and  seven  wounded.  The  survivors  of  the  crews 
of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Selma  became  prisoners 


SURRENDER  OF  FORT  MORGAN          211 

of  war.  About  three  weeks  after  the  battle,  Fort 
Morgan  surrendered  to  the  combined  army  and 
naval  forces,  the  other  fortifications  in  Mobile 
Bay  having  surrendered  or  been  abandoned  within 
a  day  or  two  after  the  battle. 


CHAPTER  IV 

EVOLUTION   OP   THE   BATTLESHIP 

WE  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  much- 
discussed  "  revolution  in  naval  architecture  "  that 
is  popularly  supposed  to  have  been  the  result  of 
the  example  of  the  Monitor.  In  this,  as  in  much 
that  has  gone  before,  it  is  necessary  to  be  cautious 
before  ascribing  great  results  to  individual  causes. 
The  steam  engine  and  the  art  of  steam  navigation 
were  not  sudden  discoveries,  but,  as  has  been 
shown,  were  slow  growths  and  the  productions  of 
many  minds.  This  also  is  true  of  the  changed 
methods  of  war-ship  construction,  which  were  in 
progress  before  the  day  of  the  Monitor,  and  would 
have  continued  to  advance  without  her  example, 
though  much  hastened  by  it.  Without  the  Merri- 
mac  and  Monitor  the  evolution  that  began  in  the 
Stevens  battery,  the  Kinburn  batteries,  the  War- 
rior, and  La  Gloire,  would  have  progressed  slowly 
and,  unless  quickened  by  the  emergency  construc- 
tions of  some  other  war,  might  not  have  resulted 
in  the  modern  battleship  before  the  middle  of  the 
twentieth  century ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
that  creation  would  have  been  reached  eventually. 


213 

No  principle  brought  into  prominence  by  the 
conflict  in  Hampton  Roads  was  novel ;  the  ram 
was  as  old  as  Salamis ;  armor  protection  for  ships 
of  war  was  used  by  the  vikings,  who  hung  their 
tough  shields  over  the  sides  of  their  ships;  the 
revolving  tower  as  a  protection  for  men  and  mis- 
sile-throwing machines  was  in  action  first  in  mod- 
ern times  on  board  the  Monitor,  but  it  was  not  a 
new  thing.  Ericsson  himself,  in  the  progress  of 
a  controversy  as  to  the  so-called  invention,  ad- 
mitted that  "  a  house  or  turret,  turning  on  a  pivot 
for  protecting  apparatus  intended  to  throw  war- 
like projectiles,  is  an  ancient  device ;  I  believe 
was  known  among  the  Greeks.  Thinking  back,  I 
cannot  fix  any  period  in  my  life  at  which  I  did  not 
know  of  its  existence."  He  stoutly  maintained, 
however,  that  the  Timby  revolving  turret,  de- 
scribed in  a  former  chapter,  and  antedating  the 
Monitor  by  several  years,  was  a  totally  different 
invention.  The  capitalists  who  became  his  asso- 
ciates in  building  monitors  looked  at  this  question 
differently,  and  found  it  a  practical  business  pre- 
caution to  buy  the  right  to  use  Timby 's  patent 
and  thus  avoid  litigation. 

The  sinking  of  the  Cumberland  by  the  Merri- 
mac  revived  belief  in  the  ram  as  a  weapon  to  such 
an  extent  that  very  few  vessels  of  war  have  been 
built  since  that  day  that  have  not  been  provided 
with  an  under- water  projecting  or  ram  bow.  Faith 
in  the  ram  was  further  augmented  by  the  battle  of 


214        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

Lissa  in  1866,  in  which  the  Austrian  Ferdinand 
Maximilian  rammed  and  sank  the  Italian  flagship 
Re  d'  Italia.  The  United  States  must  be  excepted 
from  the  general  statement  that  the  ram  was 
adopted  by  all  nations  as  a  result  of  the  Merrimac's 
exploit.  Throughout  the  course  of  the  Civil  War 
and  for  about  ten  years  thereafter  all  vessels,  ex- 
cept a  few  of  special  types,  built  for  the  United 
States  navy  retained  the  graceful  overhanging  bow 
that  was  characteristic  of  the  American  clipper- 
ship,  with  long  head  booms  and  towering  masts. 
This  reluctance  on  the  part  of  American  naval  offi- 
cers and  architects  to  give  up  an  established  form 
that  had  outlived  its  purposes  is  the  more  remark- 
able because  it  was  our  country  that  first  suffered 
from  the  revival  of  the  ram,  and  because  at  that 
very  time  American  shipbuilders  were  constructing 
for  the  Italian  government  war-vessels  that  were 
conspicuous  for  the  prominence  of  their  ram  bows. 
The  battle  of  the  ironclads  proved  beyond  dis- 
pute the  value  of  armor,  but  the  question  as  to  the 
manner  of  placing  that  armor  remained  open.  The 
English  and  French  naturally  adhered  at  first  to 
their  practice  of  plating  large  broadside  ships,  but 
the  influence  of  the  turret  soon  had  an  effect  and 
led  to  many  curious  modifications  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  armor.  The  modern  system  of  protecting 
guns  in  revolving  turrets  or  behind  circular  bar- 
bettes is  the  result  of  the  evolution,  and  is  the 
greatest  change  that  may  be  attributed  to  the 


THE  MONITOR  IDEA  IN  FAVOR         216 

event  in  Hampton  Roads.  In  the  United  States, 
the  change  was  immediate,  without  a  long  expe- 
rimental period.  The  complete  novelty  of  the 
Monitor's  construction  and  the  magnitude  of  her 
achievement  so  charmed  the  public  mind  that  the 
shipbuilding  policy  of  the  government  was  con- 
trolled, and  many  vessels  of  the  monitor  type  were 
at  once  built.  Operations  in  rivers  early  in  the 
war  had  shown  the  necessity  of  metal  armor  for 
gunboats,  and  in  December,  1861,  three  months 
before  the  Monitor  was  completed,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  had  asked  Congress  for  authority  to 
build  twenty  ironclad  steamers,  but  it  was  not  until 
the  February  following  that  a  law  granting  that 
authority  was  enacted.  This  law  simply  appropri- 
ated ten  million  dollars  for  armored  vessels,  with- 
out specifying  the  number  or  type.  Many  designs 
were  proposed  to  the  Navy  Department,  but  nothing 
definite  was  decided  upon,  as  it  was  thought  proper 
to  wait  until  Ericsson's  then  nearly  completed  bat- 
tery had  been  tested  at  sea  and  in  battle. 

The  meeting  in  Hampton  Roads  fixed  the  moni- 
tor type  upon  the  United  States  navy,  and  just  one 
week  later,  March  16,  1862,  an  order  was  given 
to  Ericsson  to  build  with  all  possible  speed  six  ves- 
sels on  the  general  plans  of  the  Monitor.  Three 
of  these  were  built  at  the  Continental  Iron  Works, 
where  the  Monitor  had  been  built,  and  the  others 
by  other  shipbuilding  establishments.  Ericsson, 
encouraged  by  his  happy  selection  of  the  name 


216        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

for  the  Monitor,  bestowed  upon  the  new  vessels 
the  names  Impenetrable,  Penetrator,  Paradox, 
Gauntlet,  Palladium,  and  Agitator,  but  the  Navy 
Department  gave  them  good  American  names  that 
were  much  shorter  —  Passaic,  Montauk,  Catskill, 
Patapsco,  Lehigh,  and  Sangamon.  They  were  in 
general  dimensions  about  one  third  larger  than  the 
Monitor  and  possessed  certain  improvements  that 
had  been  found  desirable :  chief  among  these  were 
a  permanent  smokepipe,  the  pilot-house  placed  on 
top  of  the  turret,  and  provision  for  getting  air  into 
the  fire-room  by  means  of  large  standing  venti- 
lators. The  contract  price  was  $400,000  each. 
Each  was  armed  with  two  15-inch  cast-iron  guns. 
All  were  completed  by  the  end  of  the  year  and 
became  prominent  in  naval  operations,  especially 
in  the  investment  of  Charleston  harbor.  One,  the 
Patapsco,  was  sunk  by  a  torpedo  off  Charleston  in 
January,  1865,  but  the  others  still  remain  on  the 
list  of  ships  of  our  navy,  and  were  prepared  for 
coast-defense  duty  in  the  recent  war  with  Spain. 

Besides  these  six,  contracts  were  made  about  the 
same  time  with  various  shipbuilders  for  four  other 
monitors  of  the  same  class,  Ericsson's  designs  being 
followed.  These  were  the  Camanche,  the  Nahant, 
the  Nantucket,  and  the  Weehawken,  —  all  yet  on 
the  navy  list  except  the  Weehawken,  which  after 
distinguishing  herself  by  defeating  and  capturing 
the  Atlanta,  a  Confederate  armorclad  of  the 
same  type  as  the  Merrimac,  was  herself  lost,  in 


THE  MONITOR  IDEA  IN  FAVOR         217 

December,  1863,  by  foundering  in  the  harbor  of 
Charleston,  four  assistant  engineers  and  twenty- 
six  enlisted  men  perishing  in  her.  In  July,  1862, 
while  Ericsson  was  busy  rushing  forward  the  work 
on  the  Passaic  class,  he  undertook  contracts  to 
build  two  huge  monitors,  —  Dictator  and  Puritan, 
—  each  of  nearly  five  times  the  displacement  of 
the  original  Monitor  and  costing  in  round  numbers 
four  times  as  much  each.  They  would  have  been 
the  most  formidable  ships  in  the  world  at  that  time 
if  completed  as  soon  as  expected,  but  the  work  was 
much  delayed  by  changes  suggested  by  naval  offi- 
cers and  by  the  resulting  controversies  with  Erics- 
son, who  was  unwilling  to  receive  advice  from  any 
source  on  a  subject  that  he  fancied  himself  master 
of.  In  the  end  neither  vessel  was  completed  in 
time  to  be  of  any  service  during  the  Civil  War, 
and  the  Puritan  as  first  projected  was  never  com- 
pleted :  long  after  the  close  of  the  war  a  new  and 
improved  Puritan  was  built  from  the  old  one,  but 
little  except  the  name  entered  into  the  new  con- 
struction. 

The  same  year  (1862)  the  government  under- 
took the  construction  of  four  large  double-turreted 
monitors  at  navy-yards  as  follows ;  Miantono- 
moh,  at  New  York ;  Tonawanda  (afterward  named 
Amphitrite),  at  Philadelphia  ;  Monadnock,  at  Bos- 
ton, and  Agamenticus  (Terror),  at  Boston.  The 
hulls  of  these  vessels  were  of  wood  and  deteriorated 
after  a  few  years  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  the 


218        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

ships  worthless,  but  not  before  two  of  them  had 
performed  the  very  important  service  of  proving 
that  the  monitor  type  was  capable  of  long  sea  voy- 
ages. The  year  after  the  war  ended,  the  Monad- 
nock  steamed  successfully  from  Philadelphia  to  San 
Francisco  around  the  continent  of  South  America, 
and  the  Miantonomoh  astonished  European  critics 
by  crossing  the  Atlantic  and  appearing  at  various 
dockyards  in  England  and  elsewhere.  Beginning 
in  1874  and  extending  over  a  period  of  twenty 
years,  a  system  of  "  repairing  "  was  applied  to  these 
four  monitors  that  resulted  in  entirely  new  iron 
vessels,  with  modern  rifled  guns,  approved  turret- 
turning  mechanism,  and  modern  armor.  They  were 
all  actively  employed  in  the  late  war  with  Spain 
and  did  useful  service,  though  taken  far  from  their 
proper  station  as  harbor-defense  ships.  Because 
of  slowness,  and  lack  of  comfort  in  their  living 
spaces  in  hot  climates  under  steam,  their  record  in 
the  Spanish  war  was  injurious  rather  than  other- 
wise to  the  reputation  of  the  monitor  type. 

The  placing  of  two  turrets  on  one  hull  was  op- 
posed by  Ericsson  as  a  departure  from  his  original 
conception  of  mounting  guns  in  such  manner  that 
they  could  be  turned  to  fire  in  any  direction,  which 
object  was  defeated  in  the  case  of  double  turrets, 
as  each  masked  a  considerable  angle  of  fire  of  the 
other.  The  prevailing  naval  notion,  fixed  by  some 
centuries  of  practice,  was,  that  heavy  broadside 
fire  was  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  it  was  in 


THE  MONITOR  IDEA  IN  FAVOR         219 

accordance  with  that  belief  that  two  turrets  were 
adopted.  In  one  instance  three  turrets  were  placed 
on  the  same  ship,  the  frigate  Roanoke  being  cut 
down  somewhat  as  the  Merrimac  had  been  and 
three  Ericsson  turrets  installed  on  her  deck  ;  she 
was  not  a  success.  Besides  the  four  double-tur- 
reted  monitors  begun  in  1862  in  navy-yards,  an- 
other large  one,  the  Onondaga,  was  undertaken  by 
contract  in  New  York,  and  four  others  at  places 
in  the  Mississippi  Valley.  The  Onondaga,  after 
over  a  year  of  active  war  service,  was  returned 
to  her  builder  at  his  request,  and  by  him  sold  to 
the  French  government. 

The  Western  river  monitors  were  considerably 
different  from  Ericsson's  design,  the  guns  being 
mounted  hi  turrets  on  a  "disappearing"  principle 
invented  by  the  distinguished  engineer  James  B. 
Eads,  and  the  decks  were  so  crowned  or  rounded 
that  the  vessels  were  known  as  "  turtle-backs." 
Another  peculiar  feature  was  that  they  each  had 
four  propelling  screws,  two  on  each  side  of  the 
rudder,  each  pair  driven  by  bevel  gearing  from 
the  same  engine  shaft.  Five  small  smgle-turreted 
monitors  of  special  types  were  placed  under  con- 
struction in  the  Mississippi  Valley  at  the  same  time 
as  the  larger  ones.  In  September  of  the  same 
year  nine  Ericsson  monitors,  similar  to  but  slightly 
larger  than  the  Passaic  class,  were  undertaken  by 
contract ;  they  are  known  from  one  of  them  as 
the  Canonicus  class,  though  the  most  famous  was 


220        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

the  Tecumseh,  which  was  sunk  by  a  torpedo  in  the 
battle  of  Mobile  Bay.  From  the  foregoing  we  see 
that  the  monitor  idea  was  in  such  favor  that  within 
a  few  months  after  the  Monitor-Merrimac  duel  no 
less  than  thirty-five  vessels  of  that  type  were  being 
built  for  the  United  States  navy. 

In  addition  to  monitors,  the  year  1862  produced 
in  the  United  States  a  number  of  other  armor- 
clads  of  special  types,  mostly  small,  and  not  marked 
by  much  success  in  their  brief  careers.  One,  how- 
ever, the  Dunderberg,  was  very  large,  and  such  an 
important  advance  in  war-ship  construction  that 
a  description  of  her  is  necessary.  Described  as 
an  "ocean-going,  ironclad  frigate  ram,"  this  ship, 
instead  of  following  the  revolving  turret  example 
of  the  Monitor,  was  a  reproduction,  in  greatly  im- 
proved form,  of  the  casemate  broadside  system  of 
the  Merrimac.  That  is,  she  consisted  essentially 
of  a  low  hull,  with  prominent  ram,  surmounted  by 
an  armored  casemate  with  sloping  sides,  in  which 
was  mounted  a  very  heavy  battery. 

As  shown  by  the  midship  section  of  this  ship, 
wood  was  used  for  armor  at  the  knuckle  about  the 
water-line  in  very  much  the  same  arrangement  em- 
ployed by  the  Confederates  in  their  constructions  ; 
with  the  latter,  however,  the  employment  of  wood 
was  a  necessity  because  of  lack  of  iron  armor  and 
the  appliances  for  making  it.  The  sides  of  the 
Dunderberg  were  sloped  at  an  angle  of  thirty-five 
degrees  from  the  perpendicular  below  the  knuckle 


Midship  Section 


Section  through  Battery 


U.  S.  S.  DUNDEKBEKG,  1862 


THE  DUNDERBERG  OR  ROCHAMBEAU    221 

and  at  an  angle  of  fifty-five  degrees  above  it,  pre- 
senting, therefore,  a  right  angle,  or  ninety  degrees, 
on  the  broadside.  The  iron  armor  over  the  wood 
was  of  forged  plates  four  and  one  half  inches  in 
thickness. 

This  remarkable  ship  was  built  by  the  famous 
shipbuilder  W.  H.  Webb,  of  New  York  city,  under 
a  contract  dated  July  3,  1862 ;  because  of  her 
great  size  and  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  material, 
she  was  not  launched  until  the  summer  of  1865, 
too  late  to  be  of  any  use  in  the  Civil  War.  The 
government  relinquished  its  claim  to  her,  and  the 
contractor  sold  her  to  France  for  500,000  pounds, 
or  nearly  two  and  one  half  million  dollars.  Under 
the  name  Rochambeau,  she  was  for  many  years 
one  of  the  most  formidable  vessels  in  the  navy  of 
that  country,  upon  the  naval  architecture  of  which 
her  example  had  lasting  results,  still  visible  in  the 
sloping  upper  sides  and  exaggerated  ram  bows 
habitually  designed  by  French  constructors.  She 
possessed  a  number  of  features  that  are  now 
essential,  such  as  sub-division  into  water-tight 
compartments  by  fore-and-aft  and  transverse  bulk- 
heads, armor  gratings  in  the  smokepipe  as  protec- 
tion to  boilers,  etc.,  but  which  were  then  almost 
unknown,  or  deemed  of  little  importance.  Her 
size,  as  shown  by  the  following  table  of  princi- 
pal dimensions,  was  much  greater  than  that  of  the 
usual  naval  vessels  of  the  time  both  at  home  and 
abroad :  — 


222        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

Extreme  length 380  feet,    4  inches. 

Extreme  beam 72     "  10     " 

Draft  when  equipped  for  sea  .     21     " 

Length  of  ram 50     " 

Displacement 7000  tons. 

Tonnage 5090   " 

Weight  of  iron  armor 1000   " 

Capacity  of  coal-bunkers 1000    " 

Horse-power  of  main  engines      .     .     .  5000. 

The  public  had  become  so  imbued  with  the 
monitor  idea  after  the  event  in  Hampton  Roads 
that  the  shipbuilding  policy  of  the  government 
was  dictated  by  it,  and  the  principal  constructions 
of  that  year  were  the  large  number  of  monitors 
before  mentioned.  The  next  year  (1863),  moni- 
tors still  predominated,  though  a  large  number 
of  wooden  frigates  and  sloops-of-war  were  placed 
under  construction  to  provide  a  fleet  for  general 
cruising  purposes.  The  principal  monitors  pro- 
jected that  year  were  four,  with  double  turrets, 
undertaken  at  navy-yards.  They  were  big  ships 
(5600  tons  displacement)  with  big  names,  —  Quin- 
sigamond,  Passaconaway,  Kalamazoo,  and  Shack- 
amaxon,  —  intended  to  be  heavily  armed  and 
armored  and  fit  for  ocean  cruising ;  battleships,  in 
fact.  The  end  of  the  war  found  them  still  on  the 
stocks,  and  under  the  policy  of  retrenchment  that 
followed,  not  one  of  them  was  ever  completed. 
More  unfortunate  was  the  experience  begun  that 
year  with  a  class  of  light-draft  single-turreted 


TWENTY  YEARS  OF  INACTIVITY        223 

monitors  that  would  have  been  very  useful  for 
service  in  rivers  and  on  shallow  coasts.  No  less 
than  twenty  such  vessels  were  begun  by  contract 
early  in  the  year,  but  because  of  changes  in  weights 
imposed  upon  the  builders,  and  errors  in  the  origi- 
nal designs,  the  first  to  be  launched  would  barely 
float,  and  only  a  few  of  them  were  ever  fully  com- 
pleted ;  none  gave  any  valuable  service  to  the  navy, 
and  all  were  soon  broken  up  and  sold  for  old  iron 
for  a  tithe  of  their  original  cost. 

No  monitors,  and  but  few  ships  of  any  kind, 
appeared  in  the  shipbuilding  programme  of  1864, 
after  which  year  the  United  States  practically 
dropped  out  of  sight  for  twenty  years  as  a  naval 
or  maritime  power.  The  wait  was  a  long  one,  and 
particularly  humiliating  to  naval  officers,  who  had 
to  witness  the  slow  decay  of  our  fleet,  until  the  few 
ships  that  remained  to  display  the  flag  abroad  were 
inferior  in  every  respect  to  the  war-vessels  of  even 
the  fourth-rate  powers  of  South  America  and  the 
Orient.  During  our  long  period  of  naval  repose, 
the  principal  nations  of  Europe  were  spending 
fortunes  in  a  rivalry  to  excel  hi  the  development 
of  ships,  armor,  and  guns.  As  a  consequence,  the 
naval  indifference  of  the  United  States  was  not 
without  recompense,  for  when  we  again  awoke  to 
our  naval  necessities  we  were  able  to  profit  by  the 
experience  of  other  nations  and  proceed  with  the 
construction  of  a  modern  fleet  without  the  pre- 
liminary expense  of  learning  by  experiment  what 


224        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

to  build.  By  timidity  and  good  luck  combined  we 
were  not  involved  in  a  war  during  the  twenty  years 
of  inactivity,  and  thus  escaped  national  humilia- 
tion, for  there  were  few  organized  governments  on 
the  face  of  the  earth  that  did  not  possess  enough 
naval  force  to  drive  our  few  ships  off  the  seas  and 
devastate  our  home  coasts. 

Except  for  a  slight  recent  revival,  that  will  be 
referred  to  in  its  proper  order,  the  fashion  for 
monitors  reached  its  height  in  the  United  States 
immediately  after  the  battle  in  Hampton  Roads, 
flourished  for  a  year  or  two,  and  then  subsided 
with  all  other  considerations  relating  to  the  naval 
requirements  of  our  country.  It  is  to  Europe, 
therefore,  that  we  must  look  for  the  real  applica- 
tion of  the  lessons  derived  from  the  Monitor,  and 
for  the  evolution  of  the  battleship.  The  principle 
of  the  revolving  turret  for  a  gun-shield  was  im- 
mediately taken  up  abroad,  and  in  tracing  its 
adoption  we  are  confronted  at  the  very  outset  with 
a  controversy  as  to  whether  or  not  Ericsson  was 
the  originator  of  that  system. 

During  the  Crimean  War,  Captain  Cowper  Coles 
of  the  British  navy  had  had  constructed  and  sent  into 
action  a  little  turret  ship,  or  "cupola"  ship  as  he 
called  it,  named  Lady  Nancy,  which  was  little  more 
than  a  raft  with  a  shielded  revolving  gun  mounted 
on  it.  From  that  time  forward  he  had  been  busily 
engaged  experimenting  with  his  idea  and  writing 
pamphlets  and  memorials  to  the  Admiralty  regard- 


CAPTAIN  COLES'S  TURRET  SHIP         226 

ing  it.  His  work  was  entirely  independent  of  that 
which  Ericsson  was  doing  at  that  time  along  the 
same  lines.  His  representations  made  no  more  im- 
pression upon  the  conservative  Admiralty  than  had 
Ericsson's  claims  for  the  screw  propeller  twenty 
years  before,  and  the  application  of  armor  in  the 
British  navy  would  probably  have  been  limited  for 
an  indefinite  period  to  plating  broadside  ships  but 
for  the  sudden  interest  in  turrets  awakened  by  the 
appearance  and  performance  of  the  Monitor.  A 
seaman  of  the  old  school  by  profession  and  train- 
ing, Captain  Coles  was  hampered  in  his  inventive 
efforts  by  a  lack  of  the  mechanical  knowledge  and 
aptitude  that  so  distinguished  Ericsson ;  in  con- 
sequence he  had  to  call  to  his  aid  engineers  and 
architects  to  develop  his  ideas,  and  thus  lost  to 
himself  credit  as  an  originator  or  inventor,  but 
with  such  technical  help  the  turret  that  bore  his 
name  possessed  certain  features  that  were  con- 
sidered superior  to  Ericsson's. 

The  primitive  idea  in  the  Coles  turret  was  a 
turntable,  20  or  25  feet  in  diameter,  fixed  level 
with  the  deck,  and  on  which  was  raised  a  conical 
or  vertical  building,  or  cupola,  of  wood  about  two 
feet  thick,  to  which  as  a  backing  the  armor  plating 
was  attached ;  the  circumference  of  the  cupola  was 
pierced  with  port-holes  for  one  or  two  guns,  accord- 
ing to  the  size  of  the  ship.  The  table  was  sup- 
ported on  a  strong  central  pivot,  with  rollers  at 
the  circumference  moving  on  the  metal  surfaces  of 


226        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

the  supporting  platform  and  the  under  face  of  the 
moving  floor ;  an  arrangement  of  toothed  pinions 
and  segments  turned  the  table  and  guns  around  to 
the  desired  line  of  fire.  The  use  of  supporting 
rollers  at  the  circumference  was  decidedly  better 
than  the  Ericsson  system  of  bearing  the  entire 
weight  of  the  turret  on  the  central  spindle.  An- 
other good  feature  that  Ericsson's  turret  lacked  was 
that  the  base  of  the  turret,  instead  of  standing  on 
the  upper  deck,  thus  exposed  to  danger  of  jamming 
by  the  impact  of  shot,  was  supported  on  the  deck 
below,  and  thus  protected  by  the  ship's  sides  from 
direct  injury.  This  inclosed  deck,  from  which 
there  was  free  access  to  the  turret  base  and  mechan- 
ism without  exposure  to  fire,  allowed  several  meth- 
ods of  turning  the  turret  to  be  safely  employed.  In 
practice,  the  lower  part  of  Coles's  turret  was  fitted 
for  the  application  of  tackles  and  capstan-bars  as 
emergency  methods  of  turning  if  the  usual  rack 
and  pinion  mechanism  should  become  deranged. 

Though  unable  to  convince  his  own  countrymen, 
Captain  Coles  succeeded  in  inducing  the  Danish 
naval  authorities,  in  1861,  before  the  Monitor  was 
built,  to  undertake  the  construction  of  a  vessel  with 
his  turret  system.  The  ship,  named  Rolf  Krake 
and  launched  in  1863,  was  built  in  Glasgow  by 
Napier  on  an  order  from  Denmark,  and  is  note- 
worthy as  the  first  turret  ship  built  in  Europe, 
and  the  first  outside  the  United  States  to  be 
engaged  in  battle.  She  was  armored  her  whole 


THE  ROLF  KRAKE  227 

length  from  the  upper  deck  to  three  feet  below 
the  water  line  with  41-inch  iron  plates.  There 
were  two  Coles  turrets,  or  cupolas,  each  containing 
originally  two  68-pounder  guns,  but  later  changed 
to  one  8-inch  Armstrong  gun  each.  The  length 
of  the  ship  was  185  feet  2  inches ;  beam,  38  feet 
3  niches ;  draft  of  water,  9  feet  2  inches ;  and  dis- 
placement, 1325  tons.  She  had  three  masts  and 
full  sail  power.  In  1864,  when  Denmark  was 
assailed  by  powerful  neighbors,  the  Rolf  Krake 
made  a  brave  resistance  against  a  much  superior 
naval  force,  and  received  a  great  many  hits  from 
large  projectiles  without  material  damage. 

This  ship  was  in  no  way  the  result  of  the  build- 
ing of  the  Monitor,  and  would  have  been  built 
exactly  as  she  was  had  there  been  no  civil  war  in 
America.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  example  of  the 
Rolf  Krake  alone  would  have  given  an  impetus 
to  the  turret  idea,  as  naval  sentiment  among  the 
great  European  powers  clung  to  the  time-honored 
broadside  ships.  Though  the  English  did  not  at 
once  undertake  turret  ships  for  themselves,  they 
began  building  them  for  others,  taking  encourage- 
ment from  the  exploit  of  the  Monitor,  but  adopt- 
ing the  Coles  system  of  turrets.  The  kingdom  of 
Prussia  ordered  its  first  ironclad  in  England  at 
this  tune,  the  ship,  named  Arminius,  being  launched 
in  1864 ;  she  was  almost  an  exact  copy  of  the 
Rolf  Krake,  though  slightly  larger.  Another  de- 
velopment of  the  Rolf  Krake  appeared  in  the 


228        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

Italian  Affondatore,  launched  by  the  Millwall 
Shipbuilding  Company  in  1866,  and  engaged  in 
the  battle  of  Lissa  the  same  year,  though  with  no 
great  credit  to  herself.  She  was  much  larger  than 
the  turret  ships  that  immediately  preceded  her, 
being  of  4100  tons  displacement,  and  had  an  enor- 
mous ram  projecting  26  feet  beyond  the  stem. 
The  Dutch  also  ordered  some  Coles  turret  ships  at 
this  time,  their  first  one,  the  Prince  Henry  of  the 
Netherlands,  being  launched  by  the  Messrs.  Laird 
at  Birkenhead  in  1867. 

During  this  period  a  number  of  small  turret 
ships  were  built  in  England  for  South  American 
nations,  the  most  important  being  the  Huascar  for 
Peru  and  the  Bahia  for  Brazil.  As  one  of  the 
stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  battleship  and  as  a 
vessel  whose  career  has  influenced  naval  precedent, 
the  Huascar  deserves  particular  mention.  Built 
by  the  Lairds  at  Birkenhead  under  direction  of 
Coles,  and  launched  in  1866,  she  was  in  several 
respects  an  improvement  upon  similar  ships  of 
the  same  period.  The  iron  hull  was  of  unusual 
strength  and  was  divided  into  water-tight  com- 
partments inclosing  the  base  of  the  turret,  ma- 
chinery, and  boilers,  under  which  vital  parts  a 
double  bottom  was  provided.  She  had  a  swan- 
breasted  ram  bow,  sharp  stern,  single  screw,  and 
three-fourths  sail  power  on  two  masts  ;  the  length 
was  200  feet ;  beam,  35  feet ;  draft,  14  feet,  and 
displacement,  1800  tons.  An  armor  belt  41  inches 


THE  HUASCAR  229 

thick  amidships  and  tapering  to  2|  inches  at  the 
ends  encircled  the  ship ;  the  single  turret  con- 
tained two  300-pounder  guns  protected  by  5^ 
inches  of  armor  on  14  inches  of  teak  backing.  A 
top-gallant  forecastle  and  poop  cabin  prevented 
direct  ahead  and  astern  fire  by  the  turret  guns, 
which  defect  was  partially  offset  by  three  light 
shell-guns  on  the  upper  deck  aft.  The  bulwarks 
or  rail  plating  was  made  to  let  down  in  the  wake 
of  the  turrets  to  permit  unobstructed  range  of  fire. 
The  first  notable  performance  of  the  Huascar 
was  in  "  standing  .  off  "  two  large  British  men-of- 
war  in  a  pitched  battle  of  almost  three  hours'  dura- 
tion. The  navy  of  Peru  has  always  interested 
itself  in  politics,  and  in  1877  the  crew  of  the 
Huascar  mutinied  because  a  presidential  election 
was  not  progressing  to  suit.  The  ship  went  to 
sea,  and  by  so  doing  became  a  pirate  in  the  eyes 
of  the  law,  for  there  was  no  recognized  nation  to 
which  she  belonged  or  owed  allegiance.  The  Eng- 
lish rear  admiral,  De  Horsey,  on  that  station,  con- 
ceived it  his  duty  to  capture  her,  and  set  out  on 
that  mission  with  his  flagship,  the  Shah,  and  the 
corvette  Amethyst.  The  Shah  was  a  large  ship- 
rigged  unarmored  frigate  of  6250  tons,  18  large 
guns,  and  602  officers  and  men.  The  Amethyst 
was  of  1970  tons  displacement  and  carried  14 
64-pounder  guns  and  226  officers  and  men.  The 
complement  of  the  Huascar  was  from  200  to  220 
officers  and  men.  After  a  week's  search  the 


230        EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

Huascar  was  located  near  the  port  of  Ylo,  and 
an  engagement  immediately  ensued,  the  Peruvian 
commander  having  abruptly  refused  a  summons  to 
surrender.  The  Huascar  was  badly  cut  up  in  her 
upper  works,  —  boats,  masts,  funnel,  ventilators, 
and  bridge,  but  her  fighting  qualities  were  not 
impaired;  she  had  one  man  killed  and  two  wounded. 
There  were  no  casualties  on  the  British  ships,  and 
their  injuries  were  confined  to  the  rigging.  The 
Shah  fired  280  projectiles,  only  30  of  which  are 
supposed  to  have  hit  the  enemy,  about  30  other 
hits  being  credited  to  the  Amethyst.  The  gun- 
nery of  the  Peruvians  was  reported  by  the  British 
to  have  been  wretched,  and  so  it  must  have  been, 
considering  the  size  of  the  targets  they  had  to  fire 
at.  At  one  stage  of  the  fight  the  Huascar  closed, 
as  if  to  ram,  and  the  Shah  fired  a  Whitehead  tor- 
pedo at  her,  which  is  said  to  have  been  the  first 
ever  used  in  actual  warfare.  At  nightfall  the 
Huascar  quietly  steamed  away,  and  next  day  sur- 
rendered to  the  Peruvian  authorities. 

In  May,  1879,  the  Huascar  in  an  engagement 
off  Iquique  destroyed  the  Chilean  corvette  Esme- 
ralda  after  a  peculiarly  bloody  battle,  in  which  the 
Esmeralda  was  greatly  overmatched  and  in  which 
she  was  rammed  three  times  by  the  Huascar.  The 
captain  of  the  Esmeralda,  Arturo  Prat,  was  killed 
on  the  deck  of  the  Huascar,  he  having  boarded 
her,  followed  by  only  one  man,  the  first  time  she 
rammed.  Later  in  the  summer  the  Huascar  per- 


THE  SCORPION  AND  THE  WYVERN      231 

formed  the  unusual  feat  of  capturing  a  regiment 
of  cavalry  that  happened  to  be  afloat  on  a  trans- 
port. In  October,  1879,  off  Angamos  Point,  she 
was  defeated  and  captured  by  two  Chilean  iron- 
clads, the  Almirante  Cochrane  and  Blanco  Enca- 
lada,  each  superior  to  her  in  force.  The  resistance 
of  the  Huascar  in  this  unequal  battle  was  such 
as  to  enroll  her  name  permanently  in  the  list  of 
famous  fighting  ships,  and  to  make  the  battle  of 
Angamos  one  of  the  notable  sea-fights  of  history. 
Her  turret  and  pilot-house  were  both  penetrated 
by  projectiles,  the  commander,  Admiral  Grau, 
was  killed,  and  the  injury  and  slaughter  on  board 
was  frightful ;  the  Chilean  ships  also  suffered 
severely.  The  Chileans  repaired  their  prize  and 
used  her  in  the  same  war  against  her  former  coun- 
try. She  is  still  a  figure  in  the  Chilean  navy  and 
was  in  active  service  in  the  Balmaceda  civil  war 
of  1891. 

Somewhat  different  from  the  Huascar  were  two 
turret  ships  built  by  the  Lairds  about  the  same 
time,  the  Scorpion  and  the  Wyvern,  for  the  Con- 
federate States  of  America.  They  were  consider- 
ably larger  than  the  Huascar,  and  had  a  turret  aft 
as  well  as  one  forward,  which  were  on  the  Coles 
system,  each  turret  containing  two  12-ton  guns.  In 
1864  they  were  seized  by  the  English  authorities 
and  were  afterward  purchased  by  that  government. 
They  were  inferior  to  the  American  monitors  in 
offensive  and  defensive  properties,  but  the  example 


232        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

of  their  building  in  England  led  to  the  immediate 
construction  of  the  two  large  turret  ships  that  will 
next  be  described.  The  spectacle  of  these  and 
other  turret  ships  being  built  in  England,  com- 
bined with  the  tales  of  the  Monitor,  had  a  powerful 
influence  on  the  public  mind  and  gave  an  external 
support  to  Captain  Coles  that  enabled  him  to  over- 
come the  stubborn  opposition  of  the  Admiralty  to 
him  and  his  turret.  An  indifferent  opportunity 
was  reluctantly  afforded  him  to  introduce  his  sys- 
tem into  the  British  navy  by  putting  into  his 
hands  the  Royal  Sovereign,  an  old  three-decker  of 
120  guns  that  was  already  ruined  in  the  eyes  of 
the  authorities  by  having  had  engines  fitted  on 
board. 

The  hull  of  the  Royal  Sovereign  was  cut  down 
to  ten  feet  above  the  water,  and  an  unusually 
strong  deck  built  over  it,  sloping  from  the  ship's 
sides  upward  to  the  outer  circumference  of  the 
turrets.  This  deck,  of  heavy  planks,  was  laid  over 
one  inch  of  iron  plating,  which  affords  an  early 
example  of  an  attempt  at  a  protective  deck,  the 
same  feature  having  appeared  in  the  Rolf  Krake 
and  in  the  Monitor.  The  sides  of  the  ship  from 
the  water-line  up  were  plated  with  4-1  inches  of  iron, 
and  the  bulwarks  were  hinged  so  as  to  be  let  down, 
as  in  the  Huascar.  There  were  four  turrets,  the 
forward  one  containing  two  121-ton  guns  and  the 
others  one  each  of  the  same  size.  These  turrets 
were  131  feet  high,  but  only  about  five  feet  of  the 


The  Rolf  Krake.    (See  page  226) 


11 


The  Huascar.    (See  page  228) 


The  Royal  Sovereign 

EARLY  FOREIGN   TURRET  SHIPS 


THE  PRINCE  ALBERT  233 

height  was  exposed,  the  remainder  being  below 
the  deck  and  standing  on  rollers  on  the  lower 
deck,  where  the  winches  and  other  appliances  for 
turning  by  man-power  were  located.  The  work  of 
Coles  in  remodeling  this  ship  was  completed  in 
1864,  and  in  that  year  she  had  a  series  of  steam 
and  gun  trials  that  were  satisfactory,  though  she 
was  not  regarded  as  anything  but  a  coast-guard 
or  harbor-defense  ship. 

Contemporary  with  the  alterations  in  the  Royal 
Sovereign  was  the  building  of  the  Prince  Albert, 
a  four-turret  ship,  very  similar  to  her  in  appear- 
ance, but  built  of  iron  and  modeled  to  suit  Coles's 
designs,  instead  of  being  a  wooden  ship  merely 
adapted  to  them.  The  Prince  Albert  was  begun 
in  1862  and  launched  in  1864,  and  is  noteworthy 
because  she  was  the  first  turret  ship  built  expressly 
for  the  British  navy.  Two  guns  each  were  origi- 
nally mounted  in  two  of  the  turrets  and  one  in 
each  of  the  others,  but  this  was  afterward  changed 
to  one  gun  in  each  turret, — four  in  all.  The  ship 
was  240  feet  long,  48  feet  beam,  and  of  3900 
tons  displacement.  Like  the  Royal  Sovereign,  she 
was  not  a  seagoing  ship,  but  was  designed  for  coast- 
defense  only. 

Captain  Coles  next  sought  to  apply  his  system 
to  seagoing  battleships,  and  as  public  opinion  sup- 
ported him,  just  as  it  had  supported  Ericsson  in 
America,  the  Admiralty  directed  the  construction 
of  the  Monarch.  She  was  projected  in  1865  and 


234        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

launched  in  1867,  and  was  a  very  large  ship  for 
that  time:  displacement,  8300  tons;  length,  330 
feet ;  beam,  57 1  feet ;  and  mean  draft,  24  feet. 
An  armor  belt  extended  entirely  around  the  hull, 
rising  in  the  central  part  to  form  a  sort  of  citadel 
for  the  protection  of  the  lower  parts  of  the  turrets 
and  machinery.  The  turrets  were  placed  rather 
close  together  on  the  centre  line  of  the  ship  and 
carried  two  25-ton  guns  each.  At  the  bow  and 
stern,  armored  walls  or  bulkheads  were  carried  up 
to  protect  smaller,  but  fairly  heavy,  guns  placed  in 
battery  at  the  ends  of  the  ship.  The  all-round 
feature  of  the  turret  system  was  thus  sacrificed, 
as  these  bulkheads  masked  the  fore-and-aft  fire  of 
the  turrets.  The  vessel  was  rigged  as  a  three- 
masted  ship  with  full  sail  power.  Coles's  turret 
system  was  adopted,  but  the  design  of  the  ship 
was  by  the  construction  department  and  was  not 
approved  by  Coles.  He  insisted  on  a  low  free- 
board to  reduce  weights  and  make  a  smaller  tar- 
get for  an  enemy  to  fire  at,  though  he  approved 
the  full  sail  power ;  he  also  objected  to  the  bow 
and  stern  features  that  cut  off  the  fore-and-aft 
fire  of  the  turret  guns. 

After  protracted  representations  and  discussions, 
Captain  Coles  eventually,  in  1867,  obtained  au- 
thority to  design  a  ship  that  would  embody  his 
own  views  and  be  built  under  his  direction  free 
from  interference  by  the  government  naval  archi- 
tects. The  Captain,  built  by  the  Lairds  at  Bir- 


THE  BUILDING  OF  THE  CAPTAIN        235 

kenhead  under  Coles's  personal  supervision,  was 
the  result.  Her  length  was  320  feet ;  the  beam, 
53  feet ;  draft,  nearly  26  feet ;  and  displacement, 
7900  tons.  As  designed  by  Captain  Coles,  she 
was  to  have  8  feet  6  inches  freeboard,  but  by 
error  in  calculations  it  was  found  to  be  two  feet 
less  when  the  ship  was  completed.  She  was  ship- 
rigged  with  full  sail  power,  but  against  the  views 
of  the  ablest  naval  architects  of  England,  who  saw 
danger  in  the  union  of  low  freeboard  and  wide 
spread  of  sails.  The  Monarch,  not  intended  to 
go  off  the  coast,  had  14  feet  freeboard  and  no 
more  sail  than  the  Captain.  In  spite  of  Coles's 
objections  to  the  poop  and  forecastle  of  the  Mon- 
arch, he  found  it  advantageous  to  put  both  those 
features  on  his  own  ideal  ship,  and  he  connected 
them  by  a  hurricane-deck  running  above  the  tur- 
rets and  adding  much  to  the  upper  weights. 

The  Captain  had  a  wide  armor  belt  from  6  to 
8  inches  thick,  running  entirely  around  her,  and 
13  inches  of  armor  on  the  turrets ;  the  latter,  two 
in  number,  were  placed  in  the  centre  line  of  the 
ship  and  were  armed  with  two  25-ton  guns  each, 
the  guns  being  only  eight  feet  above  the  water. 
The  ship  had  twin  screws.  She  was  launched  in 
1869  and  completed  in  1870,  in  the  latter  part  of 
which  year  she  made  one  or  two  short  and  success- 
ful cruises  at  sea,  though  her  speed  under  sail  or 
steam,  or  with  sail  and  steam  combined,  was  infe- 
rior to  that  of  the  Monarch  under  each  of  the  three 


236        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

conditions.  The  general  British  public  regarded 
her  as  the  best  fighting  ship  in  the  fleet  and  des- 
tined to  become  the  type  of  all  future  battleships. 
A  few  naval  architects  had  misgivings,  and  the 
builders,  hi  handing  the  ship  over  to  the  govern- 
ment, suggested  that  her  stability  be  ascertained 
by  heeling ;  this  was  done  with  fairly  satisfactory 
results. 

September  6,  1871,  the  Captain  was  cruising 
under  sail  with  the  Channel  squadron  in  the 
Bay  of  Biscay.  The  evening  came  on  rainy  and 
squally  with  a  heavy  sea  and  falling  barometer,  from 
which  it  was  known  that  bad  weather  was  at  hand. 
The  ships  gradually  shortened  sail  and  shifted  to 
steam  power,  until  about  1  A.  M.  of  the  7th,  when 
a  furious  squall  struck  them  and  the  remaining 
sails  were  furled.  The  Captain,  next  in  line 
behind  the  flagship  Lord  Warden,  was  at  that 
moment  observed  by  the  admiral  to  be  closing  up 
under  steam,  with  no  sail  on  except  close-reefed 
topsails  and  foresail,  and  heeled  considerably  to 
starboard,  the  wind  being  on  her  port  side.  The 
signal  "  open  order "  was  made  by  the  flagship 
and  answered  by  the  Captain  and  others,  the  in- 
tervals between  the  ships  being  then  opened  out 
accordingly,  and  soon  thereafter  the  Lord  Warden 
lost  sight  of  the  Captain's  light  in  a  fierce  gust  of 
wind  and  rain.  Toward  morning  the  wind  abated 
and  the  stars  came  out,  but  the  ships  were  so  scat- 
tered that  they  could  not  be  identified  by  their 


THE  SINKING  OF  THE  CAPTAIN         237 

lights  visible  here  and  there  across  the  dim  sea. 
At  daybreak  it  was  noticed  that  there  were  only 
ten  ships  in  sight  instead  of  eleven,  and  as  soon  as 
light  permitted  full  investigation  a  fear  of  the 
admiral  turned  to  dreadful  fact.  The  Captain 
was  gone ! 

The  fleet  dispersed  in  search  and  found  wreck- 
age that  proved  to  a  certainty  that  the  missing 
ship  had  foundered  in  one  of  the  violent  squalls 
during  the  dark  hours  of  the  night.  The  fastest 
ship  in  the  squadron,  the  Inconstant,  was  ordered 
to  steam  at  full  speed  to  Plymouth  to  carry  home 
the  awful  tidings  that  spread  consternation  and 
woe  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  Eng- 
land. Of  over  500  officers  and  men  only  18  sur- 
vived, they  having  gained  a  boat  left  floating  as 
the  ship  went  down,  and  in  it  made  their  way  with 
toil  and  suffering  to  the  rugged  coast  of  Finisterre. 
From  them  it  was  learned  that  the  Captain  had 
rolled  heavily  in  the  cross  sea  and  showed  so  little 
buoyancy  that  the  rolls  were  slow,  sullen  lurches, 
putting  the  lee  rail  under  water,  and  creating 
doubt  as  to  whether  she  would  return  or  not.  At 
last  an  unusually  heavy  squall  struck  her  and  she 
did  not  return,  heeling  over  slowly  and  steadily 
until  she  capsized  and  dropped  out  of  sight,  a 
coffin  for  her  crew  in  the  depths  of  the  ocean.  So 
deliberately  did  she  turn  that  the  angles  of  heel 
called  to  Captain  Burgoyne  by  a  man  at  the  tell- 
tale came  at  appreciable  intervals :  "  Eighteen 


238        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

degrees  !  Twenty-three !  Twenty-eight !  "  It  was 
only  a  British  seaman  calling  commonplace  num- 
bers, but  commonplace  as  they  were,  they  were 
the  words  of  tragedy.  Indeed,  the  mind  can 
imagine  nothing  more  awful  and  tragic  than  the 
plight  of  a  great  ship  in  darkness  and  storm  slowly 
rolling  to  certain  doom,  and  beyond  all  hope  of 
human  aid.  One  hideous  detail  of  the  calamity 
was  the  shifting  of  the  boilers  as  the  ship  neared 
her  beam-ends  and  a  mighty  roar  of  steam  from 
the  broken  pipes  rushing  out  of  the  smoke-pipe, 
in  which  din  were  plainly  heard  the  cries  of  fire- 
men pinned  in  the  burning,  scalding  hell  below. 

No  officer  escaped  from  the  Captain.  Regarded 
as  the  finest  specimen  of  a  war-ship  afloat,  duty  in 
her  had  been  much  sought,  and  she  had  on  board 
representatives  of  several  of  the  most  distin- 
guished families  of  England.  Her  captain  was 
the  son  of  Sir  John  Burgoyne,  and  grandson  of 
the  General  Burgoyne  whose  disaster  at  Saratoga 
furnished  the  American  colonies  with  the  turning- 
point  toward  success  in  their  war  for  independ- 
ence. Captain  Coles,  the  designer,  was  on  board 
as  a  guest  of  the  commander.  His  tragic  ending 
in  a  fabric  of  his  own  making  has  afforded  the 
champions  of  Ericsson  in  the  turret  controversy 
a  gloomy  but  satisfactory  instance  of  retributive 
justice.  As  a  matter  of  truth,  however,  the  Coles 
type  of  turret  had  no  part  in  the  combination  of 
defects  that  was  fatal  to  the  Captain,  and  features 


RESULTS  OF  THE  CAPTAIN'S  LOSS       239 

of  his  turret  have  been  perpetuated  and  have  had 
an  influence  in  the  development  of  the  battleship 
to  quite  as  great  an  extent  as  have  those  peculiar 
to  Ericsson's  conception. 

Some  good  is  proverbially  said  to  result  from 
evil,  and  in  this  case  the  good  was  great.  The 
disaster  led  naval  constructors  to  pay  great  atten- 
tion to  the  stability  of  ships,  a  matter  that  up  to 
that  time  had  not  been  thought  of  much  conse- 
quence, and  the  number  of  vessels  lost  by  capsiz- 
ing has  as  one  result  been  remarkably  decreased. 
The  magnitude  of  the  Captain  tragedy  also  called 
a  halt  to  amateur  designers,  and  proved  that  naval 
construction  must  become  an  exact  science  and 
not  be  left  to  the  rule-of-thumb  methods  of  broad- 
axe  shipwrights.  Nothing  perhaps  has  contributed 
more  than  this  disaster  to  raise  the  business  of 
shipbuilding  from  a  trade  to  a  profession,  and  to 
lead  to  its  recognition  as  the  most  serious  and  re- 
sponsible of  all  the  sciences  connected  with  naval 
affairs.  Seamanship  is  a  difficult  and  intricate 
art,  but  no  amount  of  skill  and  knowledge  can 
save  a  ship,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Captain,  that  is 
put  afloat  with  inherent  and  incurable  defects  by 
incompetent  designers  or  builders. 

The  combination  of  sails  and  much  top  hamper 
proved  fatal  to  the  Captain  in  connection  with  her 
low  freeboard,  and  after  her  example  the  British 
authorities  abandoned  sails  for  that  class  of  fight- 
ing-ships, though  retaining  them  out  of  deference 


240        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

to  tradition  for  many  purposes.  The  chief  con- 
structor of  the  British  navy,  Sir  Edward  J.  Reed, 
had  earnestly  opposed  the  design  of  the  Captain, 
knowing  that  the  sails  were  dangerous,  and  believ- 
ing that  the  American  system  of  turret  ships  was 
the  true  one.  After  the  visit  of  the  Miantonomoh 
to  England  in  1866  he  began  working  out  plans 
for  a  mastless  seagoing  turret  ship,  the  work  ma- 
turing in  1869  with  the  designs  for  the  Devasta- 
tion and  the  Thunderer,  the  first  launched  early  in 
1871  and  the  other  a  year  later.  They  were  sister 
ships,  alike  in  all  principal  dimensions,  and  differ- 
ing only  in  some  details  of  construction  and  in 
type  of  propelling  machinery.  It  was  admitted 
that  they  were  evolved  from  the  American  moni- 
tors Dictator  and  Puritan,  though  larger  and  more 
formidable  in  every  way.  The  Devastation  was 
285  feet  long,  58  feet  beam,  nearly  27  feet  draft, 
and  9387  tons  displacement.  The  freeboard  of 
the  hull  proper  was  only  four  feet,  strictly  follow- 
ing the  monitor  type,  but  a  forecastle  and  side 
superstructures  for  crew  space  made  the  height  of 
the  sides  above  water  from  eight  to  eleven  feet 
except  at  the  after  part  of  the  ship,  where  it  was 
only  four  feet.  The  two  turrets  were  on  the  cen- 
tre line  of  the  ship  at  the  ends  of  a  central  citadel 
or  breastwork  9  feet  above  the  water  line  and 
about  150  feet  long ;  the  armor  on  the  turrets 
was  12  and  14  inches  in  thickness  ;  on  the  breast- 
work, 10  and  12  inches,  and  on  the  sides  of  the 


n 


The  Devastation 


The  Captain 


liiiilQB:H-:hZ^ 

lllllllllllllMlllllllllllllllliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii'umniiiillllL 


Monarch 


ENGLISH   BATTLESHIPS,   1867-1871 


THE  INFLEXIBLE  241 

ship,  10  and  12  inches.  Each  turret  contained 
two  35-ton  guns  mounted  about  14  inches  above 
the  water.  The  guns  of  the  forward  turret  of  the 
Thunderer  were  soon  replaced  by  two  38-ton  guns 
of  12  inches  bore,  operated  by  hydraulic  power. 

Immediately  following  these  great  monitors  came 
the  Dreadnought,  originally  named  Fury,  which 
may  be  described  as  a  Devastation  of  greater 
growth,  being  1000  tons  heavier,  with  thicker 
armor  and  bigger  guns.  The  next  step  in  the 
development  of  the  sea-going  turret  ship  was  the 
Inflexible,  laid  down  in  1874  and  launched  in 
1876.,  This  ship  shows  in  several  features  the 
keenness  of  the  rivalry  in  war-ship  construction 
then  progressing  in  Europe,  and  is  chiefly  remark- 
able for  the  advance  in  armor  and  armament  she 
exhibited.  Instead  of  the  maximum  armor  thick- 
ness of  14  niches  of  the  Devastation  she  had  armor 
as  thick  as  24  inches,  and  in  place  of  the  38-ton 
guns  of  the  Thunderer  she  mounted  in  each  of  her 
two  turrets  two  81-ton  guns.  The  location  of  her 
turrets  was  a  great  departure  from  previous  prac- 
tice :  instead  of  being  directly  forward  and  aft  of 
each  other  on  the  centre  line  of  the  ship  they  were 
placed  at  the  diagonally  opposite  corners  of  a  rec- 
tangular armored  citadel  occupying  the  central  part 
of  the  ship.  The  combination  was  well  described 
as  a  floating  turreted  castle.  The  advantage  of 
this  arrangement  was  that  the  turrets  did  not 
mask  the  fore  and  aft  fire  of  each  other,  and  each 


242        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

could  with  the  location  of  superstructure  bulkheads 
shown  by  the  drawing,  fire  directly  ahead  or  astern, 
as  well  as  on  either  broadside.  The  Inflexible  was 
320  feet  long,  75  feet  beam,  and  of  11,400  tons 
displacement,  being  by  far  the  largest  ship-of-war 
constructed  up  to  that  time.  There  was  no  side 
armor  on  the  hull  forward  or  abaft  the  central 
citadel,  which  was  a  departure  from  the  practice 
followed  in  former  turret  ships.  Several  vessels 
of  the  Inflexible  type  followed  her,  but  she  stood 
for  several  years  as  the  high-water  mark  in  the 
rush  for  heavy  armor  and  ordnance  in  England. 

Contemporary  with  the  Devastation  and  .Thun- 
derer, or  slightly  ahead  of  them  in  point  of  time, 
appeared  a  number  of  smaller  turret  ships  designed 
for  coast  defense  and  representing  better  than  the 
big  sea-going  ships  the  true  development  of  the 
monitor  type  in  England.  Of  these,  the  Cerberus, 
Magdala,  and  Abyssinia,  projected  in  1866  by 
Mr.  Reed  for  the  defense  of  colonial  harbors,  were 
pure  types  of  the  improved  American  monitor,  in 
which  were  combined  the  good  features  of  both 
the  Coles  and  the  Ericsson  turrets.  They  were 
of  about  3000  tons  displacement  and  carried  two 
18-ton  guns  in  each  of  two  turrets.  They  were 
completed  in  1870,  and  were  followed  the  next 
year  by  four  others  of  practically  the  same  class, 
—  Cyclops,  Gorgon,  Hecate,  Hydra.  Immediately 
after  these  came  the  Eupert,  Glatton,  and  Hot- 
spur, the  first  two  of  about  5000  tons  displace- 


THE  TURRET  SHIP  A  SIDE  ISSUE       243 

ment  and  the  Hotspur  of  4000  tons.  They  had 
only  one  turret,  placed  forward,  were  of  low  free- 
board, and  were  essentially  monitors  closely  resem- 
bling the  American  type. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  introduction 
of  monitors  in  England,  as  merely  outlined  in  the 
preceding  pages,  indicates  the  extent  of  British 
war-ship  building  during  the  period  under  consid- 
eration. On  the  contrary,  the  turret  ship  was 
only  a  side  issue  in  comparison  with  the  vast  labor 
of  creating  a  new  and  armored  British  fleet  then 
in  progress,  to  meet  the  changed  circumstances  of 
naval  warfare  precipitated  by  the  conflict  of  the 
ironclads  in  Hampton  Roads.  The  original  Eng- 
lish conception  of  an  armorclad  appeared  in  the 
Warrior,  a  ship  of  ordinary  appearance  in  every 
respect,  fully  rigged,  and  with  armor  only  around 
the  main  battery  space.  From  this  it  was  but  a 
step  to  an  armor  belt  entirely  around  the  ship,  pro- 
tecting the  gun-deck  for  a  full  broadside  battery. 
The  broadside  ship  remained  in  favor  until  about 
1867,  when  it  became  the  fashion  to  assemble  the 
main  guns  in  a  central  casemate  or  citadel,  the 
idea  perhaps  being  taken  from  the  collection  of 
gun  a  in  turrets  in  the  monitors.  The  all-round 
armor  belt  went  with  the  broadside  battery,  and 
in  its  place  the  box-battery  ships  began  to  have 
protective  decks,  that  is,  armor  over  the  decks  for- 
ward and  aft  of  the  part  protected  by  citadel 
armor. 


244        EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

Space  forbids  an  account  of  the  experiments 
and  types  of  battleships  peculiar  to  this  period 
when  old  traditions  and  new  inventions  were  in 
conflict.  Every  one  agreed  that  armor  was  essen- 
tial, but  in  almost  everything  else  there  was  much 
dispute  and  difference  of  opinion.  The  advocates 
of  the  old  time-honored  and  history-proved  broad- 
sides were  temporarily  discomfited,  but  their  guns 
soon  reappeared  in  the  form  of  an  auxiliary  bat- 
tery, the  turret  ship  Inflexible,  with  eight  4-inch 
guns  in  addition  to  her  main  battery,  being  the 
first  instance  of  this  kind.  A  persistent  effort 
was  made  to  preserve  the  traditional  "  ship-shape  " 
appearance  of  war-vessels  by  retaining  masts  and 
sails ;  these,  as  we  have  seen,  were  entirely  dis- 
pensed with  on  the  early  low-freeboard  turret  ships, 
but  other  armorclads,  whether  broadside  or  box- 
battery  ships,  were  for  many  years  fully  sparred ; 
this  in  spite  of  the  well-recognized  fact  that  sails 
and  steam  were  incompatible  powers,  requiring 
very  different  forms  of  hull  for  their  best  results. 
Without  attracting  as  much  attention  as  the  rivalry 
between  guns  and  armor,  steam  gradually  gained 
the  upper  hand  on  its  own  merits  in  the  struggle 
with  sail  power,  and,  from  being  in  the  beginning  a 
mere  adjunct,  soon  became  the  main  motive  power, 
and  finally  the  only  one. 

Because  of  the  many  forms  of  armored  ships 
that  were  in  favor  for  a  short  time  and  were  then 
superseded  by  improvements,  and  because  of  the 


THE  BARBETTE  245 

various  methods  in  vogue  from  time  to  time  of 
arranging  guns  in  battery,  it  is  wholly  out  of  the 
question  to  indicate  in  order  of  time  the  evolutions 
that  produced  the  modern  battleship.  The  study 
is  much  complicated  also  by  the  contemporary 
growth  of  types  other  than  battleships,  —  armored 
and  unarmored  cruisers,  gunboats,  torpedo-boats, 
and  other  special  forms.  The  ironclad  battleship 
of  the  present  may  be  said  to  be  a  union  of  the 
turret  ship  of  about  the  Inflexible  class  with  the 
central  citadel  or  box-battery  ship,  to  which  union 
the  older  broadside  type  also  contributes  certain 
features.  The  broadside  yielded  to  the  central 
battery  arrangement,  and  that  in  turn  to  the  tur- 
ret. A  modification  of  the  turret,  or  rather  a 
combination  of  it  with  the  box-battery  system,  is 
the  barbette,  much  used  abroad  but  never  in  much 
favor  in  the  United  States.  Its  peculiarity  is 
that  instead  of  the  circular  armor  wall  revolving 
with  the  gun  as  hi  the  case  of  the  turret,  it  remains 
fixed,  and  the  gun  revolves  inside  on  a  turntable, 
as  in  a  fort.  The  modern  battleship  mounts  a 
limited  number  of  heavy  guns  in  dispersed  positions 
in  turrets  or  barbettes,  with  a  secondary  battery  of 
smaller  and  more  rapid  firing  guns  in  broadside. 

After  the  foregoing  explanation,  we  will  return 
for  a  moment  to  the  history  of  battleships  in  Eng- 
land where  we  left  that  subject  at  the  Inflexible. 
The  immediate  successors  of  that  ship,  the  Ajax  and 
the  Agamemnon,  were  of  much  the  same  general 


246        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

design,  but  were  smaller  and  inferior  in  every  re- 
spect. The  next  battleships,  the  Edinburgh  and 
the  Colossus,  launched  in  1886,  with  the  Inflexi- 
ble disposition  of  turrets,  were  a  great  step  in 
advance.  They  had  breech-loading  guns,  the  old- 
time  muzzle-loaders  having  last  appeared  on  the 
Ajax,  and  a  better  proportion  of  length  to  breadth 
of  hull  made  them  about  three  knots  faster  than 
their  immediate  predecessors.  Immediately  after 
the  Colossus  is  the  "  admiral "  class  of  battle- 
ships, of  which  the  Anson  may  serve  as  the  type. 
They  were  a  little  larger  and  faster,  and  showed 
the  greatest  advance  over  the  ships  that  were  just 
before  them  in  the  breech-loading  barbette  guns, 
that  were  of  67  tons  instead  of  45  tons.  They 
had,  in  addition  to  four  of  these  great  guns,  six 
6-inch  guns  in  a  broadside  battery.  From  the 
period  that  we  have  now  reached,  the  growth  of 
the  United  States  navy  will  carry  forward  the 
development  of  the  monitor  idea;  but  before  leav- 
ing the  English  navy  it  is  pertinent  to  mention 
two  fine  battleships  of  the  year  1887,  —  the  Nile 
and  the  Trafalgar, — because  in  them,  after  a  lapse 
of  about  ten  years,  the  pure  monitor  type  was 
revived,  they  being  improved  Devastations,  larger, 
swifter,  and  more  formidable. 

In  the  construction  of  the  French  armored  fleet, 
which  was  contemporary  with  the  same  work  in 
England,  we  find  much  less  of  direct  bearing  on  our 
subject.  In  disposition  of  armor  and  dimensions 


THE  FRENCH  ARMORED  FLEET    247 

of  hull,  the  French  had  hit  upon  a  much  better 
combination  in  La  Gloire  than  had  the  English 
with  the  Warrior,  and  they  therefore  had  less 
occasion  for  changes  and  experimental  types.  As 
a  result  of  their  good  beginning,  their  ships  were 
more  uniform  than  those  of  their  neighbors,  but, 
like  the  English,  they  progressed  from  the  broad- 
side to  the  central  battery  type,  and  from  that  to 
the  barbette  with  auxiliary  broadside  battery.  The 
turret  has  not  been  much  used  on  French  battle- 
ships, though  adopted  to  some  extent  in  small 
special-service  vessels,  the  barbette  having  been 
more  in  favor.  As  already  stated,  the  French 
bought  the  American  double  -  turreted  monitor 
Onondaga  in  1866,  and  she  still  figures  on  their 
navy  list  as  a  coast-defense  vessel,  but  they  have 
not  seemed  disposed  to  copy  the  type.  In  this 
connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  of  the 
great  number  of  monitors  built  hi  the  United 
States,  and  in  spite  of  the  willingness  of  our  gov- 
ernment to  dispose  of  them  after  the  Civil  War, 
only  two  besides  the  Onondaga  ever  got  into  the 
hands  of  other  nations.  These  were  the  double- 
turreted  vessels  Catawba  and  Oneota,  built  in  the 
Mississippi  Valley,  and  sold  to  Peru  in  1868. 

The  first  French  turret  vessel  was  a  small  moni- 
tor ram,  the  Taureau,  built  in  1863,  which  was  an 
amplification  of  Captain  Coles's  Lady  Nancy  of 
the  Crimean  War  period  rather  than  an  offspring 
of  the  American  monitors.  The  turret  was  well 


248        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

forward,  and  did  not  revolve,  having  four  ports  for 
bow  and  beam  fire.  Four  other  rams,  the  Boule- 
dogue  class,  more  like  the  American  monitors,  were 
built  immediately  after ;  these  had  a  single  revolv- 
ing turret  each,  armed  with  two  24-centimetre  guns. 
All  had  wooden  hulls,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that 
the  French  built  their  war  vessels  of  wood  until 
1872,  though  iron  became  the  building  material 
in  England  with  and  after  the  Warrior  of  1859. 
Four  coast-defense  vessels  with  one  turret  each, 
the  Vengeur  class,  very  similar  to  the  British 
Rupert,  were  built  in  1872,  and  several  similar 
but  larger  vessels,  with  barbettes  instead  of  tur- 
rets, followed  soon  after.  Generally  speaking,  the 
American  monitor  has  not  greatly  influenced  the 
characteristics  of  French  shipbuilding. 

Germany,  or  Prussia,  was  not  a  naval  power  in 
the  days  when  the  armored  ship  was  growing  into 
being,  and  therefore  contributes  nothing  to  this 
investigation.  The  early  German  ironclads  were 
mostly  built  in  England  or  France,  and  of  course 
had  the  chief  features  of  ships  built  by  those 
countries  for  themselves,  resembling  in  general 
the  English  types  rather  than  the  French. 

Italy  followed  closely  the  French  broadside  iron- 
clads, without  much  experiment  with  turrets.  In 
one  instance,  however,  she  took  the  lead  even  of 
England  in  the  development  of  the  armored  turret 
ship.  It  has  been  mentioned  that  in  the  Inflexible 
the  belt  armor  was  omitted,  and  all  armor  was  con- 


MONITORS  IN  SCANDINAVIA  249 

centrated  on  the  central  citadel  and  turrets.  The 
determination  to  dispense  with  bow  and  stern  belt 
armor  originated  with  the  Italians,  and  was  put  in 
practice  by  them  in  the  Duilio,  begun  at  Castella- 
mare  in  1872,  launched  in  1876,  but  not  com- 
pleted until  1880.  She  has  two  turrets  arranged 
as  described  in  the  case  of  the  Inflexible,  each 
turret  carrying  two  100-ton  Armstrong  guns.  A 
sister  ship,  the  Dandolo,  followed  soon  after.  It  is 
admitted  by  English  naval  writers  that  the  designs 
of  the  Duilio  were  copied  in  the  Inflexible. 

The  nations  of  northern  Europe  introduced  the 
American  type  of  monitor  almost  without  change. 
Sweden,  Ericsson's  native  land,  had  as  much  pride 
and  faith  in  his  achievement  as  the  Americans  had, 
— possibly  more,  —  and  at  once  began  the  build- 
ing of  monitors  from  his  plans,  but  it  was  not 
until  1865  that  the  first  one  was  launched.  This 
was  named  John  Ericsson,  and  was  armed  with 
two  15-inch  American  (Rodman)  guns,  presented 
to  Sweden  by  Ericsson.  Three  other  monitors  of 
the  same  class  soon  followed,  very  much  the  same 
as  the  Passaic  class  except  that  they  had  9|-inch 
guns  made  in  Sweden.  Norway,  between  1866 
and  1872,  built  five  vessels  very  similar  to  the 
Swedish  monitors,  but  armed  them  with  11-inch 
Armstrong  guns. 

Russia,  the  hereditary  enemy  of  Scandinavia, 
checkmated  the  monitor  move  of  Norway  and 
Sweden  by  obtaining  plans  of  the  Passaic  class 


260        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

from  America  and  building  from  them  ten  vessels 
that  were  all  launched  in  1864.  These  had  exactly 
the  same  dimensions  as  the  Passaic  class,  but 
varied  considerably  in  displacement.  They  each 
had  two  9-inch  rifled  guns,  and,  though  copies  of 
Ericsson's  ships,  possessed  certain  features  that 
were  improvements  :  the  turret,  for  instance,  was 
made  of  such  large  diameter  that  the  guns  could 
be  placed  far  enough  apart  to  allow  a  clear  fore 
and  aft  fire  past  the  smokepipe.  The  junction  of 
the  turret  with  the  deck  was  protected  by  a  glacis, 
which  was  the  development  of  a  protecting  ring 
introduced  by  Ericsson  in  his  later  monitors  after 
service  by  the  Passaic  class  had  shown  the  base 
of  the  turret  to  be  a  vulnerable  spot.  At  about 
the  same  time,  the  Russians  had  a  small  double- 
turreted  monitor  built  in  England  on  the  Coles 
system.  In  1867  and  1868  they  built  two  larger 
double-turreted  monitors  in  imitation  of  the  Amer- 
ican type,  and  four  much  larger  seagoing  low- 
freeboard  turret  ships  named  for  Russian  admi- 
rals. Two  of  these  latter  had  three  turrets  each, 
and  the  others  two ;  one  of  the  three  turret  ships 
had  two  guns  in  each  turret,  but  in  all  the  others 
there  was  but  one  gun  to  each  turret.  They  were 
of  about  3700  tons  displacement,  and  were  in- 
tended to  be  fully  rigged  ships  like  the  Captain, 
which  they  much  resembled,  but  the  loss  of  that 
ship  before  they  were  fully  completed  caused  the 
rigging  to  be  abandoned.  An  important  amplifi- 


RUSSIAN   ENTERPRISE  251 

cation  of  the  monitor  in  Russia  appears  in  the 
Peter  the  Great,  launched  in  1872  but  not  ready 
for  sea  until  1875.  This  ship,  320  feet  long  and 
of  over  9600  tons  displacement,  was  remarkably 
like  the  Devastation  in  general  details,  and  actu- 
ally larger  and  more  formidable  than  that  huge 
English  monitor. 

Russia  furnished  the  example  of  the  most  abnor- 
mal development  that  the  monitor  type  has  under- 
gone, in  the  "  Popoffkas,"  so  named  in  honor  of 
their  designer,  the  Russian  admiral  Popoff,  two 
steam  batteries  that  were  perfectly  circular,  pro- 
pelled by  six  screws,  and  mounting  in  a  central 
circular  barbette  two  heavy  guns  commanding  the 
whole  horizon.  They  were  built  about  1873,  and 
were  intended  for  coast-defense  purposes  in  the 
shallow  waters  of  the  Black  Sea.  The  smaller 
one,  named  Novgorod,  was  101  feet  long  and  101 
feet  beam,  or,  more  properly  described,  was  101 
feet  in  diameter,  and  only  13  feet  draft ;  the  dis- 
placement was  about  2500  tons.  The  sides  were 
only  two  feet  above  the  water,  but  the  upper  deck 
curved  upward  so  much  that  in  the  centre  it  was 
five  feet  above  the  water  line  ;  from  this  eleva- 
tion the  turret,  or  barbette,  mounting  two  11-inch 
28-ton  guns,  rose  seven  feet  higher.  A  light 
deck-house  forward  furnished  quarters  for  a  portion 
of  the  crew.  The  armor  on  the  sides  and  on  the 
barbette  was  11  inches  thick,  and  the  thickness  of 
deck  plating  was  about  three  inches.  The  hull  was 


252        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

built  of  Russian  iron  and  had  on  the  flat  bottom 
twelve  parallel  keels  each  eight  inches  deep.  The 
other  one  of  these  curious  crafts,  the  Vice  Admiral 
Popoff,  was  1000  tons  greater  in  displacement 
than  the  Novgorod,  20  feet  more  in  diameter,  and 
mounted  two  41-ton  guns,  while  the  side  and 
barbette  armor  was  eighteen  inches  thick.  These 
vessels,  were  slow  and  unmanageable,  and  were  con- 
sidered failures. 

In  the  United  States,  complete  apathy  held  sway 
during  all  these  years  when  other  nations  were  re- 
building their  fleets.  Such  attention  as  the  navy 
received  from  Congress  was  of  destructive  rather 
than  beneficial  character,  and  consisted  of  appro- 
priations that  were  manifestly  inadequate  for  carry- 
ing out  their  objects.  Under  such  a  system  of 
neglect,  our  ships  and  naval  property  at  shore 
stations  slowly  decayed  and  became  unserviceable, 
until  the  naval  establishment  was  the  cheapest  and 
most  useless  branch  of  the  government.  One  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  realizing  that  the  time  was 
rapidly  coming  when  there  would  be  no  seaworthy 
vessels  remaining  to  perform  even  the  ordinary 
duties  of  the  service,  broadly  construed  his  author- 
ity to  use  the  meagre  appropriations  for  "  repairs  " 
placed  at  his  disposal,  and  had  a  number  of  ships 
built  that  were  fairly  useful  though  of  a  type 
already  out  of  date.  These  were  mostly  wooden 
corvettes  or  sloops-of-war  with  both  steam  and  sail 
power,  built  as  entirely  new  vessels  and  bearing 


RUSSIAN   STEAM   BATTERY  NOVGOROD 

FRENCH   RAM   BOULEDOGUE.    (See  page  248) 


AMERICAN  INACTIVITY  253 

the  names  of  old  sailing-sloops  or  steamers  that 
had  fallen  into  hopeless  decay,  but  appeared  on  the 
navy  register  as  being  under  repairs.  This  pro- 
ceeding, which  probably  lacked  strictly  the  warrant 
of  law,  finally  led  to  investigations  by  committees 
of  Congress  and  condemnatory  resolutions  directed 
at  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  some  of  his  prin- 
cipal subordinates  in  the  Navy  Department,  but 
the  resolutions  were  never  acted  on.  The  mam 
result,  therefore,  was  that  a  few  serviceable  vessels 
were  added  to  the  navy,  and  its  complete  dissolution 
thus  prevented. 

Besides  the  wooden  ships  built  around  old  names 
in  this  way,  new  iron  ships  were  begun  as  "  repairs  " 
to  the  big  unfinished  monitor  Puritan  and  the  four 
wooden  monitors  of  the  Miantonomoh  class.  Be- 
cause of  limited  appropriations  this  commendable 
work  progressed  slowly  for  a  few  years,  and  was 
then  abruptly  stopped  by  the  Congressional  investi- 
gation when  the  ships  were  still  in  a  very  incom- 
plete state.  They  remained  for  some  years  at  the 
shipyards  of  the  contractors,  running  up  bills  for 
the  rent  of  the  space  they  occupied,  and  were 
finally  taken  in  hand  by  the  government.  By  the 
year  1881  the  American  fleet  had  reached  such  a 
state  of  worthlessness  that  a  board  of  prominent 
officers  was  organized  to  consider  the  situation  and 
advise  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as  to  what  should 
be  done.  The  report  of  this  board,  which  recom- 
mended an  extensive  building  programme,  was  sent 


254        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

to  Congress  at  the  end  of  the  year  with  a  statement 
from  the  secretary  setting  forth  the  dilapidated 
state  of  the  navy.  The  situation  was  so  discredit- 
able that  the  same  year  the  President  referred  to 
it  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  and  pointed 
to  the  necessity  for  immediate  action  if  the  Ameri- 
can navy  was  to  be  saved  from  total  disappearance. 
The  advisory  board  had  recommended  the  immedi- 
ate building  of  sixty-eight  vessels  of  war  of  various 
types.  Congress,  after  eight  months'  deliberation, 
authorized  the  building  of  two  unarmored  cruisers, 
which  shows  how  low  the  navy  had  fallen  in  public 
esteem  and  what  little  interest  and  pride  in  its 
welfare  was  felt  by  national  legislators.  At  its 
next  session,  Congress  modified  its  act  to  the  ex- 
tent that  three  cruisers,  much  smaller  than  the  ones 
first  appropriated  for,  and  one  iron  dispatch-boat 
were  authorized  in  place  of  the  two  cruisers  origi- 
nally provided  for. 

The  first  of  these  acts,  which  bears  date  of 
August  5, 1882,  appropriated  $400,000  for  tempo- 
rary work  on  the  five  monitors  before  referred  to, 
the  principal  work  authorized  being  the  launching 
of  the  hulls  so  they  could  be  removed  from  the 
contractors'  yards.  The  act  specified  that  no  other 
steps  be  taken  toward  completing  these  vessels 
until  a  further  order  from  Congress.  The  next 
naval  bill  appropriated  $1,000,000  for  machinery 
for  these  double-turreted  ironclads,  but  the  appro- 
priation bill  of  the  following  year,  approved  July  7, 


THE  MONITOR  PURITAN  255 

1884,  directed  that  all  work  on  them  should  cease, 
and  that  any  part  of  the  previous  appropriation 
remaining  unexpended  should  be  returned  to  the 
treasury!  It  taxes  one's  patience  to  encounter 
such  instances  of  legislative  frittering  and  hauling 
at  cross  purposes.  The  general  deficiency  bill  of 
the  very  next  year  contained  items  amounting  to 
considerably  more  than  $200,000  to  pay  contractors 
for  the  use  and  occupation  of  their  premises  by 
these  hulls  lying  idly  in  them.  In  1886  an  act  to 
increase  the  naval  establishment  directed  the  com- 
pletion of  these  monitors  and  appropriated  over 
$3,000,000  to  begin  the  work.  As  the  work  of 
completion  was  undertaken  at  navy -yards  and 
depended  from  year  to  year  upon  Congressional 
action  it  did  not  advance  rapidly,  and  it  was  ten 
years  before  the  last  of  them  was  ready  for  com- 
mission. 

The  new  Puritan  is,  omitting  inches,  290  feet 
long,  60  feet  beam,  18  feet  mean  draft,  and  of 
6,060  tons  displacement ;  she  has  horizontal  twin- 
screw  compound  engines  of  3700  horse-power,  cal- 
culated to  give  the  ship  a  speed  of  twelve  knots 
per  hour.  Each  turret  contains  two  12-inch  breech- 
loading  rifled  guns  of  modern  pattern,  worked  by 
hydraulic  power  ;  besides  these  she  has  six  4-inch 
rapid-firing  guns  and  eleven  smaller  rapid-fire  or 
machine  guns.  The  armor  on  sides  and  turrets 
varies  from  six  to  fourteen  inches,  and  the  bases 
of  the  turrets  are  protected  by  barbettes  fourteen 


256        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

inches  thick.  A  superstructure  between  the  tur- 
rets on  the  upper  deck  furnishes  comfortable  quar- 
ters for  officers,  but  detracts  considerably  from 
the  pure  monitor  features  of  the  vessel.  The  four 
smaller  ones  —  Amphitrite,  Miantonomoh,  Terror, 
and  Monadnock  —  are  of  the  same  principal  di- 
mensions, but  differ  to  some  extent  in  details  of 
arrangement,  manner  of  working  turrets,  machin- 
ery, etc.  They  are  260  feet  in  length,  56  feet 
beam,  15  feet  draft,  and  of  about  4,000  tons  dis- 
placement. Each  has  four  10-inch  rifled  guns 
arranged  in  pairs  in  the  turrets,  and  a  number  of 
smaller  guns  for  a  secondary  battery.  All  but  the 
Monadnock  have  antiquated  machinery  and  are  of 
low  speed. 

Besides  directing  the  completion  of  the  double- 
turreted  monitors,  the  naval  bill  of  August  3, 1886, 
provided  for  the  first  battleship  for  the  United 
States  navy,  though  the  result  was  an  example  of 
English  rather  than  of  American  methods.  Be- 
cause of  lack  of  experience  at  home  it  was  thought 
proper  to  procure  plans  for  this  ship  in  England, 
in  which  country  the  United  States  offered  a  prize 
of  $15,000  for  the  best  design  of  a  battleship  that 
a  competition  would  bring  forth.  The  plans  thus 
secured  were  for  a  ship  that  was  built  at  the  Nor- 
folk navy-yard,  and  named  Texas.  The  propelling 
machinery  was  obtained  by  contract  from  the  Rich- 
mond Locomotive  Works,  of  Richmond,  Virginia. 
Owing  to  doubts  as  to  the  practicability  of  the 


THE  BATTLESHIP  TEXAS  257 

plans,  the  work  of  building  the  Texas  was  consid- 
erably delayed,  and  she  was  not  ready  for  service 
until  midsummer  of  1895,  though  the  keel  was 
laid  early  in  1889.  After  completion  she  was  the 
victim  of  a  series  of  mishaps  and  accidents,  some 
the  evident  result  of  faults  in  the  original  design, 
that  gave  her  a  bad  name  and  reflected  upon  the 
judgment  of  the  Navy  Department  in  its  method 
of  procuring  the  plans.  The  evil  reputation  of  the 
ship  was  overcome  and  her  past  faults  atoned  for 
by  the  fortunate  position  that  enabled  her  to  take 
a  prominent  part  in  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  when  it  issued  from  Santiago  harbor. 

Roughly  described,  the  Texas  is  a  central  citadel 
ship  somewhat  like  the  Inflexible  type,  though 
smaller  and  inferior  to  that  vessel;  she  has  two 
turrets  diagonally  opposite  each  other  in  the  citadel, 
each  turret  mounting  only  one  gun,  —  a  12-inch 
rifle.  Six  6-inch  guns  are  mounted  outside  the 
citadel,  two  of  them  being  on  the  upper  deck  and 
very  much  exposed.  The  side  and  turret  armor  is 
twelve  inches  thick.  The  Texas  is  301  feet  long, 
64  feet  beam,  6300  tons  displacement,  and  has 
twin-screw  triple-expansion  engines  that  have  given 
her  a  speed  of  nearly  eighteen  knots. 

The  same  law  that  authorized  the  building  of 
the  Texas  brought  into  existence  the  Maine,  a  ves- 
sel of  somewhat  similar  features,  though  designed 
wholly  by  Americans  and  known  originally  as  an 
armored  cruiser  instead  of  a  battleship.  She  had 


258        EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

two  turrets  of  the  monitor  type,  each  mounting 
two  10-inch  guns,  arranged  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  upper  deck,  one  well  forward  and  the  other  aft, 
but  not  protected  by  a  redoubt  or  citadel. 

The  naval  appropriation  act  of  1887  directed  the 
construction  of  some  cruisers  and  gunboats,  and 
one  monitor,  —  the  Monterey.  This  vessel  is  almost 
a  copy  in  principal  dimensions  of  the  Miantonomoh 
class,  but  being  of  a  so  much  later  date  is  built  of 
better  material  and  is  an  improvement  upon  that 
class  in  all  respects.  She  has  twin-screw  triple- 
expansion  engines  of  5,000  horse-power,  which  is 
more  than  three  times  that  of  the  Miantonomoh 
class,  and  is  consequently  much  faster.  Her  for- 
ward turret  contains  two  12-inch  rifles,  and  the 
after  turret  two  10-inch ;  she  has  the  usual  supply 
of  small  guns.  Two  years  later,  in  1889,  Congress 
authorized  the  building  of  what  it  styled  an  "  ar- 
mored steel  cruising  monitor,"  of  about  3,000  tons 
displacement  and  a  sea  speed  of  seventeen  knots. 
The  qualities  the  law  required  for  this  vessel  were 
so  difficult  or  impossible  to  fulfill  that  no  contract 
for  its  construction  was  ever  made. 

The  distinctively  American  battleship  dates 
from  the  year  1890,  when  Congress  authorized  the 
building  of  "  three  seagoing,  coast-line  battleships, 
designed  to  carry  the  heaviest  armor  and  most 
powerful  ordnance  .  .  .  and  to  have  the  highest 
practicable  speed  for  vessels  of  their  class,  to  cost, 
exclusive  of  armament  and  of  any  premiums  that 


U.  S.  S.  Texas 


^griffin 


'Iii»tn°  .r.4  .•. .  .™*L 


S.  S.  Maine 


SECOND-CLASS   BATTLESHIPS 


THE  COST  OF  A  BATTLESHIP  259 

may  be  paid  for  increased  speed,  not  exceeding 
four  million  dollars  each."  The  Indiana,  the 
Massachusetts,  and  the  Oregon  were  the  result, 
the  two  first  built  by  the  Cramp  Company  of  Phila- 
delphia, and  the  Oregon  by  the  Union  Iron  Works 
of  San  Francisco.  They  are  348  feet  in  length, 
69  feet  beam,  24  feet  mean  draft,  and  of  10,288 
tons  displacement.  They  have  vertical  triple- 
expansion  engines  of  about  10,000  horse-power, 
and  can  steam  about  sixteen  knots  per  hour.  The 
Oregon  developed  about  1,000  more  horse-power 
than  the  others  on  the  official  trial  and  averaged 
16.79  knots,  as  against  15.55  by  the  Indiana, 
and  16.21  by  the  Massachusetts.  Their  side  armor 
is  18  inches  thick ;  that  on  the  main  turrets, 
15  inches ;  and  that  on  the  main  turret  barbettes, 
17  inches.  The  actual  cost  of  one  of  these  great 
battleships  is  something  enormous,  the  armor  and 
guns  being  so  expensive  that  the  contract  price 
for  hull  and  machinery  may  not  represent  much 
more  than  one  half  of  the  whole.  The  total  cost 
of  the  Indiana  was  certified  to  Congress  as  more 
than  six  million  dollars,  the  items  being  distributed 
as  follows :  — 
Hull  and  machinery  (including  hull 

armor,  premium,  and  cost  of  trial).     .  $4,133,393.10 

Armor  for  gun  protection 977,134.02 

Armament 966,567.58 

Equipment 95,691.45 

Total  cost  to  date  of  being  commissioned  $6,172,786.15 


260        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

These  battleships  are  wholly  of  American  de- 
sign, and  are  much  different  from  the  same  class 
of  ships  contemporary  with  them  in  other  countries. 
In  them  the  diagonal  arrangement  of  turrets  is 
abandoned  and  the  two  main  turrets,  each  mount- 
ing two  13-inch  rifled  guns,  are  placed  on  the 
centre  line  of  the  ship  at  a  distance  apart  equal 
to  about  one  half  the  length  of  the  ship.  With 
their  low  freeboard  (about  eight  feet)  and  these 
enormous  turrets  they  are  in  appearance  and  real- 
ity magnified  monitors,  of  which  type  they  are 
the  lineal  descendants.  A  central  superstructure 
between  the  turrets  contains  four  6-inch  guns 
and  affords  space  on  its  top  for  a  large  secondary 
battery  of  small  guns.  With  the  number  and 
arrangement  of  guns  described,  the  Oregon  class  is 
not  greatly  overmatched  by  foreign  battleships  of 
like  size ;  but  the  American  ships  possess  another 
battery  intermediate  to  the  turret  and  secondary 
guns  that  makes  them  superior  in  gun  power  to 
anything  near  their  size  afloat. 

At  the  corners  of  the  superstructure,  and  stand- 
ing higher  than  the  tops  of  the  13-inch  turrets,  are 
four  other  turrets,  each  mounting  two  8-inch  guns, 
the  location  and  arrangement  being  as  shown  by 
the  outline  battery  and  armor  plans  here  intro- 
duced. From  these  it  will  be  observed  that  eight 
turret  guns  and  two  of  the  four  6-inch  guns  may 
be  fired  on  each  broadside,  and  that  six  of  the  tur- 
ret and  two  of  the  broadside  guns  may  be  trained 


OREGON  AND  CENTURION  COMPARED    261 

directly  ahead  or  astern.  The  secondary  battery, 
not  shown  by  the  drawings,  has  an  equally  wide 
range  of  fire.  It  has  been  asserted  by  European 
critics  that  these  battleships  are  over-gunned,  but 
they  have  carried  their  heavy  batteries  safely  on 
long  sea  voyages,  and  have  all  been  in  situations 
recently  where  the  great  weight  of  guns  on  board 
was  not  detrimental  to  their  welfare  and  safety. 
A  graphic  comparison  of  these  ships  with  similar 
ones  built  at  exactly  the  same  time  in  Europe  will 
be  interesting  to  show  the  extent  that  American 
ideas  of  war-ships  differ  from  the  most  expert  for- 
eign practice.  In  illustration,  the  drawings  of 
the  first-class  battleships  Barfleur  and  Centurion 
of  the  British  navy  are  shown.  These  ships  were 
completed  in  1894,  and  are  of  10,500  tons  dis- 
placement, 360  feet  long,  and  70  feet  beam,  or 
only  very  little  larger  in  chief  dimensions  than  the 
Oregon  class.  The  batteries  of  the  two  classes 
are  as  follows :  — 

OREGON.  CENTURION. 

Four  13-inch  rifles.  Four  10-inch  rifles. 

Eight  8-inch  rifles.  Ten  4.7-inch  rifles. 

Four  6-inch  rifles.  ........ 

Twenty  6-pounder  rapid  Eight  6-pounder  rapid  fire 

fire  guns.  guns. 

Six  1-pounder  rapid  fire  Twelve  3-pounder  rapid  fire 

guns.  guns.  . 

Two  Colts  machine  guns.  Seven  light  machine  guns. 

Two  3-inch  field  guns.  Two  light  field  guns. 


262        EVOLUTION   OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

As  a  partial  offset  to  this  inferiority  in  battery, 
the  British  ships  have  about  3,000  more  horse- 
power and  between  two  and  three  knots  greater 
speed  than  the  American  ships,  which  advantage 
might  prevent  defeat  if  it  did  not  lead  to  victory, 
for  speed  is  now  recognized  as  one  of  the  chief 
factors  in  naval  warfare. 

Though  designated  as  "  coast-line  battleships  " 
and  intended  only  for  home  defense,  the  ships  of 
the  Oregon  class  have  proved  in  a  conclusive  man- 
ner their  fitness  for  ocean  cruising.  The  example 
of  the  Oregon  herself  is  unequaled  in  the  his- 
tory of  battleships,  and  is  remarkable  enough  to 
deserve  a  brief  review.  This  ship  left  the  naval 
station  at  Bremerton,  Washington,  March  6, 1898, 
and  arrived  at  San  Francisco,  March  9,  where  she 
filled  up  with  coal  and  ammunition  in  obedience 
to  orders  from  the  Navy  Department.  She  left 
San  Francisco,  March  19,  and  arrived  at  Callao, 
Peru,  April  4,  having  made  an  average  speed  of 
10.7  knots  on  the  run  of  about  4000  miles.  At 
Callao  the  engines  were  adjusted  and  the  boilers 
cleaned,  while  1100  tons  of  coal,  that  had  already 
been  bought  and  loaded  on  lighters  by  the  gun- 
boat Marietta,  was  being  hurried  on  board.  On 
April  7,  after  three  days  of  this  work,  the  Oregon 
proceeded,  and  appeared  in  Magellan's  Straits  on 
the  16th,  having  averaged  11|  knots  during  the 
whole  voyage,  made  in  a  heavy  swell  that  kept 
the  decks  flooded  and  caused  much  racing  and 
vibration  of  the  engines. 


0 


U.  S.  S.  Oregon 


U.  M.  S.  Centurion 


FIRST-CLASS  BATTLESHIPS 


THE  OREGON'S  FAMOUS  VOYAGE    263 

At  Sandy  Point  more  coal  was  obtained,  and  on 
the  21st  the  ship  passed  out  of  the  Straits  into  the 
Atlantic,  her  progress  being  somewhat  retarded  by 
the  company  of  the  slower  Marietta.  On  April  30 
they  arrived  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  heard  for 
the  first  time  of  the  existence  of  war  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain.  They  left  Rio  de 
Janeiro  May  4,  having  in  company  the  Nictheroy 
(Buffalo),  and  with  a  warning  from  home  that  a 
formidable  Spanish  fleet  was  on  its  way  to  Amer- 
ican waters.  On  the  8th,  the  Oregon,  having  left 
her  consorts  behind  because  of  their  slow  speed, 
stopped  at  Bahia  to  communicate  with  the  Navy 
Department,  leaving  there  the  next  day  and  stop- 
ping eighteen  hours  off  Barbados  on  the  18th.  The 
next  heard  of  the  Oregon  was  her  telegram  from 
Jupiter  Inlet  on  the  coast  of  Florida,  announcing 
her  arrival  there  May  24,  in  perfect  condition, 
from  which  place  she  was  ordered  to  join  the  fleet 
of  Admiral  Sampson  operating  against  the  enemy 
in  the  West  Indies.  "  It  is  difficult,"  says  Cap- 
tain Mahan,  "  to  exaggerate  the  honor  which  this 
result  does  to  the  officers  responsible  for  the  con- 
dition of  her  machinery.  The  combination  of 
skill  and  care  thus  evidenced  is  of  the  highest 
order."  In  describing  the  high  spirit  that  animated 
his  crew,  Captain  Clark  of  the  Oregon  reports 
instances  of  officers  voluntarily  doubling  their  ardu- 
ous watches  in  the  engine-rooms  when  high  speed 
was  to  be  made,  of  attempts  of  men  to  return 


264        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

to  work  in  the  firerooms  after  having  been  car- 
ried out  insensible,  and  of  officers  manning  wheel- 
barrows to  assist  in  the  work  of  coaling  ship. 

In  the  long  sea  vigil  off  the  harbor  mouth  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  instituted  by  Admiral  Sampson 
to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  the 
Oregon  was  a  conspicuous  figure.  When  at  last 
the  day  of  battle  came  she  was  found  ready,  and 
was  by  far  the  most  important  factor  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  enemy's  ships.  About  a  month  later 
she  steamed  to  New  York  with  the  victorious  fleet, 
and  there  for  the  first  time  in  six  months  her 
crew  had  the  opportunity  of  rest  and  shore  leave. 
Within  less  than  three  months  she  took  the  sea 
again,  and  retraced  the  long  route  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  going  eventually  from  Callao  to  Honolulu 
and  thence  to  Manila,  where  she  arrived  March 
18,  1899,  just  one  year  from  the  day  she  had  left 
San  Francisco  to  go  to  the  Atlantic  coast.  The 
dispatch  of  Admiral  Dewey  announcing  her  arri- 
val at  Manila  added :  "  The  Oregon  is  in  fit  con- 
dition for  any  duty."  No  other  battleship,  and 
few  if  any  ships-of-war  of  any  class,  can  boast 
of  such  a  record  of  sea  miles  steamed  over  or  of 
stirring  events  participated  in  within  the  short 
period  of  one  year. 

Very  similar  to  these  three  great  battleships  or 
monitors  is  the  Iowa,  undertaken  two  years  later 
and  first  commissioned  in  1897.  An  important 
structural  difference  is  that  the  superstructure, 


THE  LATER  BATTLESHIPS  265 

instead  of  being  stopped  forward  and  aft  by  the 
principal  turrets,  is  carried  forward  to  the  bow, 
making  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  one  deck 
higher  than  the  after  part,  which  takes  away  the 
monitor  appearance,  but  adds  to  the  seagoing 
qualities.  The  forward  turret  is  placed  higher 
than  the  after  one  because  of  this  feature.  Other- 
wise, the  general  plan  is  much  the  same  as  that  of 
the  Oregon  class,  —  two  very  large  turrets  on  the 
central  line  of  the  ship  forward  and  aft,  and  four 
8-inch  turrets  in  the  corners  of  the  intervening 
space.  The  main  turrets  mount  12-inch  instead 
of  13-inch  guns.  The  Iowa  is  1,000  tons  heavier 
than  the  class  that  she  resembles,  and  is  of  pro- 
portionately greater  general  dimensions. 

The  later  battleships  for  the  United  States  navy, 
eleven  of  which  are  now  in  various  stages  of  con- 
struction, retain  the  monitor  feature  of  having  the 
principal  guns  in  two  central  turrets  forward  and 
aft,  but  have  abandoned  the  smaller  turrets  for 
intermediate  guns  and  have  come  back  to  the 
broadside  or  central-battery  arrangement.  This 
has  been  caused  largely  by  advancement  in  mechan- 
ical processes  and  methods  that  have  made  much 
larger  sizes  of  quick-firing  guns  practicable.  In 
the  older  of  these  new  ships,  the  Kentucky  and 
the  Kearsarge,  appears  the  novel  feature  of  double- 
decked  or  two-storied  turrets.  On  top  of  the 
13-inch  turrets,  and  forming  a  fixed  part  of  them, 
are  the  8-inch  turrets  with  guns  laid  parallel  to 


266        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

the  larger  ones  below.  Concentration  of  heavy 
gun  fire  is  the  advantage  claimed  for  this  arrange- 
ment. None  of  the  other  new  battleships  have  this 
feature,  but  they  all  have  what  are  known  as  ellip- 
tical turrets,  the  side  of  the  turret  opposite  the 
long  projecting  guns  being  prolonged  or  "  bulged  " 
out  of  circular  form,  the  object  being  to  balance  the 
turret  and  enable  it  to  be  turned  more  easily  when 
the  ship  is  heeled  or  rolling.  The  new  battleships 
following  the  Kearsarge  and  the  Kentucky  in  date 
are  Alabama,  Illinois,  and  Wisconsin,  authorized  in 
1896  ;  Maine,  Missouri,  and  Ohio,  authorized  in 
1898  ;  and  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  Georgia, 
authorized  in  1899. 

In  the  spring  of  1898,  when  the  country  found 
itself  at  war  and  its  seaports  liable  to  attack, 
the  old  Ericsson  monitors  were  hastily  fitted  for 
service  and  distributed  as  harbor-defense  vessels 
along  the  Atlantic  coast.  This  awakened  public 
interest  in  the  uses  of  monitors,  and  Congress,  as 
if  to  make  amends  for  neglect  during  the  long 
years  of  peace,  immediately  directed  the  building 
of  four  harbor-defense  vessels  of  the  pure  monitor 
class,  of  small  size,  and  carrying  only  one  turret. 
These  are  now  building,  and  have  been  named 
Arkansas,  Connecticut,  Florida,  and  Wyoming. 
As  designed,  they  are  to  be  252  feet  long,  50  feet 
beam,  and  have  a  mean  draft  of  between  twelve  and 
thirteen  feet.  The  turret,  of  elh'ptical  pattern,  is 
placed  well  forward  and  mounts  two  12-inch  rifled 


THE  MONITOR  THE  PROTOTYPE         267 

guns,  besides  which  there  are  to  be  four  4-inch 
rapid-fire  guns,  three  6-pounders,  and  four  1 -pound- 
ers. The  maximum  calculated  speed  is  only  11 1 
knots,  but  this  is  sufficient  if  the  vessels  are  re- 
stricted to  their  proper  sphere  as  harbor-defenders, 
and  not  sent  on  long  sea- voyages  or  put  to  chasing 
blockade-runners.  A  large  deck-house  or  super- 
structure abaft  the  turret  furnishes  a  position  for 
the  smaller  guns,  but  prevents  the  stern  fire  of  the 
turret  guns  ;  its  shape,  however,  is  such  that  the 
latter  can  be  trained  all  around  the  horizon  except 
over  an  arc  of  sixty  degrees  directly  astern. 

We  have  now  outlined  the  origin  and  growth 
of  the  principles  that  made  an  ironclad  steamship 
of  war  possible  ;  we  have  seen  such  a  vessel,  in 
the  shape  of  the  Monitor,  created  hurriedly  to 
meet  special  conditions  in  an  emergency,  and  we 
have  seen  how  completely  that  vessel  fulfilled  its 
object.  We  have  also  traced  the  evolution  of  the 
battleship  at  home  and  abroad  as  influenced  by  the 
example  of  that  rude  primitive  ironclad.  What- 
ever might  have  been  the  development  of  fighting 
ships  had  there  been  no  civil  war  in  America  and 
no  Monitor,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Monitor  is 
the  prototype  of  the  modern  battleship.  Through 
all  the  changes  and  developments  that  we  have 
reviewed  there  will  be  observed  in  the  truest  result- 
ing types  of  fighting  ships  a  close  adherence  to 
the  first  principle  of  Ericsson's  invention,  which 
was  in  having  the  principal  guns  mounted  in  a 


268        EVOLUTION  OF  THE  BATTLESHIP 

turret  placed  on  the  midship  line  of  the  vessel ;  an 
arrangement  that  is  the  most  economical  of  weight 
and  productive  of  the  greatest  power.  The  highest 
development  of  the  Monitor,  represented  by  the 
Oregon,  possesses  this  feature  unchanged,  and  has 
other  qualities  that  overcome  defects  in  the  ori- 
ginals of  the  type.  The  modern  monitor  is  very 
large,  that  its  guns  may  be  carried  high,  and  thus 
capable  of  use  in  a  seaway :  the  size  permits  the 
carrying  of  coal  for  long  sea-voyages  at  good  speed, 
and  also,  as  important  as  any  of  the  improvements, 
powerful  propelling  engines  may  be  carried  that 
enable  the  full-grown  monitor  to  meet  on  equal 
terms  cruisers  built  specially  for  speed,  or  even  to 
outrun  them  as  the  Oregon  did.  The  steps  in 
naval  evolution  that  we  have  looked  at  have  all 
been  due  to  the  influence  of  the  ironworker,  sym- 
bolized by  the  steam  engine.  The  nineteenth  cen- 
tury began  with  the  wooden  sailing  ship-of-the-line 
as  all-powerful  in  naval  constructions,  and  consid- 
ered so  perfect  after  many  decades  of  development 
that  its  disappearance  from  the  ocean  seemed  an 
impossible  thing.  Nevertheless  it  has  utterly  van- 
ished from  the  face  of  the  waters,  and  the  century 
draws  to  its  close  with  steam  and  steel  as  the  true 
emblems  of  naval  power. 


CHAPTER  V 

PRINCIPAL     ACTS     OF     THE     NAVY     IN     THE   WAR 
WITH   SPAIN 

THE  present  chapter  is  added  simply  to  bring 
this  outline  of  American  naval  history,  as  influ- 
enced by  steam,  up  to  the  present  time,  and  not 
with  any  wish  of  increasing  the  already  confusing 
mass  of  literature  on  the  subject  of  the  war  with 
Spain.  That  war  is  such  a  recent  event  that 
biased  or  imperfect  newspaper  reports  and  the  ex- 
traordinarily prolific  output  of  the  magazines  are 
still  fresh  in  the  public  mind,  and  are  so  produc- 
tive of  error  and  prejudice  that  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  serious  history  would  be  accepted  as  final 
at  this  time.  The  premature  appearance  of  many 
so-called  histories  of  the  war,  some  of  them  actu- 
ally written  before  peace  was  restored  and  before 
official  records  necessary  to  a  correct  understand- 
ing of  events  were  accessible,  has  greatly  added  to 
the  confusion  and  must  increase  the  task  of  the 
historian,  who,  a  generation  hence,  may  extract 
from  all  the  material  that  will  be  at  his  hand  a 
true  account  of  events  as  they  were.  The  pyra- 
mid of  guess-work  erected  by  over-eager  writers 


270  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  publishers  is  a  discouraging  structure  to  ex- 
plore because  of  its  vastness,  and  dangerous  to 
enter  because  of  the  treacherous  quality  of  the  ma- 
terial of  which  it  is  built.  Avoiding  it,  therefore, 
the  author  will  bring  his  narrative  up  to  date  as 
briefly  as  possible,  using  only  as  his  sources  of 
information  the  official  reports,  orders,  and  dis- 
patches that  have  already  been  made  public  and  a 
few  published  articles  by  responsible  participants 
in  important  events,  together  with  some  personal 
experience  and  observation  while  the  war  was  in 
progress. 

The  third  of  a  century  of  peace  that  intervened 
between  the  great  Civil  War  and  the  outbreak  of 
the  Spanish  War  was  a  period  of  miracles  in 
the  United  States  in  the  development  of  mechan- 
ical appliances  great  and  small.  The  greatest 
machine  that  the  period  produced  was  the  battle- 
ship, the  evolution  of  which  has  been  traced  in 
another  chapter.  We  have  now  to  see  this  huge 
mastodon  of  steel  and  steam  rush  into  the  arena  of 
strife,  for  which  it  was  created,  and  to  witness  the 
desolation  and  ruin  that  followed  its  advent.  It 
will  no  longer  be  necessary  to  call  attention  to  the 
influence  of  steam  in  describing  the  operations  of 
naval  war.  With  the  completion  of  the  modern 
battleship,  sails  finally  disappeared  as  a  military 
element,  and  the  full  day  of  the  era  of  steam  came 
in.  In  the  Spanish  War  steam  was  the  factor 
that  decided  the  character  of  every  movement  and 


THE  PROBLEMS  BEFORE  THE  NAVY   271 

undertaking,  and  we  may  hereafter  assume  its  in- 
fluence as  granted,  just  as  we  understand  that 
wind  and  sail  governed  the  actions  of  Nelson  and 
Collingwood  in  older  wars  against  peoples  of  the 
same  race. 

The  work  of  the  navy  of  the  United  States  in 
the  war  with  Spain  may  be  classified  under  two 
general  heads.  The  first  relates  to  naval  events 
in  the  Far  East  and  is  comprehended  by  the  single 
word  Manila.  The  second,  of  far  wider  scope  and 
greater  responsibilities  with  a  corresponding  mea- 
sure of  importance  in  deciding  the  outcome  of  the 
war,  deals  with  the  operations  of  our  vessels  on  the 
American  side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Including 
the  whole  eastern  coast  of  the  United  States  and 
the  ramification  of  waters  throughout  the  West 
Indies,  it  embraced  a  wide  region  and  required 
the  exercise  of  grand  strategy  and  a  broader  appli- 
cation of  the  principles  of  war  than  was  involved 
in  the  hasty  meeting  and  quick  battle  of  the 
opposing  naval  forces  in  the  Orient. 

The  problem  confronting  the  commander  of  our 
Atlantic  fleet  was  not  limited  to  descending  upon 
and  destroying  an  enemy  of  known  force  and  loca- 
tion, but  included  the  protection  of  our  seaboard 
cities,  thought  by  many  in  authority  to  be  in  great 
danger,  and  the  waging  of  negative  war  against  a 
large  army  by  blockading  the  ports  upon  which 
it  depended  for  provisions  and  munitions  of  war. 
It  included  also,  back  of  all  other  considerations, 


272  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

and  more  important  than  all  others  together,  the 
grand  game  for  the  control  of  the  ocean  by  which 
the  fleet  of  the  enemy  was  restricted  move  by  move 
until  the  day  and  hour  of  checkmate  came.  The 
story  of  the  North  Atlantic  fleet  remains  untold 
as  a  splendid  opportunity  for  a  truthful  and  just 
historian,  and  until  its  true  history  is  written  the 
American  people  will  not  know  what  a  debt  of 
gratitude  and  honor  the  nation  owes  to  the  sad- 
faced,  silent  commander-in-chief  who,  regardless  of 
praise  or  slander,  steadfastly  pursued  to  a  success- 
ful end  his  purpose  of  finding  and  overcoming  his 
enemy,  as  the  only  certain  method  of  saving  from 
devastation  the  shores  of  his  country,  of  speedily 
ending  the  war,  and  of  bringing  his  battleflags 
home  with  the  historic  lustre  of  their  colors  un- 
dimmed. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1898  the  condi- 
tion of  the  people  of  Cuba,  reached  as  the  result 
of  an  insurrection  against  the  lawful  sovereignty 
of  Spain,  had  become  so  pitiful  as  to  enlist  the 
sympathy  of  all  civilized  nations.  In  the  United 
States  the  manner  in  which  Spain  conducted  the 
war  had  been  so  violently  denounced  by  the  pul- 
pit and  press,  and  even  in  Congress,  that  a  feeling 
of  dislike  toward  that  country  had  been  excited  in 
the  minds  of  the  people,  and,  by  reaction,  a  simi- 
lar sentiment  existed  in  Spain  toward  us.  With 
the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  question,  as  we  now 
understand  them,  this  narrative  has  no  concern. 


STRAINED  RELATIONS  WITH  SPAIN      273 

We  are  interested  only,  as  a  beginning  for  this 
relation,  in  the  fact  that  hard  feelings  had  grown 
up  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  as  a  result 
of  the  rebellion  in  Cuba. 

Still,  there  was  no  visible  sign  of  war  between 
the  two  countries.  Diplomatic  relations  remained 
unchanged  and  people  of  each  country  could  freely 
visit  the  other  without  much  danger  of  harm.  For 
more  than  two  years  the  naval  power  of  the  United 
States  had  been  actively  and  earnestly  used  to 
suppress  American  adventurers  and  speculators 
who  sought  to  make  money  by  supplying  muni- 
tions of  war  to  the  Cuban  insurgents,  and  some  of 
these  "filibusters,"  as  they  were  called,  who  had 
been  caught  had  been  severely  punished  by  the 
American  courts.  Out  of  deference  to  Spanish 
sensitiveness,  American  naval  vessels  almost  ceased 
their  once  frequent  visits  to  Cuban  ports,  and  for 
some  time  the  favorite  winter  drill  grounds  of  our 
North  Atlantic  squadron  in  the  vicinity  of  Key 
West  had  been  abandoned  lest  the  presence  of  a 
naval  force  so  near  Cuba  might  give  offense  as  a 
seeming  menace  to  Spanish  authority.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1898,  however,  the  squadron  that  had  been 
drilling  all  summer  long  off  the  Northern  coast 
was  sent  to  the  warmer  latitude  of  Key  West  to 
continue  its  work,  and  this  move,  though  harm- 
lessly intended,  proved  to  be  the  beginning  of  a 
remarkable  chapter  of  nineteenth-century  naval 
history. 


274  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

This  squadron  was  commanded  by  Rear  Admiral 
Montgomery  Sicard,  one  of  the  oldest  and  most 
prominent  officers  on  the  active  list  of  the  navy, 
and  consisted  of  the  armored  cruiser  New  York  as 
flagship ;  the  first-rate  battleships  Iowa,  Indiana, 
and  Massachusetts ;  the  second-rate  battleships 
Maine  and  Texas,  and  several  small  cruisers  and 
gunboats.  A  flotilla  of  five  torpedo-boats  was  also 
in  the  vicinity  of  Key  West  at  the  time  the  squad- 
ron arrived  there.  On  the  night  of  January  24, 
the  ships  then  lying  at  sea  between  Key  West  and 
Dry  Tortugas,  the  Maine  was  signaled  to  proceed 
to  Havana,  and  immediately  parted  company,  for- 
ever as  it  transpired,  from  the  group  of  big  ships 
of  which  she  had  long  been  a  favorite  and  con- 
spicuous member.  Her  orders  on  this  duty  came 
from  Washington,  and  the  Maine  was  selected  be- 
cause she  had  been  at  Key  West  for  some  time 
before  the  squadron  arrived  and  had  been  asked 
for  before  that  time  by  the  United  States  consul 
general  at  Havana,  who  considered  the  presence 
of  an  American  war-vessel  desirable  at  that  port. 

After  this  departure,  which  did  not  excite  much 
interest  at  the  time,  as  ships  were  always  coming 
and  going  on  detached  service,  the  squadron  took 
up  its  regular  routine  of  sea  drills,  using  Dry  Tor- 
tugas as  a  base  for  coal  and  provisions,  and  cruis- 
ing in  the  open  waters  of  the  Gulf  between  Tor- 
tugas and  Ponce  de  Leon  Bay  on  the  mainland  of 
Florida.  There  were  rumors  from  time  to  time 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  MAINE  275 

that  the  Maine  was  not  wholly  welcome  to  the 
official  class  in  Havana,  but  no  one  dreamed  that 
any  harm  would  befall  her.  At  daylight  on  the 
morning  of  February  16,  the  squadron  then  being 
engaged  in  coaling  at  Tortugas,  the  torpedo-boat 
Ericsson  arrived  from  Key  West  with  the  shock- 
ing intelligence  that  the  Maine  had  been  blown  up 
and  destroyed  with  great  loss  of  life  in  Havana 
harbor  the  evening  before.  The  news  seemed  in- 
credible, though  the  dispatches  were  official  and 
direct,  and  the  hasty  judgment  of  the  squadron 
was  for  an  immediate  descent  upon  Havana  to 
investigate  and  seek  redress,  as  would  have  been 
done  in  olden  times  when  warriors  instead  of  diplo- 
matists regulated  the  intercourse  of  nations.  No 
such  violent  move  was  contemplated  by  the  officials 
in  authority,  however,  and  the  only  immediate 
action  was  the  removal  of  Admiral  Sicard,  in  the 
New  York,  to  Key  West,  where  he  could  be  in 
closer  communication  with  his  government  and 
in  a  better  position  to  watch  events. 

Particulars  of  the  awful  catastrophe  were  soon 
learned.  About  9.40  p.  M.,  February  15,  when 
nearly  all  the  men  were  asleep  in  their  hammocks, 
a  frightful  explosion  tore  the  forward  half  of  the 
ship  into  pieces  and  caused  her  to  sink  to  the  bot- 
tom instantly.  Two  officers  and  two  hundred  and 
sixty-four  men  were  killed  or  drowned,  or  died 
subsequently  of  injuries,  out  of  a  total  crew  of 
twenty-six  officers  and  three  hundred  and  thirty- 


276  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

one  men.  .  The  great  disproportion  in  the  loss  of 
life  between  officers  and  men  was  due  to  the  facts 
that  the  officers'  quarters  were  in  the  after  part  of 
the  ship,  remote  from  the  explosion,  that  several 
officers  were  on  shore,  and  that  of  those  on  board 
few  if  any  were  asleep.  The  two  that  lost  their 
lives  were  Lieutenant  Friend  W.  Jenkins  and 
Assistant  Engineer  Darwin  R.  Merritt. 

An  American  court  of  inquiry  composed  of  naval 
officers,  of  which  court  Captain  W.  T.  Sampson  of 
the  Iowa  was  president,  was  organized  to  investigate 
the  cause  of  the  disaster,  and  for  several  weeks 
engaged  in  a  very  patient  and  thorough  exami- 
nation of  the  wreck  by  means  of  divers  and  in 
taking  testimony  from  the  survivors.  It  was 
thought  by  many  hi  the  squadron  —  even  feared, 
in  fact,  to  tell  the  exact  truth — that  the  members 
of  this  court  were  too  pacific  by  natural  inclination 
to  accept  the  popular  theory  of  deliberate  destruc- 
tion of  the  ship  by  external  agencies,  and  would 
be  disposed  to  find  the  disaster  due  to  accidental 
explosion  of  boilers  or  magazines  within  the  vessel 
itself,  unless  very  strong  proof  to  the  contrary 
should  be  brought  forth.  At  all  events,  the  court 
was  perfectly  neutral  in  its  attitude  and  rendered 
a  finding  strictly  according  to  the  testimony,  pos- 
sibly against  the  preconceived  opinions  of  its 
members.  In  this  finding  the  court  stated  that 
in  its  opinion,  "  the  Maine  was  destroyed  by  the 
explosion  of  a  submarine  mine,  which  caused  the 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR  277 

partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  the  forward 
magazines." 

A  board  of  Spanish  naval  officers  conducted  a 
similar  investigation,  but  without  any  attempt  at 
equal  thoroughness,  and  reported  that,  "On  the 
night  of  February  15  last  an  explosion  of  the  first 
order,  in  the  forward  magazine  of  the  American 
ironclad  Maine,  caused  the  destruction  of  that  part 
of  the  ship  and  its  total  submersion  in  the  same 
place  in  this  bay  at  which  it  was  anchored."  Full 
reports  of  the  proceedings  of  these  two  naval  courts 
of  inquiry  are  published  as  Senate  documents, 
Fifty-fifth  Congress,  second  session,  and  make  ex- 
tremely interesting  reading  when  taken  together. 

In  the  mean  while,  during  the  long  weeks  that 
the  court  of  inquiry  was  taking  its  testimony  and 
preparing  its  finding,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  were  crying  for  war  and  revenge  for  the 
slaughtered  men  of  the  Maine.  Congress,  March 
9,  under  the  influence  of  public  clamor,  appro- 
priated $50,000,000  to  be  used  "  for  the  national 
defense,"  and  the  work  of  fitting  the  army  and 
navy  for  war  went  forward  with  the  help  of  this 
fund.  Owing  to  the  intense  zeal  and  energy  of 
Mr.  Theodore  Roosevelt,  then  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  and  his  positive  belief  that  war  could 
not  be  prevented,  the  Navy  Department  got  and 
expended  considerably  more  than  one  half  of  this 
sum,  buying  with  it  coal,  ammunition,  guns,  and 
auxiliary  vessels,  so  that  by  April  15,  a  week 


278  THE  WAR   WITH  SPAIN 

before  the  actual  beginning  of  hostilities,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  was  able  to  report  that  the  navy 
of  the  United  States  was  ready  for  war. 

Those  were  long  weeks  for  the  big  steel  ships 
lying  at  sea  seven  miles  off  Key  West,  with  steam 
up  and  rigidly  observing  night  and  day  the  outlook 
and  precautions  of  war.  Few  of  them  were  des- 
tined to  have  steam  off  their  main  engines  or  their 
guns  unloaded  at  night  for  months  to  come ;  but 
that  was  not  known  then,  and  the  uncertainty  was 
trying.  They  saw  preparations  for  war  going  for- 
ward all  about  them,  but  exactly  what  had  been 
done  or  what  would  be  done  next  by  the  author- 
ities at  home  was  a  closed  book  to  the  men  whose 
lives  would  be  the  first  at  stake  when  the  time  of 
preparation  was  over.  Ships  of  war,  regular  and 
improvised,  arrived  day  after  day  and  reported  to 
the  flag ;  ammunition  and  supplies  by  the  shipload 
were  constantly  arriving,  and  the  air  was  full  of 
stories  and  rumors.  Finally  when  the  order  came 
to  disfigure  the  beautiful  white  ships  that  all  were 
so  proud  of  by  stripping  them  of  external  ornamen- 
tation, and  covering  their  glistening  sides  with  the 
dirty  gray  of  the  "  war  paint,"  it  was  felt  that  the 
end  of  the  waiting  was  at  hand  and  that  the  stern 
"  last  argument  of  kings  "  would  soon  be  resorted 
to.  It  was  a  great  relief  when,  on  the  evening  of 
April  21,  orders  came  to  establish  a  blockade  on  the 
northern  coast  of  Cuba,  and  the  reaction  from  long 
suspense  amounted  to  genuine  joy  from  forecastle 
to  cabin  on  board  the  waiting  ships. 


THE  ASIATIC  SQUADRON  279 

Before  following  the  fortunes  of  the  fleet  that 
conducted  the  most  extensive  and  decisive  sea 
campaign  in  our  history,  we  will  turn  to  the  Far 
East,  where  the  first  great  event  of  the  war  took 
place.  Like  other  nations  having  important  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  eastern  countries  of  Asia, 
the  United  States  has  habitually  maintained  a 
squadron  of  war-vessels  in  that  region.  Our  Asi- 
atic squadron  has  never  been  large,  and  because  of 
the  character  of  service  required  on  shallow  coasts 
and  rivers  has  been  composed  mainly  of  small  ves- 
sels. At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1898  this 
squadron,  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
George  Dewey,  consisted  of  the  protected  cruisers 
Olympia  (flagship),  Boston,  and  Raleigh,  the  gun- 
boats Helena  and  Petrel,  and  the  old  side-wheel 
double-ender  Monocacy.  The  Helena  had  only 
just  started  from  New  York  to  join  the  squadron, 
and  was  recalled  after  getting  as  far  as  Lisbon  in 
Portugal.  The  protected  cruiser  Baltimore  from 
the  Pacific  station  was  shortly  ordered  to  Asia  to 
relieve  the  Olympia,  and  the  gunboat  Concord,  also 
from  the  Pacific,  went  out  early  in  the  year  to  join 
the  Asiatic  squadron.  The  revenue  cutter  McCul- 
loch,  armed  as  a  small  gunboat,  was  also  sent  out 
to  that  station  at  about  the  same  time. 

By  February  25  the  state  of  affairs  was  such  as 
to  cause  the  navy  department  to  send  the  following 
cablegram  to  Commodore  Dewey :  "  Secret  and 
confidential.  Order  the  squadron,  except  Mono- 


280  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

cacy,  to  Hong  Kong.  Keep  full  of  coal.  In  the 
event  of  declaration  of  war  Spain,  your  duty  will 
be  to  see  that  the  Spanish  squadron  does  not  leave 
the  Asiatic  coast,  and  then  offensive  operations  in 
Philippine  Islands.  Keep  Olympia  until  further 
orders."  The  Olympia,  the  Raleigh,  and  the  Pet- 
rel were  then  at  Hong  Kong;  the  Baltimore  at 
Honolulu,  the  Boston  at  Chemulpo,  Corea,  and  the 
Concord  at  sea  between  Yokohama  and  Chemulpo. 
April  7,  Dewey  was  cabled  to  "  land  all  woodwork, 
stores,  etc.,  it  is  not  considered  necessary  to  have 
for  operations,"  and  April  21  he  was  notified  that 
"war  may  be  declared  at  any  moment."  April  24 
he  received  from  Secretary  Long  the  final  cable- 
gram :  "  War  has  commenced  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain.  Proceed  at  once  to  Philippine 
Islands.  Commence  operations  at  once,  particu- 
larly against  the  Spanish  fleet.  You  must  capture 
vessels  or  destroy.  Use  utmost  endeavors."  The 
same  day,  at  the  request  of  the  governor  of  Hong 
Kong,  the  Boston,  the  Concord,  the  Petrel,  and  the 
McCulloch  left  port,  followed  the  next  morning  by 
the  Olympia,  the  Baltimore,  and  the  Raleigh. 

These  ships  assembled  in  Mirs  Bay  on  the  main- 
land of  China,  thirty  miles  from  Hong  Kong,  with 
which  port  they  maintained  communication  by 
means  of  tugs  and  steam  launches.  April  27  they 
started  on  the  voyage  across  the  China  Sea,  six 
hundred  miles,  to  the  Philippines.  Accompanying 
them  were  two  supply-steamers  that  Commodore 


DEWEY'S   ARRIVAL  OFF  LUZON          281 

Dewey  had  bought ;  the  Nanshan  with  3000  tons 
of  coal  and  the  Zafiro  with  six  months'  supplies  for 
the  ships.  The  largest  ship  in  the  squadron,  the 
Olympia,  was  of  less  than  6000  tons  displacement, 
the  Baltimore  of  4400,  the  Raleigh  of  3200,  and 
the  others  dwindling  down  to  the  little  Petrel  of 
only  892  tons.  Had  they  been  in  the  North 
Atlantic  fleet  then  operating  in  the  West  Indies, 
none  of  these  ships,  except  possibly  the  Olympia, 
would  have  been  considered  very  formidable  or 
worthy  of  being  kept  with  the  flagship  for  the  first 
line  of  battle.  The  Spanish  squadron  in  the  Phil- 
ippines was  equally  inferior  in  comparison  with 
ships  of  their  own  country  at  home  or  in  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  though  it  considerably  exceeded 
the  American  squadron  in  number.  Its  largest 
and  best  ship  was  the  steel  cruiser  Reina  Cristina 
of  3520  tons,  which  was  the  flagship. 

On  the  morning  of  April  30  the  American  squad- 
ron arrived  oft  Cape  Bolinao  on  the  main  island 
(Luzon)  of  the  Philippines,  about  one  hundred 
miles  north  of  Manila  Bay,  and  proceeded  down, 
close  to  the  tropical  shore,  at  about  eight  knots' 
speed.  The  Boston  and  the  Concord,  and  later 
the  Baltimore,  were  sent  ahead  at  higher  speed  to 
reconnoitre  Subig  Bay,  it  being  suspected  that  the 
enemy  would  concentrate  there,  but  no  hostile  ships 
were  found.  It  was  learned  later  from  the  report 
of  the  Spanish  admiral,  Montojo,  that  he  had  been 
there  with  six  of  his  ships  from  the  26th  to  the 


282  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

29th  of  the  month,  but  had  returned  to  Manila 
because  of  his  disgust  at  the  failure  to  provide  for 
the  defense  of  the  bay  by  placing  guns  and  torpe- 
does previously  ordered,  and  because  he  learned 
by  cable  from  the  Spanish  consul  at  Hong  Kong 
that  Dewey  would  probably  look  for  him  at  Subig. 
April  30  the  Spanish  admiral  anchored  his  ships 
in  line  of  battle  across  the  mouth  of  Bacoor  Bay, 
on  the  southeast  side  of  Manila  Bay,  where  the 
naval  station  of  Cavite  is  located.  At  seven  that 
evening  he  received  a  telegram  from  Subig  that 
the  enemy  had  been  in  that  port  and  had  proceeded 
toward  Manila,  and  at  midnight  he  knew  by  the 
sound  of  gunfire  from  the  direction  of  Corregidor 
that  the  Americans  would  soon  be  upon  him.  No 
surprise  was  therefore  in  store  for  him,  and  none 
was  probably  intended,  as  there  is  a  telegraph  line 
from  Cape  Bolinao,  where  Dewey  had  shown  him- 
self early  in  the  morning. 

Coming  on  down  the  coast,  Commodore  Dewey 's 
ships  joined  those  already  in  Subig  Bay  about 
5  P.  M.,  and  a  council  of  the  captains  was  held,  to 
determine  what  to  do  in  the  absence  of  the  Span- 
iards from  that  place.  Then  the  united  squadron 
continued  its  voyage  to  the  southward,  steaming 
slowly.  Forty  miles  below  Subig  is  the  entrance, 
about  six  miles  wide,  of  Manila  Bay,  the  opening 
being  divided  into  two  channels  by  an  island,  Cor- 
regidor, one  mile  from  the  northern  side  of  the 
entrance.  The  bay  is  so  extensive  that  Corregidor 


DEWEY  ENTERS  MANILA  BAY  283 

is  about  thirty  miles  from  the  city  of  Manila,  situ- 
ated on  the  eastern  or  inland  shore  of  the  bay. 
Steaming  on  past  the  northern  entrance,  Dewey, 
shortly  after  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  turned  to  the 
eastward  and  northward  and  proceeded  into  the 
larger  opening,  called  Boca  Grande,  the  width  of 
which  (about  five  miles)  practically  freed  it  from 
danger  from  torpedoes.  There  was  a  battery  of 
heavy  rifled  guns  on  Corregidor  and  another  on  a 
small  island,  El  Fraile,  lying  close  to  the  southern 
side  of  the  entrance. 

The  squadron  was  steaming  in  column,  or  line 
ahead,  with  no  lights  showing  except  one  screened 
lantern  over  the  stern  of  each  ship  as  a  guide  to 
the  one  next  following.  The  crews  were  called  to 
quarters  for  battle  when  the  ships  headed  in,  as  it 
was  not  supposed  possible  to  steam  past  the  bat- 
teries without  discovery  and  action.  Nevertheless, 
the  six  war-ships  passed  without  a  sign  from  the 
enemy,  and  it  was  not  until  the  McCulloch  came 
up  abreast  of  Corregidor  that  rockets  and  signal 
flares  gave  notice  that  they  had  been  seen.  It  is 
disputed  whether  the  discovery  was  due  to  flames 
from  soft  coal  blazing  out  from  the  smokepipe  of 
the  McCulloch  or  whether  the  leading  ships  had 
gone  so  far  in  that  their  stern  lights  became  visi- 
ble to  the  enemy.  The  battery  at  El  Fraile  fired 
a  few  shots  that  hit  nothing,  but  were  returned 
by  the  McCulloch  and  by  the  Boston  and  Concord 
next  ahead  of  her.  It  was  then  a  few  minutes 


284  THE   WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

after  midnight  of  Sunday  morning,  May  1.  The 
squadron  continued  on  at  low  speed  across  the 
dark  bay,  the  men  remaining  at  the  guns,  but 
being  allowed  to  lie  down  on  deck  and  sleep  if 
they  could.  The  Olympia  led,  followed  by  the 
Baltimore,  the  Raleigh,  the  Petrel,  the  Concord, 
the  Boston,  the  McCulloch,  the  Zafiro,  and  the 
Nanshan,  in  the  order  named.  The  three  last  were 
left  in  the  middle  of  the  bay  and  did  not  partici- 
pate in  the  battle  that  ensued. 

At  daybreak  the  ships  were  off  the  city  of  Ma- 
nila, three  or  four  miles  distant,  and  at  5.15  A.M. 
three  batteries  in  or  near  the  city  began  firing  at 
them  at  too  long  range  to  have  any  effect.  Two 
other  batteries  at  Cavite  and  the  line  of  Spanish 
ships  lying  thereby  immediately  took  up  the  fire  at 
harmless  range,  and  as  the  Americans  approached, 
two  submarine  mines  are  reported  to  have  been 
exploded  at  least  half  a  mile  ahead  of  the  fore- 
most ship.  This  is  denied  by  Spanish  authority, 
which  claims  that  no  mines  were  planted  in  that 
part  of  the  bay.  The  wasteful  and  premature 
firing  of  the  batteries,  without  the  incident  of  the 
mines,  is  a  sufficient  illustration  of  the  thought- 
less impetuosity  of  the  Latin  races  that  has 
brought  disaster  upon  them  and  rendered  personal 
courage  futile  in  almost  every  instance  where  they 
have  been  pitted  against  more  self-possessed  and 
calculating  men  of  colder  blood.  Steaming  slowly 
onward,  the  Olympia  led  her  little  column  of  ships 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANILA  BAY  285 

to  the  southward  and  westward,  taking  a  course 
about  parallel  to  the  Spanish  line  of  battle,  and  at 
5.41  A.M.  her  forward  turret  guns  spoke  the  word 
that  began  the  battle,  when  Dewey  gave  the  quiet 
order  to  the  captain  of  his  flagship,  "You  may 
fire  when  you  are  ready,  Gridley."  The  Spanish 
naval  force  consisted  of  ten  vessels  of  war  and  one 
armed  transport,  besides  which  the  two  batteries 
at  Cavite  were  so  located  as  to  form  a  prolonga- 
tion of  their  line  of  ships. 

After  steaming  along  the  Spanish  line,  giving 
and  receiving  a  fierce  cannonade,  the  American 
ships  returned  over  nearly  the  same  course,  contin- 
uing the  engagement  and  executing  in  the  complete 
circuit  a  double  loop  something  like  an  elongated 
figure  8.  The  distance  from  the  Spanish  line 
during  this  manoauvring  varied  from  5600  to 
2000  yards,  the  -distance  at  principal  action  being 
about  2500  yards.  Two  such  circuits  were  com- 
pleted and  half  of  another,  making  five  times  that 
our  squadron  passed  along  the  front  of  the  Span- 
iards, when,  at  7.35,  the  flagship  signaled  to  cease 
action  and  withdrew  the  ships  into  the  bay,  where 
the  crews  were  allowed  to  go  to  breakfast.  Much 
has  been  made  of  this  incident  as  an  example  of 
supreme  confidence  of  success  and  of  extraordinary 
consideration  for  the  men,  whose  work  both  above 
and  below  decks  had  been  of  the  most  intense  and 
exhausting  character.  Admiral  Dewey  reported 
that  he  went  out  of  action  because  he  had  been 


286  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

informed  that  there  were  left  on  the  Olympia  only 
fifteen  rounds  per  gun  for  the  5 -inch  rapid-firing 
battery,  and  he  wished  a  consultation  and  redis- 
tribution of  ammunition  if  the  latter  should  be 
found  necessary.  His  position  would  have  been 
critical  if  not  fatal  had  he  exhausted  his  ammuni- 
tion in  the  presence  of  a  hostile  fleet  at  its  own 
base  of  supplies  while  he  was  thousands  of  miles 
from  a  home  port.  At  that  time,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, the  Spanish  ships  gave  very  little  visible 
evidence  of  the  injuries  they  had  sustained,  and  the 
American  officers  were  greatly  perplexed,  after 
the  tremendous  firing  on  both  sides,  to  see  no  ap- 
parent results.  The  hauling  off  of  the  American 
squadron  gave  the  Spanish  governor  of  Manila 
the  temporary  satisfaction  of  cabling  home  the 
news  of  a  victory. 

The  report  as  to  shortness  of  ammunition 
proved  to  be  erroneous,  and  at  11.16  the  action 
was  resumed  by  the  Baltimore  being  sent  in  to 
attack  the  ships  and  shore  batteries,  followed  about 
twenty  minutes  later  by  the  Olympia  and  others. 
By  that  time  injuries  to  the  ships  of  the  enemy, 
not  noticeable  when  the  first  action  ceased,  had 
shown  themselves,  and  several  of  them  were  burn- 
ing beyond  control  or  sinking.  The  second  action 
was  therefore  confined  to  silencing  the  Cavite  bat- 
teries and  the  fire  of  the  one  Spanish  ship  that 
still  had  a  crew  on  board  to  work  a  gun.  By  one 
o'clock  the  victory  was  complete,  the  white  flag 


MANILA  BAY 


DEWEY'S  VICTORY  AT  MANILA          287 

was  flying  at  Cavite,  and  the  American  squadron 
withdrew  to  an  anchorage  in  the  bay,  leaving  the 
Petrel  to  complete  the  destruction  of  some  aban- 
doned gunboats  that  had  retired  into  shoal  water 
inside  Bacoor  Bay.  That  little  vessel  had  been  so 
conspicuous  in  the  day's  work  that  she  earned 
from  the  fleet  the  sobriquet  of  the  "  Baby  Battle- 
ship." The  next  day  the  squadron  returned  to 
Cavite,  and  May  3  the  Baltimore  and  the  Raleigh 
captured  and  destroyed  the  battery  on  the  island 
of  Corregidor  and  paroled  the  garrison.  The  ser- 
vices rendered  by  this  squadron  latei,  in  compel- 
ling the  surrender  of  Manila,  in  conjunction  with 
the  army,  were  of  great  importance,  but  cannot  be 
described  in  a  work  of  this  limited  and  general 
character. 

The  almost  complete  escape  from  injury  of  our 
ships  in  this  remarkable  battle  is  wholly  beyond 
understanding,  and  can  be  attributed  only  to  the 
hot-headed  temperament  of  our  antagonists,  who 
seemed  to  fire  in  a  frenzy  of  excitement,  bent  upon 
making  much  noise  and  smoke  without  considera- 
tion of  results.  Though  in  close  action  and  sub- 
jected to  an  incessant  and  rapid  fire  for  two  hours, 
our  ships  came  out  of  action  as  fit  for  battle  as 
when  they  went  in,  and  not  a  man  was  killed  in 
the  fleet.  The  Baltimore  was  struck  five  times 
and  was  the  only  American  vessel  that  received 
injuries  worth  noticing.  One  of  her  6-inch  guns 
was  put  out  of  action  by  a  small  shell  hitting  its 


288  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

recoil  cylinder ;  the  same  shell  exploded  a  box 
of  3-pounder  ammunition,  fragments  from  which 
slightly  wounded  two  officers  and  six  men,  and 
these  were  the  only  personal  casualties  in  the 
fleet.  The  Olympia  was  hit  eight  times,  the  Bos- 
ton four  times,  the  Raleigh  and  Petrel  once  each, 
and  the  Concord  not  at  all ;  these  hits  were  all 
from  small  projectiles  or  pieces  of  shells,  and  the 
damage  they  caused  was  insignificant. 

The  Spaniards  lost  their  entire  squadron,  as 
follows :  — 

Sunk,  —  Reina  Cristina,  Castilia,  Don  Antonio 
de  Ulloa. 

Burnt,  —  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Isla  de  Cuba, 
Isla  de  Luzon,  General  Lezo,  Marques  del  Duero, 
El  Correo,  Velasco,  and  Isla  de  Mindanao  (trans- 
port). 

Captured,  —  Manila  (transport),  Rapido  and 
Hercules  (tugs),  and  several  small  launches. 

Of  these  vessels,  the  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  the 
Isla  de  Cuba,  and  the  Isla  de  Luzon,  small  steel 
cruisers,  were  found  not  badly  injured,  the  upper 
works  only  being  burned,  and  have  since  been 
floated  and  repaired  as  vessels  of  the  United 
States  navy,  thanks  to  the  energy  and  ability  of 
Naval  Constructor  Capps,  who  was  sent  out  to 
Manila  on  that  service. 

Besides  losing  their  ships,  the  Spanish  suffered 
dreadfully  in  personnel.  The  flagship  Reina 
Cristina  at  one  stage  of  the  battle  came  out  from 


SPANISH  LOSSES  AT  MANILA  289 

the  Spanish  line  with  the  seeming  intention  of 
engaging  the  Olympia  at  close  quarters,  but  was 
driven  back,  sinking  and  on  fire,  and  with  such 
loss  that  Admiral  Dewey  reported  that  she  had 
150  killed,  including  her  captain,  and  90  wounded. 
The  Spanish  admiral  reported  his  total  loss,  in- 
cluding those  at  the  arsenal  on  shore,  to  be  381 
men  killed  and  wounded.  The  conclusion  reached 
by  him  as  to  causes  of  the  great  disaster  that 
befell  him  may  be  repeated  in  his  own  words  :  — 

"  It  remains  only  to  say  that  all  the  chiefs,  offi- 
cers, engineers,  quartermasters,  gunners,  sailors, 
and  soldiers  rivaled  one  another  in  sustaining  with 
honor  the  good  name  of  the  navy  on  this  sad  day. 

"  The  inefficiency  of  the  vessels  which  composed 
my  little  squadron,  the  lack  of  all  classes  of  the 
personnel,  especially  master  gunners  and  seamen 
gunners,  the  inaptitude  of  some  of  the  provisional 
machinists,  the  scarcity  of  rapid-fire  cannon,  the 
strong  crews  of  the  enemy,  and  the  unprotected 
character  of  the  greater  part  of  our  vessels,  all 
contributed  to  make  more  decided  the  sacrifice 
which  we  made  for  our  country  and  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  the  horrors  of  the  bombardment  of 
the  city  of  Manila,  with  the  conviction  that  with 
the  scarcity  of  our  force  against  the  superior 
enemy  we  were  going  to  certain  death,  and  could 
expect  a  loss  of  all  our  ships." 

Commodore  Dewey  was  appointed  an  acting 
rear  admiral  by  the  President  on  May  7,  and  three 


290  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

days  later  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  tendered 
him  the  thanks  of  that  body,  which  act  carried 
with  it  his  promotion  to  rear  admiral.  Nearly 
ten  months  later  the  rank  of  admiral  was  created 
by  Congress,  and  Dewey  was  promoted  to  fill  it. 
The  captains  of  ships  in  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay 
were  all  advanced  in  official  standing  for  "  eminent 
and  conspicuous  conduct  in  battle." 

The  victory  itself  was  so  remote  from  the  real 
theatre  of  war  and  affected  such  small  fractions  of 
the  naval  force  of  the  contending  powers  that  its 
direct  influence  upon  the  conduct  of  the  war  was 
not  great.  Indirectly,  however,  its  influence  upon 
subsequent  events  was  important.  It  produced 
the  greatest  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  in  their  navy,  and  crystallized  public 
opinion  into  enthusiastic  support  of  the  military 
branches  of  the  government.  It  greatly  strength- 
ened the  naval  service  by  the  high  standard  of 
excellence  set  before  it,  and  produced  an  exactly 
opposite  moral  effect  upon  the  enemy,  who  for 
the  first  time  realized  that  their  antagonist  was 
dangerous.  The  extinction  of  Spanish  naval  power 
in  the  Far  East  had  the  important  military  result 
of  relieving  the  United  States  from  protecting  its 
Pacific  coast  by  sending  ships  there  from  other 
regions,  and  it  was  of  great  pecuniary  benefit  to 
the  people  of  the  western  coast,  as  sea  commerce 
could  be  pursued  without  hindrance  and  without 
exorbitant  insurance  rates.  As  an  actual  fact  the 


SAMPSON  TAKES  COMMAND  291 

Spanish  Asiatic  fleet  was  unable  to  attempt  a  hos- 
tile movement  across  the  Pacific  Ocean,  but  that 
was  known  only  to  naval  observers  and  was  not 
believed  by  the  general  public. 

We  will  now  return  to  the  American  fleet  in 
the  West  Indies  and  follow  its  principal  operations 
through  the  long  and  perplexing  campaign  that 
culminated  in  the  greatest  sea  victory  known  in  our 
history.  During  the  weeks  of  preparation  after 
the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  Rear  Admiral  Sicard 
continued  in  command  and  was  unceasing  in  his 
efforts  to  get  his  ships  ready  for  the  coming  strug- 
gle. March  26,  his  health  having  failed  under 
the  strain,  the  Navy  Department  was  obliged  to 
detach  him,  and  he  was  succeeded  temporarily,  as 
the  law  provides,  by  the  next  officer  in  rank  in 
the  squadron,  who  happened  to  be  Captain  Wm. 
T.  Sampson  of  the  Iowa.  April  21,  with  the  dis- 
patches from  Washington  directing  the  fleet  to 
proceed  against  the  Cuban  coast,  Sampson  was 
formally  ordered  to  the  command  of  the  naval 
force  on  the  North  Atlantic  station,  with  the  rank 
of  rear  admiral  for  the  time  being. 

His  flag  as  a  rear  admiral  was  hoisted  on  the 
New  York  at  eight  o'clock  the  next  morning,  as 
the  ships  were  leaving  Key  West  on  their  hos- 
tile mission,  and  was  heartily  cheered,  especially 
by  the  crew  of  the  Iowa.  The  appointment  gave 
the  utmost  confidence  and  satisfaction  to  officers 
and  men  throughout  the  fleet,  for  the  professional 


292  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN 

reputation  of  Captain  Sampson  was  of  the  highest 
order,  and  it  was  felt  that  he  was  preeminently 
the  right  man  for  the  place.  He  had  been  chief 
of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment for  four  years  shortly  preceding  the  war, 
when  the  battleships  now  in  his  fleet  were  being 
built,  and  was  beyond  doubt  the  best-informed 
officer  in  the  fleet  as  to  their  qualities  and  their 
offensive  and  defensive  powers.  He  had  also 
been  for  four  years  superintendent  of  the  Naval 
Academy  at  Annapolis,  the  most  important  duty 
that  an  officer  of  the  navy  can  exercise  in  time  of 
peace,  because  he  is  then  responsible  for  the  train- 
ing and  spirit  of  the  future  officers'  of  the  navy. 

The  orders  under  which  the  commander-in-chief 
led  his  ships  to  war  gave  little  opportunity  for 
vigorous  operations.  They  directed  a  blockade  of 
the  coast  of  Cuba  from  Cardenas,  east  of  Havana, 
to  Bahia  Honda,  west  of  that  port,  a  coast  extent 
of  about  140  miles,  and  left  the  blockade  of  the 
seaport  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  optional. 
Bombardment  was  expressly  forbidden  in  the 
orders  sent  to  Sampson  April  6  by  the  Navy 
Department.  These  orders  stipulated  that  in  the 
event  of  war  the  naval  force  of  the  United  States 
in  the  West  Indies  must  be  used  to  capture  or 
destroy  Spanish  war-vessels  in  those  waters,  but 
that  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  must  not  be 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  shore  batteries  at  Havana, 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  or  other  strongly  fortified 


ADMIRAL  DEWEY 


PROPOSED  ATTACK  ON  HAVANA         293 

ports.  The  reasons  given  for  this  restriction  were 
that  there  might  not  be  any  American  troops 
available  to  occupy  and  maintain  order  in  any  cap- 
tured place,  and  that  our  ships  should  not  risk 
being  crippled  before  the  formidable  cruising  ships 
of  Spain  were  disposed  of. 

To  this  order  Sampson  replied  at  length  under 
date  of  April  9,  describing  the  batteries  at  the 
approach  to  Havana  and  urging  that  he  be  allowed 
to  attack  them  according  to  a  plan  that  he  de- 
scribed. In  this  reply  he  said,  "  I  sympathize 
with  all  you  say  about  guarding  our  big  ships 
against  a  possible  serious  loss  while  the  enemy's 
fleet  is  still  intact.  At  the  same  time  I  regard  it 
as  very  important  to  strike  quickly  and  strike  hard 
as  soon  as  hostilities  commence."  In  describing 
his  plan  of  attack,  the  admiral  paid  a  handsome 
compliment  to  the  monitor  class  of  war-ships  by 
saying,  "Before  the  arrival  of  the  Puritan  and 
Amphitrite  I  was  not  entirely  sanguine  of  the 
success  of  such  an  attack.  Since  their  arrival 
yesterday  I  have  little  doubt  of  its  success."  The 
admiral's  desire  in  this  matter  did  not  meet  with 
approval  in  Washington,  and  orders  sent  him  April 
21  concluded  with,  "  The  Department  does  not 
wish  the  defenses  of  Havana  to  be  bombarded  or 
attacked  by  your  squadron."  Had  such  an  attack 
been  made  the  first  day  of  hostilities  it  would, 
whether  successful  or  not,  in  all  probability  have 
changed  the  whole  history  of  the  war,  for  it  would 


294  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN 

have  fixed  the  vicinity  of  Havana  as  the  scene  of 
action.  There  might  then  have  been  no  San  Juan 
blockhouse  nor  El  Caney  in  our  military  history, 
and  the  men  who  fell  at  those  places  might  yet 
be  alive ;  but  with  the  great  multitude  of  Spanish 
troops  in  and  around  Havana  we  might  have  had 
a  longer  and  more  difficult  campaign  and  a  larger 
death  roll  to  contemplate. 

The  fleet  arrived  off  Havana  shortly  before  sun- 
set of  the  day  it  left  Key  West,  and  for  the  first 
time  in  the  experience  of  nearly  all  its  officers 
and  men  they  looked  upon  an  enemy's  country. 
For  the  first  time  also  they  realized  with  personal 
interest  that  the  combination  of  dark  nights  and 
sneaking  torpedo-boats  is  contemplated  with  less 
equanimity  in  real  war  than  in  text-books  on  naval 
tactics.  The  ships,  with  all  lights  extinguished, 
dispersed  along  the  coast  and  began  the  weary 
and  monotonous  blockade  that  was  never  relaxed 
until  hostilities  ceased.  Uneventful  as  it  was,  it 
afforded  the  only  duty  that  some  of  the  smaller 
vessels  saw  during  those  hot  summer  months  under 
the  yellow  sky  where  the  Northern  Star  hangs  low 
and  the  Southern  Cross  is  seen.  For  the  first 
week  or  so  blockading  was  not  without  its  excite- 
ment, for  vessels  with  provisions  and  war-material 
for  the  enemy  came  in  considerable  numbers  upon 
the  coast,  and  had  to  be  captured,  often  after  an 
exciting  chase  that  gave  the  firemen  ample  employ- 
ment and  streaked  the  sky  for  miles  with  long 


THE  BLOCKADING  FLEET  295 

ribbons  of  black  smoke  trailed  astern  from  the 
funnels  of  pursuer  and  pursued.  After  a  short 
time  all  flags  but  that  of  the  United  States  practi- 
cally disappeared  from  those  waters,  and  the  block- 
ade became  a  long  waiting  and  watching  for  con- 
traband ships  or  ships  from  home  with  supplies 
and  mail,  the  monotony  being  rarely  broken  by 
an  arrival  of  either  kind. 

As  more  vessels  were  added  to  the  fleet  the 
blockade  became  more  extended,  until  toward  the 
close  of  the  war  it  included  nearly  all  the  ports 
of  any  consequence  on  both  the  north  and  south 
coasts  of  Cuba  and  some  in  Puerto  Rico.  The 
character  of  this  large  and  widespread  fleet,  which 
in  July  contained  more  than  one  hundred  vessels 
under  Admiral  Sampson's  command,  was  not  cal- 
culated to  inspire  confidence  in  the  mind  of  any 
one  who  had  been  led  by  Congressional  oratory  to 
believe  that  we  could  "  lick  all  creation  "  on  the 
ocean,  though  it  sufficed  for  the  particular  emer- 
gency that  called  it  into  being.  As  at  the  time 
of  the  civil  war,  the  government  found  itself  with 
a  wholly  inadequate  number  of  vessels  of  war  for 
real  hostilities,  and  was  forced  to  buy  or  charter 
at  exorbitant  rates  all  sorts  of  steamers  that  could 
be  hastily  fitted  with  a  few  guns  and  hurried  to 
the  scene  of  activity.  There  were  great  ocean 
steamers,  jaunty  yachts,  revenue  cutters,  light- 
house tenders,  and  ill-favored  harbor  tugs  mixed 
in  with  the  regular  ships  of  war  and  trying  to  do 


296  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

equal  duty  with  them.  A  great  battleship  might 
relieve  a  tugboat  on  a  blockade  station,  and  a 
clumsy  eight-knot  monitor  was  expected,  in  theory 
at  least,  to  chase  a  blockade-runner  with  the  celer- 
ity of  a  twenty-knot  cruiser. 

As  the  campaign  narrowed  down  to  a  prospect 
of  a  fight  with  a  formidable  squadron  of  the  enemy, 
most  of  our  large  fighting-ships  were  taken  off 
blockade  duty  and  put  in  one  or  the  other  of  the 
two  squadrons  that  for  some  time  were  held  in 
readiness  for  the  encounter.  This  left  the  block- 
ading lines  almost  entirely  to  small  gunboats, 
yachts,  and  tugs,  and  in  such  extended  order  that 
each  small  vessel  was  almost  wholly  self-dependent. 
What  the  Spanish  gun-vessels  and  torpedo-boats, 
of  which  there  were  about  fifty  in  the  many  little 
rivers,  bays,  and  inlets  of  the  Cuban  coast,  were 
thinking  of  that  they  did  not  take  the  many  oppor- 
tunities that  offered  of  falling  upon  these  isolated 
little  blockaders  is  more  than  one  can  imagine.  A 
little  enterprise  and  resolution  would  have  made  us 
much  trouble  and  caused  the  erection  of  more  than 
one  memorial  tablet  in  the  chapel  of  the  Naval 
Academy.  But  for  some  cause  they  left  us  almost 
entirely  unmolested.  The  only  notable  instances 
of  Spanish  attacks  upon  the  blockade  were  at  San 
Juan  in  Puerto  Rico,  where  the  cruiser  Isabel  II. 
and  the  destroyer  Terror  went  out  to  attack  the 
huge  but  lightly  armed  liner  St.  Paul,  and  at  Cien- 
fuegos,  where  three  gunboats  assailed  the  yacht 


THE  FIRST  ENGAGEMENT  297 

Eagle.     Both  attacks  were  in  daylight  and  both 
were  easily  discouraged  with  loss  to  the  enemy. 

April  27,  a  few  days  after  the  establishment  of 
the  blockade  as  m  above  described,  the  first  action 
of  the  war  occurred.  The  flagship  New  York  left 
the  vicinity  of  Havana  that  morning  and  pro- 
ceeded to  the  eastward  on  an  inspection  tour.  Off 
Matanzas,  fifty  miles  east  of  Havana,  the  monitor 
Puritan  and  the  cruiser  Cincinnati  were  found 
blockading  the  port,  and  the  New  York,  after 
directing  them  to  follow  her,  steamed  into  the 
harbor  entrance  to  observe  some  new  batteries  that 
were  seen  to  have  been  erected  there.  To  ascer- 
tain their  extent  and  the  nature  of  their  guns  the 
New  York  opened  fire,  followed  by  the  two  other 
ships,  which  fire  was  at  once  returned  by  the  new 
battery  and  by  an  older  one  on  the  other  side  of 
the  harbor.  Many  shells  struck  near  the  Ameri- 
can ships  or  passed  over  them,  but  none  hit  them. 
The  action  was  sustained  for  twenty-nine  minutes, 
when  the  ships  withdrew,  having  accomplished  their 
object,  besides  considerably  damaging  the  enemy's 
earthworks.  The  New  York  fired  one  hundred  and 
four  shells,  and  the  other  ships  in  equal  proportion 
to  their  batteries.  Of  course  it  was  reported  as  a 
Spanish  victory.  It  was  merely  a  reconnoissance, 
and  would  not  be  mentioned  but  for  the  fact  that  it 
was  the  first  actual  clash  of  arms  on  land  or  sea 
in  the  Spanish-American  war.  Many  newspaper 
boats  at  that  time  were  permitted  to  tag  the  war- 


298  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

vessels  wherever  they  went,  with  the  result  in  this 
case  that  when,  a  week  or  two  later,  newspapers 
arrived  from  home,  the  American  naval  officers 
were  much  surprised  to  learn  that  they  had  been 
engaged  in  a  tremendous  battle ! 

The  Spanish  Cape  Verde  squadron,  or  "  disap- 
pearing "  squadron  as  our  sailors  called  it,  left  St. 
Vincent,  Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  on  the  morning 
of  April  29,  and  for  nearly  two  weeks  disappeared 
off  the  face  of  the  ocean  so  far  as  any  news  of 
them  was  concerned,  though  they  were  steaming 
in  frequented  waters.  The  presence  of  boats  with 
newspaper  reporters  on  board  before  spoken  of 
would  have  made  any  such  secret  movement  im- 
possible for  the  American  ships.  The  Spanish 
squadron  consisted  of  Admiral  Cervera's  flagship, 
the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  and  the  armored  cruisers 
Vizcaya  and  Almirante  Oquendo,  these  three  being 
exactly  alike  and  of  7000  tons  displacement ;  the 
slightly  smaller  armored  cruiser  Cristobal  Colon, 
and  the  large  torpedo-boat  destroyers  Furor,  Plu- 
ton,  and  Terror.  The  destroyers  had  been  but 
recently  completed  in  England  and  had  a  record 
of  about  30  knots  speed;  the  armored  cruisers 
had  trial-trip  records  of  about  20  knots.  The 
three  first  named  were  built  at  Bilbao  in  the  north 
of  Spain,  by  an  English  engineering  establishment 
there,  and  the  Cristobal  Colon  was  built  in  Italy. 

The  possibilities  for  a  squadron  of  such  speed 
were  great,  and  the  definite  news  that  it  had  left 


CERVERA'S  SQUADRON  299 

St.  Vincent  and  steamed  into  the  west  caused 
much  uneasiness  in  the  United  States.  It  did  not 
seem  likely  that  Cervera  would  go  to  the  West 
Indies  and  seek  battle  with  Sampson's  superior 
squadron,  though  he  might  go  to  that  region  and 
harass  or  break  up  the  blockade,  which  his  sup- 
posed superior  speed  would  enable  him  to  do,  and 
avoid  a  general  action.  The  danger  most  feared 
was  that  he  might  appear  off  the  cities  of  the 
Atlantic  coast  and  inflict  great  damage  before  a 
naval  force  could  be  assembled  to  attack  him,  re- 
peating the  onslaught  from  place  to  place  and 
replenishing  his  coal  and  supplies  from  the  pro- 
perty of  his  victims.  As  time  went  by  without 
a  word  of  the  whereabouts  or  destination  of  the 
Spaniards  the  anxiety  increased  and  there  was 
much  preparation  and  telegraphing.  Swift  cruis- 
ers like  the  Columbia  and  the  Minneapolis,  with 
many  armed  mail-steamers,  were  sent  out  as  scouts 
to  watch  off  the  coast  of  New  England  and  in  the 
Atlantic  about  one  hundred  miles  east  of  the  east- 
ernmost line  of  the  West  Indies,  and  the  "  flying 
squadron "  was  held  in  readiness  for  immediate 
use  at  any  threatened  point  on  the  coast.  This 
latter  was  a  small  squadron  collected  some  time 
before  at  Hampton  Roads  for  home-defense  pur- 
poses, and  consisted  principally  of  the  battleships 
Massachusetts  and  Texas,  withdrawn  from  Samp- 
son's fleet  for  this  purpose,  and  the  armored  cruiser 
Brooklyn. 


300  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN 

Consideration  of  all  the  probabilities  in  the  case 
led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Spanish  squadron 
would  in  all  likelihood  first  appear  at  San  Juan  in 
the  island  of  Puerto  Rico,  which  was  the  nearest 
Spanish  port  in  the  West  Indies,  and  where  there 
was  a  navy-yard  and  coaling-station.  From  there, 
if  allowed  to  coal  unmolested,  it  would  be  free  to 
proceed  northward  to  attack  the  American  coast  or 
to  try  to  avoid  Sampson  and  annoy  the  blockade 
on  the  coast  of  Cuba.  In  view  of  the  probabilities, 
it  was  decided  to  take  a  sufficient  force  from  the 
blockade  and  proceed  to  Puerto  Rico,  so  as  to 
arrive  there  about  the  time  the  enemy  would  be 
due  at  their  probable  sea  speed.  The  force  selected 
for  this  expedition  consisted  of  the  flagship  New 
York,  the  battleships  Iowa  and  Indiana,  the  mon- 
itors Amphitrite  and  Terror,  the  small  cruisers 
Detroit  and  Montgomery,  and  the  torpedo-boat 
Porter.  An  armed  tug,  the  Wompatuck,  and  the 
collier  Niagara  completed  the  squadron,  which, 
because  of  the  low  speed  of  the  monitors  and  the 
great  difference  in  speed  of  its  units,  was  a  very 
ill-assorted  group  of  ships  to  send  against  a  fast  and 
homogeneous  squadron  ;  but  it  was  the  best  that  we 
could  do  in  our  poverty  in  real  ships-of-war,  with 
the  blockade  to  be  maintained  at  the  same  time. 

This  force  assembled  by  stealth,  to  avoid  betrayal 
by  the  news-gatherers,  about  dark  on  the  evening  of 
May  4  in  the  vicinity  of  Cardenas,  and  proceeded 
to  the  eastward  through  the  Nicholas  Channel. 


SAMPSON  SAILS  FOR  SAN  JUAN         301 

The  unfitness  of  the  two  monitors  for  such  an 
expedition  was  at  once  proved,  as  they  could  not 
keep  up  at  the  desired  speed  and  had  to  be  taken 
in  tow  by  the  New  York  and  Iowa,  which  seriously 
reduced  the  speed  of  the  squadron.  No  one  knew 
better  than  Admiral  Sampson  that  monitors  were 
not  fit  for  extended  sea  voyages  when  anything 
depended  upon  the  voyage ;  but  in  the  absence  of 
anything  more  suitable  he  was  compelled  to  take 
them  along  to  get  the  use  of  their  powerful  turret 
guns.  Besides  the  loss  of  actual  speed  caused  by 
towing  the  monitors,  much  delay  arose  from  the 
frequent  breaking  of  hawsers  with  which  they  were 
towed,  so  that  on  May  8,  instead  of  being  off  San 
Juan  as  originally  expected,  the  fighting  squadron 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  Cape  Haitien,  Haiti.  From 
there  its  location  was  reported  by  some  of  the 
enterprising  newspaper  people,  and  was  known  all 
over  the  world  from  the  newspapers  of  the  next 
morning.  Had  Cervera  been  at  San  Juan  then, 
or  even  two  or  three  days  later,  he  would  have 
had  notice  of  the  coming  of  the  American  squadron 
and  had  ample  time  to  avoid  it  and  fall  upon  the 
weakened  blockade  line  far  to  the  westward.  It 
happened  fortunately  that  he  had  been  delayed  in 
crossing  the  ocean  by  difficulty  with  machinery 
and  was  still  at  sea  out  of  reach  of  telegraph  lines. 
Proceeding  onward  at  its  compulsory  slow  speed, 
the  squadron  arrived  near  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico, 
soon  after  midnight  in  the  morning  of  May  12, 


302  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

seeing  in  the  distance  through  the  night  the  reflec- 
tion of  the  lights  of  the  city  in  the  sky.  It  was  a 
thrilling  and  critical  hour.  All  fully  expected  to 
find  the  Spanish  fleet  there  and  to  be  soon  engaged 
in  a  great  and  decisive  battle,  the  outcome  of  which 
no  man  could  foresee  because  there  was  much 
doubt  as  to  the  real  force  of  the  enemy.  It  had 
been  stated  that  other  large  Spanish  ships  beside 
those  of  the  Cape  Verde  squadron  were  crossing 
the  Atlantic,  and  among  the  many  rumors  brought 
off  by  the  newspaper  boats  that  had  communicated 
at  Cape  Haitien  was  one  to  the  effect  that  there 
were  seventeen  Spanish  war-ships  at  San  Juan. 
On  the  voyage  eastward  from  Havana  much  serious 
work  had  been  done  on  the  ships  to  prepare  them 
for  a  desperate  encounter.  On  board  the  flagship 
New  York  the  beautiful  and  expensive  hard-wood 
paneling  of  cabins  and  officers'  quarters  had  been 
ruthlessly  chopped  to  pieces  and  thrown  overboard 
to  minimize  the  danger  from  fire ;  chain  cables 
were  wound  around  the  ammunition-tubes,  under 
turrets  and  elsewhere,  and  bags  of  coal  and  ashes 
were  built  into  barricades  in  the  wardroom  and 
other  places  where  men  worked,  to  serve  as  partial 
protection  against  flying  debris.  Similar  grim  pre- 
parations were  made  on  the  other  ships,  and  had 
their  effect  in  impressing  the  crews  with  the  seri- 
ousness of  the  enterprise.  Officers  and  men  were 
in  a  high-strung  state  of  expectancy,  and  so  eager 
to  meet  the  enemy  and  have  the  suspense  over, 


ORDER  OF  BATTLE  PREPARED     303 

even  with  our  ill-assorted  squadron,  that  it  is  a 
great  pity  the  decisive  battle  could  not  have  been 
fought  that  morning  and  the  country  spared  the 
cost  and  loss  of  life  incident  to  the  later  cam- 
paign of  the  army  against  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

The  admiral  had  prepared  an  order  of  battle 
several  days  before,  which  was  printed  and  dis- 
tributed to  the  officers  that  they  might  intelligently 
meet  any  emergency  that  might  arise.  This  order, 
dated  at  sea,  May  7,  latitude  20.33  N.,  longitude 
73.37  W.,  provided  for  both  contingencies  of  find- 
ing the  enemy  in  port  and  meeting  him  at  sea,  and 
is  a  model  illustration  of  the  exactness  and  fore- 
thought demanded  of  a  trained  naval  commander 
in  the  exercise  of  the  highest  functions  of  his  pro- 
fession. It  detailed  the  duty  expected  of  each 
vessel  in  either  condition  that  might  be  met,  and 
left  little  to  be  done  except  to  obey  orders  and  win 
a  victory. 

On  the  evening  of  the  llth  the  admiral  trans- 
ferred his  flag  to  the  Iowa,  believing  that  battleship 
better  suited  to  lead  in  the  expected  fight  than  the 
lightly  armored  New  York.  All  hands  were  called 
on  the  ships  the  next  morning  at  three  o'clock,  and 
coffee,  hard-tack,  and  cold  corned  beef  provided  for 
officers  and  men.  Meanwhile  the  ships  stole  silently 
forward,  slowly  approaching  their  goal.  With  the 
first  streaks  of  dawn,  when  objects  could  begin  to 
be  distinguished,  it  became  reasonably  certain  that 
the  Spanish  ships  were  not  in  the  harbor,  nor  could 


304  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

any  signs  of  them  be  discovered  in  the  eastern  sea 
where  the  sun  was  rising.  To  ascertain  the  strength 
and  location  of  the  shore  batteries  and  to  make 
absolutely  sure  regarding  the  presence  of  ships  of 
the  enemy  in  the  inner  harbor,  the  order  of  battle 
providing  for  finding  the  enemy  in  port  was  carried 
out  and  the  fortifications  were  attacked.  In  this 
the  admiral  was  justified,  in  spite  of  the  orders  not 
to  hazard  his  ships  against  shore  defenses  so  long 
as  the  Spanish  fleet  was  at  large.  The  risk  of 
crippling  the  ships  was  not  great,  and  under  the 
circumstances  the  attack  was  in  a  manner  an  attack 
upon  the  ships  of  the  enemy,  which  might  very  well 
be  within  hearing  and  would  presumably  hurry  to 
the  scene  of  action.  The  caution  about  attacking 
fortifications  had  been  repeated  to  Sampson,  May 
5,  by  cablegram  sent  to  Cape  Haytien :  "  Do  not 
risk  so  crippling  your  vessels  against  fortifications 
as  to  prevent  from  soon  afterward  successfully 
fighting  the  Spanish  fleet,  composed  of  Pelayo, 
Carlos  V.,  Vizcaya,  Oquendo,  Colon,  Teresa,  and 
four  torpedo-boat  destroyers  if  they  should  appear 
on  this  side.  —  LONG." 

The  next  day,  May  6,  Secretary  Long  had  sent 
the  following  confidential  letter  to  the  admiral, 
which,  however,  was  not  received  until  after  the 
affair  at  San  Juan. 

SIR,  —  Referring  to  the  Department's  confi- 
dential instructions  of  the  6th  of  April,  1898,  and 


ORDERS   AS  TO   SHORE   BATTERIES       305 

to  confidential  order  of  April  21,  1898,  modifying 
the  above  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  blockade  of 
Cuba,  and  to  the  Department's  cipher  despatches 
of  April  21,  1898,  and  April  26, 1898,  you  are  in- 
formed  that  the  Department  has  not  intended  to 
restrict  your  operations  in  the  West  Indies,  except 
in  regard  to  the  blockade  of  certain  portions  of 
Cuba  and  in  the  exposure  of  your  vessels  to  the 
fire  of  heavy  guns  mounted  on  shore  which  are 
not  protecting  or  assisting  formidable  Spanish 
ships. 

The  Department  is  perfectly  willing  that  you 
should  expose  your  ships  to  the  heaviest  guns  of 
land  batteries  if,  in  your  opinion,  there  are  Spanish 
vessels  of  sufficient  military  importance  protected 
*by  those  guns  to  make  an  attack  advisable,  your 
chief  aim  being  for  the  present  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  principal  vessels. 

The  Department  writes  this  letter  because  it 
has  been  intimated  by  civilians,  and  it  is  believed 
by  officers  of  rank  serving  under  you,  that  you 
are  not  permitted  to  take  the  offensive  even  against 
small  land  batteries,  and  that  you  must  wait  to  be 
fired  upon  before  making  an  aggressive  movement 
against  any  port,  no  matter  how  poorly  fortified. 

The  Department  does  not  think,  however,  that 
you  have  personally  held  this  view ;  but  in  order 
to  guard  against  any  probable  misconception  on 
your  part  it  has  concluded  to  define  more  particu- 
larly its  views  as  expressed  above. 

JOHN  D.  LONG,  Secretary. 


306  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see  well,  the 
little  Wompatuck  advanced  within  range  of  the 
batteries  to  anchor  a  stake-boat  for  a  turning- 
point  for  the  big  ships,  as  the  order  of  battle  re- 
quired. It  was  a  daring  and  perilous  deed,  which 
the  onlookers  expected  to  see  ended  by  the  brave 
little  craft  being  blown  out  of  the  water ;  but  not 
a  gun  was  fired  at  her.  Indeed,  though  it  was 
now  daylight,  no  flags  were  flying  on  the  Morro, 
nor  was  there  a  sign  of  life  on  the  shore.  The 
Detroit  steamed  rapidly  across  the  mouth  of  the 
harbor  to  take  her  appointed  station  to  intercept 
any  torpedo-boats  that  might  try  to  come  out,  and 
still  no  movement  on  shore,  though  it  was  now  five 
o'clock.  The  Iowa,  the  Indiana,  the  New  York, 
the  Amphitrite,  and  the  Terror  then  advanced  in 
column  at  about  four  knots  speed  toward  the  boat 
anchored  by  the  Wompatuck.  At  5.16  the  Iowa 
broke  the  morning  calm  by  firing  a  6-pounder,  an 
8-inch,  and  then  a  12-inch  gun  in  succession,  and 
this  was  followed  by  general  firing  from  all  her 
starboard  battery  and  from  those  of  the  other 
ships  as  they  came  within  good  range.  Then  there 
was  hurrying  in  hot  haste  on  shore,  manning  bat- 
teries, hoisting  flags,  and,  in  a  short  time,  firing, 
the  first  Spanish  shot  being  fired  eight  minutes 
after  the  first  gun  from  the  Iowa.  No  vessels  of 
any  class  appeared  out  of  the  harbor  to  participate 
in  the  battle. 

It  was  a  grand  spectacle,  though  an  incongruous 


BOMBARDMENT  OF  SAN  JUAN  307 

combination  of  the  beautiful  in  nature  with  the 
destructive  machinery  of  science.  The  white  town 
with  its  background  of  great  green  hills  on  which 
the  trees  were  waving  in  the  wind  made  a  pecul- 
iarly peaceful  picture  as  it  lay  there  in  the  gentle 
quiet  of  the  tropical  morning,  but  all  this  was  sud- 
denly changed  by  the  rude  voice  of  war.  Clouds 
of  sulphurous  smoke  shut  out  the  white  houses 
and  green  trees  from  the  landscape,  and  the  silence 
gave  place  to  the  shrieking  of  shells,  the  loud  rapid 
reports  of  the  smaller  guns,  and  the  thunderous 
discharges  and  echoes  of  the  great  guns  of  the 
battleships  reverberating  among  the  hills.  As  the 
blue  sky  became  dimmed  with  cannon  smoke,  the 
variegated  colors  of  the  morning  vanished,  and 
the  only  brightness  in  the  scene  was  the  flash  of 
guns  and  the  lustre  of  our  battle-flags,  of  which 
the  writer  retains  a  very  vivid  recollection,  as  they 
shone  beautifully  in  the  morning  sun  above  the 
clouds  of  smoke  that  enveloped  the  ships  that  bore 
them.  On  shore  also  the  red  and  gold  of  the 
Spanish  ensign  made  many  a  bright  spot  amid  the 
smoke  and  dust  and  the  great  fountain-like  erup- 
tions of  crushed  masonry  and  earth  flying  skyward 
where  our  big  shells  were  striking. 

Five  ships  of  the  attacking  column  steamed  to- 
ward the  town,  firing  at  the  Morro  and  at  the 
other  fortifications  along  the  shore,  until  they  had 
approached  to  within  about  1500  yards ;  then  they 
turned  and  steamed  back,  to  pass  again  over  the 


308  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

firing  line,  using  only  the  "big  guns  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  engagement  because  of  the  great  quan- 
tity of  smoke  made  by  the  smaller  guns.  After 
passing  three  times  over  the  firing  line  and  being 
in  action  two  hours  and  twenty  minutes,  the  ships 
ceased  firing  and  drew  out  of  range,  except  the 
Terror,  which  remained  close  in,  engaging  the 
batteries  for  an  hour  longer.  The  enemy,  whose 
batteries  were  more  numerous  and  provided  with 
heavier  guns  than  had  been  supposed,  continued 
firing  the  whole  time,  and  by  so  doing  furnished  a 
more  prolonged  and  persistant  resistance  than  they 
did  in  any  other  attack  upon  them  during  the  war. 
The  American  squadron  could  have  silenced  the 
fire  and  forced  the  capitulation  of  the  city  during 
the  day,  but  there  were  no  troops  to  hold  it,  and 
as  it  had  been  proven  that  the  Spanish  ships  were 
not  in  the  harbor,  there  was  no  military  object  in 
continuing  the  attack :  hence  the  withdrawal. 

The  firing  of  the  Spaniards  was  miserable,  par- 
ticularly when  our  ships  were  closest,  and  conse- 
quently the  easier  targets.  Shells  struck  in  num- 
bers all  around  the  ships,  and  a  great  many  passed 
high  over  them,  as  though  all  fired  at  the  same 
long  range  regardless  of  the  changing  positions  of 
the  ships.  They  fell  the  closest  at  a  point  on  the 
return  course  from  the  firing  line,  between  four 
and  five  thousand  yards  from  shore,  and  it  has 
been  surmised  that  the  Spaniards  had  had  a  target 
planted  at  that  point  and  were  not  accustomed  to 


SPANISH  MARKSMANSHIP  309 

firing  their  guns  at  any  other  range.  This  suppo- 
sition is  reasonable,  judging  from  results,  though 
it  is  difficult  to  imagine  the  patience  of  mind  of  a 
military  genius  who  would  thus  train  a  gun  and 
wait  for  an  enemy  to  go  to  the  proper  place  to  be 
hit.  Be  this  as  it  may,  both  the  Iowa  and  the 
New  York  were  struck  at  the  location  mentioned, 
the  former  while  returning  from  her  second  trip 
over  the  firing  line,  and  the  latter  while  going  out 
of  action  after  the  last  round.  The  explosion  of 
the  shell  on  the  Iowa  wounded  three  men  and  did 
considerable  damage  to  boats  and  upper  works. 
On  the  New  York  the  injury  was  more  serious,  as 
one  man  was  killed  instantly  and  four  wounded, 
while  a  search-light  and  one  boat  were  completely 
demolished,  and  a  great  many  holes  were  made  by 
flying  fragments  in  boats,  sinokepipes,  ventilators, 
and  other  standing  objects  on  deck.  From  pieces 
of  this  shell  it  was  identified  as  of  fifteen  centi- 
metres diameter,  or  only  about  six  inches,  yet  its 
explosive  energy  was  such  as  to  hurl  vicious  mis- 
siles over  an  area  measured  by  at  least  one  hun- 
dred feet  of  the  ship's  length.  It  was  purely  a 
random  shot,  and  very  peculiarly  the  man  who  was 
killed  by  it  was  named  Widemark. 

It  was  supposed  on  the  New  York  at  the  time 
that  this  man  was  the  first  of  the  navy  to  lose 
his  life  in  the  war,  but  it  was  learned  a  few  days 
later  that  this  was  not  the  case.  The  day  before 
(May  11)  a  spirited  engagement  took  place  in  the 


310  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

harbor  of  Cardenas  between  the  Wilmington,  the 
Winslow,  and  the  Hudson  on  the  American  side 
and  some  Spanish  gunboats  and  shore  batteries. 
In  this  the  Winslow,  a  torpedo-boat,  was  tempora- 
rily disabled  by  a  shell  wrecking  one  of  her  en- 
gines, and  had  an  officer  —  Ensign  Worth  Bagley 
—  and  four  men  killed.  The  same  day,  at  Cien- 
fuegos,  on  the  opposite  side  of  Cuba,  two  men  of 
the  Marblehead  were  killed  in  boats  engaged  close 
in  shore,  cutting  cables  under  protection  of  the 
guns  of  the  Marblehead  and  the  Nashville.  Both 
these  affairs  furnish  examples  of  the  greatest  gal- 
lantry and  heroism,  and  reflect  much  honor  upon 
the  personnel  of  the  American  navy. 

When  the  attack  at  San  Juan  was  concluded, 
the  situation  was  more  baffling  than  ever.  The 
most  probable  plan  of  finding  the  Spanish  fleet 
that  could  be  devised  had  been  carried  out  and 
had  failed,  leaving  us  more  in  the  dark  than  ever 
as  to  its  whereabouts.  By  all  estimates  of  time 
and  speed  it  should  have  arrived  at  San  Juan  be- 
fore Sampson  did,  and  now  it  seemed  likely  that 
it  had  been  there  and  gone,  or  had  passed  to  the 
westward  too  far  from  the  course  of  the  American 
ships  to  be  discovered.  This  probability  put  the 
Havana  blockade  in  danger  a  thousand  miles  away 
and  made  it  imperative  for  the  admiral  to  hasten 
back  with  his  heaviest  ships.  The  second  morning 
after  leaving  San  Juan,  that  is,  May  14,  the  hos- 
pital-ship Solace  was  met  and  gave  the  remarkable 


CERVERA  AT  CURAgAO  311 

information  that  it  was  reliably  reported  in  Key 
West,  which  port  she  had  left  on  the  llth,  that 
the  Spanish  fleet  was  at  Cadiz  in  Spain !  The 
mystery  was  now  darker  than  ever  and  the  cares 
of  the  admiral  greatly  multiplied,  for  he  could  not 
believe  the  report  and  yet  had  no  absolute  facts 
upon  which  to  base  doubt.  The  Porter  was  sent 
to  a  port  in  San  Domingo  to  send  a  cablegram 
home  asking  about  the  trtith  of  the  rumor,  and 
also  requesting  that  a  collier  be  sent  to  San  Juan 
in  case  it  proved  to  be  true.  This  shows  that  the 
admiral  intended  to  return  and  capture  that  port 
if  it  transpired  that  the  Spanish  fleet  had  really 
returned  home. 

Meanwhile,  and  for  two  days  before,  cable  dis- 
patches were  flying  thickly  all  over  the  West 
Indies  and  to  and  from  the  United  States.  The 
"disappearing  squadron"  had  appeared  on  the 
American  side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  but  the 
admiral  was  fated  not  to  know  this  for  another  day, 
when  at  midnight  of  the  15th  the  Porter  brought 
out  from  Cape  Haitien  a  quantity  of  dispatches, 
among  them  a  positive  one  from  Secretary  Long 
that  the  Spaniards  were  at  Curacao,  even  giving 
the  information  that  the  Teresa  and  Vizcaya  had 
entered  that  port  for  coal.  Another  dispatch  of 
the  same  date  from  the  secretary  ordered  Sampson 
to  proceed  to  Key  West  at  all  possible  speed.  It 
transpired  that  at  the  very  hour  our  ships  were 
attacking  San  Juan  an  American  officer  at  Fort 


312  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

de  France,  in  Martinique,  saw  with  his  own  eyes 
the  Spanish  ships  passing  by  to  the  westward. 
Instead  of  heading  directly  for  their  own  island 
of  Puerto  Rico,  the  Spaniards  had  taken  a  more 
southerly  route  across  the  Atlantic  and  had  passed 
through  the  chain  of  the  Windward  Islands  at  the 
French  island  of  Martinique,  about  one  hundred 
miles  south  of  the  latitude  of  Puerto  Rico.  The 
big  auxiliary  cruiser  Harvard  had  put  in  at  St. 
Pierre,  Martinique,  May  11,  to  cable  a  report  of 
her  scouting  in  that  vicinity.  That  evening  the 
American  consul,  Mr.  .Darte,  received  a  private 
dispatch  from  Fort  de  France,  fifteen  miles  distant 
in  the  same  island,  announcing  that  a  Spanish  tor- 
pedo-destroyer had  arrived  there  at  four  that  after- 
noon. This  was  confirmed  almost  immediately  by 
the  governor  of  the  island  sending  official  notice 
to  Captain  Cotton  of  the  Harvard  that  the  Span- 
ish destroyer  Furor  had  arrived  at  Fort  de  France 
and  would  depart  about  7  P.  M.,  and  that  in  accord- 
ance with  international  usage  the  Harvard  could 
not  go  to  sea  before  7  P.  M.  of  the  following  day. 

The  marine  officer  of  the  Harvard,  Lieutenant 
Kane,  and  the  consul  were  sent  by  Captain  Cot- 
ton to  collect  further  news  if  possible.  They  made 
the  trip  in  five  hours  in  a  small  rowboat  that 
night,  arriving  at  Fort  de  France  at  two  the  next 
morning,  May  12.  There  they  found  a  Spanish 
hospital-ship,  the  Alicante,  that  had  been  there 
for  some  time,  but  no  signs  of  any  Spanish  fight- 


CERVERA  IN  THE  CARIBBEAN  313 

ing-ships.  About  seven  in  the  morning  they  started 
on  the  return  trip  to  St.  Pierre  in  a  small  local 
steamer,  and  soon  saw  something  that  every  Amer- 
ican eye  had  been  straining  in  imagination  to  see 
for  the  last  two  weeks.  A  squadron  of  large  war- 
steamers,  almost  hull  down,  was  passing  in  from 
the  eastward,  and  any  doubt  as  to  its  nationality 
was  quickly  removed  by  one  vessel  standing  in  to 
the  harbor  of  Fort  de  France,  passing  so  near  the 
steamer  upon  which  the  Americans  were  that  they 
counted  her  small  guns  and  signal  poles,  and  even 
noticed  that  her  bottom  was  painted  red.  It  was 
the  Spanish  torpedo-destroyer  Terror,  and  the 
mystery  of  the  disappearing  squadron  was  at  last 
dispelled.  The  important  tidings  were  cabled  at 
once  by  Mr.  Darte  to  the  State  Department 
at  Washington  and  by  Captain  Cotton  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  and  the  fright  that  is  said 
to  have  prevailed  along  our  northern  coasts  was 
relieved. 

Passing  on  from  the  offing  of  Fort  de  France, 
the  Spanish  ships  proceeded  on  a  southwesterly 
course  in  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Spurred  to  energy, 
perhaps,  by  the  knowledge  that  their  whereabouts 
would  now  be  known  throughout  the  world,  they 
steamed  in  the  next  twenty-four  hours  just  one 
hundred  miles  more  than  had  been  made  in  any 
nautical  day  in  the  run  since  leaving  the  Cape 
Verde  Islands.  They  arrived  off  the  Dutch  island 
of  Cura9ao,  on  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  May  14, 


314  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN 

where  the  Teresa  and  the  Vizcaya,  and  later  the 
Pluton,  entered  the  port.  This  news  was  cabled 
broadcast  from  Washington  to  every  naval  com- 
mander and  consul  in  the  West  Indies,  but,  as 
before  noted,  did  not  reach  Sampson  until  the  15th. 
Why  Cervera  took  his  squadron  to  neutral  waters 
so  far  from  the  theatre  of  war  instead  of  going  to 
his  most  convenient  and  natural  base  in  Puerto 
Rico  is  something  that  remains  unexplained.  He 
left  Curacao  the  evening  of  the  15th,  which  fact 
was  of  course  at  once  reported  by  cable,  with  the 
disquieting  addition,  "  Destination  unknown." 

Meanwhile,  the  flying  squadron  had  been  dis- 
turbed from  its  anchorage  in  Hampton  Roads  and 
sent  to  a  sea  rendezvous  off  Charleston,  South  Caro- 
lina, to  await  further  orders.  May  14  it  was  ordered 
to  proceed  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  Key  West, 
where  it  arrived  the  18th.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  same  day  Admiral  Sampson  arrived  at  the 
same  port  in  the  New  York,  having  preceded  his 
other  ships  at  higher  speed  to  obey  the  orders  of 
the  department.  The  next  morning  the  flying 
squadron  left  under  orders  to  go  off  the  port  of 
Cienfuegos  to  look  for  Cervera  there.  The  Iowa 
and  the  Marblehead  were  detailed  by  Sampson  to 
strengthen  the  flying  squadron,  and  some  auxiliary 
vessels  and  colliers  were  also  added  to  it.  Up  to 
this  time  and  until  a  few  days  later  this  squadron 
was  commanded  by  Commodore  W.  S.  Schley, 
whose  flagship  was  the  Brooklyn,  but  on  May  24 


CERVERA'S  ARRIVAL  AT  SANTIAGO      315 

by  order  of  the  Navy  Department  the  flying 
squadron  was  placed  under  the  orders  of  Admiral 
Sampson  and  became  a  part  of  the  fighting  squad- 
ron, as  the  West  India  fleet  was  popularly  called. 
The  department  had  received  information  that  the 
Spanish  ships  carried  munitions  of  war  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  defense  of  Havana,  and  it  there- 
fore appeared  certain  that  they  would  try  to 
force  an  entrance  to  that  port  or  seek  another  that 
had  rail  communication  with,  it.  The  only  fea- 
sible place  on  the  south  coast  answering  the  latter 
requirement  was  Cienfuegos,  and  it  was  fully  ex- 
pected when  the  flying  squadron  left  for  that  point 
that  a  general  engagement  would  surely  take  place 
very  soon. 

It  happened  however  that,  at  about  the  exact 
hour  in  the  morning  of  May  19  when  Schley's 
ships  were  steaming  out  of  Key  West  the  Spanish 
squadron  was  steaming  into  the  narrow  harbor 
mouth  at  Santiago  de  Cuba.  The  news  of  this 
arrival  was  immediately  telegraphed  to  Captain- 
General  Blanco  at  Havana,  and  at  the  same  time, 
by  agencies  established  by  the  army  signal  corps, 
was  telegraphed  through  Havana  to  Colonel  James 
Allen,  the  United  States  signal  officer  at  Key 
West.  That  officer  carried  the  message  person- 
ally to  the  commandant  of  the  Key  West  naval 
station,  who  repeated  it  to  Washington.  Allowing 
for  locations  of  telegraph  offices  in  Havana  and 
Key  West,  it  is  probable  that  the  commandant  at 


316  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

the  latter  place  actually  read  the  important  news 
before  it  was  known  to  General  Blanco.  Admiral 
Sampson,  in  the  New  York,  coaling  outside,  was 
informed  of  the  dispatch  during  the  day,  and  the 
next  morning  it  was  printed  by  newspapers  all 
over  the  world,  with  press  confirmations  from 
Paris  and  Madrid.  Gifts  from  the  Greeks  were 
suspected  by  the  ancients,  and  in  this  modern  in- 
stance information  of  such  vital  importance  com- 
ing from  the  camp  of  the  enemy  was  naturally 
doubted,  and  not  taken  as  conclusive. 

The  Spaniards  had  barely  missed  observation 
by  responsible  witnesses.  The  big  steamer  St. 
Louis  and  the  tug-gunboat  Wompatuck  had  been 
engaged  in  cable-cutting  under  the  fire  of  the 
Morro  batteries  at  Santiago  on  the  18th,  and  had 
left  that  position  early  in  the  morning  of  the  19th 
to  undertake  similar  work  at  Guantanamo  Bay, 
forty  miles  to  the  eastward.  Had  they  delayed 
their  departure  only  an  hour  they  would  have  seen 
the  approaching  Spanish  ships,  which  passed  in  at 
the  entrance  at  8  A.  M.  That  would  have  been  a 
valuable  hour,  for  in  the  event  it  was  exactly  ten 
days  before  the  Americans  positively  located  their 
antagonists. 

Although  doubting  the  telegram  from  Santiago, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  telegraphed  Sampson 
the  same  day  that  it  "might  very  well  be  correct," 
and  advised  him  to  order  the  flying  squadron  from 
Cienfuegos  to  Santiago.  Several  of  the  big  scouts 


SCHLEY'S   MOVEMENTS  317 

were  ordered  to  reconnoitre  Santiago,  but  they  all 
reported  within  a  few  days  that  they  had  seen 
nothing  of  the  enemy's  ships.  While  in  front  of 
Santiago,  May  25,  the  St.  Paul  captured  the 
English  steamer  Restormal,  bound  in  with  a  cargo 
of  coal  for  Cervera.  The  log  of  this  steamer 
showed  that  she  had  originally  been  ordered  to 
meet  the  Spaniards  at  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico, 
thus  confirming  the  accuracy  of  the  belief  that 
they  would  first  attempt  to  make  that  port. 

The  flying  squadron  arrived  off  Cienfuegos, 
May  21,  and  remained  there  until  the  evening  of 
the  24th,  doubtful  whether  or  not  the  Spaniards 
were  in  port.  It  then  proceeded  eastward  at  slow 
speed  and  arrived  within  twenty  miles  of  Santiago 
forty-eight  hours  later,  that  is,  in  the  evening  of 
May  26.  Two  hours  afterward,  before  any  exami- 
nation of  the  port  had  been  made,  the  flagship 
Brooklyn  signaled  the  squadron  to  proceed  to  Key 
West,  and  a  start  was  made  for  that  destination. 

The  authorities  in  Washington,  naturally  greatly 
exercised  over  the  second  disappearance  of  the 
Spanish  squadron,  became  very  anxious  and  per- 
haps provoked  at  what  seemed  lack  of  enterprise 
on  the  part  of  the  flying  squadron  in  seeking  the 
enemy,  and  some  of  the  dispatches  sent  to  the 
commander  of  that  squadron  were  almost  reproach- 
ful. When  the  cablegram  was  received  announ- 
cing that  that  squadron  was  on  the  way  back  to 
Key  West  there  was  genuine  disappointment  if 


318  THE   WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

not  consternation  in  Washington.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  immediately  telegraphed  the  important 
news  to  Sampson  and  asked  him  how  soon  after 
the  arrival  of  Schley  he  could  reach  Santiago  with 
the  New  York  and  some  other  ships,  and  how  long 
he  could  blockade  there,  the  latter  question  having 
reference  to  the  maintenance  of  a  coal  supply.  To 
this  the  admiral  replied  that  he  could  reach  Santi- 
ago in  three  days,  that  he  could  blockade  there 
indefinitely,  and  that  he  would  like  to  start  at 
once,  as  he  did  not  see  the  necessity  of  waiting  the 
return  of  the  flying  squadron,  but  proposed  meeting 
it  and  turning  back  its  principal  ships.  The  same 
day,  May  29,  the  department  answered,  authoriz- 
ing him  to  proceed  in  person  to  Santiago  at  once. 
For  more  than  a  week  previous,  Sampson  had 
been  on  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  trying  with  the 
vessels  at  his  hand  to  guard  Havana  from  an  ap- 
proach by  the  enemy's  squadron.  As  many  ships 
as  could  be  spared  from  the  immediate  vicinity  were 
taken  with  the  New  York  down  the  coast  to  the 
eastward,  where  for  several  days  they  cruised  slowly 
back  and  forth  in  the  Nicholas  Channel,  expecting 
to  encounter  the  enemy  there,  bound  around  the 
east  end  of  Cuba  for  Cardenas,  Matanzas,  or  Ha- 
vana. It  was  then  thought  impossible  that  Cervera 
would  linger  at  Santiago,  with  a  free  exit  before 
him,  any  longer  than  necessary  to  take  coal.  The 
American  force  now  with  Sampson  was  of  such  com- 
position as  to  be  fitly  described  by  the  word  noude- 


SAMPSON'S  MOVEMENTS  319 

script,  and  was  daily  changing,  as  ships  went  back 
and  forth  to  keep  the  Havana  position  in  strength. 
On  one  day  about  the  middle  of  the  week  there 
were  present,  as  shown  by  the  author's  notes,  the 
flagship  New  York,  one  battleship,  two  monitors, 
four  small  cruisers  of  three  different  types,  four 
gunboats  of  three  types,  one  dynamite-gun  vessel, 
two  converted  yachts,  and  two  torpedo-boats.  A 
precise  order  of  battle  was  printed  and  distributed 
for  use  should  the  enemy  appear. 

Distracted  with  anxiety  and  disappointed  at  the 
reports  received  from  the  flying  squadron,  Sampson 
eventually  went  to  Key  West  to  communicate  with 
his  government,  anchoring  there  with  the  New  York 
the  morning  of  May  28.  There  he  found  the  Ore- 
gon, just  arrived  from  her  wonderful  voyage  from 
the  Pacific,  and  fit  for  any  service.  There  also  he 
received  the  unwelcome  information  that  the  flying 
squadron  had  abandoned  the  vicinity  of  Santiago, 
and  the  telegram  before  mentioned  asking  if  he 
could  go  to  Santiago  and  maintain  a  blockade  there. 
On  the  evening  of  the  next  day  the  New  York, 
having  filled  up  with  coal,  went  to  sea,  and  the  next 
morning  rejoined  the  patrol  line  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Cardenas.  Commodore  Watson  was  left 
in  command  of  the  blockading  force  on  the  north 
coast  of  Cuba,  and  Sampson,  with  the  New  York, 
the  Oregon,  the  Mayflower,  and  the  Porter,  started 
eastward  at  about  thirteen  knots  speed.  At  dark 
that  evening  (May  30)  they  met  two  of  the  scouts 


320  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

— Yale  and  St.  Paul  —  and  learned  from  them  posi- 
itively  that  the  Spanish  ships  were  in  Santiago  and 
that  the  flying  squadron  was  still  in  that  vicinity. 

We  will  now  return  to  the  point  where  we  left 
that  squadron  turning  back  toward  Key  West. 
It  steamed  slowly  westward  during  the  night  of 
May  26  and  the  day  of  the  27th,  being  delayed  by 
a  breakdown  of  the  machinery  of  the  collier  Merri- 
mac,  and  by  the  circumstance  that  the  Texas  and 
Marblehead  were  alongside  that  collier,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  smooth  weather  to  get  coal.  The  delay 
gave  ample  time  for  reflection,  and  the  westward 
movement  was  suspended.  The  next  day,  the  28th, 
the  ships  steamed  back  toward  Santiago,  near  which 
place  they  arrived  about  dark  and  laid  off  and  on 
until  the  next  morning.  They  then  steamed  near 
enough  to  observe  objects  in  the  harbor,  the  first 
remarkable  object  that  met  the  eye  being  the  Cris- 
tobal Colon  lying  at  anchor  in  the  channel  less  than 
a  mile  from  its  mouth.  She  was  first  seen  by  the 
Iowa,  which  signaled  the  discovery  to  the  Brook- 
lyn and  prepared  for  the  battle  that  Captain  Evans 
supposed  would  surely  take  place.  Two  cruisers 
of  the  Vizcaya  class  and  two  torpedo -destroyers 
were  soon  made  out,  and  all  doubts  as  to  the 
location  of  the  disappearing  squadron  were  at  last 
removed.  The  scout  St.  Paul  was  sent  at  full 
speed  for  St.  Nicholas  Mole,  Haiti,  to  cable  the 
news  home  and  to  find  and  inform  the  commander- 
in-chief.  The  Spanish  ships  were  not  molested. 


AN  EXCHANGE  OF  SHOTS  321 

The  next  day,  May  30,  the  squadron  was 
strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  the  cruiser  New 
Orleans.  That  ship  had  been  dispatched  by  Samp- 
son when  in  the  Nicholas  Channel  with  orders  to 
Schley  to  remain  on  a  blockade  at  Santiago  at  all 
hazards  if  the  Spanish  ships  were  there,  and  to 
obstruct  the  channel  at  its  narrowest  part  by  sink- 
ing a  collier.  This  proposition  was  not  a  novel  war 
measure.  An  order  to  the  same  effect  had  been 
sent  direct  from  the  Navy  Department,  and  the 
Bureau  of  Navigation  has  since  reported  that  it 
was  suggested  to  the  department  by  fully  one  hun- 
dred persons.  The  naval  force  now  off  Santiago 
was  much  stronger  than  the  Spanish  squadron,  and 
consisted  of  the  Brooklyn,  the  Iowa,  the  Massachu- 
setts, the  Texas,  the  New  Orleans,  the  Marblehead, 
and  the  converted  yacht  Vixen.  May  31,  in  the 
afternoon,  the  Massachusetts,  the  Iowa,  and  the 
New  Orleans  steamed  in  from  their  sea  positions 
and  crossed  the  harbor  entrance  twice  at  distances 
varying  from  five  to  six  and  one  half  miles,  firing 
at  the  Cristobal  Colon.  This  reconnoissance  was 
reported  by  the  commodore,  who  was  on  the  Mas- 
sachusetts, as  intended  principally  to  injure  or  de- 
stroy the  Colon,  but  the  distance  chosen  was  such 
that  she  was  not  hit  and  did  no  damage  in  return, 
recording  in  her  log-book,  "  Our  shot  falling  short 
on  account  of  the  enemy  keeping  at  too  great  dis- 
tance." The  other  Spanish  ships  and  the  batteries 
joined  in  the  firing,  but  without  effect.  An  exag- 


322  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

gerated  impression  of  the  power  of  the  guns  in 
the  shore  batteries  was  obtained  in  this  incident 
and  reported  to  Admiral  Sampson,  who  afterward 
experienced  some  harsh  newspaper  criticism,  as 
though  the  error  had  been  his  own. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  June  1  the  admiral,  with 
the  New  York  and  the  Oregon,  arrived  off  Santiago, 
took  personal  command  of  his  squadron,  and  im- 
mediately instituted  a  night  and  day  blockade  of 
the  port  that  was  not  relaxed  until  its  necessity 
had  passed  away.  June  2  the  admiral  issued  an 
order  of  battle  assigning  positions  for  his  ships  and 
directing  among  other  things,  "  If  the  enemy  tries 
to  escape,  the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon 
as  possible,  and  endeavor  to  sink  his  vessels  or 
force  them  to  run  ashore  in  the  channel."  This 
order  remained  standing  and  was  the  one  under 
which  the  captains  acted  a  month  later  when  the 
battle  was  fought.  The  first  plan  of  blockade  was 
for  the  ships  to  lie  in  an  irregular  semicircle  with 
a  radius  of  about  six  miles  from  the  Morro  in  the 
daytime,  closing  in  to  about  four  miles  at  night. 
The  smaller  ships  lay  closest  in  shore  at  the  ends 
of  this  curve,  the  battleships  occupying  the  centre 
in  front  of  the  harbor  entrance.  After  the  first 
bombardment,  June  6,  when  it  was  found  that  the 
shore  batteries  were  not  so  formidable  as  supposed, 
the  blockading  line  was  contracted  to  four  miles  in 
the  daytime  and  closer  at  night.  At  the  same  time 
the  arrangement'  was  modified  by  sending  in  three 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  SANTIAGO  323 

small  vessels  at  night  to  lie  within  two  miles  of 
the  Morro,  with  three  steam  launches  as  pickets  a 
mile  inside  of  them.  These  launches  mounted  a 
1 -pounder  gun  and  carried  several  marines  with 
rifles  in  addition  to  their  regular  crews.  They  were 
usually  commanded  by  young  naval  cadets,  who  in 
those  long  dark  nights  experienced  the  most  trying 
and  dangerous  service  that  the  war  afforded.  They 
seemed  to  like  it,  and  were  so  little  impressed  with 
the  perils  of  their  duty  that  it  is  an  item  of  unoffi- 
cial history  that  one  of  these  youths  one  night 
landed  near  the  Morro  to  go  in  swimming,  for  which 
recreation  he  underwent  a  period  of  suspension 
from  duty,  prescribed  by  his  commanding  officer. 

Beginning  June  8,  the  battleships  were  sent 
close  in  from  dark  until  daylight,  alternating  in 
directing  a  brilliant  search-light  directly  up  the 
harbor  entrance.  This  was  the  most  important 
element  in  making  the  blockade  successful,  as 
Spanish  officers  afterward  admitted  that  a  sortie 
at  night  was  absolutely  impossible  because  of  the 
blinding  glare  of  light  that  a  ship  trying  to  steer 
her  way  out  of  the  channel  had  to  face.  At  the 
same  time  the  channel  was  so  illuminated  from 
our  point  of  view  that  detection  and  attack  in  case 
of  an  attempted  escape  were  as  easy  as  in  day- 
light. This  was  proved  when  the  enemy  tried  one 
night  about  midnight  to  sink  the  Reina  Mercedes 
to  block  the  channel,  which  ship  was  promptly  sunk 
by  the  gunfire  of  the  Texas  and  the  Massachusetts, 


324  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

then  on  guard,  before  she  could  go  the  few  hun- 
dred yards  to  the  desired  position.  Close  by  the 
search-light  ship  there  was  always  another  battle- 
ship, totally  dark,  and  with  her  guns,  in  the  ex-, 
pressive  idiom  of  the  frontier,  "  loaded  for  bear," 
and  ready  to  open  fire  the  moment  a  suspicious 
movement  was  observed  inside. 

When  the  admiral  arrived  off  Santiago  he 
found  that  nothing  had  been  done  toward  sinking 
a  collier  in  the  channel.  He  accordingly  had  it 
announced  in  the  fleet  that  volunteers  for  such  an 
enterprise  would  be  accepted,  and  the  response 
was  more  than  gratifying,  as  hundreds  of  officers 
and  men  hastened  to  send  in  their  names.  The 
collier  Merrimac  was  selected,  and  the  work  of 
removing  valuable  stores  and  furniture  from  her 
and  preparing  her  for  self-destruction  was  at  once 
begun  under  the  supervision  of  Assistant  Naval 
Constructor  K.  P.  Hobson,  of  the  New  York. 
The  original  order  had  named  the  Sterling  as  the 
vessel  to  be  sacrificed,  but  the  Merrimac  was 
finally  selected  as  a  larger  ship,  and  with  the  mass 
of  2500  tons  of  coal  in  her  hold  was  better  calcu- 
lated to  form  an  effectual  obstruction  to  naviga- 
tion. The  selection  of  Mr.  Hobson  to  command 
the  expedition  was  somewhat  irregular,  as  he  was 
a  staff  officer  and  not  eligible  under  the  law  to 
exercise  military  command.  He  had,  however, 
worked  out  a  chain  of  details  by  which  the  sud- 
den sinking  of  the  ship  was  to  be  effected,  and 


HOBSON  AND  THE  MERRIMAC  325 

from  being  thoroughly  familiar  with  them  was 
naturally  the  best  qualified  to  execute  them.  There 
was  no  time  for  him  to  teach  some  other  officer, 
who  might  lawfully  command,  and,  as  always  hap- 
pens in  strong  emergencies,  theories  of  law  had  to 
be  interpreted  to  suit  actual  requirements. 

A  large  force  of  men  from  the  New  York 
worked  all  the  afternoon  of  June  1,  and  nearly  all 
night  stripping  the  Merrimac  and  preparing  her 
for  destruction.  The  admiral  went  on  board  about 
three  in  the  morning,  and  after  an  inspection  of 
the  various  provisions  by  which  sinking  was  to  be 
effected  he  bade  Hobson  good-by  and  authorized 
him  to  go  in.  The  ship  was  barely  ready,  and  in 
the  delay  of  completion  and  in  getting  the  work- 
ing parties  off  it  began  to  grow  light.  Determined 
to  settle  the  affair  then  and  there,  Hobson  started 
in,  but  it  was  then  so  light  that  his  approach 
would  surely  be  discovered  long  before  he  could 
gain  the  channel,  and  the  admiral  sent  the  Porter 
to  call  him  back.  Hobson  was  not  over-pleased  at 
the  order,  but  the  delay  gave  him  all  of  that  day 
in  which  to  perfect  his  details,  and  enabled  him 
to  go  in  finally  as  completely  prepared  as  fore- 
thought and  opportunity  could  make  him.  The 
hours  of  the  next  night  were  long  ones  to  the 
watchers  in  the  fleet,  and  must  have  seemed  longer 
to  Hobson  and  his  men  on  the  dark  and  silent 
hulk  lying  near  the  flagship.  As  finally  arranged, 
a  pilot  and  several  men  in  addition  to  the  volun- 


326  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

teer  crew  were  to  stay  on  board  to  work  the  fires 
and  do  other  necessary  work  until  close  to  the 
harbor  entrance,  when  they  were  to  be  taken  off 
by  boats  from  the  New  York  and  the  Texas.  The 
crew  selected  from  all  the  volunteers  numbered 
but  seven  men,  —  three  of  the  regular  crew  of  the 
Merrimac,  three  from  the  New  York,  and  one 
from  the  Iowa. 

The  sky  was  overcast  and  black.  About  three  in 
the  morning,  June  3,  the  Merrimac  moved  slowly 
away  from  the  flagship  and  vanished  in  the  dark- 
ness, a  steam  launch  from  the  New  York  com- 
manded by  Cadet  Powell  following  her  to  rescue 
survivors,  who,  according  to  Hobson's  plan,  hoped 
to  come  out  of  the  harbor  in  a  row-boat  after  the 
sinking.  There  was  a  seemingly  interminable  wait 
while  hundreds  in  the  fleet  with  hushed  voices  and 
straining  eyes  faced  the  black  silence  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Morro.  The  suspense  was  at  last 
broken  by  the  flash  and  subsequent  report  of  a 
gun ;  then  another  and  another,  until  in  a  few  sec- 
onds the  steep  hillsides  on  both  sides  of  the  channel 
were  literally  blazing  with  gunfire  and  rattling  with 
its  echoes.  It  was  learned  later  that  some  hundreds 
of  riflemen  were  posted  on  these  slopes  at  night, 
and  batteries  of  small  rapid-fire  guns  were  con- 
cealed among  the  bushes  waiting  for  just  such  an 
emergency.  The  lurid  popular  accounts  of  this 
event  describe  the  heavy  guns  of  the  Morro  and  of 
the  Socapa  battery  opposite  as  ploughing  the  Mer- 


THE  SINKING  OF  THE  MERRIMAC       327 

riinac  with  their  shells,  but  their  location  so  close 
to  the  channel  and  so  high  above  it  made  it  impos- 
sible for  them  to  hit  her,  even  if  they  fired  at  all, 
which  is  extremely  doubtful.  The  Reina  Merce- 
des, lying  hi  the  side  channel  between  Cay  Smith 
and  Socapa,  did  fire  at  her,  as  did  the  Pluton  from 
the  little  bay  opposite.  Each  of  these  vessels 
fired  two  torpedoes  at  her,  but  apparently  without 
result,  and  two  of  the  torpedoes  were  found  float- 
ing at  sea  the  next  morning.  One  of  these  was 
harmless,  having  the  exercise  or  drill  head  on  it 
instead  of  the  war  head  by  which  it  could  be  ex- 
ploded, which  shows  that  the  enemy  was  at  least 
excited. 

The  firing  lasted  for  a  considerable  time,  per- 
haps fifteen  minutes,  when  it  gradually  ceased  and 
all  was  darkness  again  and  silence.  As  day  broke 
and  the  sun  came  up,  about  ten  feet  of  the  Merri- 
mac's  smokepipe  and  her  two  masts  were  distin- 
guished sticking  out  of  the  water  a  long  distance 
up  the  channel  beyond  where  it  was  desired  to  sink 
her.  There  were  no  unusual  signs  of  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy  and  no  vestige  of  the  New 
York's  steam  launch.  An  hour  or  so  later  that 
boat  was  observed  to  the  westward  of  the  entrance 
close  in  shore,  where  she  had  been  searching  for 
the  Merrimac's  men.  She  soon  returned  to  the 
ship,  and  Mr.  Powell  reported  that  no  one  came 
back  after  the  ship  went  down.  It  did  not  seem 
possible  that  any  man  could  survive  what  the  Mer- 


328  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

rimac  had  been  seen  to  go  through,  and  the  general 
belief  then  was  that  all  the  gallant  little  crew  had 
perished.  About  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  a 
Spanish  tug  flying  a  flag  of  truce  came  outside 
and  the  Vixen  was  sent  to  meet  her.  When  the 
Vixen's  boat  went  alongside  the  on-lookers  im- 
agined they  could  see  ominous-looking  long  boxes 
being  put  into  the  boat,  and  the  worst  fears  of  the 
day  seemed  realized,  for  the  enemy  could  have  no 
purpose  in  communicating  with  us  except  to  return 
our  dead.  The  very  opposite  proved  to  be  the 
case.  A  gray  Spanish  captain,  courtly  and  digni- 
fied, came  on  board  from  Admiral  Cervera  to  say 
that  Hobson  and  his  men  were  safe  and  prisoners 
of  war  in  the  Morro,  and  that  the  unusual  heroism 
of  their  exploit  had  so  moved  their  captors  that 
the  admiral  deemed  it  proper  for  their  friends  to 
know  of  their  safety.  It  was  an  extraordinary 
message,  and  besides  turning  apprehensions  into 
rejoicing  it  gave  the  Americans  a  peculiar  sensa- 
tion, as  though  they  had  seen  the  pages  of  the  cen- 
turies turned  backward  to  the  days  when  Spanish 
chivalry  had  been  the  example  of  the  world. 

To  return  briefly  to  Hobson  and  the  Merrimac. 
The  carefully  laid  plans  of  anchoring  the  ship  at 
the  narrowest  part  of  the  channel  and  sinking  her 
as  she  swung  across  with  the  tide  by  opening  her 
valves  and  exploding  improvised  torpedoes  strung 
along  her  sides,  failed  through  no  fault  of  prepa- 
ration. The  shots  fired  at  her  in  the  darkness 


THE  RESCUE  OF  HOBSON  329 

seemed  to  find  the  most  unfortunate  landings,  and 
in  a  very  brief  time  the  string  of  torpedoes  was 
broken,  the  anchor  chains  shot  away,  and  the  ship 
itself  out  of  control  because  of  damage  to  the  rud- 
der. So  she  went  on  into  the  blazing  hell  quite 
unable  to  help  herself  or  even  to  sink  herself. 
Some  of  the  first  observation  mines  were  passed 
without  injury,  but  by  that  time  the  operators  were 
alert  and  a  mine  was  exploded  so  close  as  to  lift  her 
partly  out  of  the  water  and  to  do  damage  that,  in 
conjunction  with  the  opened  sea  connections,  caused 
her  to  sink  soon  after,  half  a  mile  further  in  than 
was  intended  and  at  a  place  where  she  offered  little 
or  no  difficulty  to  navigation. 

The  subsequent  rescue  of  Hobson  and  his  com- 
panions from  the  water  by  the  Spanish  admiral 
himself,  the  kindness  of  the  Spaniards  to  them, 
their  imprisonment  in  the  Morro  and  subsequently 
at  Santiago,  and  their  eventual  exchange  and  re- 
turn to  duty  are  all  details  of  the  most  romantic 
and  heroic  episode  of  the  war,  too  well  known  to 
require  repeating.  Hobson  failed  in  his  object  of 
blocking  the  channel,  through  no  fault  of  his  own  ; 
but  in  failing,  he  set  an  example  of  self-devotion 
and  patriotism  that  has  not  many  parallels  in  all 
the  history  of  warfare.  Those  who  were  privileged 
to  witness  his  exploit  had  an  ideal  of  youth  re- 
vived, and  the  long-forgotten  school-book  stories 
of  Horatio  on  the  bridge  and  Leonidas  in  the 
pass  of  Thermopylae  came  vividly  into  mind,  as 


330  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

they  must  have  come  back  to  the  thousands  who 
have  since  read  the  story  of  the  Merrimac. 

Some  unfavorable  newspaper  comment,  born  of 
crass  ignorance,  has  been  directed  at  Admiral 
Sampson  because  he  did  not  steam  boldly  into 
Santiago  harbor  immediately  upon  his  arrival 
there,  "  as  Dewey  did  at  Manila."  There  is  no 
possible  comparison  between  the  two  places.  The 
Boca  Grande,  by  which  Dewey  went  into  Manila 
Bay,  is,  as  previously  described,  about  five  miles 
wide,  correspondingly  deep,  and  the  channel  of 
rapid  tidal  currents.  Its  defense  by  submarine 
mines  would  be  almost  impossible  and  an  under- 
taking so  great  that  no  country  would  dream  of 
attempting  it  unless  possessed  of  unlimited  time, 
and  enormous  wealth  to  sink  in  the  sea.  Spain 
had  neither  of  these  requisites  when  the  war  came, 
and  danger  from  torpedoes  at  the  approach  to 
Manila  Bay  was  probably  not  thought  of  any 
more  than  such  a  danger  would  have  been  feared 
in  the  middle  of  the  China  Sea.  The  entrance  to 
Santiago  Bay,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  wider  than 
the  length  of  the  New  York,  and,  with  the  buoys 
and  range  marks  removed,  would  have  offered  a 
serious  problem  in  navigation  without  any  de- 
fenses. The  ship  channel  is  so  narrow  that  in- 
stead of  requiring  acres  or  square  miles  of  mines, 
one  mine  in  a  place  distributed  along  the  channel 
is  all  that  is  required  for  complete  obstruction. 

A   few  minutes  after  the  formal  surrender  of 


MINES  IN  SANTIAGO  HARBOR  331 

Santiago,  Lieutenant  Capehart  of  the  New  York, 
a  torpedo  expert,  was  at  work  removing  the  mines, 
in  which  delicate  task  he  was  voluntarily  assisted 
by  the  Spanish  naval  officer  who  had  planted  them. 
The  location  and  arrangement  was  found  to  be  as 
shown  by  the  chart  inserted  here.  The  electric 
or  observation  mines,  each  containing  226  kilos, 
or  nearly  500  pounds,  of  gun-cotton,  were  arranged 
to  be  exploded  by  electrical  contact  from  hidden 
stations  on  shore,  where  there  were  suitable  instru- 
ments mounted  for  observing  the  exact  position  of 
a  passing  vessel  and  determining  when  it  was  over 
any  particular  mine.  A  row  of  contact  mines, 
that  is,  torpedoes  that  explode  when  a  ship  runs 
against  them,  was  planted  across  the  channel  at 
the  line  indicated  just  below  the  Merrimac.  That 
part  of  the  channel  east  of  the  Merrimac  was 
closed  by  log  booms,  the  logs  secured  together  by 
5-inch  steel  hawsers,  and  a  similar  boom  extended 
from  Smith  Cay  to  the  mainland  as  a  protection 
for  the  Mercedes.  A  very  vivid  illustration  of 
the  effect  of  a  submarine  mine  upon  a  ship  existed 
in  the  minds  of  all  present  in  the  example  of  the 
Maine.  Some  of  the  contact  mines  were  taken 
up  to  let  the  Spanish  ships  go  out  later,  and  the 
firing  arrangements  for  the  electric  mines  were 
disconnected  on  shore,  all  being  replaced  when  the 
ships  had  passed.  With  this  brief  description  of 
the  defenses  and  the  chart  showing  the  position  of 
the  mines,  it  is  not  necessary  to  speculate  as  to  the 


332  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

result  of  an  attempt  to  force  the  passage  or  to  ex- 
plain why  any  officer  of  sound  mind  did  not  try  it. 

After  the  affair  of  the  Merrimac  came  a  month 
of  rigorous  blockade  duty  that  demanded  the  full 
energy  and  attention  of  every  officer  and  man  on 
the  encircling  ships.  The  scenery  became  very 
familiar,  and  some  may  have  grown  weary  of  look- 
ing always  at  the  great  mediaeval  castle  on  the 
crag  at  the  harbor  mouth  and  the  iron  hills  be- 
yond, but  there  was  little  complaining,  as  all  real- 
ized that  a  great  object  was  in  view,  and  that 
patience  would  bring  a  successful  ending.  Those 
were  not  days  of  pleasure  ;  the  keeping  of  watches 
and  drilling,  taking  coal  almost  by  the  handful  out 
of  colliers  in  the  rolling  sea,  and  the  frequent  calls 
to  arms  night  and  day,  furnished  employment  that 
seemed  never  to  have  a  resting  period.  Fresh 
fruit  and  vegetables  were  almost  unknown  to  those 
crews  all  summer  long,  and  the  canned  substitutes 
sometimes  failed  to  please.  Even  as  humble  and 
common  an  article  as  the  potato  acquires  unsus- 
pected virtue  when  it  becomes  a  stranger  for  a 
number  of  weeks. 

The  much  discussed  canned  roast  beef  that 
made  so  much  trouble  in  the  army  was  the  staple 
diet  of  officers  and  men  of  the  navy,  who  appar- 
ently did  not  know  any  better  than  to  like  it.  It 
must  be  said,  however,  that  there  are  ample  facili- 
ties for  preparing  it  in  various  ways  for  the  table 
on  board  ship,  and  that  canned  foods  stored  far 


•  Contact  Mines. 
}t    Electric  Mines. 
K   "Keina  Mercedes." 
M  ''Merrimac." 


ENTRANCE  OF  SANTIAGO   HARBOR 


LIFE  ON  THE  BLOCKADE  333 

below  the  water-line  in  a  ship's  hold  are  much 
more  liable  to  retain  their  wholesomeness  than 
when  jolted  about  in  commissary  wagons  under  the 
midsummer  sun  of  the  tropics.  Prolonged  absence 
from  laundry  facilities  had  a  noticeable  and  uncom- 
fortable influence  upon  the  attire  of  officers,  who 
are  usually  fastidious  in  such  matters.  But  all 
these  discomforts  were  good-naturedly  accepted  as 
unavoidable,  and  a  necessary  part  of  the  profession 
when  called  to  its  highest  endeavor.  All  things 
considered,  there  was  an  excellent  degree  of  cheer- 
fulness, patience,  and  good-fellowship  preserved, 
and  with  the  almost  total  absence  of  sickness,  due 
to  the  really  splendid  abilities  of  our  naval  sur- 
geons, life  on  the  blockade  of  Santiago  was  not 
nearly  so  bad  as  has  been  imagined. 

It  was  far  from  being  monotonous.  About  once 
a  week  the  heavy  ships  would  be  formed  in  attack- 
ing columns,  usually  early  in  the  morning,  and  a 
terrific  bombardment  of  the  shore  batteries  would 
take  place.  The  batteries  were  silenced  in  every 
case  after  a  short  time,  but  when  our  ships  ceased 
firing  and  began  returning  to  their  blockading 
stations  the  Spanish  gunners  would  climb  back  to 
their  guns  and  fire  the  last  shots.  There  were  few 
instances  of  Spanish  guns  actually  hit  by  our  shells 
and  disabled,  though  many  were  temporarily  made 
useless  by  being  covered  with  earth  and  sand 
thrown  over  them  by  bursting  shells.  Besides 
these  great  bombardments  there  were  many  lesser 


334  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

actions  along  the  coast,  in  which  one  or  more 
vessels  took  part,  and  which  served  like  the  others 
to  keep  the  crews  in  fine  war  spirit  and  prevented 
anything  like  dullness  from  growing  upon  the  life 
afloat.  The  most  important  of  the  minor  actions 
was  the  seizure  of  Guantanamo  Bay  by  a  battalion 
of  marines,  supported  by  the  Texas  and  two  or 
three  smaller  vessels.  This  was  important  not 
merely  as  a  successful  fight,  but  because  it  gave 
the  American  squadron  a  quiet  and  safe  harbor  in 
which  to  coal,  take  stores,  and  make  repairs.  As 
mournfully  reported  by  the  Spanish  commander  at 
Guantanamo,  "  The  American  squadron,  in  posses- 
sion of  the  outer  bay,  has  taken  it  as  if  for  a  harbor 
of  rest ;  they  have  anchored  as  if  in  one  of  their 
own  ports  since  the  7th,  the  day  they  cut  the 
cables." 

The  most  spectacular  bombardment  of  the  month 
was  that  of  June  22,  the  day  that  the  army  began 
landing.  This  force,  the  5th  Army  Corps,  com- 
manded by  Major  General  Shafter,  arrived  in 
thirty-two  transports,  convoyed  by  fifteen  naval 
vessels,  on  the  morning  of  June  20,  and  presented 
a  really  stirring  sight  as  the  eastern  horizon  became 
literally  black  with  masts  and  smokepipes.  The 
flagship  of  the  convoying  force  was  the  battleship 
Indiana,  which  joined  the  blockading  squadron  and 
became  an  important  actor  in  subsequent  events. 
Naval  vessels,  mostly  small  ones  that  had  come 
with  the  convoy,  were  stationed  along  the  coast  for 


THE  LANDING  OF  THE  TROOPS          335 

about  sixteen  miles,  from  Cabanas  west  of  the  har- 
bor mouth  to  Daiquiri  east  of  it,  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  22d  began  firing  to  dislodge  the  enemy 
from  the  many  blockhouses  and  rifle-pits  he  had 
all  along  the  coast.  The  spectacle  of  so  many  ships 
firing  along  such  an  extended  line,  combined  with 
the  activity  of  scores  of  small  boats  landing  troops 
from  the  swarm  of  transports  at  Daiquiri,  made  a 
thrilling  sight  long  to  be  remembered.  The  only 
damage  sustained  by  the  navy  that  day  was  from 
a  shell  from  the  western,  or  Socapa,  battery  at  the 
harbor  entrance,  which  struck  the  Texas  and  killed 
one  of  her  men,  besides  wounding  eight. 

All  the  large  ships  of  Sampson's  fleet  contri- 
buted their  boats  and  steam  launches  to  aid  in  the 
landing,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  landed 
were  put  on  shore  by  the  navy.  The  transports 
furnished  some  boats,  and  probably  in  time  could 
have  landed  all  the  men  without  naval  aid,  though 
they  were  without  steam  launches,  which  were  of 
immense  value  in  towing  numbers  of  loaded  boats 
at  a  single  trip.  By  nightfall  six  thousand  men 
were  on  shore,  which  was  heralded  by  some  of  the 
newspaper  men  as  a  great  and  unequaled  achieve- 
ment, neglectful  of  the  fact  that  more  than  fifty 
years  before  double  that  number  of  American 
troops  were  landed,  with  naval  assistance,  in  six 
hours,  near  Vera  Cruz  in  Mexico.  After  landing, 
two  regiments  under  General  Lawton  moved  along 
the  coast  westward,  and  the  next  morning  took  pos- 


336  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

session  of  the  Ensenada  de  los  Altares  (Siboney), 
where  troops  were  landed  the  same  day  as  well  as 
at  Daiquiri.  All  the  troops,  with  animals,  field 
guns,  and  other  paraphernalia,  were  not  on  shore 
until  the  evening  of  the  26th.  Altogether,  includ- 
ing 3500  Cubans  brought  in  our  transports  from 
west  of  Santiago,  about  20,000  men  were  landed 
in  the  enemy's  country.  General  Lawton  reported 
that  at  Siboney  he  found  nearly  one  hundred  rail- 
way cars  loaded  with  steam-coal.  At  Santiago 
the  day  of  the  surrender  the  author  saw  consider- 
able quantities  of  coal  in  piles  near  the  Juragua 
Iron  Company's  pier ;  from  which  facts  it  seems 
that  lack  of  coal  did  not  prevent  the  Spanish  ships 
from  leaving  Santiago  during  the  twelve  days  in 
which  the  sea  was  free  to  them  after  their  arrival. 
The  orders  to  General  Shafter,  dated  May  31, 
directing  him  to  take  a  military  force  into  Cuba, 
mentioned  the  seizure  of  the  enemy's  positions  at 
the  entrance  of  Santiago  harbor,  in  order  that  the 
navy  might  take  up  the  mines  and  enter,  as  a 
definite  object  of  the  expedition.  After  the  first 
bombardment  of  the  harbor  forts,  June  6,  when 
Sampson  found  that  the  batteries  alone  could  not 
keep  the  ships  out,  he  telegraphed  home  that  if 
ten  thousand  troops  were  there  the  Spanish  fleet 
and  city  could  be  taken  in  forty-eight  hours.  In 
the  light  of  after  events  it  looks  as  if  the  admiral 
overestimated  if  anything  the  number  of  men  re- 
quired, for  the  garrisons  in  the  Morro  and  adjoin- 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  337 

ing  forts  were  found  to  be  very  small,  and  probably 
half  the  number  of  men  mentioned  could  have  held 
the  position  against  any  men  that  could  have  come 
from  Santiago  long  enough  to  permit  of  taking  up 
the  mines.  The  day  the  army  arrived,  there  was 
a  conference  between  Admiral  Sampson  and  Gen- 
erals Shafter  and  Garcia,  at  which  it  was  agreed 
that  the  capture  of  the  harbor  forts  was  the  first 
object  in  view.  Indeed,  it  was  the  only  object,  and 
the  reason  why  troops  had  been  sent  to  that  part 
of  Cuba.  The  capture  or  destruction  of  Cervera's 
fleet,  not  the  possession  of  the  remote  city  of  San- 
tiago, was  the  wish  of  the  government.  Neverthe- 
less, when  the  army  was  once  landed  it  proceeded 
inland  on  a  totally  different  campaign,  and  did  not 
move  against  the  harbor  forts  at  all. 

July  1,  the  New  York,  the  Gloucester,  and  the 
Suwanee  went  close  in  at  Aguadores,  three  miles 
east  of  the  Morro,  and  for  several  hours  shelled 
some  rifle-pits  and  an  old  fort  there,  supporting  an 
attack  by  the  Michigan  brigade.  This  was  sup- 
posed at  the  time  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  move- 
ment to  take  the  Morro  and  batteries,  but  the 
soldiers  withdrew  about  the  time  when  they  seemed 
to  have  won  a  victory,  as  there  were  no  more  signs 
of  Spaniards ;  and  it  was  afterwards  reported  that 
the  day's  proceeding  was  merely  a  feint  to  distract 
attention  from  a  more  serious  attack  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Santiago.  At  five  the  next  morning  the 
New  York,  the  Oregon,  the  Indiana,  the  Iowa,  the 


338  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Massachusetts  and  the  Texas  attacked  the  harbor 
batteries,  and  for  nearly  three  hours  the  fiercest 
bombardment  of  the  war  ensued,  the  ships  during 
the  engagement  going  almost  inside  the  entrance 
and  firing  at  the  Punta  Gorda  battery  beyond  the 
wreck  of  the  Merrimac.  On  this  occasion  the  big 
flag  that  had  flown  so  bravely  from  the  Morro  ever 
since  the  blockade  began  was  shot  away. 

The  next  day,  July  3,  was  Sunday,  and  began 
like  other  mornings  without  sign  of  any  great  com- 
ing event.  The  Massachusetts  had  been  on  the 
search-light  position  all  night,  but  left  at  dawn  to 
go  to  Guantanamo  to  spend  the  day  coaling  and 
return  in  time  to  resume  her  blockade  duty  at 
dark.  The  other  ships  then  present  were  lying 
in  the  usual  day  position  on  a  rough  semicircle  with 
a  radius  of  a  little  more  than  three  miles  from  the 
Morro,  the  Indiana  being  closer  inshore  and  con- 
siderably less  than  that  distance.  Counting  from 
the  eastward,  they  were  Indiana,  New  York,  Ore- 
gon, Iowa,  Texas,  and  Brooklyn.  Fully  a  mile 
almost  directly  north  of  the  Indiana,  close  inshore 
and  not  more  than  one  and  one-half  miles  from 
the  Morro,  was  the  armed  yacht  Gloucester,  and 
another  similar  yacht,  the  Yixen,  lay  a  mile  west 
of  the  Brooklyn  and  about  half  a  mile  nearer 
shore.  The  auxiliary  cruiser  Resolute,  with  a  large 
quantity  of  high  explosives  on  board  that  were  in- 
tended for  use  in  countermining  the  channel,  was 
close  to  the  Indiana.  The  Texas  and  the  Iowa  were 


CERVERA'S  SQUADRON   EMERGES         339 

most  directly  in  front  of  the  channel  and  com- 
manded the  best  view  inside. 

At  8.50  the  New  York  drew  out  of  the  line 
and  started  for  Siboney  to  land  the  admiral  and 
his  staff  for  a  conference  with  General  Shafter, 
who  was  very  desirous  that  the  navy  should  force 
the  harbor  at  all  cost.  Disquieting  reports  from 
the  army  had  reached  the  flagship  the  evening  be- 
fore, one  so  serious  as  to  indicate  a  possible  retreat 
unless  relieved  from  resistance  in  front  by  the  pre- 
sence of  the  American  fleet  in  the  harbor.  The 
New  York  was  accompanied  by  the  torpedo-boat 
Ericsson  and  the  yacht  Hist,  the  commander  of 
the  .latter,  Lieutenant  Young,  being  on  board  the 
flagship  reporting  an  engagement  at  Manzanillo. 
The  report  of  Captain  Evans  of  the  Iowa  gives 
9.31  as  the  time  that  the  lookout  on  the  bridge 
of  that  ship,  while  regarding  a  suspicious  column 
of  smoke  beyond  the  headlands  inside  the  en- 
trance, saw  the  big  black  bow  of  a  Spanish  cruiser 
suddenly  push  into  view.  The  Iowa  instantly 
fired  a  6-pounder  gun  to  attract  attention,  and 
hoisted  the  signal,  "  Enemy's  ships  coming  out." 
At  practically  the  same  instant  the  same  discovery 
and  signal  was  made  by  the  Texas,  sharing  with 
the  Iowa  the  best  position  for  observation.  As 
there  were  watchers  on  every  ship  whose  business 
for  a  month  had  been  to  scan  that  narrow  harbor 
gap,  it  is  not  strange  that  almost  every  vessel  has 
claimed  the  discovery  as  original.  As  the  first 


340  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

Spanish  ship  came  on  it  was  seen  that  she  was  fol- 
lowed closely  by  another,  and  that  by  a  third,  all 
with  their  battle-flags  unfurled,  and  it  was  known 
that  the  long-hoped-for  hour  had  come.  Almost 
simultaneously  with  the  discovery  of  the  Spaniards 
the  batteries  on  shore  began  firing  at  the  American 
ships  with  their  customary  lack  of  precision,  and 
the  Spanish  ships  opened  fire  as  they  came  into 
range  soon  after. 

There  was  a  slight  pause  —  possibly  five  min- 
utes —  before  any  American  ship  fired,  which  was 
due  partly  to  the  fact  that  the  crews  of  all  the 
ships  were  standing  at  quarters  for  Sunday  in- 
spection, and  partly  because  the  position  of  some 
of  the  ships  prevented  them  from  seeing  the 
enemy  until  he  was  almost  outside  the  channel. 
The  admiral's  order  of  battle  of  a  month  before 
was  carried  out  literally  by  all  the  ships  immedi- 
ately starting  their  engines  ahead  at  full  speed  and 
closing  in  toward  the  harbor  to  engage  the  enemy. 
The  only  departure  from  the  prescribed  plan  of 
action  was  on  the  part  of  the  Brooklyn.  That 
vessel,  after  steaming  about  half  a  mile  toward 
the  enemy,  suddenly  turned  away  in  a  circle  that 
brought  her  eventually  on  a  parallel  course  with 
that  taken  by  the  Spaniards  (whose  column  was 
now  well  outside  and  headed  westward)  but  about 
half  a  mile  farther  out  than  the  other  American 
ships. 

Different  reasons  have  been  advanced  in  expla- 


THE  BROOKLYN'S  MANOEUVRE  341 

nation  of  this  manoeuvre,  but  they  do  not  appear  to 
have  satisfied  the  public,  if  one  may  judge  by  the 
wide-spread  discussions  that  have  resulted.  Had 
the  Brooklyn  turned  the  other  and  more  natural 
way  to  acquire  a  parallel  course  with  the  Span- 
iards, it  would  have  brought  her  closer  to  them 
than  our  other  ships  were ;  but  as  she  was  then, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  navigators,  a  mile 
further  west  than  any  other  American  ship  and 
was  of  much  higher  speed  than  any  of  them,  the 
fear  of  her  "  blanketing  "  their  fire  by  interpos- 
ing between  them  and  the  enemy  does  not  seem  to 
be  well  founded.  Some  results  of  the  mano3uvre 
were  disadvantageous :  while  running  back  after 
turning  around,  she  crossed  the  path  of  the  on- 
coming Texas  so  close  that  that  Vessel  had  to  stop 
and  back  her  engines  to  avoid  collision,  thereby 
losing  position  and  increasing  her  distance  from 
the  flying  enemy ;  the  Brooklyn's  own  position 
gained  by  the  turn  was  a  loss  of  advantage,  as 
the  increased  distance  of  course  decreased  the  accu- 
racy of  her  gun  fire.  The  latter,  however,  was 
excellent  as  it  was,  and  contributed  so  much  to 
the  general  result  that  any  error  committed  earlier 
in  the  action  was  redeemed.  The  ship  does  not 
deserve  the  slighting  comparison  that  has  been 
made,  likening  her  conduct  to  that  of  her  prede- 
cessor in  the  navy,  the  older  Brooklyn,  which  is 
on  official  record  as  having  faltered  at  the  Vicks- 
burg  batteries  and  at  Mobile  Bay. 


342  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

The  little  Vixen  saw  that  she  was  nearly  in  the 
course  of  the  enemy  and  very  properly  fled  from 
that  dangerous  region,  standing  straight  out  to  sea 
until  well  outside  the  American  line,  when  she 
steamed  parallel  with  it,  firing  her  small  guns  fre- 
quently when  within  range.  The  New  York  was 
four  miles  east  of  her  blockading  station  and  seven 
miles  from  the  Morro  when  the  signal  gun  of  the 
Iowa  rang  out  its  warning.  She  turned  sharply 
about  and  steamed  at  full  speed  back  to  where  the 
battle  was  soon  to  begin,  but  as  the  Spaniards 
turned  westward  the  fight  became  a  running  one, 
moving  rapidly  in  that  direction,  and  the  New 
York  never  got  within  effective  range  of  the  big 
cruisers,  her  part  in  the  actual  fighting  being 
limited  to  firing  a  few  times  at  the  torpedo- 
destroyers  and  to  receiving  for  some  time  the  undi- 
vided fire  from  the  forts  at  the  harbor  mouth  as 
she  sped  past  them.  In  former  years  seven  miles 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  have  completely  sepa- 
rated a  ship  from  an  engagement,  but  with  modern 
ordnance  distances  are  greatly  reduced.  Those 
who  assert  that  the  New  York  was  entirely  out  of 
the  Santiago  sea-fight  seem  to  forget  that  her  dis- 
tance from  the  enemy's  vessels  was  but  little  if  any 
greater  than  that  selected  a  month  before  by  the 
ships  of  the  flying  squadron  that  attacked  the 
Cristobal  Colon  when  she  was  lying  at  the  mouth 
of  the  harbor. 

It  was  a  sore  disappointment  to  the  crew  of 


THE  NEW  YORK'S  PART  343 

the  New  York  that  she  was  not  the  central  figure 
in  this  event,  as  she  had  been  in  all  others  of 
importance  during  the  campaign,  but  in  the  light 
of  results  it  is  better  that  the  affair  came  off  just 
as  it  did.  Had  the  New  York  been  at  her  usual 
station,  her  great  size  and  the  admiral's  flag  that 
she  wore  would  have  attracted  the  whole  Spanish 
fire ;  and,  bad  as  their  gunnery  was,  they  could 
hardly  have  failed  to  do  her  some  injury  and  kill 
some  of  her  people.  As  it  was,  the  Spanish  fleet 
was  annihilated  with  a  loss  to  us  of  only  one 
man. 

Though  debarred  from  an  active  part  in  the 
fighting,  the  flagship  directed  the  operations  of  the 
day  to  a  considerable  extent.  She  sent  the  Indi- 
ana and  the  Iowa  back  from  a  point  about  fifteen 
miles  west  of  the  harbor  to  resume  the  blockade, 
and  she  dispatched  the  small  vessels  —  Gloucester, 
Hist,  and  Ericsson  —  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  the 
crews  of  the  stranded  Spanish  ships.  The  rees- 
tablishment  of  the  blockade  was  a  vital  point,  as 
there  were  armed  Spanish  vessels  still  in  the  har- 
bor that  might  have  escaped  or  attacked  the  fleet 
of  transports  near  Daiquiri.  The  superior  speed 
of  the  New  York  enabled  her  to  gain  several 
miles  on  all  the  other  vessels  during  the  chase  and 
to  arrive*  at  the  final  scene  very  little  later  than 
the  ships  more  fortunate  in  position  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  battle. 

As  an  offset  to  the  chagrin  of  being  out  of  the 


344  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

thickest  of  the  fight,  that  part  of  the  crew  of  the 
New  York  that  was  not  engaged  in  shoveling  coal 
into  her  forty-eight  hungry  furnaces  had  an  excep- 
tional opportunity  of  viewing  the  combat,  which 
was  spread  out  before  them  like  a  tragedy  on  the 
stage.  It  was  a  glorious  sight.  The  Spanish 
ships  came  out  at  good  speed  in  close  column  in  a 
great  cloud  of  their  own  smoke  that  rose  as  high 
as  the  Morro  and  presented  an  unnatural  mixture 
of  white  and  black  as  the  cannon  smoke  wreathed 
around  that  from  the  furnaces.  As  they  turned 
westward  clear  of  the  channel,  their  speed  increased 
to  the  full  power  of  their  engines,  and  they  drew 
rapidly  ahead  of  our  ships,  that  had  much  the  ad- 
vantage of  position  at  the  start.  In  turning,  their 
broadsides  were  presented  toward  the  Indiana,  and 
that  ship  seemed  to  receive  the  greater  part  of 
their  fire  at  first,  as  our  other  ships  were  more 
nearly  ahead  of  them  and  at  a  considerably  greater 
distance.  The  Indiana  blazed  like  a  volcano  in 
reply,  and  must  have  done  them  much  injury  at 
the  very  beginning  of  the  battle.  Indeed,  the 
pilot  who  took  out  the  leading  ship,  the  Teresa, 
said  that  when  the  helm  was  shifted  to  turn  west- 
ward there  were  already  many  killed  and  wounded 
in  the  battery,  and  he  believed  the  ship  was  al- 
ready on  fire.  Our  other  ships  of  course  were 
firing  furiously  at  the  same  time.  The  enemy 
came  out  in  the  order  Infanta  Maria  Teresa 
(flagship),  Vizcaya,  Cristobal  Colon,  Almirante 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  SQUADRON       345 

Oquendo,  and  the  destroyers  Pluton  and  Furor. 
The  destroyers  were  roughly  used  by  the  battleships 
nearest  the  harbor,  and  were  finished  by  the  plucky 
little  Gloucester,  which  closed  in  with  them  both 
and  within  a  very  short  time  had  to  rescue  their 
survivors. 

The  speed  of  the  armored  cruisers,  though  high 
for  a  few  minutes,  never  reached  what  they  were 
capable  of,  and  very  soon  began  to  drop.  With 
the  exception  of  the  Colon,  which  was  inside  the 
others  and  shielded  by  them,  they  were  all  being 
terribly  battered  by  the  big  American  ships,  and 
the  destruction  on  deck  that  soon  caused  a  marked 
diminution  of  their  gun-fire  probably  had  its  effect 
below  and  took  the  nerve  from  their  firemen. 
Within  fifteen  minutes  the  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo 
were  burning  from  the  effect  of  our  shells,  and  for 
some  reason  did  not  put  the  fires  out,  though  they 
were  found  well  equipped  with  fire-extinguishing 
apparatus.  Much  less  than  an  hour  after  they  came 
out,  they  were  both  on  shore  about  seven  miles 
from  the  harbor,  burning  beyond  control,  with  their 
crews  struggling  to  escape  over  the  bows  to  the 
shore.  The  Vizcaya  continued  the  unequal  contest 
for  nearly  an  hour  longer,  hopelessly  fighting  the 
Oregon,  the  Iowa,  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  Texas, 
when  "she  too,  also  on  fire,  turned  and  ran  ashore. 
The  explosion  of  one  of  her  magazines  later  was 
the  most  terrific  incident  of  the  day. 

Of  the  formidable  squadron  of  less  than  two 


346  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

hours  before,  the  Cristobal  Colon  alone  remained, 
and  she  was  so  far  ahead  at  this  stage  of  the  battle 
that  her  chance  of  escape  seemed  excellent.  The 
Iowa  and  the  Indiana  were  withdrawn  from  the 
battle  by  the  flagship  about  the  time  the  Vizcaya 
went  ashore,  and  the  Brooklyn,  the  Oregon,  and 
the  Texas,  with  the  New  York  much  farther  be- 
hind, continued  the  pursuit.  The  Oregon,  from 
being  next  to  the  easternmost  ship  when  the  alarm 
sounded,  had  passed  rapidly  ahead  of  the  other 
battleships  by  a  remarkable  burst  of  speed,  and 
was  now  almost  abreast  of  the  Brooklyn,  which 
position  she  maintained  to  the  end,  using  her  forced 
draft  and  exceeding  at  times  her  contract  trial 
speed.  The  chase  continued  for  about  two  hours, 
the  initial  speed  of  seventeen  knots  of  the  Colon 
gradually  diminishing  and  the  pursuers  visibly 
gaining.  Ten  minutes  before  1  P.  M.  the  Oregon 
began  firing  her  forward  13 -inch  turret  guns, 
throwing  shells  near  and  over  the  chase,  and  the 
Brooklyn  fired  some  smaller  guns  soon  after.  At 
a  quarter  after  one  the  Colon  turned  in  toward 
the  beach,  ran  ashore,  fired  a  gun  to  leeward,  and 
hauled  down  her  flag.  Thus  tamely  did  the  deci- 
sive battle  of  the  war  end,  after  it  had  begun  with 
such  fury  and  desperate  valor. 

"To  Castile  and  Leon  a  new  world  gave  Colon," 
was  written  on  the  tomb  of  the  great  Admiral  of 
the  Indies.  Worse  is  it  than  the  cruelty  of  fate 
that,  nearly  four  centuries  afterward,  the  fluttering 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  THE  COLON    347 

down  of  the  ensign  emblazoned  with  the  armorial 
bearings  of  Castile  and  Leon  from  the  peak  of  the 
noble  ship  that  bore  the  admiral's  name  should  be 
the  signal  for  the  passing  away  of  their  last  vestige 
of  power  in  that  new  world.  But  so  it  was ;  the 
bright  ensign  of  Spain  lay  for  hours  that  fatal 
afternoon  on  the  quarterdeck  of  the  Cristobal 
Colon,  and  at  least  one  who  saw  it  reflected  with 
sorrow  that  in  glorifying  the  arms  of  the  leading 
nation  of  the  new  world  it  had  been  the  decree  of 
fate  that  the  name  of  its  discoverer,  revered  by 
its  inhabitants,  should  be  dragged  to  dishonor. 

The  Colon  was  found  almost  uninjured,  and 
looked,  as  the  victors  closed  around  her,  like  a  per- 
fect and  beautiful  ship  at  anchor.  Only  six  hits, 
all  by  small  projectiles,  are  reported  in  her  case, 
and  she  had  only  one  man  killed.  She  gave  up 
the  contest  without  showing  either  the  speed  or  the 
fighting  power  that  was  in  her,  and  her  conduct  is 
the  only  blot  on  a  day  that  but  for  this  contained 
a  full  measure  of  honor  and  glory  for  the  van- 
quished. After  running  ashore  her  sea  connec- 
tions were  opened  and  the  ship  allowed  to  fill 
slowly  with  water.  This  has  been  stigmatized  as 
a  dishonorable  act,  and  so  it  was  if  it  was  com- 
mitted after  the  flag  was  hauled  down,  for  with 
that  token  of  surrender  the  ship  passed  from  the 
authority  of  the  enemy,  and  was  not  theirs  to  de- 
stroy. Otherwise,  it  was  the  duty  of  her  com- 
mander, as  in  our  own  and  all  naval  services,  to 


348  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN 

sink  or  destroy  his  ship  to  keep  it  out  of  the  hands 
of  an  enemy.  As  the  Colon  settled  deeper  in  the 
water  there  was  some  haste  to  get  her  crew  disem- 
barked and  to  get  our  own  prize  crew  out  of  her. 
It  was  then  after  dark,  and  the  white  search-lights 
shining  on  the  doomed  ship  and  flitting  figures 
about  her  decks  made  a  weird  and  uncanny  spec- 
tacle. She  lay  at  the  foot  of  a  great  mountain 
rising  8000  feet  abruptly  from  the  edge  of  the 
sea  and  apparently  extending  as  far  below  its  sur- 
face, as  the  bottom  deepens  with  startling  rapidity 
off  shore.  Hawsers  were  led  ashore  from  the 
Colon,  and  in  a  final  effort  to  save  her  the  big 
New  York  steamed  up  against  her  and  shoved  her 
bodily  on  the  beach  with  her  ram.  But  all  efforts 
failed  ;  about  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  with  the  flag 
of  the  United  States  flying  at  the  staff  on  the 
stern,  she  rolled  half  over  on  the  shelving  beach 
and  sank  almost  out  of  sight. 

The  Spanish  loss  this  day  was  reported  by 
Admiral  Cervera  as  six  hundred  men  killed  and 
wounded,  but  probably  this  was  an  overestimate, 
since  a  number  of  survivors  from  the  stranded  ships 
are  known  to  have  straggled  back  to  Santiago  and 
to  have  been  surrendered  later.  About  seven- 
teen hundred  prisoners,  many  of  them  wounded, 
were  on  board  the  American  ships  at  the  close 
of  the  day.  Admiral  Cervera  and  nearly  one 
hundred  officers  were  prisoners.  The  Spanish 
ships  were  thoroughly  examined  as  soon  after  the 


A  DECISIVE  SEA  FIGHT  349 

battle  as  they  could  be  boarded,  and  were  found  ter- 
ribly riddled,  especially  by  small  projectiles  from 
6-pounder  and  3-pounder  rapid-firing  guns.  The 
engines  were  found  intact,  showing  mechanical  in- 
aptitude instead  of  injury  as  the  reason  for  their 
failure  in  speed.  From  the  circumstance  that 
guns  on  the  engaged  side  were  found  loaded  on 
each  ship,  it  seems  probable  that  something  in  the 
nature  of  a  panic  must  have  resulted  from  the 
storm  of  projectiles  that  fell  upon  them  before 
they  were  fairly  out  of  the  harbor.  The  injury 
received  by  the  Americans  is  not  deserving  of 
mention  in  comparison  with  the  damage  they  in- 
flicted. The  Texas,  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  Iowa 
were  the  only  vessels  hit  at  all,  and  their  injuries 
were  so  slight  as  to  affect  hi  no  way  their  fighting 
or  steaming  qualities.  One  man  killed  and  two 
wounded,  all  on  the  Brooklyn,  were  the  only  cas- 
ualties in  the  fleet. 

This  great  sea  fight  decided  the  issues  of  the 
war,  since  Spain  with  her  best  and  only  important 
fleet  gone  was  at  the  mercy  of  her  enemy.  In  no 
other  modern  war  has  the  control  of  the  sea  been 
of  greater  importance.  The  military  commander 
at  Santiago,  confronted  by  a  superior  hostile  army, 
threatened  by  famine,  and  with  the  support  of  the 
ships  lost,  was  in  a  fatal  position,  but  Spanish 
ideas  of  honor  sustained  him,  and  he  sturdily 
declined  the  first  demands  for  surrender.  The 
hopelessness  of  his  position  was  fully  proved  to  him 


350  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

July  10  and  11,  when  the  New  York,  the  Brook- 
lyn, and  the  Indiana  from  a  position  off  Agua- 
dores  bombarded  the  city,  firing  over  the  high 
hills  a  distance  of  about  five  miles  and  dropping 
their  shells  with  remarkable  accuracy  in  the  cen- 
tral part  of  the  town.  This  resulted  the  next 
day  in  an  armistice  which  came  to  an  end  on  the 
17th  by  the  formal  surrender  of  the  city  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 
The  work  of  the  big  ships  was  now  nearly  over. 
The  most  of  them  went  to  Guantanamo  Bay,  where 
for  the  first  time  in  months  fires  were  allowed  to 
go  out  in  the  main  boilers  and  the  ships  allowed 
to  cool  by  the  permanent  removal  of  the  battle- 
hatches.  Scrubbing  and  painting  took  away  much 
of  the  evidence  of  hard  service  and  changed  the 
sullen  gray  war  color  back  to  the  shining  white  of 
peace.  A  month  later  the  New  York  led  her  band 
of  battleships  into  New  York  harbor,  where  amid 
booming  of  cannon,  waving  of  flags,  and  the  cheers 
of  a  vast  multitude,  they  received  a  triumphal 
welcome  greater  than  any  that  Rome  ever  saw, 
and  by  the  outburst  of  praise  and  gratitude  from 
their  countrymen  the  crews  of  the  ships  felt  well 
repaid  for  all  the  toil,  danger,  and  hardship  of  the 
months  gone  by.  It  was  the  first  time  in  Ameri- 
can history  that  a  victorious  fleet  had  come  home 
from  a  foreign  war. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abyssinia,  the  British  turret 
ship,  242. 

Admiral  class  of  battleships, 
246. 

Agamemnon,  the  British  turret 
ship,  245,  246. 

Agamemnon,  the  British  war- 
ship, assists  in  the  laying  of 
the  first  Atlantic  cable,  50, 
51. 

Agamenticus,  the  monitor.  See 
Terror. 

Ajax,  the  British  turret  ship,  245, 
246. 

Alabama,  the  battleship,  266. 

Alabama,  the  Confederate  cruis- 
er, building  of,  185, 186  ;  goes 
to  the  Azores,  186,  187;  pre- 
parations for  commerce  de- 
stroying, 187;  many  prizes 
captured,  187-193 ;  engage- 
ment with  the  Hatteras,  189- 
191 ;  goes  to  the  Indian  Ocean, 
to  Brazil,  and  thence  to  Cher- 
bourg, France,  192,  193  ;  fight 
with  the  Kearsarge,  126,  193- 
199,  picture  of,  196 ;  letter 
from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  regarding  it,  200-202. 

Albatross,  the,  167. 

Albemarle,  the  war-ship,  98. 

Alicante,  the  Spanish  hospital- 
ship,  312. 

Allegheny,  the  steamer,  24,  43, 
95. 

Allen,  Col.  James,  315. 


Allen,  Dr.  John,  4. 

Almirante  Cochrane,  the  Chilean 
ironclad,  231. 

Almirante  Oquendo,  the  Spanish 
armored  cruiser,  298,  304,  344, 
345. 

Alvarado,  Mexico,  capture  of, 
39. 

Amanda,  the  armed  bark,  125. 

Amethyst,  the  British  corvette, 
229,230. 

Amphitrite,  the  monitor,  217, 
218,  256,  293,  300,  306. 

Angamos,  battle  of,  231. 

Alison,  the  British  battleship, 
246. 

Ariel,  the  mail  steamer,  189. 

Arkansas,  the  Confederate  ar- 
mored ram,  164,  165. 

Arkansas,  the  monitor,  266,  267. 

Arminius,  the  Prussian  war-ship, 
227. 

Armor  for  war-ships,  57-67,  214, 
215. 

Atlanta,  the  Confederate  ar- 
mored ram,  180-182. 

Atlantic  cable,  50-52. 

"Baby  Battleship,"  the  Petrel 

so  called,  287. 

Bagley,  Ensign  Worth,  310. 
Bailey,  Capt.  Theodoras,  155. 
Baltimore,  the  protected  cruiser, 

279-281,  284,  286-288. 
Bankhead,    Capt.    J.    P.,    142- 

145. 


354 


INDEX 


Barbette,  the,  245. 

Barfleur,  the  British  battleship, 
261,  262. 

Battleship,  evolution  of  the  mod- 
ern :  the  direct  influence  of 
Ericsson's  designs,  212-224 ; 
rams,  220,  221;  Capt.  Coles's 
turret  ships,  224-239 ;  greater 
attention  to  stability  in  ships, 
239  ;  improvements  in  armor, 
243,  244  ;  gradual  union  of  the 
best  features  of  the  various 
types  of  war-ships,  245 ;  the 
distinctively  American  battle- 
ship, 258-262  ;  the  Monitor  the 
prototype  of  the  modern  bat- 
tleship, 267,  268. 

Beaufort,  the  gunboat,  102, 105, 
112. 

Bell,  Capt.  Henry  H.,  156. 

Benton,  the  gunboat,  99. 

Bernouilli,  Daniel,  8. 

Black  Prince,  the  British  fri- 
gate, arrangement  of  armor 
on,  illustration  of,  64. 

Blake,  Commander  Homer 
Crane,  190,  191. 

Blanco,  Captain-General  at  Ha- 
vana, 315,  316. 

Blanco  Encalada,  Chilean  iron- 
clad, 231. 

"  Blood  is  thicker  than  water," 
56. 

Boston,  the  protected  cruiser, 
279,  280,  281,  283,  284,  288. 

Bouledogue  class  of  French  rams, 
248  ;  illustrations  of,  252. 

Boulton  &  Watt  build  steam 
engine  for  Fulton,  9. 

Bramah,  Joseph,  8. 

Brandywine,  the  ship,  107. 

Brooke,  John  M.,  93-9(5. 

Brooklyn,  the  armored  cruiser, 
299,  314,  317,  320,  321,  338, 340, 
341,  345,  346,  349,  350. 

Brooklyn,   the   steam  sloop-of- 


war,  156,  159,  160,  203,  205, 
207,  210,  341. 

Brown,  Rear  Admiral  George, 
170. 

Brunei,  Sir  Marc  Isambard,  7, 
17. 

Buchanan,  Franklin,  appointed 
to  command  the  Merrimac, 
102  ;  instructions,  102-104  ;  the 
fight  at  Hampton  Roads,  111, 
113, 126,  136  ;  sketch  of  his  ca- 
reer, 114,  115  ;  portrait,  170  ; 
in  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay, 
210. 

Buffalo,  the  ship.  See  Nictheroy. 

Burgoyne,  Capt.,  237. 

Bushnell  &  Co.,  builders  of  the 
gunboat  Galena,  74-76. 

Bushnell,  C.  S.,  his  association 
with  Ericsson,  78,  79. 

Bushnell,  David,  8. 

Butler,  Gen.  B.  F.,  assumes  mili- 
tary control  of  New  Orleans, 
158. 

Caldwell,  Lieut.,  155. 

Caledonia,  the  steamer,  23. 

California,  the  seizure  of,  31-33 ; 
effect  of  its  acquisition  upon 
the  destiny  of  Japan,  41. 

Camanche,  the  monitor,  216. 

Cambridge,  the  gunboat,  116. 

Campbell,  A.  B.,  120. 

Canandaigua,  the  sloop-of-war, 
149. 

Canonicus  class  of  war-vessels, 
219,  220. 

Capehart,  Lieut.,  331. 

Captain,  the  British  war-ship,  80 ; 
designed  by  Capt.  Coles  and 
built  by  the  Lairds,  234-236 ; 
sunk  while  cruising  with  the 
Channel  squadron,  236-239; 
illustrations  of,  240. 

Cardenas,  battle  of,  309,  310. 

Carlos  V.,  the  Spanish  ship,  304. 


INDEX 


355 


Catawba,  the  monitor,  247. 

Catskill,  the  monitor,  173,  179, 
180,  216. 

Cayuga,  the  gunboat,  155,  157. 

Centurion,  the  British  battle- 
ship, 261 ;  illustrations  of,  262. 

Cerberus,  the  British  turret 
ship,  242. 

Cervera,  Admiral,  298,  314,  318, 
328,  348. 

Chalmette  batteries  silenced,  158. 

Champion,  the  steamer,  36. 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  invested  by 
ironclads,  77,  141,  171 ;  im- 
portance of  the  city  to  the 
Confederacy,  170,  171 ;  desire 
of  the  Federal  forces  to  cap- 
ture it,  171 ;  attack  upon  the 
fortifications,  173-176. 

Charlotte  Dundas,  the  tow-boat, 
6,  7,  9. 

Cherub,  the  British  war-ship, 
166. 

Chesapeake  pilots  refuse  to  take 
the  Monitor  to  Newport  News, 
125. 

Chickasaw,  the  monitor,  202. 

China,  expedition  of  British, 
French,  and  American  minis- 
ters to,  in  1859,  to  exchange 
treaties,  54  ;  battle  near  mouth 
of  Pei-ho  River,  55-57. 

Cincinnati,  the  cruiser,  297. 

Civil  War,  important  naval 
events  of  :  attack  on  Drewry's 
Bluff,  75  ;  victory  of  the  Mer- 
rimac,  109-117 ;  fight  of  the 
Merrimac  and  the  Monitor, 
126-134  ;  capture  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  150  ; 
the  opening  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  151-170  ;  operations  on 
the  Atlantic  coast  at  Charles- 
ton, 170-180 ;  surrender  of  the 
Atlanta,  180-182  ;  Confeder- 
ate privateering,  183-202 ;  the 


Alabama,  185 ;  her  fight  with 
the  Kearsarge,  193-202;  the 
battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  202-211. 

Clark,  Capt.  Charles  E.,  of  the 
Oregon,  263,  264. 

Clermont,  the  steamboat,  10, 11 ; 
picture  of,  10. 

Clifton,  the  steamer,  160. 

Coles,  Capt.  Cowper,  his  "  cu- 
pola" ship,  224;  his  develop- 
ment of  the  turret  idea,  224- 
226  ;  Denmark  builds  the  Rolf 
Krake  from  his  plans,  226- 
228 ;  the  Huascar  built  for 
Peru,  228,  229;  her  career, 
229-231 ;  Coles's  rebuilding  of 
the  Royal  Sovereign,  232,  233 ; 
the  Prince  Albert,  233;  the 
Monarch,  233,  234;  the  Cap- 
tain, Coles's  ideal  ship,  built 
under  his  personal  supervision, 
234  ;  her  loss,  236-240. 

Colossus,  the  British  battleship, 
246. 

Columbia,  the  cruiser,  299. 

Columbus,  the  ship-of-the-line, 
44. 

Comet,  the  British  steam  vessel, 
17,  18. 

Commerce,  mostly  carried  in 
sailing-vessels  as  late  as  1861, 
68. 

Commerce  of  the  United  States 
during  the  Civil  War,  183-185. 

Commissioners  for  the  Navy,  20, 
21. 

Commodore,  the  title  and  rank 
of,  35. 

Concord,  the  gunboat,  279-281, 
283,  284,  288. 

Congress,  the  frigate,  108-114, 
147. 

Connecticut,  the  monitor,  266, 
267. 

Conner,  Commodore  David,  34, 
36. 


356 


INDEX 


Conrad,  the,  one  of  the  Alaba- 
ma's prizes,  192. 

Constitution,  the  frigate,  mea- 
surements of,  13  ;  comparison 
of  its  work  to  that  of  the  Mon- 
itor, 119. 

Continental  Iron  Works  builds 
monitors,  215. 

Cormorant,  the  steamer,  56,  57. 

Cotton,  Capt.,  of  the  Harvard, 
312,  313. 

Cramp  Company,  shipbuilders, 
77,  259. 

Craven,  Commander  Tunis  A., 
206. 

Crimean  War,  use  of  shell-guns 
in,  58 ;  gives  first  instance  of 
use  of  rifled  guns  on  shipboard, 
64  ;  floating  batteries,  98  ; 
treaty  at  close  of,  184 ;  Capt. 
Coles's  turret  ship  used  in, 
224. 

Cristobal  Col6n,  the  Spanish  ar- 
mored cruiser,  298,  304,  320, 
321,  342,  344-348. 

Cuba,  condition  of,  in  1898,  272, 
273 ;  northern  coast  blockaded, 
278,  292,  294. 

Cumberland,  the  sloop-of-war, 
88,  91,  108-111,  147. 

Cupola  vessel.    See  Ironclad. 

Currituck,  the  gunboat,  119. 

Cyane,  the  war-ship,  32. 

Cyclops,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242. 

Dacotah,  the  steam  sloop,  138. 

Dahlgren,  Rear  Admiral  John 
A.,  takes  command  of  the 
squadron  before  Charleston, 
S.  C.,  179 ;  continues  the  strug- 
gle for  possession  of  Charles- 
ton Harbor,  179. 

"  Damn  the  torpedoes  !  Go 
ahead !  "  Farragut's  order  at 
Mobile  Bay,  207. 


Dandolo,  the  Italian  war-ship, 
249. 

Darte,  Mr.,  American  consul  in 
Martinique,  312,  313. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  94. 

Davis,  John  Lee,  161. 

Deerhound,  the  British  yacht, 
198-201. 

De  Horsey,  Rear  Admiral,  with 
his  ship  the  Shah  and  the  cor- 
vette Amethyst,  fights  the 
Huascar,  229,  230. 

Demologos,  the  war-ship.  See 
Fulton  the  First. 

Detroit,  the  cruiser,  300,  306. 

Devastation,  the  French  floating 
battery,  61,  62. 

Devastation,  the  British  war- 
ship, 240,  241,  251 ;  illustra- 
tions of,  240. 

Dewey,  Admiral  George,  in  Ma- 
nila Bay,  126;  at  Battle  of 
Port  Hudson,  169 ;  his  dis- 
patch announcing  arrival  of 
the  Oregon  at  Manila,  264  ;  his 
squadron  in  the  Pacific,  279- 
281 ;  his  orders  in  event  of  war 
with  Spain,  279,  280,  281 ;  bat- 
tle of  Manila  Bay,  281-291; 
portrait,  292. 

Dictator,  the  monitor,  217,  240. 

Disappearing  squadron,  the 
Spanish  fleet  so  called,  298, 
311. 

Double-enders,  148. 

Downes,  Commander,  of  the  Na- 
hant,  174. 

Dragon,  the  tug-boat,  116,  129. 

Drayton,  Capt.  Percival,  204. 

Dreadnought,  the  British  turret 
ship,  241. 

Drewry's  Bluff,  attack  on,  by 
the  Galena,  the  Monitor,  and 
other  vessels,  75,  140. 

Duilio,  the  Italian  war-ship,  249. 

Dunderberg,  the  armored  war- 


INDEX 


357 


ship,  220-222  ;  illustrations  of, 
220. 

Pundas,  Lord,  6. 

Du  Pont,  Rear  Admiral  S.  F., 
commands  the  fleet  off  Charles- 
ton, S.  C.,  173, 178. 

Eads,  James  B.,  98,  219. 

Eagle,  the  yacht,  297. 

Edinburgh,  the  British  battle- 
ship, 240. 

El  Caney,  battle  of,  294. 

Engines,  marine,  growth  of  with- 
in fifty  years,  illustration  of, 
20. 

England,  her  proposed  occupa- 
tion of  California,  31-33. 

English  navy,  the,  first  steam 
vessels  of,  17-19. 

Ericsson,  John,  portrait,  frontis- 
piece; monitor,  3;  developing 
the  system  of  screw  propulsion, 
8,  25,  26 ;  the  first  to  put  the 
screw  propeller  to  practical  use, 
25,  26 ;  removes  from  England 
to  the  United  States,  26 ;  builds 
the  Princeton  with  his  pa- 
tented screw,  26 ;  designs  a 
formidable  gun,  27,  28,  60  ;  his 
plan  for  an  ironclad  battery, 
64-67 ;  building  of  the  Moni- 
tor, 74,  77-86,  121  ;  over- 
whelmed with  honors,  134  ;  on 
the  principles  of  the  Monitor, 
213 ;  builds  more  monitors, 
215-217;  opposes  double-tur- 
reted  type,  218  ;  comparison  of 
his  work  with  that  of  Capt. 
Coles,  225,  226 ;  presents  two 
guns  to  Sweden  for  ship  bear- 
ing his  name,  249. 

Ericsson,  the  torpedo-boat,  275, 
339,  343. 

Ericsson's  Folly,  10. 

Esmeralda,  the  Chilean  corvette, 
230. 


Essex,  the  frigate,  15 ;  capture 

of,  166. 
Essex,  the  iron-clad,  99  ;  destroys 

the  Arkansas,  1(>5  ;   assists  in 

battle  of  Port  Hudson,  167. 
Evans,   Capt.   Robley    D.,  320, 

339. 

Fairbairn,  William,  23. 

Farragut,  Admiral  David  G., 
76,  115  ;  commands  the  Missis- 
sippi River  fleet,  151,  153, 156- 
169  ;  portrait,  170 ;  battle  of 
Mobile  Bay,  202-211. 

Ferdinand  Maximilian,  the  Aus- 
trian war-ship,  214. 

Field,  Cyrus  W.,  51. 

Fifth  Army  Corps,  in  the  Span- 
ish-American war,  334,  335. 

Filibusters,  273. 

Fingal,  the  vessel.  See  At- 
lanta, armored  ram. 

Fitch,  John,  5. 

Florida,  the  monitor,  266,  267. 

Flying  squadron,  the,  in  Spanish- 
American  war,  299,  314,  315, 
317,  319-321. 

Foote,  Commodore  Andrew  H., 
takes  Fort  Henry,  150,  170; 
portrait,  170. 

Fort  Donelson,  capture  of,  in 
1862,  150. 

Fort  Henry,  capture  of,  in  1862, 
150. 

Fort  McAllister,  attacked  by  the 
Montauk,  172. 

Fort  Morgan,  205,  211. 

Fort  Moultrie,  174. 

Fort  Sumter,  174,  179. 

Fort  Wagner,  179. 

Forrest,  F.,  Mallory's  letter  to, 
concerning  the  Merrimac,  94, 
95. 

Fox,  Gustavus  Vasa,  80. 

France,  takes  the  lead  in  shell- 
guns,  armored  ships,  and  rifled 


358 


INDEX 


cannon,  61-64;  general  devel- 
opment of  her  navy,  246-248. 

Fry,  Capt.  Joseph,  Confederate 
commander  at  St.  Charles, 
Ark.,  163 ;  charged  with  aid- 
ing a  Cuban  insurrection  and 
executed,  164. 

Fulton,  Robert,  his  early  life,  8, 
9;  becomes  interested  in  steam 
navigation,  9  ;  builds  the  Cler- 
mont,  9,  10 ;  his  success  with 
the  Clermont,  10,  11 ;  impor- 
tance of  his  work,  11,  12 ; 
designs  and  builds  a  steam 
war-vessel,  12,  13 ;  his  death, 
14, 15. 

Fulton  the  First,  the  war-ship 
(Demologos),  construction  of, 
12  ;  description  of,  13 ;  success- 
ful trial  of,  13,  14  ;  her  fitness 
for  use,  14 ;  her  armaments, 
15 ;  rigged  by  Capt.  Porter,  15, 
16;  her  destruction,  17,  20; 
illustrations  of,  12. 

Fulton  (the  second),  construction 
of,  21,  22,  53. 

Fulton's  Folly,  10. 

Furor,  the  Spanish  torpedo-boat, 
298,  312,  345. 

Fury,  the  British  turret  ship. 
See  Dreadnought. 

Gaines,  the  gunboat,  209. 

Galena,  the  gunboat,  74-76,  140, 
208,  210  ;  picture  of,  76. 

Garcia,  Gen.  Calixto,  337. 

Gardiner,  Col.  David,  27. 

Genesee,  the  gunboat,  167,  168. 

Geneva  Tribunal,  186. 

Georgia,  the  battleship,  266. 

Germantown,  the  sailing  war- 
ship, 91. 

Germany,  armored  ships  of,  248. 

Gilmer,  Thomas  W.,  27. 

Glatton,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242,  243. 


Gloire,    La,  ironclad   ship,    63, 

212,  247  ;  illustration  of,  64. 
Gloucester,  the  armed  yacht,  337, 

338,  343. 

Glynn,  Commander  James,  42. 
Goldsborough,  Capt.  L.  M.,  138. 
Gorgon,  the  British  turret  ship, 

242. 
Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.,  at  Forts 

Henry  and  Donelson,  150,  151. 
Grau,  Admiral,  231. 
Great  Eastern,   the    steamship, 

51,  52. 
Greene,  Lieut.   S.   Dana,  officer 

of  the  Monitor,  120  ;  his  letter 

describing      her     voyage     to 

Hampton     Roads,     123,    124; 

takes    command    during    the 

battle,  130,  134. 
Gridley,  Capt.,  285. 
Griswold,  John  A.,  79. 
Guantanamo    Bay,    seizure    of, 

334. 
Guns,  improvement  in,  57-59. 

Hampton  Roads,  naval  engage- 
ment in,  68,  79,  90,  106-118. 

Hands,  R.  W.,  120. 

Harriet  Lane,  the  revenue  cut- 
ter, 53,  151. 

Hartford,  the  sloop  -  of  -  war, 
building  of,  29,  149 ;  in  the 
Mississippi  River  during  the 
Civil  War,  151,  155,  156,  159, 
160, 166,  167,  202-205,  207-211 ; 
picture  of,  152. 

Hartford  class  of  steam  vessels, 
the,  41. 

Harvard,  auxiliary  cruiser,  312. 

Haswell,  Charles  H.,  21. 

Hatteras,  the  armed  steamer, 
fight  with  the  Alabama,  189- 
191. 

Hecate,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242. 

Helena,  the  gunboat,  279. 


INDEX 


359 


"  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  ship 
Vixen,"  190. 

Hist,  the  yacht,  339,  343. 

Hobson,  Richmond  Pearson, 
naval  constructor,  324-330. 

Hope,  Rear  Admiral,  British 
commander  of  expedition  to 
China,  1859,  55-57. 

Hotspur,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242,  243. 

Howard,  Samuel,  125. 

Huascar,  Peruvian  war-ship, 
built  by  the  Lairds  under  di- 
rection of  Capt.  Coles,  228, 
229 ;  has  an  eventful  career, 
229-231 ;  illustration  of,  232. 

Hudson,  the  revenue  cutter,  310. 

Hulls,  Jonathan,  5. 

Hunter,  Lieut.  Charles  G.,  "  Al- 
varado  Hunter,"  38,  39. 

Hunter,  Lieut.  W.  W.,  24,  95. 

Hydra,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242. 

Hydrostatic  javelin,  67. 

Illinois,  the  battleship,  266. 

Inconstant,  the  British  war-ship, 
237. 

Indiana,  the  battleship,  259-262, 
274,  300,  306,  337,  338, 343, 344, 
346,350. 

Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Admiral 
Cervera's  flagship,  298,  304, 
311,  314,  344,  345. 

Inflexible,  the  British  turret 
ship,  241,  242,  245,  248,  249; 
illustrations  of,  242. 

Iowa,  the  battleship,  264,  265, 
274,  300,  301, 303,  306,  309, 314, 
320,  321,  326,  337-339,  342,  343, 
345,  346,  349. 

Iron  vessels,  the  first,  22,  23. 

Ironclad  cupola  vessel  by  Erics- 
son, illustrations  of,  82. 

Ironclad  vessels,  early  experi- 
ments with,  59-61 ;  gradual 


adoption  of,  61-67.    See  also 

Monitor  and  Merriniac. 
Iroquois,  the  sloop-of-war,  151, 

156, 159. 
Isabel  II.,  the  Spanish  cruiser, 

296. 
Isherwood,  Benjamin  F.,  naval 

engineer,  88,  89. 
Italy,  war-ships  of,  248,  249. 
Itasca,   the    gunboat,   155,   156, 

203. 

Jackson,  the  earth-work  battery 
near  New  Orleans,  152,  153, 
158. 

Jamestown,  the  gunboat,  102, 
105, 106, 112,  136,  137. 

Japan,  the  opening  of,  41-50. 

Jenkins,  Friend  W.,  276. 

Jet  propulsion,  4,  5,  7. 

John  Ericsson,  the  Swedish  moni- 
tor, 249. 

Jones,  Lieut.  Catesby  ap  R.,  in 
the  naval  battle  in  Hampton 
Roads,  126,  127,  131. 

Juniata,  the  sloop-of-war,  149. 

Kalamazoo,  uncompleted  moni- 
tor, 222. 

Kane,  Lieut.,  of  the  Harvard, 
312,  313. 

Katahdin,  the  gunboat,  159. 

Kearsarge,  the  sloop-of-war,  126 ; 
fight  with  the  Alabama,  193- 

202,  picture  of,  196. 
Kearsarge,  the  battleship,  265, 

266. 

Keeler,  W.  F.,  120. 
Kennebec,  the  gunboat,  156, 159, 

203,  210. 

Kennon,  Capt.  Beverly,  27. 
Kentucky,  the  battleship,  265, 

266. 

Keokuk,  the  ironclad,  173,  174. 
Kilty,  Commander,  of  the  Mound 

City,  163. 


360 


INDEX 


Kinburn,  battle  of,  62. 
Kineo,  the  gunboat,  167.  * 
Knowles,   quartermaster  of  the 
Hartford,  204. 

Laekawanna,  the  sloop-of-war, 
149,  203,  210. 

Lady  Nancy,  Capt.  Coles's  "  cu- 
pola ship,"  224,  247. 

Laird,  Messrs.,  builders  of  the 
Alabama,  185 ;  of  the  Prince 
Henry  and  the  Huascar,  228  ; 
the  Captain,  234-236. 

Lave,  the  French  floating  bat- 
tery, 61. 

Lawton,  Gen.  Henry  W.,  335, 
336. 

Lee,  Robert  E.,  37. 

Lehigh,  the  monitor,  216. 

Levant,  the  war-ship,  32. 

Lightning,  the  steamer,  18. 

Lissa,  battle  of,  213,  214,  228. 

Livingston,  Robert,  9,  10. 

Logue,  D.  C.,  120. 

Lome,  Dupuy  de,  naval  archi- 
tect, 63. 

London  Times  on  the  Monitor, 
135. 

Long,  John  D.,  letter  from,  to 
Rear  Admiral  Sampson,  304, 
305  ;  dispatch  from,  311. 

Lopez,  Carlos  Antonio,  52. 

Lord  Warden,  the  British  war- 
ship, 236. 

Lyttleton,  William,  8. 

McClellan,     Gen.     George    B., 

quoted    on   the  fight  of   the 

Merrimac,  118. 
MacCord,  Prof.  C.  W.,  83. 
McCulloch,  the  revenue  cutter, 

279,  280,  283,  284. 
Macedonian,  the  British  frigate, 

126. 
Magdala,  the  British  turret  ship, 

242. 


Mahan,  Capt.  A.  T.,  quoted  con- 
cerning the  voyage  of  the  Ore- 
gon, 263. 

Maine,  the  battleship,  descrip- 
tion of,  257,  258  ;  illustrations 
of,  258  ;  sent  to  Havana,  274 ; 
her  destruction  in  Havana  har- 
bor, 275,  276 ;  reports  of  the 
courts  of  inquiry,  276,  277. 

Maine  (2d),  the  battleship,  266. 

Mallory,  Stephen  Russell,  urges 
Confederate  naval  committee 
to  construct  an  ironclad,  92, 

93,  100 ;  his  letter  to  F.  For- 
rest concerning  the  Merrimac, 

94,  95 ;    letter    to    Franklin 
Buchanan,     appointing     him 
commander  of  the  Merrimac, 
with    suggestions    as   to   her 
work,  102-104. 

Manassas,  the  iron-plated  ram, 

98,  157. 

Manhattan,  the  monitor,  202. 
Manila  Bay,  battle  of,  126,  271 ; 

chart  of,  286. 
Marblehead,  the  cruiser,  310, 314, 

320,  321. 

Marietta,  the  gunboat,  262,  263. 
Marine  engines.     See  Engines. 
Marsden,  Capt.  John,  119,  124. 
Maryland  Agricultural  College, 

115. 
Massachusetts,    the    battleship, 

259-262,    274,    299,    321,    323, 

338. 

Maxey,  Virgil,  27. 
Mayflower,  the  converted  yacht, 

319. 

Mazatlan,  Mexico,  32. 
Meade,  R.  W.,  170. 
Merrick  &  Sons,  builders  of  the 

New  Ironsides,  74,  76,  77. 
Merrimac  class  of  steam  vessels, 

the,  41. 
Merrimac,  the  frigate,  building 

of,  29 ;  efforts  to  save  her  from 


INDEX 


361 


the  Confederates,  88,  90 ;  scut- 
tled and  upper  works  burned, 
91 ;  raised  by  the  Confeder- 
ates, 91  ;  converted  into  an 
ironclad  battery,  92-98  ;  pic- 
tures of,  96  ;  name  changed  to 
Virginia,  101 ;  plans  for  her 
action.  102-101 ;  she  attacks 
the  Union  squadron  in  Hamp- 
ton Roads,  and  destroys  the 
Congress  and  Cumberland, 
105-117 ;  battle  with  the  Moni- 
tor next  day,  126-134,  picture 
of,  130 ;  size  and  armor  of, 
compared  with  Monitor,  illus- 
trations of,  120 ;  far-reaching 
results  of  the  conflict,  134, 
135 ;  her  subsequent  history 
and  destruction,  135-140. 

Merrimac,  the  collier,  320 ;  sink- 
ing of,  in  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can war  of  1898,  95,  324-330. 

Merritt,  Darwin  R.,  276. 

Metacomet,  the  gunboat,  203, 
205,  209,  210. 

Meteor,  the  steamer,  18. 

Mexican  War,  the,  naval  opera- 
tions in,  31-40. 

Miantonomoh,  the  monitor,  217, 
218,  240,  256. 

Miantonomoh  class  of  war-ships, 
253,  258. 

Michigan,  the  war-steamer,  22. 

Miller,  Patrick,  5,  6. 

Millwall  Shipbuilding  Company, 
228. 

Mines,  submarine,  in  naval  war- 
fare, 173,  174,  284,  331. 

Minneapolis,  the  cruiser,  299. 

Minnesota,  the  frigate,  107 ;  at 
Hampton  Roads,  115-117, 125- 
133. 

Mississippi,  the  war-steamer,  con- 
struction of,  22  ;  on  blockade 
duty  in  the  Mexican  War,  33, 
34  ;  at  the  taking  of  Tabasco, 


36 ;  taken  home  for  repairs, 
36  ;  returns  to  Mexico,  36  ;  her 
cruise  in  the  Mediterranean, 
43  ;  Perry's  first  flagship  on 
the  expedition  to  Japan,  43; 
in  the  Mississippi  River  fleet, 
151,  155,  157,  166  ;  destruction 
of,  168,  169. 

Mississippi  Bay,  Japan,  47. 

Mississippi  River,  naval  actions 
in,  during  the  Civil  War,  im- 
portance of,  150 ;  preparations 
for,  151 ;  capture  of  New  Or- 
leans, 152-158  ;  batteries  at 
Vicksburg  passed,  158-164 ;  en- 
gagements with  the  Arkansas, 
164,  166  ;  battle  of  Port  Hud- 
son, 166-169. 

Missouri,  the  battleship,  266. 

Missouri,  the  war-steamer,  22. 

Mobile  Bay,  battle  of,  115,  202- 
211. 

Mohican,  the  sloop-of-war,  29. 

Monadnock,  the  monitor,  217, 
218,  256. 

Monarch,  the  British  war-ship, 
233,  234  ;  illustrations  of,  240. 

Monitor,  the  ship,  an  epoch- 
maker,  3 ;  foreshadowings  of, 
59,  60,  64-67 ;  building  of,  70, 
74,  77-86, 101 ;  illustrations  of, 
82  ;  lack  of  faith  in,  101 ;  final 
trial  trip,  119;  officers,  119- 
121 ;  crew,  121 ;  perilous  voy- 
age to  Hampton  Roads,  119- 
124;  size  and  armor  of,  com- 
pared with  Merrimac,  illustra- 
tions of,  120;  timely  arrival 
and  preparations  for  battle, 
125  ;  fight  with  the  Merrimac, 
126-134,  picture  of,  130 ;  far- 
reaching  influence  upon  naval 
warfare,  134,  135  ;  subsequent 
history  and  loss  of  the  Moni- 
tor, 138,  140-145;  popularity 
of  the  type,  212-219. 


362 


INDEX 


Monitors,  fleet  of,  urged  by  the 
people,  170 ;  several  such  ves- 
sels built  and  sent  to  Charles- 
ton, S.  C.,  170-172  ;  their  work 
in  the  vicinity,  172-174;  Du 
Font's  report,  175;  Stimers's 
report,  17&-178  ;  continued 
building  upon  the  Monitor 
type,  215-224,  246 ;  use  of  the 
old  monitors  in  the  Spanish- 
American  war,  266  ;  four  new 
monitors  ordered  to  be  built, 
266. 

Monocacy,  the  gunboat,  148,  279. 

Monongahela,  the  sloop-of-war, 
149,  166,  167,  203,  210. 

Montauk,  the  monitor,  172, 173, 
216. 

Monterey,  Cal.,  32. 

Monterey,  the  monitor,  258. 

Montgomery,  the  cruiser,  300. 

Montojo,  Admiral,  281,  282. 

Moore,  John  W.,  154. 

Morgan,  the  gunboat,  209. 

Morris,  Lieut.  George  U.,  execu- 
tive officer  of  the  Cumberland, 
109,  110. 

Morris  Island,  174. 

Mound  City,  the  gunboat,  terri- 
ble disaster  to,  162,  163. 

Mullany,  Commander,  of  the 
Oneida,  209. 

Nagasaki,  42. 

Nahant,  the  monitor,  172-174, 
180-182,  216. 

Nanshan,  the  steamer,  281,  284. 

Nantucket,  the  monitor,  173, 
176,  216. 

Napier,  Scotch  shipbuilder,  226. 

Napole'on,  the  French  ship,  63. 

Narragansett,  the  sloop-of-war, 
29. 

Nashville,  the  gunboat,  310. 

Nashville,  the  Confederate  pri- 
vateer, 172. 


Naugatuck,  the  ironclad  steam- 
er, 137,  138. 

Naval  brigade,  the  first,  40. 

Navy  Department  of  the  United 
States,  does  little  during  the 
period  following  the  Civil  War, 
223,  224,  252-255;  revival  of 
interest,  256. 

New  Ironsides,  the  ironclad 
steam  frigate,  76,  77,  173; 
picture  of,  76. 

New  Jersey,  the  battleship,  266. 

New  Orleans,  capture  of,  by  Fed- 
eral fleet,  158. 

New  Orleans,  the  cruiser,  321. 

New  York,  attack  on,  planned 
by  Confederate  officers,  103. 

New  York,  the  armored  cruiser, 
297,  300,  301,  303,  306,  309,  314, 
318,  319,  321,  326,  337-339,  342- 
344,  346,  348,  350 ;  picture  of, 
298. 

Newport  News,  Union  batteries 
at,  108,  109, 115. 

Newton,  Isaac,  120. 

Niagara,  the  collier,  300. 

Niagara,  the  frigate,  50,  51. 

Nictheroy,  the  war-ship,  263. 

Nile,  the  British  battleship,  246. 

Ninety-Ninth  New  York  Volun- 
teer Infantry  in  the  fight  at 
Hampton  Roads,  113, 114. 

Norfolk,  city  of,  abandoned  to 
the  Union  forces,  139. 

North  Atlantic  Blockading  Sta- 
tion, report  of,  concerning  the 
loss  of  the  Monitor,  142-145. 

North  Atlantic  squadron,  move- 
ments in  1898.  See  Spanish- 
American  war. 

Norway,  war-ships  of,  249. 

Novgorod,  the  Russian  steam  bat- 
tery, 251 ;  illustrations  of,  252. 

Octorara,  the  gunboat,  137,  203, 
210, 


INDEX 


363 


Ohio,  the  battleship,  266. 

Old  Dominion  Company,  steam- 
ers of,  used  in  Civil  War,  105, 
106. 

Olympia,  Dewey's  flagship,  279- 
281,  284-286,  288,  289  ;  picture 
of,  280. 

Oneida,  the  sloop-of-war,  76, 149, 
151, 153, 155,  159, 160,  208,209, 
210. 

Oneota,  the  monitor,  247. 

Onondaga,  the  monitor,  219, 247. 

Ordinance  of  Secession  of  Vir- 
ginia, 90. 

Ordnance,  growth  of,  within 
fifty  years,  illustration  of,  20. 

Oregon,  the  battleship,  259-262  ; 
voyage  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic  coast,  262-264,  319; 
her  part  in  the  battle  of  Sant- 
iago de  Cuba,  264,  319,  322, 
337,  338,  345,  346 ;  her  return 
to  the  Pacific,  264  ;  picture  of, 
264  ;  represents  the  highest  de- 
velopment of  the  Monitor,  268. 

Oregon  class  of  battleships,  260- 
262,  265  ;  illustrations  of,  262. 

Ossipee,  the  war-ship,  203,  210. 

Paddle-wheels,  disadvantage  of, 
in  war-vessels,  23,  24  ;  Hunter's 
horizontal,  24,  25. 

Paixhans,  Col.,  inventor  of  shell- 
guns,  58  ;  his  plans  for  armor- 
ing war-ships,  60. 

Papin,  Denis,  4,  11. 

Paraguay  expedition  of  1858,  52- 
54. 

Paris,  Treaty  of  (1856),  184, 185. 

Passaconaway,  the  uncompleted 
monitor,  222. 

Passaic,  the  monitor,  141,  171, 
172, 173, 176,  216 ;  illustration 
of,  256. 

Passaic  class  of  war-vessels,  219, 
249,  250. 


Patapsco,  the  monitor,  172,  173, 
176,  216. 

Patrick  Henry,  the  gunboat,  102, 
105,  106,  111,  112,  117. 

Pawnee,  the  sloop-of-war,  30, 90, 
91. 

Peacemaker,  the  gun,  26. 

Pei-ho  River,  battle  near  mouth 
of,  55-57. 

Pelayo,  the  Spanish  war-ship, 
304. 

Pendergrast,  Lieut.,  109. 

Penelope,  the  British  frigate,  18. 

Pennsylvania,  the  battleship, 
266. 

Pensacola,  the  sloop-of-war,  155. 

Perry,  Matthew  Calbraith,  on 
the  Fulton,  22 ;  commands 
steam  vessels  in  the  naval 
operation  of  the  Mexican  War, 
34  ;  takes  Tabasco,  36  ;  takes 
the  Mississippi  home  for  re- 
pairs, 36  ;  put  in  charge  of  fit- 
ting out  small  steam  vessels 
for  service  in  Mexico,  36 ;  re- 
lieves Conner  as  commander 
of  the  American  squadron,  36  ; 
assists  in  the  capture  of  Vera 
Cruz,  36-38  ;  his  orders  to  Tatt- 
nall  and  their  execution,  38 ; 
public  disapproval  of  his  just 
course  in  the  Alvarado  inci- 
dent, 39 ;  recaptures  Tabasco, 
40 ;  organizes  the  first  naval 
brigade,  40 ;  commands  an 
expedition  to  Japan,  43  ;  his 
diplomatic  negotiations  with 
the  Japanese,  45-49 ;  his  treaty 
with  Japan,  49. 

Perry,  the  brig,  147. 

Peter  the  Great,  the  Russian 
war-ship,  251. 

Petrel,  the  gunboat,  279-281, 
284,  287,  288. 

Petrel,  the  Confederate  priva- 
teer, 147. 


364 


INDEX 


Petrita,  the  steamer,  36. 

Phoebe,  the  British  frigate,  166. 

Pilot  Town,  153. 

Pluton,  the  Spanish  torpedo- 
boat  destroyer,  298,  314,  327, 
345. 

Plymouth,  the  sailing  warship, 
43,  91. 

Polk,  the  revenue  cutter,  36. 

Popoff,  the  Russian  admiral,  251. 

"  Popoff  kas,"  the  Russian  steam 
batteries,  251. 

Port  Royal,  the  gunboat,  203. 

Porter,  Capt.  David,  commands 
the  frigate  Essex,  15,  166. 

Porter,  Admiral  David  D., 
commands  flotilla  of  mortar- 
schooners  on  the  Mississippi, 
151-153, 158-161, 165, 170 ;  por- 
trait, 170. 

Porter,  John  L.,  94-96. 

Porter,  William  D.,  commands 
the  ironclad  Essex,  165,  166. 

Porter,  the  torpedo-boat,  300, 
311,  319,  325. 

Powell,  Cadet,  326,  327. 

Powhatan,  the  steamer,  28 ;  be- 
comes Perry's  flagship  in  the 
East,  46  ;  flagship  of  Capt. 
Tattnall  on  expedition  to 
China,  54. 

Prat,  Arturo,  captain  of  the  Es- 
meralda,  230. 

Preble,  Commodore  George 
Henry,  44. 

Preble,  the  brig,  42. 

Prince  Albert,  the  British  turret 
ship,  233. 

Prince  Henry,  the  Dutch  war- 
ship, 228. 

Princeton,  the  sloop-of-war,  con- 
struction of,  26 ;  the  tragedy 
of,  26,  27  ;  her  importance  as 
the  first  screw  war-ship,  27  ; 
her  powerful  gun,  27,  28  ;  on 
blockade  duty  in  the  Mexi- 


can War,  33,  43 ;  her  engine, 
83. 

Privateering,  183-185. 

Puritan,  the  monitor,  217,  240, 
253,  255,  256,  293,  297  ;  illus- 
tration of,  256. 

Quinsigamond,  the  uncompleted 

monitor,  222. 
Quitman,   Gen.  John  Anthony, 

39. 

Radford,   William,   commander 

of  the  Cumberland,  109. 
Raleigh,   the    protected  cruiser, 

279-281,  284,  287,  288. 
Raleigh,  the  gunboat,  102,  112, 

113, 117, 137. 
Ram,  the,  as  a  naval  weapon, 

213,  214. 

Ramsay,  F.  Ashton,  97,  98. 
Rank  and  titles,  naval,  35. 
Re  d'  Italia,  the  war-ship,  214. 
Reed,  Sir   Edward  J.,   British 

naval  constructor,  240. 
Reina     Cristina,     the     Spanish 

cruiser,  281,  288,  289. 
Reina    Mercedes,    the    Spanish 

war-ship,  323,  327. 
Resolute,  the  auxiliary  cruiser, 

338. 

Ressel,  Austrian  engineer,  25. 
Restormal,  the  English  steamer, 

317. 

"  Revolution  in  naval  architec- 
ture," 212. 
Rhode  Island,  the  steamer,  141- 

145. 
Richmond,  the  sloop-of-war,  154, 

156,  157,  159,  160, 166-168,  203, 

210. 

Rifled  guns,  64. 
Rinaldo,  the  British  war-ship, 

138. 

Rip-Raps,  the  fort,  138, 139. 
"  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confeder- 


INDEX 


365 


acy,  The,"  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
referred  to,  94. 

River  gunboats  in  the  Civil  War, 
150, 151. 

Roanoke,  the  frigate,  107,  116, 
124,  219. 

Rochambeau,  the  armored  war- 
ship. See  Dunderberg. 

Rodgers,  George  W.,  commander 
of  the  CatskUl,  180. 

Rodgers,  John,  commander  of 
the  Galena,  75,  140  ;  of  the 
Weehawken,  181. 

Rolf  Krake,  the  Danish  war-ship 
from  Capt.  Coles's  design,  first 
turret  ship  built  in  Europe, 
226,  227  ;  illustration  of,  232. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  277. 

Royal  Sovereign,  the  British 
war-ship,  232,  233;  illustra- 
tion of,  232. 

Rumsey,  James,  5. 

Rupert,  the  British  turret  ship, 
242,  243. 

Russia,  development  of  her  war- 
ships, 249-252. 

Sabine,  the  sailing-frigate,  121. 

Sachem,  the  gunboat,  119. 

Sail  power.    See  Steam  and  sail 

power. 
St.  Charles,  Ark.,  batteries  at, 

captured  by  Union  forces,  162. 
St.  Jean  d'Acre,  18. 
St.  Lawrence,  the  frigate,  108, 

116, 147. 

St.  Louis,  the  steamer,  163. 
St.  Louis,  the  armed  steamer, 

316. 
St.   Paul,  the    armed   steamer, 

296,  317,  320. 

St.  Philip,  the  earthwork  bat- 
tery near  New  Orleans,  152, 

155, 158. 
Sampson,  Rear  Admiral  William 

T.,  126,  276;    succeeds  Rear 


Admiral  Sicard,  291 ;  his  in- 
structions, 292  ;  portrait,  292  ; 
his  desire  to  attack  Havana, 
293 ;  takes  small  squadron  to 
Puerto  Rico,  300-310 ;  ordered 
to  Key  West,  311,  314  ;  hears 
of  arrival  of  Spanish  fleet, 
316 ;  returns  to  Cuba,  318  ; 
to  Key  West  again,  319 ;  ar- 
rives off  Santiago,  322 ;  his 
conduct  of  the  campaign,  324, 
330,  335-339. 

San  Jacinto,  the  steamer,  28. 

San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  Spanish 
attack  upon  the  blockade  of, 
296 ;  Spanish  fleet  expected  to 
appear  at,  300 ;  American 
squadron  sent  there,  300-303 ; 
attack  upon  the  fortifications, 
304,  306-310. 

San  Juan  d'  Ulloa,  the  castle  of, 
37,38. 

Sangamon,  the  monitor,  216. 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  harbor  of,  en- 
tered by  Spanish  fleet,  315 ; 
naval  battle  of,  126,  339-350; 
chart  of,  332. 

Saratoga,  the  war-ship,  43. 

Savannah,  the,  Commodore 
Sloat's  flagship,  32. 

Savannah,  the  Confederate  pri- 
vateer, 147. 

Schley,  Commodore  Winfield 
Scott,  314,  315,  318,  321. 

Sciota,  the  gunboat,  156. 

Scorpion,  the  gunboat,  36. 

Scorpion,  the  turret  ship,  231. 

Scott,  Gen.  Winfield,  36,  37. 

Scourge,  the  gunboat,  36  ;  at  the 
capture  of  Alvarado,  39. 

Screw  propeller,  the,  origin  of, 
5,  7,  8  ;  development  of,  25, 
26  ;  its  adoption  in  the  United 
States  Navy,  28  ;  first  use  of 
twin  screws  in  the  U.  S.  Navy, 
30. 


366 


INDEX 


Secretary  of  the  Navy,  office  of, 
20. 

Selma,  the  gunboat,  209,  210. 

Seminole,  the  steam  sloop,  138, 
203. 

Semmes,  Raphael,  captain  of  the 
Alabama,  187-194,  199,  200. 

Seth  Lowe,  the  steamer,  119. 

Sewell's  Point,  Confederate  bat- 
teries at,  109,  116. 

Shackamaxon,  the  uncompleted 
monitor,  222. 

Shafter,  Maj.-Gen.  William  R., 
334,  336,  337,  339. 

Shah,  the  flagship  of  Rear  Ad- 
miral De  Horsey,  229,  230. 

Shell-guns,  introduction  of,  58, 
59. 

Shenandoah,  the  sloop-of-war, 
149. 

"  Short  History  of  the  Confeder- 
ate States,  A,"  by  Jefferson 
Davis,  94. 

Shorter,  Edward,  8. 

Shubrick,  W.  B.,  naval  com- 
mander of  the  Paraguay  expe- 
dition, 53. 

Siboney,  Gen.  Lawton  takes  pos- 
session of,  336. 

Sicard,  Rear  Admiral  Montgom- 
ery, in  command  of  North  At- 
lantic squadron,  274,  275  ;  suc- 
ceeded by  William  T.  Samp- 
son, 291. 

Simpson,  Rear  Admiral  Edward, 
29. 

Sinope,  battle  of,  a  test  of  shell 
against  shot,  58,  59,  61 . 

Sloat,  Commodore  John  D., 
32. 

Smith,  Joseph  B.,  executive 
officer  of  the  Congress,  109. 

Smith,  William,  commander  of 
the  Congress,  109,  113. 

Solace,  the  hospital-ship,  310, 
311. 


Soley,  Prof.  James  Russell, 
quoted  on  naval  conditions  at 
the  battle  of  Hampton  Roads, 
108. 

Spanish-American  war,  general 
conditions  preceding,  269-273 ; 
battleship  Maine  sent  to  Ha- 
vana, 274  ;  her  destruction  in 
Havana  harbor,  275,  276  ;  the 
courts  of  inquiry,  276, 277  ;  pre- 
parations for  war,  277,  278 ; 
orders  to  blockade  northern 
coast  of  Cuba,  278  ;  condition 
in  the  Pacific,  279  ;  instructions 
to  Commodore  Dewey,  279, 
280  ;  his  squadron  proceeds  to 
the  Philippines,  280-284 ;  battle 
of  Manila  Bay,  284-291 ;  Wil- 
liam T.  Sampson  appointed  to 
command  the  North  Atlantic 
squadron,  succeeding  Rear  Ad- 
miral Sicard,  291,  292  ;  his  or- 
ders, 292,  293  ;  Sampson's  sug- 
gestion of  attack  on  Havana 
not  carried  out,  293,  294  ;  the 
blockade  of  Havana  begun, 
294,  295;  character  of  the 
fleet,  295,  296;  Spanish  at- 
tacks, 296,  297 ;  action  at  Ma- 
tanzas,  297 ;  the  Spanish  squad- 
ron starts  across  the  Atlantic, 
298 ;  doubts  as  to  its  where- 
abouts, 299  ;  belief  that  it  will 
appear  at  San  Juan,  Puerto 
Rico,  300 ;  small  squadron  of 
American  ships  proceeds  thith- 
er to  meet  it,  300-303  ;  attack 
on  the  fortifications,  304-310 ; 
letter  of  Sec.  Long,  304,  305  ; 
engagement  in  the  harbor  of 
Cardenas,  309,  310  ;  the  Span- 
ish squadron  appears  in  the 
West  Indies,  311-314  ;  search 
for  it,  314-320  ;  found  at  Sant- 
iago de  Cuba,  320  ;  the  harbor 
blockaded,  322-324;  sinking 


INDEX 


367 


of  the  Merrimac,  324-330;  a 
month  of  continued  blockade 
duty,  332 ;  arrival  of  Gen. 
Shafter's  force,  334-337  ;  bom- 
bardments, 337,  338  ;  naval 
battle  of  July  3,  338-349  ;  sur- 
render of  Santiago,  350  ;  Amer- 
ican fleet  returns  to  New  York, 
350. 

Spanish  fleet  lost  at  Manila, 
names  of  the  vessels  compos- 
ing, 288. 

Spitfire,  the  gunboat,  34 ;  at  the 
bombardment  of  Vera  Cruz, 
38. 

State  of  Georgia,  the  steamer, 
141. 

Steam  and  sail  power,  conflict 
of:  Captain  Porter  and  the 
Fulton,  15,  16  ;  a  long  standing 
rivalry,  17 ;  in  Great  Britain, 
18,  19;  the  attitude  of  the 
Commissioners  for  the  Navy, 
21  ;  a  valid  objection  to  the 
use  of  steam,  23,  24  ;  Congress 
appoints  a  committee  to  inves- 
tigate the  use  of  steam  for  naval 
purposes,  28  ;  use  of  full  sail 
power  with  steam  as  an  auxil- 
iary, 29 ;  advantages  of  steam 
power,  30;  naval  prejudice 
against  steam  to  a  great  extent 
overcome  by  the  lesson  of  the 
Mexican  War,  40,  41 ;  but  still 
persists,  67,  68 ;  the  matter 
finally  settled  by  the  work  of 
the  Merriraac  and  Monitor, 
118,  119,  135  ;  Civil  War  gives 
first  instance  of  general  use  of 
steam  vessels  in  naval  opera- 
tions, 146. 

Steam  navigation,  early  experi- 
ments in,  4-8  ;  established  on 
a  commercial  basis  by  the 
success  of  Fulton's  Clermont, 
9-12. 


Sterling,  the  boat,  324. 

Stevens,  John,  his  experiments  in 
steam  navigation,  7,  9 ;  his  plan 
for  an  armored  war-ship,  59. 

Stevens  battery,  60,  61,  70,  95, 
137, 138,  212. 

Stimers,  Alban  C.,  government 
superintendent  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Monitor,  79 ;  goes 
to  sea  with  her,  120,  121,  134  ; 
inspects  the  building  of  other 
monitors  and  goes  to  Charles- 
ton to  care  for  them,  176, 177  ; 
his  report  of  their  working, 
177, 178. 

Stockton,  Capt.  K.  F.,  26. 

Stodder,  Louis  N.,  120. 

Sullivan's  Island,  battle  of,  77, 
174. 

Sunday,  the  day  of  many  famous 
naval  battles,  125,  126. 

Sundstrum,  M.  F.,  120. 

Susquehanna,  the  steam  frigate, 
40 ;  Perry's  flagship  in  the 
East,  43, 50,  138. 

Suwanee,  the,  337. 

Sweden,  war-ships  of,  follow 
Ericsson's  designs,  249. 

Symington,  William,  6,  9. 

Symonds,  Sir  William,  18,  19. 

Tabasco,  Mexico,  first  capture  of, 
36 ;  recapture  of,  40. 

Tattnall,  Commander  Josiah,  his 
tilt  with  Perry  at  the  bom- 
bardment of  Vera  Cruz,  37, 
38  ;  expedition  to  China,  54— 
57  ;  commands  the  Merrimac, 
136-140. 

Taureau,  the  French  monitor 
ram,  247,  248. 

Taylor,  Bayard,  46. 

Teaser,  the  gunboat,  102,  105, 
106,  113. 

Tecumseh,  the  monitor,  202, 204, 
205-207,  210,  220. 


368 


INDEX 


Tennessee,  the  ironclad,  202, 204, 
205,  208-210. 

Terror,  the  monitor,  217,  218, 
256,  300,  306,  308. 

Terror,  the  Spanish  torpedo-boat 
destroyer,  296,  313. 

Texas,  the  battleship,  building  of , 
256,  257;  record  in  the  Spanish- 
American  war,  257,  274,  299, 
320,  321,  323, 326,  334,  335,  338, 
339,  341, 345, 346,  349;  illustra- 
tions of,  258. 

Thomas  Jefferson,  the  gun- 
boat. See  Jamestown,  the 
gunboat. 

Thunderer,  the  British  war-ship, 
240,  241. 

Ticonderoga,  the  sloop-of-war, 
149. 

Timby,  Theodore  R.,  his  plan 
for  a  revolving  battery,  59,  60, 
213. 

Toey-wan,  the  steamer,  55, 56. 

Toffey,  Daniel,  120. 

Tonawanda,  the  monitor.  See 
Amphi  trite. 

Tonnante,  the  French  floating 
battery,  61. 

Torpedo,  first  used  in  warfare, 
230. 

Trafalgar,  the  British  battle- 
ship, 246. 

Treaty  of  Paris.  See  Paris, 
Treaty  of. 

Trenchard,  Stephen  Decatur,  56, 
145. 

Trinity  Bay,  Newfoundland,  ter- 
minus of  first  Atlantic  cable, 
51. 

Triple  hull  boat,  illustrations 
of,  6. 

Turtle-backs,  219. 

Tuscaloosa,  the  Confederate 
cruiser,  192. 

Tuscarora,  the  sloop-of-war,  149. 

Tyler,  John,  President,  26,  27. 


Union,  the  steamer,  24. 

Union  Iron  Works  build  the 
Oregon,  259. 

United  States,  the  frigate,  126. 

United  States  Congress  consid- 
ers providing  armored  vessels 
for  use  in  Civil  War,  70-74. 

Upshur,  Abel  P.,  27. 

Valencia,  Ire.,  terminus  of  first 
Atlantic  cable,  50,  51. 

Valorous,  the  steamer,  18. 

Vandalia,  the  sloop-of-war,  147. 

Varuna,  the  armed  merchant- 
steamer,  151,  155,  157,  158. 

Vengeur  class  of  coast-defense 
vessels,  248. 

Vera  Cruz,  36-38. 

Vice  Admiral  Popoff,  the  Rus- 
sian steam  battery,  252. 

Vicksburg,  Federal  fleet  under 
Farragut  passes  the  batteries 
at,  158-161, 164. 

Victory,  Nelson's  flagship,  13. 

Virginia,  her  attitude  in  the  Re- 
bellion, 90. 

Virginia,  the  war-ship.  See 
Merrimac. 

Virginius,  the  merchant-vessel, 
164. 

Vixen,  the  converted  yacht,  321, 
328,  338,  342. 

Vixen,  the  gunboat,  34,  36;  at 
bombardment  of  Vera  Cruz,  38. 

Vizcaya,  the  Spanish  armored 
cruiser,  298,  304,  311,  314,  344, 
345,  346. 

Walker,  Sir  Baldwin,  19. 

Walker,  John  G.,  170. 

Ward,  Hon.  John  E.,  American 

minister  sent  to  China  in  1859, 

54,  55. 
Warrior,   first  British  armored 

ship,    63,   135,  212,    243,  247, 

248  ;  illustration  of,  64. 


INDEX 


369 


Water  Battery,  the  earthwork 
near  Mobile  Bay,  205. 

Water  Witch,  the  steamer,  24, 
52,53. 

Watson,  Commodore,  319. 

Webb,  W.  H.,  shipbuilder,  221. 

Webber,  John  J.  N.,  120. 

Weehawken,  the  monitor,  173, 
181-183,  216,  217. 

Welles,  Gideon,  reports  on  condi- 
tion of  the  navy,  and  requests 
consideration  of  ironclads,  71 ; 
favors  building  the  Monitor, 
78 ;  his  letter  to  Capt.  Wins- 
low  after  the  defeat  of  the 
Alabama,  200-202. 

Whitehall,  the  gunboat,  117, 129. 

Widemark,  ,  killed  at  San 

Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  309. 

Williamson,  William  P.,  93-96. 

Wilmington,  the  gunboat,  31. 

Winnebago,  the  monitor,  202. 

Winslow,  John  A.,  commander 
of  the  Kearsarge,  193, 194, 199. 

Winslow,  John  F.,  79. 


Winslow,  the  torpedo-boat,  310. 
Wisconsin,  the  battleship,  266. 
Wompatuck,  the  armed  tug,  300, 

306,  316. 
Woodbury,    paymaster    of    the 

Catskill,  180. 
Worden,  John  L.,  commander  of 

the  Monitor,  86,  120,  124, 130, 

134;     portrait,    170;    of   the 

Montauk,  172. 

Wyoming,  the  sloop-of-war,  192. 
Wyoming,  the  monitor,  266,  267. 
Wyvern,  the  turret  ship,  231. 

Yale,  the  auxiliary  cruiser,  320. 
Yeddo,  47,  48. 
Yeddo  Bay,  43,  47. 
Yokohama,  47,  48. 
Yorktown,    the    steamer.      See 

Patrick  Henry,  the  gunboat. 
Young,  Lieut.,  339. 
Young  America,  the  tug,  116. 

Zafiro,  the  steamer,  281,  284. 
Zouave,  the  gunboat,  112. 


dfjc  fiiterpibe 

Electrotyped  and  printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  6°  Co. 
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000  958  1 42 


